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EDITORIAL NOTE

Ongoing Russia –Ukraine conflict, which has led to the deaths of several persons and the destruction of lives and properties, has generated a heated debate among scholars, experts, analysts, and heads of government. Central to the conflict is the unresolved issue of the continuous expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Ukraine's decision to join NATO, and Russia's aggressive response. While all these issues have played out in Europe, some grave consequences have been felt globally, especially in Africa. The concerns and consequences impress on us the need to critically examine their impact on Africa, forming the central idea behind this Journal of African and Global Issues Quarterly (JAGIQ). Thus, in this special issue, Lawrence Udisi examined the lessons Nigeria has learned from the Russia-Ukraine conflict, the causes and consequences of the neglect of agriculture, and the need for a leadership that can defeat our security threats and engenders industrial-scale agriculture for our food security and exports, using the Political Economy Approach as a guide. In *Aftermath of Russia-Ukraine War; Linking Africa to Europe: An Exploration of Nigeria and the Morocco Gas Pipeline Deal*, Oguniyi et al. raised the following questions regarding the Russia-Ukraine crisis. This includes; Will Europe succeed in breaking free of its energy dependence on Russia? Can African gas, especially Algerian, Nigerian, Moroccan, and Qatar gas, compensate for Russian gas? The study attempted to critically contextualize the Nigerian-Moroccan gas pipeline linking Africa to Europe by thoroughly synthesizing extensive literature. The authors concluded that the Nigeria-

Morocco gas pipeline project remains a geo-political and geo-economic energy infrastructure in foreign policy articulation. For Nigeria, it allows the country to reassess its gas flaring and find ways to export it to Europe. Lastly, the article "Russian-Ukraine War: Implications on African External Relations" by Raji, Adesina Abdulfattah examined the implications of "The Russian-Ukraine War on African external relations via game theory. The study establishes that, though Russia has lost its superpower status, it is still a world power to be reckoned with. Given this, Raji concludes that beyond the bilateral and systemic political implications, the war will be felt in the dynamics of foreign exchange earnings, global crude oil price, altered economic balance, and rising costs of imported food items and equipment, with both countries counting their losses from the war.

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RUSSIA-UKRAINE CONFLICT AND FOOD SECURITY: LESSONS FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN NIGERIA

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Abstract

The six month old conflict between Russia and Ukraine has led to high cost of food in many countries of the world and threatens global food security. Most countries of the world depend on grains and fertilizer from the warring countries for their sustenance. This includes countries in the Semi-arid Horn of Africa and even Nigeria. Nigerian industrial food processors depend heavily on wheat flour, maize flour and fertilizer supplies from the two embattled countries. Nigeria is richly blessed with arable land and citizens eager to unlock its food potentials. Unfortunately, this is far from being realized. Nigeria has no business depending on foreign countries for food. Instead Nigeria should be selling food to other countries. The main objectives of this paper are to examine the lessons we as a country have learnt from the Russia-Ukraine conflict, the causes and consequences of the neglect of agriculture and the need for a leadership that can defeat our security

threats and engender industrial-scale agriculture for our food security and exports using the Political Economy Approach as guide.

Keywords: Russia-Ukraine conflict, Food Security, Security threats, Industrial-Scale Agriculture, Sustainable Development, Political Economy.

Introduction

The over six-months-old war between Russia and Ukraine has continually affected the rest of the world which depends on food and fertilizer from the warring countries for their sustenance. These include countries in the semi-arid Horn of Africa and even Nigeria. Russia and Ukraine who are in conflict are the world's largest grains reserves, has led to high cost of food in many countries and threatens global food security. The major cause of the food crisis is the blockade of the Black Seaports by Russia, which the west describes as "Weaponisation of Food" but Russia blames western sanctions for the disruptions. The Vanguard Editorial 2022, wrote that back on March 11, 2022, just a couple of weeks after Russian invasion of February 24,2022, foremost industrialist, Aliko Dangote, warned of impending food shortages as from June this year at the fourth Nigerian Annual Food Processing Nutrition Leadership Forum in Lagos. He disclosed that Nigerian industrial food processors depended heavily on wheat flour, maize flour and fertilizer supplies from the two embattled countries.

His warning has come true because the price of bread has steadily risen towards the 1,000 mark. Bakers are groaning about the high cost of inputs such as wheat flour

and sugar. This, indeed led to the strike by the Association of Master Bakers and Caterers of Nigeria, serving notice that on resumption, bread would cost 20 percent more (Vanguard, September 9, 2022). Arguing further, Vanguard Editorial September 9 2022 buttressed that Nigeria is richly blessed with arable land and citizens eager to unlock its food potentials. Nigeria has no business depending on foreign countries for food. Instead, we should be selling food to other countries.

Accordingly, Vanguard Editorial, 2022, advised that we must end our bad habit of electing unhealthy, corrupt and incompetent leaders whose only interest in leadership is to gratify personal ambitions. “We need a leadership which can defeat our security threats and unleash industrial-scale agriculture for food security and exports.” This paper therefore intends to examine the lessons Nigeria have learnt from the Russia-Ukraine Conflict, the causes and consequences of the countries agricultural crisis and the need for leadership that can engender large scale agricultural development for food security and sustainable development.

The Statement of the Problem

Nigeria is perhaps the classic case of food imports growing rapidly, under the combined stimulus of commercial promotion and government policy. In 1970, prior to the rapid developments of oil exports, Nigeria was more or less self-sufficient in foodstuffs and exported food items like groundnuts. This was the case in spite of rapid urbanization during the previous decade. Some quarter of a million tons of wheat were imported but, for

the most part, local producers were increasing grain production rapidly enough to keep up with urban demand (Andrae and Beckmann, 1985 in Raikes, 1988). But oil production was just beginning to take off in 1970, and Andrae and Beckmann argued that this has much to do with the explosive growth of wheat consumption and imports which they refer to as the “Wheat trap”. Bread as a convenient form of food, especially for urban residents, but this alone would not have ensured its rapid spread. Other reasons for the increase in wheat importation and consumption include;

Firstly, oil-induced inflation within the Nigerian economy meant that the price of imported wheat fell in relation to that of local foodstuffs.

Secondly, government price controls ensured that this was also true of bread and flour, with no taxation on the austerity budget of 1984 when most other imports were hit. The state seems to have participated enthusiastically in the period of bread and its achievement of a position as ‘the cheapest staple food of our people’ (cited in *ibid*: 2, in Raikes 1988), of equal importance commercial firms, ranging from multinational giants to local small-scale bakers, have rapidly built up a comprehensive network of mills, bakeries and delivery systems, taking bread to a large proportion of the population.

The combined effort of all this was a growth in wheat imports, during the 1970s, of well over 10 percent per annum, continuing into the 1980s and beyond. By 1984, in spite of a sharp decline in oil revenues and serious balance- of- payments problems, wheat imports had

grown to 1.7 million tons, six and a half times the level of 1970. Nigeria had clearly fallen into the wheat trap (Raikes 1988).

At the time of independence, well over 70% of Nigeria's GNP came from food exports. Today, it was virtually entirely the opposite, with food making up more than 50% of imports. Despite the fact that many areas of sub-Saharan Africa remained fertile and potentially productive, food production fell following independence. Grain imports consequently soared by more than seven times (Obasanjo 1988).

While the above examples each consider only a part of the food situation in Nigeria, one thing which emerges clearly is that a host of reasons other than a simple 'food gap' can account for increased food imports into Nigeria. Another is that growth of imports may itself act to obstruct the growth of local food production.

While examining the other reason for the cause of increase in imports, such as the increasing imbalance between population and food supply, low levels of technology and low rates, inept and wasteful government policies, the desire to boost output while relying on ecologically and socially sustainable technology, as well as the necessity to provide income for the underprivileged. In addition to the aforementioned, this essay aims to demonstrate that rising urban populations, incomes, and political influence, along with state pricing and marketing policies, significantly aided by donor and developed country policies, are the main causes of the rise in food imports, though they are not the only ones. The purpose of this is in no sense to

deny the existence of a major food problem. It is only to clarify the relatively apparent fact that some marginalized groups of the population, frequently found in particularly hunger-prone places, are the ones who experience hunger, not whole nations (and especially not their political leaders).

The questions at this point are; what lessons has Nigeria learnt from food imports in relation to the Russian – Ukraine Conflict? Would the Nigeria political leaders focus on the neglected agricultural sector by investing more, and encouraging local production for food security? Why is government not able to effectively implement the development strategies and policies in agriculture and ensue food security and sustainability? I intend to answer these questions and other subsuming discourse that may come in the following paragraphs.

Development Strategies and Policies in Nigeria.

According to Claude Ake (1996), the issue with Africa, and particularly Nigeria, is not so much that progress failed as that it never ever began to occur. According to Ake, 1996, elites in power in Africa have had to make an elaborate show of seeking development.

To begin with, one must be aware of the tendency to ignore history, which has been the bane of analyses of the development experience in Africa. It takes time and effort to develop and implement development plans and policies; their viability and effectiveness are not just dependent on their formal nature. A government in office and the political elite in charge make and administer strategies and policies in a historical setting and under a

specific set of social factors. Policy and strategy for development, let alone the prospect of development, cannot be understood without continually referencing the characteristics of the state and the movements of the social forces that it is a part of (Ake 1996).

In Africa, the state frequently becomes privatized, or devoted to the service of private interests, as opposed to being a force for the public good. The African state's society is often divided into tiny, opposing political groups, many of which have distinct local identities. These communities vie for control of the state's resources and authority, or at the very least, to keep it from persecuting them.

With modest expectations, the majority of African leaders' commitment to development is, at best, equivocal due to the situation of the continent and its political environment. Most African leaders chose political dominance above social reform, particularly development, when given the option. Because of circumstances that reach back to the colonial experience, most African states tend to be in hostile relation to the bulk of their population. These are the underlying realities that have made the pursuit of development in Africa perfunctory, contradictory and ineffective (Ake 1996). Against this background I discuss what Nigerian governments have tried to do about development, especially agricultural development.

Agricultural Development

Surprisingly, the World Bank and donor nations have shown a greater interest in agricultural growth than the majority of African governments, who are often more concerned with industrialization. It is clear from the Bank's numerous publications and policy papers as well as its economic plans, such as the long-term perspectives study of Sub-Saharan Africa, that it understands the importance of agriculture. Growing sustainably out of the crisis (1989). A 1993 study states:

Achieving the economic growth objective for the region of at least 4 percent to 5 percent a year – as set forth in the Bank's long-term perspective study – requires agricultural growth rates of at least that amount. Agriculture still accounts for about a third of the regions GDP, and its role in economic transformation is crucial for its provision of investment capital, foreign exchange, and labour to other sectors of the economy. Agricultural production is also the most important source of the income needed to improve food security and reduce poverty, as most of the poor and food insecure is rural people (World Bank 1993a. p.109 cited in Ake 1996).

The Bank's understanding of the importance of agriculture has not, unfortunately, been matched by success in promoting agricultural production for instance,

on the Bank's own admission, its agricultural initiatives in Africa have a failure rate of at least 50%, making them the most unsuccessful in the whole globe (Callaghy and Ravenhill 1993 p.22). The underlying reasons for this failure are the same as the reasons why African government have paid relatively limited attention to agriculture and have had poor policy performances: the marginalization of women, the refusal to take poor people and their interest seriously, the insufficient commitment to participative development, and the desire to control what the farmer produces and how (Ake, 1996). Poor policies and insufficient government support for agriculture have hampered its development and increased food reliance.

The foundations of food dependence were constructed during the colonial period. Thereafter, Nigeria's import – export oriented economy emerged. But the conditions of exports were such that they made it impossible for us to engage in balanced trade. We produced and exported raw materials and cash crops and in return imported finished goods with higher input. Africans were made to pay for finished products that are many times more than the prices for which they sold their raw materials. Consequently, Nigeria was subjected to the shocks of export fluctuations (Ifeanacho, 2012).

The state of affairs as outlined above was further aggravated by the decline of the agricultural sector starting from 1965. The primary markers of the deterioration in agriculture include its lower total and per

capita growth rates, decreasing sectorial participation in GDP, the proletarianization of the peasantry, reduced acreage, dropping yields, falling exports, increased shortage and import of food, as well as inflationary food costs. The result of all of this was the agricultural crisis, which has since been an ongoing aspect of the Nigerian economy. Attempts have been made to stop the deterioration, but they have failed. For instance, "the entire cultivable land area of the country was projected to be 71.2 million hectares in 1987." Less than eight million hectares were used in the same year, which is a glaring evidence of the country's huge agricultural potential by any standard (Newswatch, October 5, 1987:24 cited in Ifeanchu, 2012).

The Consequences of the Agrarian Crisis

The consequences of the agrarian crisis have been grievous for Nigeria, particularly since the 1980s. The general assumption was that in times of economic depression, people displaced in industry could seek solace in agriculture. This has proved to be erroneous, taking into consideration the fact that the growth-rate of the agricultural sector was -0.5% for 1960/70 and -0.2% between 1970 and 1976 (Onimode, 1983. 45). The GDP by agriculture remained at 23.26 percent between 1977 and 1979 and even fell to 21.95 percent in 1980 (Economic and Social Statistics Bulletin, 1986). More recent statistics show no significant growth taking into consideration the current population over 218 million people, as the agriculture sector contributed 29.25% to overall real GDP during the third quarter of 2019 (National Bureau of Statistics 2019) (Wikipedia 2019).

The agrarian crisis also merged with socio-political factors that led to the military intervention in 1966. The rural-urban migration problem which reached an alarming proportion by 1980 was related to the agrarian crisis. Equally disturbing was the mounting import bill Nigeria was facing. In particular, food importation soared to new heights in 1981. Food imports cost the country ₦2.198.3 million. Over ₦2 billion was thought to be spent annually on imports.

In 2019, Nigeria's food import bill rose to 45 percent to \$271 billion (₦1.12 trillion) in 12 months. While in 2020, the Federal Government spent \$1.87 billion on food imports, showing an increase of 44.92 percent or \$840 million in one year. (Tunji 2022, CBN, 2022)

Conceptual and Theoretical Clarifications

Russia – Ukraine Conflict

The confrontation between Russia and Ukraine began in 2014 and severely worsened when Russia attacked Ukraine on February 24, 2022. According to Keane and Blake (2022), Rita and Costa (2022), and IDMC, 2022. Tens of thousands of deaths have probably been caused by the attack, which also precipitated the biggest refugee crisis in Europe since the Second World War. 8 million individuals had been internally displaced by late May, and by 3 October 2022, 7.6 million Ukrainians have left the country. Russia saw its highest emigration within five weeks of the invasion since the 1979 October Revolution (Boutsko, 2022). According to Barbara, Chaturvedi, Szytko, Quester, Johnson, Baylen, Daniel, Powell, and Lozano (2022) and The Economist 2022, the invasion has

also resulted in a global food scarcity. Immediately following the 2014 Ukrainian Revolution, Russia annexed Crimea, and paramilitaries backed by Russia seized control of a section of the Donbas region in southeast Ukraine, which is made up of the Luhansk and Donetsk Oblasts, sparking a regional war (Kirby and Guyer, 2022). Global Conflict Tracker, year 2022.

In March 2021, Russia began a large military buildup along its border with Ukraine, amassing up to 190,000 soldiers and their equipment. Up to the day of the invasion, a number of Russian government officials denied any plans to invade or attack Ukraine (Farley and Kiely 2022, Taylor, 2002, Fortova 2022). On February 21, 2022, Russia recognized the Donetsk People's Republic and the Luhansk People's Republic, two unilaterally formed breakaway quasi-states in the Donbas. 2022) (Hernandez). The following day, the Russian Federation Council authorized the use of force, and Russian military entered both regions (Hodge, 2022).

Vladimir Putin, the president of Russia, ordered a "special military operation" for the "demilitarization and denazification of Ukraine" on the morning of February 24 (Nikosikaya and Osborn 2022). Waxman, 2022; Granau, von Hein Theise, and Weber, 2022). In his speech, Putin supported irredentist sentiments, questioned Ukraine's legitimacy to statehood, and erroneously stated that Neo-Nazis in power in Ukraine were persecuting the ethnic Russian minority (The Economist 2022; Perrigo 2022; Moscow Times 2022). (Abbruzzese, 2022). Minutes thereafter, warplanes, missiles, and rockets struck Ukraine's capital city of Kyiv as well as other regions, and

then a sizable ground assault from many different angles (CNN International 2022, Kirby 2022). Volodymyr Zelensky, the president of Ukraine, imposed martial law and ordered a mass mobilization (Interfax Reuters 2022).(CBS) News 2022, Canadian Broadcasting Corporation 2022).

Russian strikes were launched initially on a northern front from Belarus against Kyiv, a north-eastern front near Kharkiv, a southern front from Crimea, and a southern-eastern front from Luhansk and Donetsk. In March, Russian soldiers began to move closer to Kyiv; by April, they had begun to withdraw from the northern front. Russia took Kherson in March and Mariupol in May following a siege on the southern and south-eastern fronts. Russia continued its assault on the Donbas area on April 19. By July 3, Luhansk Oblast had been completely taken over (Balmforth 2022). Far from the frontlines, Russian troops continued to pound both military and civilian objectives (Myre,2022, CBS News 2022).After Russia proclaimed its annexation of part of seized southern Ukraine, Ukrainian forces began counteroffensives in the south in August and the northeast in September. Wide spread worldwide disapproval of the invasion has been expressed. The United Nations General Assembly passed a resolution condemning the invasion and demanding that all Russian troops go immediately (Al Jazeera 2022).

The International Court of Justice ordered Russia's military operations to stop, and Russia was expelled from the Council of Europe. Numerous countries sanctioned Russia and its partner Belarus in as well as providing military assistance and humanitarian aid to Ukraine,

which had an effect on both countries' economies. (Chernova, Cotovio, and Thompson 2022). (Al Jazeera 2022). Protests took place all around the world, but those in Russia were greeted with intensified media censorship and widespread arrests (Morin, Subramanian, Collins, Garrison, and Groppe, 2022; Steward, Seminoff, and Kozlov, 2022). (Kirby, 2022, Simon, 2022). In reaction to the invasion, more than 1,000 businesses have left Russia and Belarus (Yale School of Management 2022). Since 2013, the International Criminal Court has been looking into crimes against humanity committed in Ukraine, including war crimes committed during the invasion of 2022. (Corder2022).

Food Security

The term "food security" refers to the availability and accessibility of sufficient, nutritious food that meets people's dietary needs and preferences for an active and healthy life. According to the United Nations Advisory Council on World Food Security, food security implies that all individuals have physical, social, and economic access to this food at all times (www.ifpri.org 2020). Food appears to be available to everyone, irrespective of area, race, or status. Food security was a concern many thousands of years ago, as evidenced by central governments in ancient China and Egypt being known to transfer food from reserve during mass starvation. The phrase "food security" was established with a focus on supply during the 1974 World Food Conference; it is defined as the availability at all times of adequate, nutritious, diversified, balanced, and moderate world food supplies of essential commodities to maintain a steady

growth of food consumption and to counterbalance variations in production and pricing (FAO UN, 2003). Demand and access problems were included in subsequent definitions. According to the inaugural World Food Summit, held in 1996, "food security exists when all people, at all times, have physical, economic access to adequate, safe, and nutritious food to suit their dietary needs and food choices for an active and healthy life" (Raj 2013, FAO 2013).

Comparably, a home is deemed to be food secure if every member always has access to adequate food for an active, healthy life (USDA, 2013). People who have access to food do not go hungry or risk hunger (FAO 2006). The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) describes **food insecurity** as a condition when there is "limited or unclear availability of nutritionally sufficient and safe foods or restricted or uncertain capacity to acquire acceptable meals in socially acceptable ways" (Gary, Mark, Cristofer, William, and John 2000). A measure of food security includes resistance to future interruption or non-availability of essential food supplies owing to a variety of risk factors, such as droughts, shipping disruptions, fuel shortages, unstable economies, and conflicts (FAO 2013).

The availability, access, usage, and stability of food are the four pillars of food security, according to the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) (FAO 2009). The right to food was first acknowledged by the UN in the 1948 Declaration of Human Rights (FAO 2006), and since then, the UN has maintained that it is essential for the enjoyment of all other rights (UN 2022).

Food should not be a tool for political and economic coercion, according to the 1996 World Summit on Food Security (FAO 2013). To address food security, several international agreements and procedures have been created. The Sustainable Development Goals contain the key international strategy to alleviate hunger and poverty. Goal 2: Zero Hunger, in particular, lays forth worldwide goals for eradicating hunger, achieving food security and better nutrition, and advancing sustainable agriculture by 2030. Policy concerns, a lack of commitment on the part of the government, corruption, climate change, herdsmen conflicts, COVID-19, and the Russia-Ukraine war all pose ongoing threats to Nigeria's efforts to achieve food security.

Political Economy

The analysis of the relationships between politics and economics is known as political economy. (i.e., judicial, institutional, and governmental) systems (Hacker, Hertel Alexander, and Thelan (2021) Alexander, Jacob, Thelan, and Pierson, editors of Hertel (2021) Mill, 1806–1773 (2016), Bladen (2016), Britannia (2022). Political economy examines how institutions, rules, and political conduct impact macroeconomic phenomena including growth distribution, inequality, and trade. It had its beginnings in the 16th century and served as the basis for contemporary economics (Weingast and Wittman (2011) Britannia (2022). Modern political economy is thought of as an interdisciplinary discipline that draws on both political science and contemporary economics theory (Britannia 2022). Political economy is a branch of western moral philosophy that dates back to the 16th century. Its

theoretical works explore the management of state wealth, with "political" denoting the Greek term polity and "economy" denoting the Greek word "oikonomia," which refers to home management. Although French physiocrats like Francois Quesnay (1694-1774) and Anne-Robert Jacques Turgot predated the British scholars Adam Smith, Thomas Malthus, and David Ricardo in producing the early works on political economics, they are typically given this credit (1727-1781) Steiner (2003) (2003) Wikipedia (2022)

The name "economics" gradually started to take the place of "political economy" in the late 19th century as a result of the development of mathematical modeling and the publishing of an influential textbook by Alfred Marshall in 1890 (Marshall) (1890). Prior to this, William Stanley Jevons, a supporter of the application of mathematics to the field, argued in favor of the term "economics" for its clarity and in the hope that it would one day be recognized as the name of a science (Jevons (1879), Groenwegen (1987)[2008]). According to citation measurement metrics from Google Ngram viewer, use of the term "economics" started to replace "political economy" from 1910, and by 1920, it had taken over as the favored title for the field (Mark, 2016). Today, the term "economics" typically refers to the specialized study of the economy without taking into account other political and social factors, whereas the phrase "political economy" denotes a different and conflicting perspective. The war between Russia and Ukraine and Nigeria's food security are best understood through the political economic perspective.

The Neglect of Agriculture and the Socio – Economic and Development Challenges in Nigeria.

I have already touched on the challenges of the agricultural sector above but it is imperative to focus more on the neglect of agriculture at this point to fully digest and comprehend the seriousness it portends to the socio-economic and development in the country.

Agriculture was deliberately neglected. Nigeria's ruling elite favored making quick money off of imported food than promoting agriculture there. The enormous sums that successive administrations have invested in poorly thought out initiatives to increase agriculture in the nation reveal the severity of the situation. Operation Feed the Nation ended up on its back with more over 41 billion Naira in lost public cash, while the River Basin Development Authorities sucked in N 2.26 billion. Similar outcomes befell both the Green Revolution and the Accelerated Food Program. It was inevitable that the Directorate of Food, Roads, and Rural Infrastructure would fail. The Agricultural Development Programs (ADPs) have had a similar failure (Ifeanacho 2013, Newswatch October 5 1987).

Whatever reasons and solutions one may proffer the poor agricultural performance, the truth remains and that the Nigerian agricultural sector is under-developed and unrelated to the manufacturing and technological sectors. While agriculture contributed 23 percent to the Nigerian economy in 1983, manufacturing contributed a meager 8.2 percent. There is lack of balance between agriculture and the manufacturing sectors.

Furthermore, the importance of oil to the national economy has aggravated the disarticulation. Oil accounted for 74.4 percent of total export valued at N476.5 million in 1971 while agriculture contributed only 22 percent (News watch October 5, 1987 in Ifeanacho2012). The Nigerian economy has not only been disarticulated but also subject to external domination, specifically in the critical sectors.

According to the aforementioned justifications, Nigeria is indeed experiencing a severe food crisis. According to a Food Agriculture Organization (FAO) estimate, between June and August 2022, over 20 million Nigerians will experience food insecurity.

Lessons from the Russia- Ukrainian Conflict and Food Importation

The claim made by development researchers that the food crisis is mostly self-inflicted and somewhat externally caused by the structure of the international economic order, in which impoverished yet endowed countries are constrained to exporting what they have, unprocessed, in exchange for what they do not need but have been trained to crave, is likewise without question. Nowhere is the complex and conflicting structure of the global economic system more apparent than in Africa's agricultural sector. Africa spends more than \$30 billion importing food, much of it of which it has no business purchasing, despite the fact that an estimated 65 percent of the world's potential land has not yet been put to cultivation. In the process, it destroys its own agriculture, spends precious foreign cash purchasing goods it could and ought to produce itself,

exports jobs, and exposes itself to the price repercussions of shocks to the world's commodity supply (says Dr Akinwomi Adesina cited in Olurunfemi2022, Premium Times, and July 28, 2022)

For Nigeria, the situation is especially tragic and sad. Despite having more than 80 million hectares of undeveloped land and nearly 300 cubic meters of water from four dams and other smaller ones that can be used to irrigate a sizable portion of this land, she spends about \$10 billion a year importing food and agricultural products, the majority of which are wheat, rice, poultry, fish, and consumer-oriented foods. The pressure on the exchange rate that results in devaluation-triggered inflation and food costs that fly up beyond the grasp of people at the bottom of the ladder as it is now is one of the negative repercussions of high food importation bills. (Olurunfemi2022).

In the previous five years, Nigerians imported \$537 million on average worth of food and agricultural products from the US, with almost 70% of it being wheat. Nigeria, the fifth-largest global importer of US wheat in 2020, brought in 1.29 million metric tonnes. However, due to the dominance of wheat from the US on the market, it represents just 40% of Nigeria's total imports. Nigeria is a beneficiary of the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), but she is unable to benefit from it because of worries about the nation's SPS / food safety system, with the country's average yearly export of food and agricultural goods from Nigeria being \$ 50 million (Premium Times July 28, 2022).

After rice and maize, wheat is now the third most popular crop in Nigeria. According to some estimates, the cost of importing wheat into Nigeria is \$ 4 billion annually. The Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) estimated the cost at \$2 billion annually, with wheat ranking as the top food import and the second-largest food import. Nigeria imported wheat worth N1.29 trillion in 2021, a rise of almost 70% from N756.92 billion in 2020 and a threefold increase from N401.31 in 2010, which indicates a growing shift in consumer preference for meals made from wheat. In fact, what is more worrying than the amount Nigerians spend on wheat imports is the consumption growth rate, which is expected to increase by 5% annually. According to a forecast made in 2014 by the then-minister for agriculture, Dr. Akinwumi Adesina, Nigeria will import 10 million metric tonnes of wheat annually by the year 2030. (Olurunfemi2022).

Some have attributed the rising acceptability and demand for wheat to the fact that it differs from other commodities not only because of its special qualities and high gluten content, but also because of the numerous applications for wheat flour. It serves as the hub for many operations in the baking and confectionery industries, as well as in the manufacturing of noodles, biscuits, spaghetti, and other foreign foods. In recent years, Nigerians have begun to adopt these foods more widely.

The local production capability, like with other imported or acquired tastes by Nigeria, is out of step with the enormous hunger and consumption, and this is especially true with wheat. One percent, or 63,000 MT, of the five to six million metric tonnes of wheat eaten yearly, according

to Yila Yusuf, a director with CBN, was produced domestically. “As it is with data on importation, there is no consensus on actual figures. Dr Solomon Asefia, coordinator of the SARD – SC wheat project had in 2017 disclosed that Nigeria’s local production figure had increased from 70,000 metric tonnes as of 2012 to 400,000 metric tonnes in 2016. However, even with 400,000 metric tonnes that would still be an insignificant percent, placed side by side with import figures, which have been on the increase over the years from 350,000 tonnes in 1971, imports have grown at an average annual rate of 10.21 percent to 6.5 million tonnes in 2020. Indeed, the wheat crop is more adapted to temperate climates, where they grow more easily. It struggles to grow in the tropics, with the added disincentive that the varieties here are not as suitable for the demands of the market due to their low gluten content. But the problem runs deeper, some experts argue, which is the reason availability of improved seeds have not magically impacted on local capacity and acceptance of their products (Premium Times, July 28, 2022).

In their book, the wheat trap, Andrew and Beckman argue that the real problem we are faced with is that of a conundrum, which leads developing countries into dependence on imported foods, which become staple, while the local conditions do not favour their production. “So, the problem we are confronted with is a foundational one, with foreign tastes, induced and acquired over time, driving a dependence or large-scale importation of food items that were not traditionally ours. To Andrew and Beckman, “the supply-side shortages in Nigeria food

productions were, to a large extent, a result of policies which allowed the massive importation of foodstuff.”

Andrew and Beckman not only foresaw the large-scale importation of food items as we currently have, they traced the history of Nigeria’s journey of wheat importation to as far back as the pre-colonial and colonial era. According to Haruna, even though the cultivation of wheat started in the 16th century, the adverse uses of wheat was not known to local farmers, with the quantity produced (between 3,000 and 5,000 metric tonnes) meeting local consumption level at the time. However, the colonialists would ignore local production and varieties to start importation of foreign wheat, introducing this to the elites, touting its “superiority and divers uses.” So rather than solve the problems of local production through the provision of a variety with higher percentage of gluten content and help farmers to improve on their yield percentage, Nigeria settled for importation thus invariably falling into the wheat trap (Andrew and Beckman cited in Olurunfemi, 2022)

By the 1970s the imported variety had begun to become entrenched. With population growth, increased urbanization and copycat fast-food consumption patterned after western lifestyle, coupled with resistance from vested interests who lobbied against restriction of importation, the journey to Nigeria becoming dependent on foreign wheat had begun, as consumption of wheat-based products began to spiral out of control. By the 1980s, alarm bells had begun ringing. Between 1971 and 1981, on account of what then referred to as “Kangaroo importation,” agricultural import bills, including that of

wheat, increased thirteen-fold from \$ 192 million to \$ 450 million (Haruna et al cited in Olurunfemi2022). The government of the day was forced to come up with policies to address the problem. That led in 1982 to the establishment of river basins and provision of dams to support local production with irrigation facilities. Following the introduction of the Structural Adjustment Programme, the Babangida government 1986 placed a ban on the importation of wheat and launched the “Accelerated Wheat Production Programme”, to drive local production that shut up local production to about 150,000 metric tonnes, but it plummeted down to 50,000 metric tonnes when the ban was rescinded in 1990. If anything, that short-lived, the ban established that there was some measure of local capacity for production, if encouraged.

While some are of the view that Nigeria cannot successfully produce wheat in commercial quantity because of the inclement weather, Dr. Akinwumi Adesina argues that it is only a myth. In 2014, while he was Minister, he launched “two new high- yield, early maturing, heat-tolerant and drought-resistant wheat varieties developed by the Lake Chad Research Institute (LCRI) in conjunction with the International Maize and Wheat Improvement Centre (CIMMYT) and Institute for Agricultural Research (IAR), Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, with assistance from the Federal Government and grant from the African Development Bank.” To discourage importation, the government had in 2012 increase import duties from 5 percent, while also pushing out a cassava-inclusion policy, mandating a 10 percent inclusion of cassava with a proposal for 40 percent

cassava-wheat composite flour, going forward (Premium Times, July 28, 2022).

The government launched the Wheat Transformation Agenda, with the objective of raising local production from 70,000 metric tonnes in 2013 to 1.5 million metric tonnes in 2017. But despite the provision of subsidies, improved seedlings, credit facilities and inputs to farmers, several factors, stemming from poor policy implementation, and resistance from stakeholders, weak supply chain contributed to the failure of the policy. Nigeria did not come close to meeting that target, which the Minister had assured will create 1 million jobs and generate income of ₦472 billion for the farmers.

The situation has since worsened with terrorists and bandits making farming even more difficult. The North-East had first suffered a setback because of the insurgency there, with millions displaced from their traditional homes and farms. Then, bandits made it difficult for meaningful farming activities to be carried out in the North-West. Yet, along with the North Central, these two regions are better placed in terms of climatic conditions and experience for wheat production. The security challenges have therefore compounded the problem, making the task of finding a way out of the wheat trap or attaining self-sufficiency difficult. Nigeria has not learnt any lessons from all indications as we appear to be doing the same mistakes from the 1970s.

Conclusion

The above narrative has highlighted the paradox Nigeria has found itself importing food. The country seems not to be prepared in addressing the food crisis despite the potentials for large-scale agriculture for sustenance and development. The government's efforts launched by the various administrations from the 1970s to date in raising local production failed stemming from poor policy implementation, resistance from stakeholders and weak supply chain.

The situation has since worsened with the Russia-Ukraine conflict, terrorists and bandits attacks, making farming even more difficult. The covid-19 pandemic, climate change and flooding has also compounded the problem, making the task of finding a way out of the wheat trap and indeed food gap and also attaining self-sufficiency much more difficult. By official figures, which might not even be the full picture, Nigeria has spent almost ₦3 trillion in the last three years importing wheat. Rather than backward-integration in the direction of wheat farming, industry players have largely moved in the direction of 'forward-integration' by setting up facilities to produce wheat-based products, as the opportunities triggered by increased consumption is difficult to resist. According to the CBN, wheat importation is one of the major factors in Nigeria's exchange imbalance, indicating that it plans to place wheat and sugar on the Forex restriction list.

There is no doubt that Nigeria has found itself in a trap, with respect to the preference for wheat-based products on the part of Nigerians, as bread and other products have

become an integral part of the diet. Experts, argue that, “we cling to wheat-based products, not necessarily because we like them better than cassava-based foods but because they are actually often cheaper and more convenient to prepare and serve. But the price is key to the preference we have demonstrated for those food items.” (Olurunfemi 2022).

How do we resolve the log jam? Indeed, the problem is akin to that of rice. However, with wheat, it is not only worse; it is more difficult and almost intractable, yet solutions must be found. Perhaps, there is a cue from some of the solutions adapted in solving the rice problem. Linking import allocation quota with the extent of investment in backward integration is one that we should consider along with a sleuth of other incentives and initiatives on crop improvement. We should also take another look at the Adesina proposal for a progressive adoption of composite flour, to help drive local production of wheat, while also reducing dependence on the product.

Indeed, attaining self-sufficiency in wheat and food production, if Nigeria desires, is not beyond realization. With adequate preparation, determination, political will and a re-orientation of Nigerians to accommodate the shocks that might come in terms of a change with food preferences, taste and lifestyle, it can be achieved over time. There are lessons to learn from the way the rice problem was addressed that has seen Nigeria setting herself on the path of self-sufficiency in local production, if the current trajectory is followed through and perfected.

Generally, there are lessons to be learnt from the difficulties in wheat importation as a result of the Russia-Ukraine war. More importantly, is filling the existing gap between local production and present requirements. Nigeria is in a trap and getting out of it, starts with recognizing and accepting that to be a fact. But it will take strategic and concerted plan, backed by the right political will to get out of this trap. It will not be by fiat, lest we are consumed by something else in a bid to flee from consuming what we ought not to have been consuming in the first place. That the paradox of our obsession with rice is finally being resolved offers hope that we should be able to get out of the wheat trap with sincerity and purposefulness. It is time to have serious conversation, starting at the highest level of government about the wheat trap. An emergency declaration with a clear roadmap, possibly designed around the “Wheat Compact Project” has become a matter of urgency and necessity.

That is the only way to overcome this externally induced, self-sustained trap Nigeria has found herself in, characterised by the prioritization of consumption of what she does not have at the expense of what she produces or is capable of producing.

To achieve self-sufficiency in local production and address the food dilemma, the following recommendations are suggested:

1. Claude Ake had argued that the problem in Africa is not so much that development, in this case agricultural development in Nigeria failed as that it never really began. Therefore, it is recommended that the

government in office and the political elite begin to show commitment and kick start the agricultural development process with the enormous potential the country has for large-scale agricultural production.

2. Government is continuity and as such strategies and policies for agricultural production by one administration should not, be neglected and abandoned rather modification or moderation is made on such strategies and policies for effective results.
3. Somewhat surprisingly, the multilateral development agencies, especially the World Bank and donor countries, have been more interested in agricultural development than most African governments, which are usually focused on industrialization. The Bank's understanding of the significance of agriculture is evident in many reports and policy papers and in its economic blueprints such as the long-term perspective study Sub-Saharan African: From crisis to sustainable growth (1989). It is imperative that the Nigerian government take a critical look at the World Bank's position and that of other donor agencies focus on agricultural development in the country, instead of the present neglect. Agriculture still accounts for about a third of the region's GDP, and its role in economic transformation is crucial for its provision of investment capital, foreign exchange, and labour to other sectors of the economy. Agricultural production is also the most important source of the income needed to improve food security and reduce poverty, as most of the poor and food insecure are rural people (World Bank (1993a. p.109 in Ake, 1996).

4. At least 50 percent of agricultural projects in Africa have failed, the underlying reasons for this failure are that African countries including Nigeria have paid relatively limited attention to agriculture and have also poor policy performances; the marginalization of women, the refusal to take poor people and their interest seriously, the insufficient commitment, to participative development, and the desire to control what the farmer produces and how. Nigerian government should critically and effectively address these issues.
5. With oil boom the significance of agriculture was reduced. This has impacted negatively to the country's economic growth and development. The diversification policy of government is implemented effectively.
6. Insecurity and climate change has compounded the food crisis. Every effort should be made to address the security challenges, and effective mitigation and adaptation strategies be engendered to curtail climate change and at the same time increase resilience capacity of the people.
7. With respect to wheat importation, local production be encouraged through capacity strengthening. Experts have advised that backward-integration in wheat farming rather than forward-integration is adopted by all concerned stakeholders. This will check Nigeria's exchange imbalance. The CBN had warned that wheat importation is one of the major factors in Nigeria's exchange imbalance.
8. Research funding on agriculture be prioritized, and research findings or research trials be conducted on

the cultivation of heat-tolerant variety of wheat and new seed varieties that will help to drive growth and expansion of wheat production in the country.

9. The preference of foreign food products is discouraged by Nigerians.
10. The proposal by Dr. Akinwumi Adesina, former Minister of Agriculture for a progressive adoption of composite flour to help drive local production of wheat, while also reducing dependence on the product is taken seriously.
11. The Indian example of import restriction and increasing local production with programmes such as the ‘Green Revolution’ and the All India Coordinate Wheat Importation Programme (AICWIP). One of the initiatives that helped in boosting local production is that the government buys about a quarter of the produces at state-set prices to build stocks, which is then used to run a major welfare programme. With purchase guaranteed, production is then encouraged. It is instructive that while India is the world’s second largest producer of wheat after China, she is not among the top-ten exporter in the world, which means the focus is more on meeting needs locally. The Indian model can be adopted in Nigeria.
12. The same strategy in solving the paradox of our obsession with rice is adopted to get out of the wheat trap. This can be achieved with sincerely and purposefulness. It is time to have a serious conversation. Starting at the highest level of government about the wheat trap. An emergency declaration with a clear roadmap, possibly designed

around the “Wheat Compact Project” has become a matter of urgency and necessity.

13. The same principles outline in 1 to 12 above be applied and adopted in all aspects of agriculture production and the concomitant value chain for food security and sustainable development.

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**AFTERMATH OF RUSSIA-UKRAINE WAR;
LINKING AFRICA TO EUROPE: AN
EXPLORATION OF NIGERIA AND MORROCO
GAS PIPELINE DEAL**

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Abstract

The aftermath of the Russian-Ukraine war and Moscow's use of the weapon of natural gas supplies against European countries in response to the Western sanctions had led many European states in search for alternatives to Russian gas. Russia supplies almost half of Europe's natural gas and 30% of its oil. Moscow cut gas supplies from a number of European countries like the Netherland,

Denmark and Germany, in response to none payment to Russia in rubbles. It notes that Russian war on Ukraine will be protracted, and may lead to energy crisis because Europe, with its weapon of sanctions wants to break the link with Russian gas in order to isolate Vladimir Putin's regime. The paper seeks answers to the following questions: will Europe succeed in breaking free of its energy dependence on Russia? Can African gas, especially Algerian, Nigerian, Morocco alongside Qatar gas, compensate for Russian gas? The study seeks to provide a critical contextualization of the Nigerian Morocco gas pipeline linking Africa to Europe in a thorough synthesis of extent literature. The paper argues that the Nigerian-Morocco gas pipeline project is a geo-political and geo-economic energy infrastructure involved in the project deploying a continuum of instruments and approaches in furtherance of a foreign policy issue. For Nigeria it affords the country the opportunity to re-assess its gas flaring to finding ways of exporting this gas to Europe. Nigeria has the largest gas reserves in Africa, and ranks as seventh largest holder of reserves in the world. The realization of this project would indeed constitute a true resource and alternative to Russian gas. The study used various scholarly and media reports to provide a vivid analysis of the events and the implications for Europe and Africa in particular. The study concludes that as the Russia- Ukraine disputes rages on and the gas dispute in Europe intensifies, the scenario of a total cut off of Russian gas seems plausible, prompting Europe to look for African sources of supply.

Keywords: Nigeria, Morocco, Gas pipeline, Africa, Europe, Russia-Ukraine war

Introduction

Since on February 21, 2022 that Ukraine began witnessing Russia invasion, scholars have attempted explaining the role of Russian leader Vladimir's decision putting Ukraine under invasion. Diverse of explanations have been adduced in this regard. Commentators from the liberal perspective conclude on the claims that due to Russian leader nature of being an autocratic leader and thus he has been running autocratic regime in Moscow as shown elsewhere. Similarly, Russian leader was once seen flagging up domestic support earlier that is (military campaigns in places like Chenchyna in 1990, Georgia 2008, and Ukraine 2014 all these bolster his position at home). In turn, the realists, focus more on American most especially overreach, and more specifically, the NATO's expansion into Russia's influence sphere, which set the stage for a confrontation with Moscow. At this juncture, realists also noted that the war between Russia and Ukraine signals the evolution of a multipolar order and far more importantly the end of 'Pax Americans'.

To others they opined that the conflict, particularly the period and timing of the invasion should be understood as a result of Russia's emergence as a petro-state with enormous foreign currency reserves. Be that as it may, to this crisis there had been several responses. On 2nd of March, 2022, there was an official African condemnation initiated in a vote that took place at the United Nations level on a resolution deploring in the strongest possible

terms of the Federation of Russia aggression against Ukraine (UNO 2022). In various quarters, the implication of this crisis has also been discussed as well as analyzed. In Europe, apart from humanitarian crisis it has created, the crisis has equally engendered infrastructure damage. It is also important to note the problem of gas consumption it has generated creating uproar following Europe's reliance on Russian gas. The debate concerning Europe energy security policy needs to be put in the right perspective as a result of the aftermath of Moscow's use of the weapon of natural gas supplies against European countries in response to western sanctions.

Therefore, this paper seek to examine the need why Africa should seize the opportunity of this crisis to re-engineer the Nigerian Morocco Gas pipeline project to Europe to compensate for Russia gas as well as eliminate gas flaring in Nigeria. This readily comes to mind as Nigeria is in dire need to re-positioning her interest in the global energy security amid rapid changes on the geostrategic scene.

The Nigeria Morocco Gas Pipeline Project to Europe

The strategic experts attention should by now be turning to Africa, far more importantly on the Nigeria Morocco gas pipeline to Europe. Beyond much argument, this no doubt is one of the biggest projects of interest from the stand point of the Europeans, but in order to achieve this big dream of ambitious project it indeed requires international efforts to come together and for the provision of needed infrastructure. According to the Nigerian Vice President, Professor Yemi Osibajo, 'Nigeria has one of the largest gas reserves in the world' (Deji 2022). This project realization and coming to

limelight would constitute indeed to a true resource as well as alternative to Russia gas, but it is pertinent to mention that this project faces a number of problems and constraint. Among the most prominent constraint is the length of the distance that the pipeline will transverse, for it will extend over 5660Km, and pass through well over 13 countries, (including Nigeria and Morocco), and these countries are: Guinea, Republic of Benin, Togo, Cote d'voire, Liberia, Ghana, Sierra Leone, Guinea, Bissau, Gambia, Mauritania and Senegal.

All the other countries belong, with the exception of Mauritania, along with Nigeria, to the West African countries economic group (CEDAO). Virtually, in all these countries political stability as a fundamental factor constitutes a constraints for the success of the project, and it is among the biggest constraints facing it. For comparison, the length one line of the 'Nord stream 2' project that connects between the Russia port of Ustluga and the city of Greenfield in Germany is 1234 SLM. The second constraint has to do with financing as the cost of the project is around \$25 billion (Peter 2022) .The fact that the pipelines will pass through vast desert areas, can generate a threat from terrorist groups present in those areas (especially in Northern Mali) moreover, for the gas pipeline getting to the Mediterranean coastline requires very large financial investments, as well as earnest, and real securing of a guarantee against terrorist and other security threats.

Currently, Nigeria exports its gas in liquefied form i.e. via ship to Europe and among its most prominent customers

are Portugal, Spain and France, and they are countries that have stations for liquefied natural gas, but Germany, which is considered the largest European state threatened by the cutting of Russian gas, does not have a liquefied gas station, and there is the need for them to build two stations, per the statements of the expert on the power sector in the German African Business Association (Manjula 2022). According to Khadi Camara, Europe in year 2019 imported around 108 billion cubic meters of liquefied natural gas, among them more than 12 billion came from Nigeria (Abu-Bakarr 2022). It is instructive to note that Nigeria is among the ten countries that have the largest reserves of gas in the world. It has more supplies than required for its particular market and therefore it is capable of equal to the task of exporting.

Russia-Ukraine Crisis and European Union Energy Crisis

After invasion of Ukraine by Russia, the sanctions against the Kremlin, championed by Western countries, have really fueled energy crisis in Europe. After Ukraine was attacked by the Russian troops at the behest of Vladimir Putin, Canada, European Union, United Kingdom as well as the United States and some of their allies announced a series of sanctions against Russia (European Council 2022). With many of the sanctions targeting the Russian economy, especially the removal of some Russian banks from the SWIFT system, it is aimed that the Putin administration takes a step back in Ukraine. Ironically, rather than backing down, Putin intensified the attack, which led the United States to announce tougher sanctions targeting the energy sector. Russia announced in

retaliation for these sanctions, that it would export natural gas to Europe in “rubles” (Dylan 2022).

This could be seen as a way for Russia to support its unstable currency and also retaliate against its European neighbours for Western sanctions over the invasion of Ukraine. By forming a new front in the war, in this manner, Moscow signaled that it is willing to use Europe’s excessive dependence on Russian gas as a political leverage. After refusal of Bulgaria and Poland to pay for Russian natural gas in rubles, Russia’s halting of natural gas shipments to these countries on 28th April, 2022 indicates that the European energy crisis has escalated (Reuters.com, 2022). On the other hand, Uniper, the parent company of Federal Republic of Germany and Hungary, which has so far only imported Russian natural gas, stated that they can adapt to the Kremlin’s proposed system to make gas payments in rubles without violating European Union sanctions (Daylimail.co.uk 2022).

It is worthy of mentioning to state that, 38.2% of the European Union’s gas need in 2021 came from Russia, 21.9% from Norway, 18.4% as liquefied natural gas (LNG), 9.4% from Algeria, 9.1% was obtained from the production of European Union countries, 2.2% from Azerbaijan and 0.8% from Libya (Khuldyz 2022). Liquefied Natural Gas, which constitutes 20% of the total gas imports, in the total supply of 80 billion cubic meters of Liquefied Natural Gas in 2021, the United States of America owns 20%, Norway 2%, Nigeria 17%, Russia 18%, Qatar 20%, Algeria 14%, and the remaining 9% belong to other suppliers (Anadolu Agency 2022). While

further information reveals that the European Union's main supplier of natural gas is Russia, gas from this country is mostly sent to Europe via pipelines such as Yamal-Europe, which passes through Poland and Belarus, Nord Stream, using the Baltic Sea, and Ukraine, Soyuz and Turk Stream. Europe imported about 40% of the natural gas, in other words it is about 175 billion cubic meters from Russia in 2021.

Russian natural gas transported through Ukraine decreased by 70%. Accordingly, the supply, which was 140 billion cubic meters in 1998, decreased to 42 billion cubic meters in 2021. Natural gas coming through Ukraine mostly goes to Slovakia and from there to Austria and Italy (Euronews.com 2022). While the situation of the European Union with its main energy supplier is difficult, the European Union needs to either increase its purchases from other suppliers or find new energy suppliers. In this regard, the European Union's energy infrastructure is sufficient to buy more gas from North Africa and Norway and increase the amount of Liquefied Natural Gas imports, however, as stated, it is not possible to increase the gas supply in these quantities rapidly. Norway, which is the country that provides the highest gas flow to the European Union after Russia, explained that its gas production capacity is at the maximum level and it is not possible for them to fill it in case of Russia's interruption, causing a further reduction in options.

Algeria has the opportunity to increase its gas flow to Europe with Liquefied Natural Gas and gas lines to Italy and Spain. However, Algeria is expected to increase the

amount of gas by a few billion cubic meters per year due to the current infrastructure insufficiency. Close to about 18.1 billion cubic meters of gas was sent to Europe from the Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP), in year 2020 which was built to transport the natural gas extracted from Azerbaijan's Shah Deniz 2 field to Europe. It does not seem possible to increase this number rapidly (Anadolu Agency 2022). On the other hand, global Liquefied Natural Gas markets are already in a tight spot due to increased demand as a result of the economic recovery. Providing its Liquefied Natural Gas to Asian countries with long-term contracts, Qatar announced that it is already producing at full capacity and that it will not contribute to Europe if Russian gas is cut off (Reuters.com 2022).

The European Union, on the other hand, is making persuasive efforts to buy the gas of Asian countries that have made purchase agreements with long-term contracts in global markets. However, since Asian countries do not have many options in gas supply, it is stated that they do not approach the European Union swap requests warmly. The European Union's annual Liquefied Natural Gas import capacity is at the level of 157 billion cubic meters, enough to meet around 40% of total current gas demand. Even with continued flow from Russia, the European Union uses 66% of its total Liquefied Natural Gas capacity. For this reason, it does not seem possible to meet all the needs with Liquefied Natural Gas in a large-scale blackout. Experts point out that the global Liquefied Natural Gas capacity and Liquefied Natural Gas-carrying vessels are almost fully utilized (Energy.ec.europa.eu

2022). Natural gas prices in Europe rose significantly in the second half of 2021, long before the current crisis in Ukraine, mainly due to the strong increase in post-pandemic demand.

On 21st December, 2021, prices hovered below €50 per megawatt-hour throughout the summer, reaching a peak of €180 per megawatt-hour (Eurportal.europa.eu 2022) (Europarl.europa.eu, 2022). This came after relatively low levels of natural gas storage. European gas storage levels are very low during the winter season when demand is at its highest. European Union gas tanks are currently around 40% full, and this gas is expected to run out in a very short time if there is an interruption from Russia (Bruegel.org 2022). In this case, the European Union does not have many options except importing electricity, restarting coal power plants that are harmful to the environment and incompatible with climate targets, the extension of the duration of the nuclear reactors that are planned to be closed, and the activation of closed power plants. Considering the fact that the European Union needs to reduce domestic demand, it is foreseen that natural gas and electricity restrictions may be applied, especially in the industry that consumes high energy.

About a quarter of the European Union's oil imports also come from Russia. Europe's dependence on Russian energy caused the first crack in the West's collective response to Russia's aggression, and the European Union stayed out of a ban on oil imports from Russia by the United States as well as United Kingdom (Rferl.org 2022). At the summit held in Brussels on 24th March,

2022, European leaders announced that they plan to become completely independent of Russian energy supplies by 2030 (at the Versailles summit of the heads of state and government of the European Union on March 10-11, the date announced was—by 2027), while at present the European Union, according to the European Commission, in gas consumption depends on 90% of imports, about 40% of which on Russia, but the numbers vary greatly for individual European Union countries. Russia covers a quarter of crude oil imports and 45% of European Union coal imports (Konoplyanik A 2022).

In summary, Russia, which started to use its energy superiority as a political weapon during the war, as a counter reaction to the sanctions imposed on itself. On the other hand, Europe, which has a high energy dependency, must either accept Russia's payment terms or quickly find an alternative. Considering the speed and capacity of the above alternatives, it is obvious that Europe should accept Russia's terms for now and produce projects for the future.

Africa Gas as a replacement for Russian Gas to Europe

The Russia-Ukraine crisis has brought to the public gleam how much Europe depends on natural gas as it moves to green energy. Gas provides backup power when there is no sun or wind as sources of green energy. Natural gas is needed as an essential ingredient in fertilizer production and other resources. Countries in Europe are now jostling to cut out new deals from the Middle East and Africa that could bring them into fossil fuel deals for years more than

they envisaged. Some members of the European countries have entered into agreements with Algeria, Egypt, Angola and the Republic of Congo to make up for almost two-thirds of the gas it was importing from Russia. The European Union in addressing the gap in gas supply from Russia proposed to build import terminals for gas shipments from the United State and West Africa. Also, in seeking an alternative to Russia gas supply to Europe, European countries have come into agreement with Senegal, Nigeria and Angola as potential partners to fill the widening gaps.

German Chancellor Olaf Scholz mentioned that the European superpower was halting approval of Russia-owned Nord Stream 2 after President Vladimir Putin officially sent troops into eastern Ukraine. Nord Stream 2, an \$11bn gas pipeline project owned by Moscow-backed energy company Gazprom, runs from western Siberia to Germany. The project was built to ensure a sustainable energy distribution across the European Union, especially as gas prices reached record highs in Europe – which gets more than a third of its natural gas from Russia. As the conflict continues in Ukraine, European gas prices have soared and there is the likelihood that Moscow could shut off supplies of gas, widely considered part of Putin’s leverage against the West in his obsession with Ukraine.

Before that, European countries are willing to pull the stops to find contingency supply networks over a period of time. In fact, sources have it that the United States of America is in talks with Qatar over supplying of gas to the European Union as a crucial substitute for Russia.

However, during a forum of gas exporting countries held in Qatar, the bloc said it would be unable to provide a considerable amount of replacement gas to Europe in the event of sanctions against Russia. They stressed the need for significant investment in gas infrastructure, as well as long-term contracts, to guarantee a large supply to Europe.

Filling the Gap

This has led to an emerging debate about whether African countries, which have some of the world's deepest gas reserves, can step in to fill the gap – a demand of 150-190 billion cubic metres annually that Russia has usually supplied to Europe. Recently, Tanzanian President Samia Suluhu Hassan [said](#) the Russian invasion of Ukraine could prove to be an opportunity for gas sales as the East African country makes efforts to secure a new energy market outside Africa. “Whether Africa or Europe or America, we are looking for markets,” said Hassan. “And fortunately, we are working with companies from Europe.” Tanzania, which has the sixth-largest gas reserves in Africa – an estimated 57 trillion cubic feet (1.6 billion cubic metres) of gas reserves – says it has been working with Shell to utilize its vast offshore gas resources and export to Europe and elsewhere.

Africa's largest gas producer Nigeria has similar plans too. As the country plans to build a pipeline, a trans-Saharan pipeline, that is going to take her gas to Algeria, then to Europe.” Nigeria's comments are buoyed by the recent signing of a MoU with Algeria and the Niger Republic and the ongoing construction of the Trans-

Saharan Gas Pipeline, a 614km (381.5 miles) long natural gas pipeline beginning in northern Nigeria. There is no official word on when the pipeline, first mooted in the 1970s, will be completed but it is slated to run through northern Nigeria into Niger and Algeria, connecting to Europe eventually. Still there are concerns about whether African countries can become a proper stopgap solution for natural gas as Europe tackles Russia's military onslaught against one of its own – or long-term suppliers.

Lack of Infrastructure

Experts say a historic lack of investment in gas infrastructure has hampered the energy industry in sub-Saharan Africa, unlike in Northern Africa. For instance, the Maghreb-Europe Gas Pipeline in Algeria – Africa's largest natural gas exporter – conveys natural gas through Morocco to Spain and Portugal, and the Medgaz pipeline links Algeria directly to Spain. Experts estimated that Algeria exported 9 billion cubic feet (255 million cubic metres) of gas to Spain in 2020 and up to 17 billion cubic feet (481 million cubic metres) annually before that. The drop was due to gas production dipping in a breakdown in relations with Morocco; last October, Algeria announced that it would immediately begin exporting gas directly to Spain.

“It is important to note that (North) Africa already has an established gas export market with Europe (before the Ukrainian crisis)”. “The Medgaz pipeline capacity enhancements (in Algeria) are also expected to increase exports to Europe.” But many African countries with massive gas reserves have also struggled to attract

investment to build gas infrastructure projects to supply the European market. Angola, which has 13.5 trillion cubic feet (382 billion cubic metres) of proven gas reserves, has experienced a sharp decline in oil and gas production in the last five years due to a combination of technical and operational problems, as well as a lack of upstream investment and incentives. In 2020, Nigeria put forward “A Decade of Gas”, a Nigerian initiative to prioritize the gas industry and take advantage of a global transition to cleaner fuels.

As part of that drive, Nigeria has commenced construction of the 614km-long, \$2.5bn Ajaokuta-Kaduna-Kano Natural Gas Pipeline. Most of the funding comes as a loan from Chinese banks. Still, like in many other African countries, significant investments are needed to build trans-regional and intercontinental pipelines, in order to open up access to Europe. And they all need loads of capital. Nigeria is hoping that its new industry legislation can provide a new framework to cut down on waste and corruption in the oil sector, reshape host community relations and ultimately, investment. “Nigeria is not presently a top investment destination for the oil and gas industry,” said Joe Nwkwue, former chairman of the Society of Petroleum Engineers in Nigeria and ex-adviser to the junior petroleum minister’. This was why we pushed for a competitive fiscal arrangement in the bill.”

“Additionally, to address the infrastructure challenge, Nigeria need to open up the sector to private capital,” the country’s current oligopoly would not suffice as the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation lacks the capital

to build our required infrastructure.” Using vessels for direct transport of Liquefied Natural Gas across the seas could also put sub-Saharan African countries in prime position to become competitive producers and exporters.

Security of Supply

There are also other existential issues African countries have to fix first to be a ready alternative for Europe in situations of urgency. Mozambique holds roughly 100 trillion cubic feet (2.8 trillion cubic metres) of proven natural gas reserves, accounting for approximately 1 percent of the world’s total reserves. But an ongoing armed uprising in the northern Mozambican province of Cabo Delgado, a gas-rich area that borders Tanzania, has hampered activity on a planned \$50bn project. Elsewhere, a wave of security threats from armed groups has affected oil and gas exploration in Nigeria’s oil-rich Niger Delta. “The key factor that remains a challenge for Africa as a reliable LNG producer and exporter revolves around security of supply,” “Whilst the Liquefied Natural Gas discoveries in Mozambique are a great find, it is also important to recognize that insecurity leads to delays and instability of supply.”

Nigeria-Morocco Pipeline Offers Europe Viable Alternative to Russian Gas

The current energy supply map of gas pipelines in Europe shows a high concentration of the sources of supply ... In total, more than 50% of the European Union’s gas needs come from a single source of supply,” it is the belief, that the current status quo “would naturally pose a threat to Europe as its energy needs **could be weaponised**. In light

of this data, the expert underscores the importance for Europe to work towards diversifying the base of its energy suppliers, noting that Africa is a promising alternative source of gas given the continent's important reserves of onshore and offshore gas. In addition, relying on African gas through the Nigeria-Morocco Gas Pipeline would reduce the risk of Europe replacing Russian gas with unconventional energy sources, and support the European Union in its endeavor to phase out coal completely, as well as prevent the emergence of strong gas dependence on Algeria, the expert adds.

First launched in 2016, the pipeline has recently been at the center of attention amid the ongoing Ukraine crisis, the tightening of global gas supplies, and the west's sanctioning of Russia. The ambitious project is extremely capital intensive as it requires a total investment of almost \$25 billion and would take 25 years to go. Earlier this year, the project received significant funding from the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). The investment went to fund the project's initial feasibility study also known as Front-End Engineering Design (FEED). Aside from its potential to end the era of Europe's dependency on Russian gas, the project promises significant socio-political advantages for the African continent, experts argue. The project will cut across 11 African countries, delivering a reliable and stable source of gas that would boost the continent's prospects to host business activities and contribute to socio-economic development.

Europe's Strategic Interest in Completing the Nigeria – Morocco Gas Pipeline

The underlying vision is that African gas supplies would strengthen Europe's energy independence, which is essential for strategic autonomy. The preferred approach is to alter European paradigms that shape its relation with Africa, making the continent a partner and providing Europe with an opportunity for global strategic repositioning. A minimum six factors justify the strategic interest Europe should have in this project.

1. Diversification of Europe's gas supply sources: a prerequisite for the continent's energy autonomy.

Europeans have long ignored the basic principle that "you should never put all your eggs in the same basket". Europe's dependence on gas imports grew significantly with completion of both Nord Stream 1 and Nord Stream 2 megaprojects that directly connect Russia to Germany via the Baltic Sea. Together, both structures can supply 110 billion m³ of gas to Germany, Europe's driving economic force. Other pipelines add to this concentration, including the 4,000km Yamal-Europe pipeline that connects Russia's Yamal Peninsula gas fields to Western Europe. Altogether, no less than 50% of European Union (EU) gas consumption originates from one single supply source. Obviously, this constitutes a serious geopolitical weapon that can and will be used against Europe in the event of strategic confrontation, e.g. the current situation in Ukraine.

It is therefore vital for Europe to diversify its gas imports. To avoid catastrophic impacts should

supplies from any one provider run into difficulty. Furthermore, diversification is also required to mitigate the economic risk arising from potential abuse of monopoly or oligopoly positions by a dominant supplier. Europe currently appears to be looking eastward for new Asian suppliers, such as Azerbaijan. Africa, although a mere 14 km from Europe, remains insufficiently visible on European energy radars. And yet, Africa's gas resources are significant and the potential of onshore and offshore reserves holds great promise. The Nigeria-Morocco Gas Pipeline project would effectively contribute to the diversification of European gas resources and give Europe greater scope for action.

2. Addressing Asymmetric threats through large-scale Economic Projects

The Mediterranean is the world's only liquid continent, a wise man once said. A semi-enclosed sea more akin to a large lake, the Mediterranean has always been a space of encounter and exchange. This is its inherent and unalterable nature. This also illustrates why the barriers erected to preserve Fortress Europe prove little effective and, above all, counterproductive with each passing day. European concerns are legitimate. Africa is itself a victim of Europe's difficulties with illegal immigration and in security. Populist currents and extreme factions are the sole beneficiaries of the situation, as evidenced by the historic breakthrough of the extreme right in Sweden's September 2022 elections. Yet, while European concerns are easily grasped, the course of

actions taken appears less than appropriate. Its main flaw lies in its focus on crisis symptoms from a purely unilateral perspective.

Instead, the focus should be on the roots of the problems in a participatory and inclusive way. Contributing to the emergence of a prosperous Africa would almost automatically cut down illegal migration flows. Facilitating trade and cooperation in joint projects generating shared wealth between both two shores of the Mediterranean creates the conditions for retaining illegal migrants in Africa and helps stem the flows of people in "economic distress". Building the Nigeria-Morocco gas pipeline would contribute to creating a new generation of measures that curb the asymmetric threats Europe faces.

3. Preserving Europe's climate objectives: not substituting one short-term crisis for another long term one

Climate change is now widely recognized. Its impact on environmental balances confirmed and especially devastating. In September 2022, a third of Pakistan territory experienced unprecedented floods.

In many ways, Europeans are a key constituent of the nascent climate consciousness. They strive to include climate-relevance to economic strategies and preserve environmental balances. The current energy crisis, however, threatens to undermine European gains in this area. Both alternatives to Russian gas, currently discussed in Europe, range from encouraging shale gas imports, on one hand, to reviving nuclear power,

on the other. Both alternatives entail significant adverse consequences to the environment. To some extent, this means replacing Europe's dependence on Russian gas, which has serious geopolitical consequences, with a dependence on non-conventional energy sources which have dangerous climatic consequences.

In this context, the Nigeria-Morocco gas pipeline, bringing natural gas from West Africa to Europe, has the merit of mitigating current solutions in Europe to replace Russian gas without sacrificing climatic balances. The goal is not to replace the two above mentioned sources, but rather reduce their impact through additional supply of conventional gas.

4. The strategic advantage of the Nigeria-Morocco gas pipeline over the Nigeria-Algeria alternative: Not repeating the same mistakes

Restructuring Europe's energy market should be done on robust and sustainable foundations. This restructuring should above all not reproduce patterns of the past that have proved their undoing. Europe's current energy crisis is the direct result of excessive energy import concentration in the hands of a single supplier. It would therefore be a strategic mistake for Europe to favor the emergence of domination by a single country, Algeria in this case, over gas imports from West Africa. As a matter of fact, the Trans-Sahara Gas Pipeline project, promoted by Algeria, which aims to bring Nigerian gas through Algeria before rerouting it to Europe, would expose

Europe to additional risk and potential political shocks.

An Abuja-Algiers gas pipeline would provide a strategic opportunity to the regime in Algeria to add Nigerian and West African gas resources to its own energy resources in advancing its political agenda. And considering Algeria's strategic alliances, particularly in light of the deepening Algiers/Iran/Russia axis, the risk of Algeria's regime employing gas as a strategic weapon should not be discounted. Two recent moves illustrate Algiers' use of gas as a geopolitical weapon in this respect. First, in late 2021, Algeria shut down the Maghreb/European Gas Pipeline supplying Spain and Portugal with Algerian gas, in large part to protest agreements signed between Morocco, the United States and Israel. Then, in early 2022, Algeria moved to punish Madrid for its rapprochement with Rabat through a range of sanctions including reduced gas deliveries.

On top of all these considerations, the insecurity element along the proposed Algerian gas pipeline route also warrants concern. European support for the Nigeria-Morocco gas pipeline neutralizes the Nigeria-Algiers gas pipeline project, which would exacerbate Europe's energy dependency rather than reduce.

5. **Repositioning Africa/Europe in a fast-changing world: A Vertical Perspective over a Horizontal One:** Europe would gain by rebalancing its strategic direction from a horizontal model, which is hardly

productive, to a truly vertical model, which leverages its influence. Relations between Europe and Africa can easily be characterized as "a big mess". Geographical, historical and economic factors predestine both continents to strong cooperation. Furthermore, of all major global players, Europe is probably the one that is least "political" in its geography. It is the power cluster that trades and invests the least in its immediate vicinity. Economic transactions between the United States and North and South America are in sharp contrast to Europe's transactions with Africa. The same is true of China's transactions with Asian countries.

This vertical projection momentum in America and Asia grows deeper despite the historic and strategic dissimilarities among countries of these areas. In 2021, China successfully established the largest free trade area in the world (the Regional Economic Comprehensive Agreement), covering 15 Asian countries, including Japan, South Korea, New Zealand and Australia. Europe, on the other hand, is stuck in a horizontal model that focuses on strengthening transatlantic and Indo-Pacific relations to the detriment of links with the Mediterranean and Africa. On this point, the Nigeria-Morocco gas pipeline project is an opportunity to establish a new vertical dynamic. It would offer Europe additional drivers to attain ambitions for a geopolitical Europe endowed with strategic autonomy.

6. Supporting West African Economic Integration: The Opportunity of a 400+ Million Consumer Market:

The world is reshaping along regional dynamics in a context of global economic rivalry. The quest for additional market share for national exports has by and large replaced warlike adventures for additional swaths of territory. In such a context, regional economic integration is proving increasingly essential. It also enables valuable synergies between economic objectives and security imperatives. In an African context, this integration process, whether at continental level, under the aegis of the African Union, or at regional level, led by Economic Integration Communities, has yet to achieve its intended objectives. There is, in fact, a considerable gap between solid institutional and normative achievements and tangible results in terms of trade volumes and number of joint projects.

Weak regional economic integration in Africa negatively impacts not only African but also European economies. Today, the West African market accounts for over 400 million consumers, and should reach 600 million by 2050 according to United Nations projections. European investment in joint projects in West Africa would create more economic opportunity for European companies. In this context, European support for the Nigeria- Morocco gas pipeline project, crossing eleven West African countries and involving fifteen of them, would provide momentum to the ongoing economic integration in West Africa, which

would in turn constitute a vast consumer market for European economies. Ultimately, this could foster the emergence of a vast area of trade and prosperity that would allow the Europe/Africa vertical to become a balancing force in a world shaped by strategic conflict, pandemics and climate threats.

Concluding Remarks

It seems unlikely that Nigeria itself can constitute a sole alternative to Russia for meeting Europe's gas needs. While it is important that greater energy cooperation between Nigeria and Europe in the realm of natural gas could give the Nigeria a chance to reassert herself as a global energy player in a way unseen for decades. As laudable as the project may be there is still the need for Nigeria to opt her capacity to transport additional natural gas to Europe via new pipeline running through west Africa and /on the Sahel and then onwards to north Africa and Europe . It is argued that the Nigeria –morocco pipeline was more viable and relevant in the long term because it takes into account geopolitical challenges since it is being built on the West coast to avoid conflict in the Northern Nigeria.

On the other hand, African countries through which the pipeline will pass also have a lot at stake as it will compensate for irregular power cuts as well as being able to produce more electricity through natural gas. It is also understood that this project is also relevant for Africa's industrial development. This more than an industrial project, this pipeline has a diplomatic dimension, as it is part of West Africa diplomacy, in so far as the pipeline

would involve a large part of the ECOWAS members, as well as Moroccan diplomacy, which wishes to assert its leadership by demonstrating the implementation of a policy that is certainly African, but also oriented towards the European continent. Today, the reconfiguration of the global energy market is leading the Europe to diversify its energy supplies and suppliers and is targeting Nigeria, which is Africa's leading country in terms of gas reserves and the seventh largest in the world.

The opportunity present Nigeria's gas fields as an opportunity to supply gas through the pipeline linking Spain and morocco. In the context of the current gas crisis in Europe, Europe and United Kingdom needs to invest massively in gas project which would help solve the European energy crisis

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RUSSIAN – UKRAINE WAR: IMPLICATIONS ON AFRICAN EXTERNAL RELATIONS

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Abstract

In international politics, the national interest of a nation is pertinent. The ongoing war between Russia and Ukraine is nothing short of that. Since the collapse of the erstwhile Soviet Union, the West has been making considerable effort to weaken Russia. Hence, allowing Ukraine to be a member of NATO is not only a threat to its national interest but also its security and economic survival. The study, therefore, seeks to examine the implications of 'The Russian-Ukraine War on African external relations.' It observes that the invasion of Ukraine by Russia has arguably been the biggest military adventure in the 21st century. It is a strong signal that Russia will not tolerate any act that is inimical to its interest. It adopts 'Games Theory' to interrogate the discourse while relying on secondary sources to gather the relevant information. The study establishes the fact that, though, Russia has lost its superpower status, it is still a world power, a permanent member of the Security Council of the United Nations. Given this, it argues that beyond the bilateral and systemic political implications, the war will be felt in the dynamic of foreign exchange

earnings, global crude oil price, alters economic balance, rising costs of imported food items, equipment's, and many more. It concludes that both Russia and Ukraine already suffered and still counting heavy losses in the war. Notwithstanding, it is a pointer to the rebirth of the Cold War between Russia and the West. It recommends that African states need to exert their influence and determine the basis of their relations with either of the countries for them to be able to benefit optimally and not lost from the ongoing war.

Keywords: Foreign Policy, National Interest, War, Africa, Nigeria.

Introduction

International relations is a very broad discipline, complex and dynamic field of study because the environs and profound changes continue to take place in the system and these are changes whose nature, impact and scope are not always predictable. The post – 1991 world order was founded intellectually on the premise that the absence of competing major ideologies would lead to the absence or sharp reduction of all sources of tension between states; democracy and commerce would flourish, and international political life would become both safer and much more boring as a direct consequence (Fukuyama, 1992). On February 24 – following months of warning and concern from the Biden Administration, European allies, NATO, and some Members of Congress – Russia invaded Ukraine (Shane, et al 2022). Russia claimed its invasion was to conduct a "special military operation" to protect the

civilian population and to "demilitarize " and "de - Nazify" Ukraine: many observers understood the latter term as a false pretext for overthrowing the democratically elected Ukrainian government (Audrius, 2022).

The world has been watching the Russian – Ukraine war with apprehension, dismay and fear because the attack really shaken the foundations of international peace and security system. This crisis threatened the core principle underpinning the post – World War II international peace and security order, enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations – namely the prohibition of the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state. The former United States ambassador to Ukraine, William B. Taylor, stated that Putin seems to conduct foreign policy where powerful nations dominated and invaded less powerful nations, where nations established spheres of influence that oppressed neighbours, leading to war and suffering (Taylor, 2020).

This ugly occurrence has caused a large humanitarian crisis and is wreaking havoc on already fragile global economy which was just managing to slowly recover from the disruption caused by the pandemic (KPMG, 2022). The conflict itself can be considered as a clash of two opposing ideologies represented by the West on one side (the EU, the UN, NATO), and Russia on the other side. The European Union along with NATO, the UN, many non – governmental organizations, as well as the United States represent the liberal democratic stance that is

perceived by Russia as a threat to its existence and the status of the world's power. The Kremlin seems to be isolated and facing the network of complex alliances attempts to minimize the influence of the Western ideology on former Soviet States, which to a large degree are still influenced by the Russian federation (Gierczaki, 2020:11).

Soviet security policy for the majority of the Cold War overall remained locked into a heavily ideological Leninist version of Clausewitz's most famous dictum – that 'war is the continuation of politics by classes and governments through forceful and coercive means' (Wardak, 1989:58). What is evident is that this war carries all the echoes of the past, especially World I and II. Rather than the Russian invasion of Ukraine, marking a post-Western international system emerging, the role of U.S and its allies is glaring by coalesce to maximize their comparative advantage to push back against Putin's attempt to reshape the current international order. Infact, the conflict has become Europe's worst security crisis since the end of the second World War. The future impact of the war not only on the EU economy but also on other economies is largely unknown, depending not least on the duration of the war and on policies adopted by countries and companies around the world to find alternative sources of energy, raw materials and food.

Essentially, we must not forget the cardinal rules of international relations that lie at the root of this conflict. They are the principles of the sanctity of the sovereign territorial integrity of nations no matter how weak or

strong, big or small. Russian's invasion of Ukraine is a flagrant violation of this principle. Its deliberate carving up of Ukrainian territory by recognizing the breakaway regions as sovereign republics is a deepening of this annoying or original violation. On the other hand, there is the countervailing principle of spheres of influence. Under that convention, Russia has a right to see Ukraine as part of its sphere of influence for historical and strategic reasons. Recognition of that sphere of influence does not permit Russia to invade Ukraine; it only allows it to act in a manner to protect that sphere. While Ukraine may have a sovereign right to join or associate with the European Union, its right to join NATO, which is a military alliance is hindered by the convention of spheres of influence. Everything in the history of Russia and the independence of Ukraine dictates that matters of military alliance and security between the two states ought to be negotiated and agreed upon without the necessity of war (Amuta, 2022:66).

Thus, my analysis will contribute to a deeper understanding of the implications of the war on Africa external relations, which may still persist for a while as a result of the war in Ukraine, and how long such implications will continue, is unpredictable.

Understanding Russia/Ukraine Relations

Russia after the Soviet collapse remained both a federal multi – ethnic state, and one of the largest and most natural resource – rich countries on earth. Vladimir Putin also inherited from Boris Yeltsin a firmly presidential system of power, Russian parliamentary democracy having never

fully recovered from the bombardment of the White House on Moscow by troops acting under Yeltsin's orders in 1993. Putin then at one and the same time both accelerated this trend towards centralization during his own term in office, fostering the establishment of a nation-wide 'party of power' (Edinaia Rossia, or 'United Russia) under conditions of 'manage democracy', and simultaneously created an interesting constitutional dilemma – the appearance of the left – cited 'tandem' or 'diarchy' in Russia decision making, upon taking up the post of prime minister following completion of his second presidential term in 2008 (Marshall, 2011:179). Clearly, the Russian Federation has a long imperial history. Its sense of superiority and the need to prove it permeates much of its society. Umland (2019:38) emphasized the importance of Ukraine for Putin and noted that it led to:

... largely manufactured, yet nevertheless widespread collective agreement within large parts of Russia's population about rightfulness, justice and legitimacy of Moscow's various territorial, political, cultural and economic claims towards Ukraine.

Many links connected the two countries, creating an unbalanced relation of co-dependence and preventing Ukraine to develop an actual sense on nationality and self-determination. The country manifested more a desire of sovereignty and antipathy, especially in the west region, against Russian historic oppression, rather than a real

national ethos (Cenciarini, 2020:4). In view of this, Calamur (2014) argued that, the two countries are 'joined at the hip'. They share different cultural, economic and social characteristics: for example, Russian language is prevalent in the South West part of the country, Russian companies are largely investing in Ukraine and millions of Ukrainians work in Russia.

However, In 1991 when the USSR collapse, all these 15 countries became Independent and Ukraine gained Independence with 75% of the population being ethnically Russian and speaking Russian. Ukraine is a relatively young state. It is divided based on ethnicity with Ukrainian majority and Russian minority, Russian and Ukrainian language, religion, i.e. "Orthodox" Ukraine and "Catholic" Ukraine or differences between the Ukrainian Orthodox church of the Moscow Patriarchate and the Ukrainian Orthodox church of the Kyivan Patriarchate" (Olzacka, 2017:25). Noticeably, Ukraine is the second largest country in Europe after Russia. Ukraine crisis is a power struggle where some parts of the country wants to join hands with European Union and some wants to join hand with Russia. It was one of the founding member of Soviet Union and played a significant role in its economic development. Ukraine is squeezed between Russia and Europe, till 1991 it was part of Soviet Union after the disintegration. Ukraine has been a democracy country with a poor economy and the foreign policy has been either pro-Russian or Pro-European.

The Ukraine crisis began in 2013 when the then president Viktor Yanukovich cancelled the deal for a greater

integration with European Union, resulting in mass protest. Russia supported Yanukovich while the U.S and Europe supported the protesters. Anti-government protests started and Yanukovich ran out of the country. Russia tried to create its lost influence back in Ukraine and annexed Crimea. The Pro-Russian rebels began seizing territory, they had shot the Malaysian Airlines Flight killing 298 people, fight between the Ukraine military and pro-Russian escalated, where the rebels were losing. In order to tackle this, Russian army invaded eastern Ukraine to support the pro-Russian (Bhattacharya, et al, 2021).

Due to its independence, first, on the Soviet Union and, now, the Russian Federation, several issues have emerged and complicated the relations between Russia and Ukraine and, how, the Russian Federation, several issues have emerged and complicated the relations between Russia and Ukraine. While almost the entire Ukraine was controlled by the Russian Empire, there was an important entity that marked its influence on the existing conflict in the Luhansk and Donetsk regions. That entity was Novorossiia ("New Russia"). Novorossiia is a historical region extending from Odesa to Donetsk and up north to Dnepropetrovsk. Russian sense of identity has been developing in these areas since then. Moreover, it led to an assertion among the Russians that the historical region ought to be under their control. The ethnic and linguistic differences were intensified by Ukraine's long dependence on the Soviet Union and Russia, therefore thwarting the development of a strong sense of national identity of Ukrainians. Furthermore, having a status of a

Post – Soviet Satellite state, even after official recognition of independence, further deepened the conflicting positions regarding whether Ukraine should learn more towards the West (the European Union) or the East (the Russian Federation) (Gierczak, 2020:4).

Nonetheless, many Ukrainian, especially after gaining independence in 1991, preferred to establish their own sense of Ukrainian identity free from Polish influence in the West and Russian in the East. On multiple occasions, proponents of independence Ukraine stood in opposition to Russian activities that were meant to consolidate their influence on the Ukrainian government. Such was the case with the Orange Revolution in 2004 that resulted after forged presidential elections in Ukraine. For years, the Ukrainians felt that they were denied means of satisfying their fundamental needs, i.e. food, health care, and safety due to the despotic and oligarchical control of Russia. Declaration of a pro-Russian candidate, Victor Yanukovich, as a winner of the elections, motivated those who voted for a pro-European candidate, Viktor Yushchenko, to start a series of protests in Kyiv's Independence square and other major cities.

It was a clear sign that the Ukrainians were fed up with being dependent on Russia. The European Union's mediating mission led by then President of Poland, Aleksander Kwasniewski was successful to the extent that it provided grounds for settling the dispute within Ukraine as noted by Zwolski (2018:182-183), it was perceived by the Russians as a Polish attempt to distance itself from Russia by ridding Ukraine from its Eastern neighbour's

influence. The conflict was resolved by the Ukraine's Supreme Court, which ruled that the elections were falsified, thus revoking the Central Election Commission's results. In the repeated elections, Yushchenko won and became president whose goal was to minimize Russian influence in Ukraine and to cease the oligarchical pressures on the government and its policies (Gierczaki, 2020:5)

Without mincing words, the Ukrainian independent in 1991, achieved during the process of dissolutions of the USSR (Bebber, 2015), could not eradicate the permanence of the Russian culture and language spread over the country, especially in the South – east region. As pointed out by Lakomy (2016:282): Ukraine has been an area of increasing differences and tensions, partly inherited from difficult historical processes, and partly developed during the post – cold War era. It has become a country permeated by conflicting interests and long – lasting division.

Situating Russia - Ukraine Conflict

The foreign policy concept that followed in 2000 was both more developed, and highly pragmatic, emphasizing above all the need to achieve firm and prestigious positions in the world community, most fully consistent with the interests of the Russian Federation as a great power, as one of the most influential centres of the modern world, as (as is furthermore) necessary for the growth of (her own) political, economic, intellectual and spiritual potential (Marshall, 2011:184). This was then further articulated in a concrete desire to seek a 'multi-polar

system of international relations', whilst also noting increasing regional and sub-regional integration, and emphasizing Russia's own stance of 'consistency and predictability (founded upon) mutually advantageous pragmatism' (Gaidar, 2007). With the assumption of power by Viktor Yanukovich, Ukraine continues to pursue a foreign policy that prioritizes Europe and good relations with the U.S. but has moved decisively away from actively pursuing NATO membership.

In his visit to Brussels, President Yanukovich highlighted the elements of continuity in Ukraine's foreign policy by signaling his intent to secure Ukraine's membership of the EU and signed an association agreement to build closer trade, political and social links between the EU and Ukraine. In April 2011, Yanukovich also highlighted the importance of strengthening good relations with the US when he agreed at the Nuclear Security Summit in Washington to renounce the nation's stockpile of highly enriched Uranium and reaffirmed his government's commitment to the 1008 US – Ukraine Charter on Strategic Partnership. Yanukovich has, however, explicitly rejected Ukraine's former policy goal of securing NATO membership. Yanukovich has instead pledge to continue cooperation with NATO while pursuing non – bloc status aimed at improving and strengthening relations with Ukraine's largest and most powerful neighbor, the Russian Federation (Sanders, 2011:191).

More particularly, since the 'Orange Revolution' at the end of 2004, Ukraine's foreign policy prioritized Euro-

Atlantic integration. The former president, Victor Yushchanko, stated that his main goal was to secure Ukraine's membership in the EU and NATO and, at least in the early months of his presidency, the prospects of membership in both organizations appeared bright (The White Book, 2006). The collapse of Viktor Yanukovych's governance, highly manipulated by the Russian leader Vladimir Putin, provoked with a chain effect, two particular affects, in relation to Russia:

- (1) Russia became aware that Ukraine would have become harder, if not impossible, to control, and counter measures were formulated in order not to lose one of the connections that benefited Russia and expanded its internal influence.
- (2) The question of national belonging reopened some unsolved issues in those regions where fragile co-existence between Russian and Ukrainian ownership was still not contested. It is the case of the already discussed south – eastern regions, where things remained frozen since the end of the Cold War, and a 'neither/ or ' question was not demanded (Calamur, 2014).

On February 24, 2022, hours after Putin's televised address announcing a "special military", Russia invaded Ukraine with an air and missile attack, using precision – guided munitions (PGMs) against key targets. These early targets included logistics centers, naval installations, command and control centers, air defenses, and critical infrastructure (Isabelle, 2022). The invasion comes after a decade of deteriorating relations between Russia and

Ukraine and the West. The invasion of Ukraine by Russia, contrary to the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 68 / 62 of 27 March 2014 on Territorial Integrity of Ukraine, not only raises questions on Russian fears about the possible use of Ukraine to threaten the national security of Russia, but also on why Russia has opted to defend its own national security to the detriment of whatever is the position of international law (Akinterinwa, 2022:65).

Retrospectively, the conflict emerged around several issues. It is a complex inter relation of ethnic, religious, political and economic interests that concerns the international observers of the conflict. Moreover, the role of the European Union in the conflict was emphasized by Mear Sheimer (2014), Lakomy (2016), and Zwolski (2018). To understand the conflict as a whole, it will be necessary to investigate the conflict issues, which can be categorized into five groups: one, Russian maintenance of Post-Soviet states; two, Ukraine's sovereignty; three, status of the Crimea, Donetsk; four, Ukraine's sense of national identity; and five, international alliances (with Ukraine being at the center of conflicting ideologies) (Gierczaki, 2020:7). Although, the Russia – Ukraine conflict can be traced back to 2015 over the ethnic Russian people who are Pro-Russia and are living in Ukraine and the Ukraine military over culture and language issues.

Ukraine is a democracy country with a poor economy and its policies are either pro-Russian and pro-Europe, half of the population wants to join EU, and half wants to be part of Russia and remain loyal to its native land. Fight

between the two countries and where by Crimea which is an important part of both the countries located near the Ukraine eastern side an autonomy country which joined hands with Russia, as it was part of Russia and followed the ethnic Russian culture and language. However, the first friction between the Ukrainian population and the Russian political pressure, was provoked by the president of Ukraine, Viktor Yanukovich, and his decisions against an association agreement toward the European Union in 2013 (Hoggins, 2014). The strong will of Ukraine citizens and political movements in favour of a nationalist approach in opposition to Russian influence, led to a period of protests against the government, whose leader (Viktor) was, then, removed from power in 2014 during the Ukrainian Revolution (Conant, 2014).

Again, the proximity of Ukraine to the EU's member states allows the financial and technical support to be provided for the Ukrainians. This is certainly perceived as a threat by the Russian government, which deems any approximation to Russia's western neighbor as possible endangerment. Before the conflict began, Russia used to supply gas to Ukraine; however, as noted by the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), "beginning in 2015, Ukraine has significantly reduced its direct import of Russian natural gas and instead has received natural gas shipments from Europe". Therefore, such clear support given to Ukraine by the EU gives legitimate reasons for Putin to feel threatened by the gradual approximation of Ukraine to the EU. As the same time, however, the broader strategic context also obviously remains crucial – Russia is not a member of NATO or a member of the EU, but she

is playing a role again in a number of old and new strategic forums, amongst the United Nations Security Council (UNSC); the G-8 and G-20; the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO, Comprising Russia, Belarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan); the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO, comprising Russia, China, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan); the Eurasian Economic Community (EEC); and the more loosely aligned BRIC states (Brazil, Russia, India and China) of rapidly developing economies. This institutional context provides Russia with a complex and interwoven set of global and regional priorities, encompassing both 'hard power' and 'soft power' security issues (Marshall, 2011:179).

Therefore, Russia's renewed invasion of neighboring Ukraine in February 2022 marked the start of Europe's deadliest armed conflict in decades. After a steady buildup of military forces along Ukraine's borders since 2021, Russia invaded Ukraine on February 24, 2022, with Russia ground forces attacking from multiple directions (Bowen, 2022:1). Putin seeing the invasion of Ukraine as a personal mission to reverse the end of the Soviet Union that began on December 26, 1991, which he calls "the greatest geo-political tragedy of the 20th century" (Associated Press, 2005). Initially, Russian forces made gains along all lines of advance. However, Russian forces ran into effective and likely unexpected levels of Ukrainian resistance from the invasion's outset. In addition, many analysts and officials assess that during this first stage of the war, the Russian military performed poorly overall and was hindered by specific tactical

choices, poor logistics, ineffective communications, and command-and -control issues, the Ukrainian military, while at a quantitative and qualitative disadvantage in personnel, equipment and resources, has proven more resilient and adaptive than Russia expected over the course of the first several weeks of the war, Russian President Vladimit Putin and the Russian military had to adjust to various setbacks and other developments on the ground. With many of its advances stalled, in late March 2022, Russian defense officials announced that Russian military operations would focus oneatern Ukraine, including the regions of Donetsk and Luhansk (collective known as the Donbas, where Russian – led separatists have been fighting since 2014) and that Russia would withdraw its forces around Kyiv and Chernihiv in the north (Bowen, 2022).

Unimaginably, Moscow deployed 180,000 men at the start of its military campaign in February and is estimated to have since suffered about 80,000 deaths and injuries, according to the U.S Ukraine, which had declared full mobilization, has a total number of troops between 700,000 and 1mn (KYIV, 2022:4). During the first month of fighting, Ukrainians repelled many Russian attacks, conducted counter – offensives and liberated some areas, most significantly around the capital Kyiv. The war has left thousands of Ukrainian civilians dead and injured, and cities partially razed to the ground. According to the UNHCR, more than 5.2 million refugees, mostly women and children, have been recorded as having fled to neighbouring countries. In addition, as of 23 June, the International Organization for Migration

estimates that more than 6.2 million people have been internally displaced, despite the fact that 5.5 million internally displaced people have already returned to their homes (European Parliament, 2022).

Mr. Putin has had difficulty understanding that his invasion of Ukraine has gone badly. As it turns out, his plans and projections were disastrous. His troops have been vastly decimated as they have lost territory they had previously occupied in the early stages of war that was planned to last less than a few days. Months have rolled by and Russian casualties, including high ranking generals, have mounted. His troops are on the run as territory previously overrun has fallen under a Ukrainian counter offensive – vast amounts of equipment and gear have been abandoned by fleeing Russian troops. Fields of human remains that loudly testify to serious war crimes have been uncovered. Domestic opinion against the war and indeed the Putin regime has begun to mount and has recently graduated into street protests (Amuta, 2022:68).

Clearly, observers continue to speculate about Russia's initial objectives and plans in launching its offensive against Ukraine. Many analysts believe Russia's expectations were based on faulty assumptions that undermined Russia's conduct of the invasion (Detsch & Mackinnon, 2022). If this is the case, these incorrect political assumptions possibly determined and imposed unrealistic objectives and timetables onto the Russian military. This in turn may partially, but not entirely, explain the Russian military's unpreparedness and poor performance (Chotiner, 2022).

Theoretical Framework

Political scientists have long analyzed political conflict, especially international relations, in terms of a series of games played by rational players in order to understand and predict events. The classic game played by game theorists is the prisoner's dilemma. As a result of the most irrational outcome that usually happens, with an overall score for the game of minus 10, the theory is highly imperative in understanding the international system. Game theorists claim that this dilemma explains many of the irrational outcomes of supposedly rational but selfish decision-making we find all around us (Mann, 2007:173). This dilemma has been applied to international conflict, specifically to the nuclear balance of terror between the US and the USSR during the Cold War. The Americans and Russians were like two scorpions in a bottle: each could literally wipe out in one day most of the other's military forces and major cities with the thousands of nuclear – armed rockets and atomic bombs in their arsenals, with the potential side effect of destroying the planet in the process (Mann, 2007:174).

Borrowing from economics, game theory and rational choice theory became popular for explaining the choices and optimizing behaviour of self-interested states in an anarchical international system as well as a means for interpreting the actions of their foreign policy decision makers. Given the dangers and unpredictability of such a system, theory building was motivated by the desire to control and predict (Wattz, 1979:6). The search for systematic inquiry could, hopefully, contribute to the effort of diminishing the likelihood of future conflict. Broadly defined as positivist, this turn to science

represents a view of the creation of knowledge based on four assumptions: first, a belief in the unity of science that is, the same methodologies can apply in the natural and social worlds; second, that there is a distinction between facts and values, with facts being neutral between theories; third, that the social world has regularities like natural world; and fourth, that the way to determine the truth of statements is by appeal to neutral facts or an empiricist epistemology (Smith, 1997:168).

Applications of game – theoretic models have themselves become more sophisticated and more complex. Prisoner’s dilemma and related 2 X 2 games were useful for the analysis of simple strategic situations, but the move to extensive-form games, particularly sequential games with incomplete information, marks a profound theoretical advance. The greater realism of the new models has contributed to a strong revival of interest in game – theoretic approaches in recent years. These games incorporate the uncertainty that decision-makers routinely face, the sequence of choices and counter-choices that generally characterize the outbreak of war, the problem of the credibility of commitments in an anarchic world, and the dynamics of signaling (Levy, 1998:160).

In the context of this discourse, there is no gainsaying in the fact that, the on-going conflict between Russia and Ukraine is a clear reflection and manifestation of politics of survival in contemporary reality of global politics. Based on this, the 'Games Theory' is considered absolutely relevant to the study.

Exploring Western Conspiracy in Russia – Ukraine Conflict

The Russian – Ukrainian war is interesting from various perspectives. First, is it a war? If it is, which type of war? Is it a lawful war? Is it not a war of attrition? Western countries call it a Russian invasion while the Russians say it is a 'Special Military Intervention'. The United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) calls it an aggression. Whether it is an invasion, a special military intervention, or aggression, they all have the same devastating effects. Second, the war raises the nexus between technocratic advice and decisions of policy makers. For instance, US foreign policy technocrats have been warning and on a serious note, that the United States should not encourage the membership expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to Eastern Europe, warning that the implications could be more deleterious. The political decision makers listened to the advice but never accepted it. Thirdly, the Russian – Ukrainian war has divided, more than it has united the European Union. Several policy decisions taken by the European Union as sanctionary measures against Russia also have negative impact of some of the EU Member states. This has been to the extent that such members have been asking for exemptions. Fourthly, the war not only raises the issue of membership of countries like Sweden and Switzerland, of the NATO, and also of the security protection of such countries in Europe. In this regard, is neutrality in international relations coming to an end in the event of Sweden and Switzerland acceding to the NATO agreement? (Akinterinwa, 2022:54).

From the early 2005, the European Union shifted its focus outside the European border, moving towards the eastern countries, planning on new agreements and alliances. The idea was to avoid direct 'assimilation' proposals inside the union; but, instead, building strong partnerships and closer political ties (Macfarlane & Menon, 2014). Ukraine has been a strategic stronghold, in relation to western countries and for its position in the Black Sea (Menkiszak, 2016). Specifically, Mearsheimer (2014:79-80) pointed out that the: "West's final tool for peeling Kyiv away from Moscow has been its efforts to spread Western values and promote democracy in Ukraine and other post-Soviet states, a plan that often entails funding pro-Western individuals and organization". From the Eastern side, an alliance of Ukraine with the EU was incompatible with the programme of Russia to build a Russia – led economic space between close countries, geographically and historically, called custom union. The refusal to sign the Association Agreement proposed by EU to Ukraine in 2013, widely supported by the Western part of the country, marked an official statement regarding its position between the European Union and Russia (Havik, 2014).

The United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolutions meant very little or nothing to Russia which underscores her national security. Russia strategic focus is to prevent the establishment of any NATO military base in any of the former Soviet States, particularly Ukraine. And, foreign policy wise, Russia wants a Russo – American joint strategy in managing global insecurity while the United States is wrapped up in the glory of its

superiority, it does not want joint leadership, and is vehemently opposed to anyone having the capacity to challenge its global leadership. This conflict in foreign policy positions of the two countries explains why the United States has been consciously expanding the membership of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) contrary to bilateral agreements reached with Russia and why Russia has also reactively been opposed to such an agenda. Russia is vehemently opposed to the nearness of NATO operations in its contiguous environment. It is opposed to Ukraine's membership of NATO. This is the main background to the dispute and the ongoing war in Ukraine. The war is first between Russia and NATO before it was between Russia and Ukraine (Akinterinwa, 2022:65).

Though, as at the time North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was founded in 1949, its primary mission was to protect Western Europe from any possible Soviet Union aggression. It achieved its mission in this respect. The whole of Eastern Europe fell to the mighty Soviet Union. But NATO was a powerful military shield that Moscow could not penetrate. After the disintegration of the erstwhile Soviet Union in 1989, NATO has been increasing in number. Meanwhile, the WARSAW Pact is now defunct and Russia is now bereft of any concrete military alliance comparable to NATO. But then, NATO is grossly limited where the primary interest of Russia is at stake. On 2 March, the UN General Assembly (UNGA) adopted a resolution reaffirming Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity with a broad majority. With Russian consistent attack on Ukraine, many western

countries have out sanction on Russian economy especially US, UK and NATO. It is no more part of G8, which has now become G7. US and Russian relations have been worsened due to Ukraine crisis with most western countries like Germany, Britain providing assistance to Ukraine.

The EU and its allies, within and beyond NATO, have adopted hard – hitting sanctions aimed at causing severe damage to the Russian economy. In an unprecedented move, the EU mobilized resources under the European Peace Facility to provide military assistance, including lethal equipment, to Ukraine. On the humanitarian front, the EU is providing aid, including through the EU Civil Protection mechanism, and has activated the Temporary Protection Directive. Humanitarian aid mobilized by the European Commission consist of £348 million of humanitarian funding in response to the war in Ukraine, of which £335 million for Ukraine and £13million for Moldova (European Parliament, 2022).The Russo-Ukrainian war is strategically a struggle for the maintenance of the Euro-American drive global hegemony. As such, the war is not simply between Russia and Ukraine. The war is in three layers: Russo-Ukrainian, Euro-Ukrainian, and Russo-American dominated NATO. At the first level of Russia and Ukraine, the question of Ukraine's membership of the NATO is a very critical issue. Ukraine is being encouraged, if not being pressured, to join the NATO. Russia is vehemently opposed to such membership, considering the security implications. For Russia, considering the recidivist de-Russification in various manners, and based on Europe's subtle

militarisation of Ukraine, Russia wants to completely neutralize Ukraine and remove whatever the country stands for and that makes her attractive to NATO countries.

In the absence of any relevant Ukraine, the NATO would have been weakened. At the second level of Euro-Ukrainian strategy, the support for Ukraine is preventive defence. The EU does not want the extension of the Ukrainian shooting war to come nearer the borders of the EU countries, hence the need to help Ukrainians to fight their battle at home, and to make it more difficult and more costly for Russia to win the war. Besides, there is the need to also ensure the sustenance of cordial ties with Ukraine, considered the most important ally of the EU in the context of the Union's Eastern partnerships and the European Neighbourhood Policy. And true enough, the EU and Ukraine have been making efforts to go beyond relationships of partnership to efforts at politico-economic integration. This ultimate objective requires cautionary policies that can prevent much destruction and sustain Ukraine (Akinterinwa, 2022: 54).

Predictably, Mr. Putin has played the dictator's game. He has threatened the world with a nuclear holocaust if the war in Ukraine continues to go against his wish. He carefully chose the eve of the 77th United Nations General Assembly to broadcast this grave threat. To indicate that he may not be bluffing, he disclosed the obvious fact that Russia is armed to the teeth with all classes of nuclear weapons both strategic and tactical. In addition, he unveiled a hasty plan to call up a reservist force of an

additional 300,000 men to join his army of mostly conscripts in the Ukraine operation. It did not matter to him that additional force will need to be mobilized, trained, equipped and motivated to go into a war that many realize has entered an attrition stage. Worse still, Putin revealed a microwave plan to hold referenda in the Donbass and Luhansk regions of Ukraine which it had previously occupied and colonized (Amuta, 2022:68). On the face of it, Putins belligerent rhetoric addressed to the United Nations is not unprecedented. Since its formation, the United Nations has always been confronted with the urgency of managing the dissenting voices of non-conformist leaders in a world that has remained divided either along ideological or temperamental lines. There is, in fact, an unwritten code that what has sustained the United Nations as a multinational platform is the freshness of dissenting voices and uncommon leadership types that it has had to deal with over the years. Leaders with divergent ideas, viewpoints and orientations have come to New York in previous years to hawk ideas an perspective that do not necessarily conform to universally accepted norms.

In view of the foregoing analysis, it needs to be perfectly understood that, while Russian expansion (or aggression) is perceived as a threat to the balance of power established after World War II, the approximation of the European Union and the United States to Russia by extending their spheres of influence in Ukraine can be perceived as a threat to Russian security. As pointed out by Mearsheimer (2014:80):

[W]hen Russian leaders look at Western social engineering in Ukraine, they worry that their country might be next .

Undoubtedly, while each of their interests seem legitimate, there will be some degree of consensus required to reach in this conflict. A lot of people had died since the beginning of the crisis. It is necessary to bring the conflict to peace.

Russia-Ukraine Conflict: Implications on African External Relations

The Russian Federation and Ukraine are among the most important producers of agricultural commodities in the world. Both countries are net exporters of agricultural products, and they both play leading supply roles in global market of foodstuffs and fertilizers, where exportable supplies are often concentrated in a handful of countries. This concentration could expose these markets to increased vulnerability to shocks and volatility. Combined, the two countries, on average, accounted for 19, 14 and 4 percent, respectively, of global output of barley, wheat and maize between 2016/17 and 2020/21. in the oil seed complex, their contribution to global production was particularly important for sunflower oil, with just over half of world output originating, on average, in the two countries during this period. In 2021, either the Russian Federation or Ukraine (or both) ranked amongst the top three global exporters of wheat, maize, rapeseed, sunflower seeds and sunflower oil, while the Russian Federation also stood as the world's top exporter of

nitrogen fertilizers, the second leading supplier of potassium fertilizers and the third largest exporter of phosphorous fertilizer (Council, 2022:3). Apparently, the war in Ukraine has already caused extensive damage and loss of life in key population centres, spread across rural areas and sparked massive displacement. Many countries that are highly dependent on imported foodstuffs and fertilizers, including numerous that belong to the Least Developed Country (LDC) and Low-Income Food-Deficit Country (LIFDC) groups, rely on Ukrainian and Russian food supplies to meet their consumption needs (Council, 2022:4).

A war in Ukraine will trigger a massive negative supply shock in a global economy (Roubini, 2022). The price shocks will have global consequences. There will be supply and commodity price shocks with wide ranging long-term consequences. Production, consumption, and trade in commodities will change as countries move towards greater self-sufficiency, creating opportunities for new suppliers. The war is leading to costlier trading patterns and a major diversion in energy trade, and the outlook for commodity markets is highly dependent on the length of the war and the disruption it causes in supply chains (World Bank, 2022). The impact on countries' economies will be heterogeneous and asymmetric and will also differ greatly depending on the economies' gas intensity (IMF, 2022).

As of the beginning of May, only Lim et al (2022) have stated that the war in Ukraine could have a negative impact on business through limited access to funds,

reduced purchasing power, an increasing inflation rate, and a threat to sustainable growth and restrictions on trade as a result of sanctions. Between 26th May and 4th April, the Secretary General of the United Nations (UN), Mr. Antonio Guterres, undertook a lightning trip to five countries in Eastern Europe and West Africa. He was in Russia and Ukraine for a first-hand assessment of and possible but late mediation in the war raging on Ukrainian soil. Then, he crossed over to Senegal, Niger and Nigeria where he highlighted, among others, the enormous impact of the war in Europe on a region far from the battle fields and already burdened with terrorism, climate change, and other developmental challenges. "This war is aggravating a triple crisis: food, energy, and financial, for the region and well beyond," Guterres said in Senegal (Adio, 2022).

Thus, African countries have not only shown uncoordinated and uncommon approach to the Russo-Ukrainian war, but also an attitudinal non-alignment. And the reasons cannot be far-fetched. A country like Egypt that wheat importations from Russia and Ukraine were to the tune of 45% cannot be expected to take side. Infact, the United States Institute of Peace has it that there is an impending food scarcity in Africa, based on the consideration that in 2020 alone, Africa \$ 4bn and \$ 2.9bn worth of agricultural products respectively from Russia and Ukraine. And with the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian war, prices of corn, wheat and soybeans have surged. And more disturbingly, the institute also says that about 20m people in the Sahel and West Africa do not have access to sufficient food. This is apart from the impact on oil exploration activities by Lukoil and Tatneft

Oil Companies, particularly in the Gulf of Guinea (Cameroon, Congo Kinshasa, Equatorial Guinea, and Nigeria) which are likely to be suspected (Akinterinwa, 2022:54).

The African Union is not united to the extent of adopted a United front via-a-vis the Russo-Ukrainian conflict. Infact, the disunity, is not only manifestly continentally, but also at the national level. The pattern of African at the United Nations voting on condemnation of the Russian invasion is another reflection of the non-coordinated approach to the conflict. On 2nd March, 2022, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution which condemned 'Russia's aggression against Ukraine'. It was voted by 141 out of the 193 members states of the organization. 35 countries abstained from voting. Of the 35 abstaining countries, 17 of them were from Africa, Eritrea was the only African country that voted against the resolution. A total of 93 countries voted in favour of suspension, 58 countries abstained while 24 countries voted against. Algeria, Burundi, CAR, Congo, Eritea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Mali, and Zimbabwe voted against the suspension. Apart from Nigeria, Eswatini, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Senegal, South Africa, Sudan, Togo and Uganda abstaining from voting (Akinterinwa, 2022:54).

Towards Russia or more precisely the old Soviet Union, some elites nostalgia still exists in some African countries. Many of the first and second generation African elite in the days of the Cold War studied in the USSR. Ideological nostalgia towards the 'evil empire' is strongest in places

like Mozambique, Angola,, Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa where political parties that pioneered the independence and anti-racist struggles were backed by the old Soviet Union (Amuta, 2022:66). And, perhaps, most interestingly, the issue of non-alignment is also necessarily raised at the level of Africa's attitudinal disposition towards the conflict. The Ukrainian president has been strenuously courting Africa's support. So has Western diplomacy tried to do, but Africa is already sharply divided on the matter. Apart from the division at the continental level, the division is also deep within some countries because of the growing effects in various dimensions in many countries of Africa. What has been and what should be Africa's approach to the conflict? What is the place of non-alignment policy in this regard? How will Africa be affected by the Russo-NATO quest for global hegemony? How will Africa be shaped again in the emerging new world order (Akinterinwa, 2022:54).

Summary and Conclusion

The Russo-Ukrainian war, as it has been shown throughout this analysis, is complex. A variety of interrelated causes, a long history that ties together but also divides the society, strong spheres of influence from countries with opposing ideologies, a broad network of influential groups and individuals with a variety of interests contribute to the complexity of the conflict. Conflict has a set of complex underlying causes and long-lasting grievances. Conflicts that have a long history and are fueled by strong ideologies require meticulous approach to their resolution with an emphasis on changing the attributes of the parties involved.No doubt, Mr. Putin

miscalculated his chances in the Ukraine mission. He probably underestimated the extent to which Ukrainians detest and even hate the Russians. For, it is difficult to sustain a massive military campaign in a terrain where the occupying force is so despised. Also, Mr. Putin never estimated the grounds well of international opposition that his invasion of Ukraine would attract. More tragically, he probably did not calculate the character of Russia's post war relations with the European states and former Soviet republics that Russia has to live with in perpetuity.

However, the irrational attitude of Mr. Putin has clearly demonstrated the fact that, the 'Might is Right'. Aggressive tendencies is peculiar with all the world powers. Hence, the world still needs a powerful stable Russia as a bulwark against the excesses of the West just as much as we need a wealthy Europe and the US to demonstrate the relative advantages of liberal democracy and the power of the free market. For those who are desirous or anxious about how this war will end, there are few certainties. First, Russia can neither crush nor annihilate Ukraine. Second, Russia will not be able to prevail against a coalition of the US, NATO and the rest of the free world. Third, the coalition of pro-Ukrainian forces will not be able to defect Russia and exclude it from the international system. A humiliated Russia is an unlikely historical oddity (Amuta, 2022:68). It is doubtful if the two parallel lines will meet somewhere in a bombed out Ukraine. Putin would probably find more satisfaction in being a party and also a guarantor of the kind of peace he desires.

Russia's permanent membership in U.N Security Council and the Veto Power along with the status of a nuclear power puts Russia in an advantageous position compared to Ukraine, which is not militarily supported and does not enjoy the international status anywhere similar to that of Russia. Moreover, in order to try and eradicate Putin's Neo-Soviet ideology from Eastern Europe, it would be necessary to hold him responsible for political crimes. Unfortunately, no one can predict how long the conflict will last and how soon we can return to an acceptable level of stability. As wartime leader Winston Churchill reminds us:

Never, never, never believe any way will be smooth and easy, or that anyone who embarks on the strange voyage can measure the tides and hurricanes he will encounter. The statesman who yields to war fever must realize that once the signal is given, he is no longer the master of policy but the slave of unforeseeable and uncontrollable events.

Notwithstanding, the uncertainty, some of the key signposts to watch for include: the effectiveness of the coordinated sanctions, the marginal changes in diplomatic position of the parties involved in the conflict and the progress (or lack thereof) of the negotiations, the military situation on the ground and the effectiveness of Ukraine's resistance. Above all, the desire for peace to prevail can and should be unequivocally communicated by all those who have a voice (KPMG, 2022).

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**INVESTIGATION OF UNDERGRADUATES'
DISPOSITION TOWARDS THE CULTURE OF
PEACE IN NIGERIAN UNIVERSITIES.**

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An Empirical Investigation of University Undergraduates' Disposition Towards the Culture of Peace in Selected Nigerian Universities in South-Western Nigeria.

Abstract

This study gathered empirical data on university undergraduates' disposition to culture of peace from 2,083 university undergraduate cross-culturally spread across 6 public universities in South-Western Nigeria. These universities and corresponding sample size are: Obafemi Awolowo University 471, University of Ibadan 407, University of Lagos 549, Olabisi Onabanjo University 356, Adekunle Ajasin University 307, Ekiti States University 283. Both qualitative and quantitative data were gathered on students' actual disposition to campus peace from all the respondents sampled in this study. The instrument used to gather data is a 14 item

undergraduates Disposition to Culture of Peace (UDCP) certified as possessing adequate psychometric properties.

The result of the findings of this study revealed that undergraduates were adequately disposed to culture of peace on their campuses. The Result also indicated that majority of respondents were indisposed to being hired by politicians as agents of violence on university campuses. Majority of respondents found unilateral increase in school fees as important factor affecting their disposition of peace on university campuses. Lack of dialogue and adequate communication between university and undergraduates are also found as important factors affecting their disposition to peace. Lastly, Adequate provision of municipal services like water, electricity and campus transportation system as important determinants to the culture of peace. The major trend however, is that safe guarding and protecting students' welfare are important barometers in measuring whether school policies and regulations promote peace or violence on university campuses production.

Keywords: *Culture of Peace, Undergraduates', Disposition, University.*

Introduction

Disposition as a concept is emotional preparedness for action. Disposition unlike perception is a step preceding action. In psychological palace, disposition is like the action component of attitude. This study therefore is like investigating the action component of students' attitude to

peace. In practical terms, one's emotional disposition to any issue determines the action component that follows.

The study therefore seeks to gather data on undergraduates' disposition or action component as regards several parameters and ramifications of the culture of peace on university campuses. Matters relating to maintenance of peace on university campuses are so germane and important that action-oriented researches like this study, are perhaps needed to prevent Nigeria from losing hours of productivity on periodic crisis on university campuses.

Literature Review

Review of Literature indicated dirt of action-oriented researchers on culture of peace in Nigeria Universities. Studies such as Denga 1982, Alabi 2005 presented data on episodic cases of crisis and violence. Some other studies provided information on approaches to maintenance of peace in Nigeria Universities. Studies such as Aluede, Jimoh, Ageinede and Omoreghe 2005, Tayo 2006 fall into this category. Studies also provided rationale for the inclusion of peace education in Nigeria Universities' curriculum as a way of impacting peace ((NUC 2004). From the length and breadth of literature reviewed, creating a culture of peace requires a fundamental change in knowledge, attitudes, behavior and worldview which enables the learners to take action for a more peaceful world. Peace education thus seeks to play a role in the societal transformation especially among university undergraduates which is the focus of this study. The desire, hope and need for peace according to Albert

2009 are universal and transcend all ages and places. Unfortunately, humanity has never established a clear culture of peace where everyone without exception is able to live in peace. If culture is being looked at as a way of life, it implies that a culture of peace means a peaceful way of living. The key challenge being faced is how to establish a global model of living in peace where all people live in peace with one another. Corroborating this assertion as noted in the above sub-theme is the belief that peace education seeks to address this challenge. According to Freire (2002), the reason why peace education is such a difficult task is the continuous war education that youngsters and adults have been receiving since the beginning of humankind. Parents teach their children with the notion that primary purpose of life is to ensure one's own survival, security and success in a dangerous conflicted and violent world. The problem compounds when also in school children and undergraduates alike are introduced to these conflicted-based views through the actual experience of school life with its culture of conflict, competition, aggression, bullying and violence. Danesh (2006) argues that we teach our children that the world is a jungle, that life is the process of survival in this jungle and that power is the essential tool to emerge victorious in this highly conflicted and violence-prone world. It is therefore not surprising that every new generation matures with much greater familiarity, certainty and comfort with the ways of conflict, competition and violence than those of harmony, cooperation and peace. A culture of peace among university undergraduates should integrate concepts of both negative and positive peace and involves the

transformation of society from the current culture of war and violence to a culture of peace and non-violence. Negative peace according to Galtung (1964) is the absence of violence while positive peace is the presence of social justice and equality and the absence of structural or indirect violence. It is pertinent to note that no known study makes a strong case for a skill-based approach to campus peace as this study. A study of this nature on undergraduates' disposition to campus peace is a skill-based investigation about actual disruptors of peace on university campuses.

In today's world, a culture of peace should be seen as the essence of a new humanity, a new global civilization based on inner oneness and outer diversity. The flourishing of a culture of peace will go a long way in transforming university undergraduates from the culture of violence to a culture of peace. Culture of peace will provide the bedrock of support to a stable, progressing and prospering world for all. This according to Gastro and Galace (2008), will generate the mind-set in us (especially the university undergraduates) that is a prerequisite for the transition from force to reason, from conflict and violence to dialogue and peace. Culture of peace will provide the bedrock of support to a stable, progressing and prospering world for all.

The task therefore of educating university undergraduates to find non-aggressive means to relate with the school authorities and with one another is of primary importance. And for all educational institutions to have a strong mechanism for peace, putting into consideration that the

gap between promise and reality should not be too wide so as to sustain the culture of peace is also very crucial.

Quite evidently, student's age is the crucially important period which enriches one's personal life, nurtures social adjustments, fosters friendship and understanding and affects one's whole life pattern. Seen from this perspective, one could very well understand the critical necessity of teaching students, youths and young leaders the art of living together in mutual respect, justice love and peace. Whitehead (2009) calls education 'the acquisition of the art of the utilization of knowledge'. It is therefore of utmost importance to tell our students and young leaders about our world and its problems. There is the need to explain to them their part in the solutions, the need to instill in them a genuine appreciation of and a profound liking towards our humanitarian traditions and values such as non-violence, tolerance, understanding, cooperation and of course peace. In conclusion, Wells (2006) opined that human history becomes more and more a race between education and catastrophe and hence the need to educate the youth for peace.

Methodology

This study collected data from 2,083 university undergraduates in 6 public Nigerian universities in South Western Nigeria. They are: Obafemi, University of Ibadan, University of Lagos, Olabisi Onabanjo University, Adekunle Ajasin University, Ekiti State University. The instrument used to collect data is a 14-item detailed questionnaire with a 4 response Likert scale with test-re-test reliability co-efficient of 0.05.

The instrument was also found to have adequate construct and validity properties. Pilot study data was also employed to enhance the psychometric properties used in this study.

The instrument was pilot-tested using the test re-test, reliability method among similar respondents in an institution outside the selected schools for this study. The results obtained from the test- re-test were subjected to Cronbach alpha test. The pilot sample size was excluded from the actual study.

Findings

Table 1.1: RESPONSE of students' disposition to culture of peace

S/N	Culture of peace	Disposition Status		Mean	Rank
		Disposed	Indisposed		
		Freq. (%)	Freq. (%)		
1	Whenever I'm on the university campus I am generally happy and at peace with myself.	1617 (77.6)	466 (22.4)	2.93	1
2	The transportation system in this school is too stressful for students.	1030 (49.4)	1053 (50.6)	2.49	6
3	Secret cult activities are so prevalent in this university that in future peace and order may be compromised by cult activities.	742 (35.6)	1341 (64.4)	2.15	10
4	The inclusion of peace education in university curriculum would enhance the culture of peace in my university.	1530 (73.5)	553 (26.5)	2.88	2
5	Personally, I do not feel too much worried whether there is peace or not in my university	601 (28.9)	1482 (71.2)	1.99	13
6	If I deem it necessary, I will actively participate in violent students' protest against the university authorities.	649 (31.2)	1434(68.8)	2.02	12
7	It is the duty of students to protect the Nigerian masses by protesting against perceived injustice in the policies and	1207 (58.0)	876 (42.0)	2.57	4

	operation of government outside the university.				
8	Where there is lack of fairness, equity and justice in school policies, I will not hesitate to participate in violent agitation against the university authorities.	824 (39.6)	1259(60.4)	2.25	9
9	When school fees are increased without adequate consultation, students' violent agitations are just and necessary and I would actively participate in such agitations.				
10	If I am hired by people or politician outside or inside the university to cause crisis in the university and the price offered is alright, I may cooperate.	563 (27.0)	1520 (73.0)	1.89	14
11	Personally, I do not feel too much worried whether there is peace or not in my university.	711 (34.1)	1372 (65.9)	2.09	11
12	If I deem it necessary, I will actively participate in students' protest against the university authorities.	972 (46.7)	1111 (53.3)	2.34	8
13	Increase in school fees without adequate consultation and dialogue with students is usually a necessary source of crisis on university campus.	1325 (63.6)	758 (36.4)	2.69	3

14	I personally do not believe in peace when university policies and administration do not exhibit fairness, equity and justice on students' matters.	1121 (53.8)	962 (46.2)	2.50	5
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Interpretation and Discussion

The results presented in the table 1.1 revealed that students were averagely disposed to the culture of peace items presented. The results showed that the item “whenever I’m on the university campus I am generally happy and at peace with myself” was ranked highest with mean score of 2.93. This was followed by the item “The inclusion of peace education in university curriculum would enhance the culture of peace in my university” with score of 2.88. This perhaps is in line with Albert’s (2009) finding which confirmed the desirability of peace education as part of the university curriculum.73.2% of the students sampled in Albert’s study favored the inclusion of peace and conflict studies in the general elective curriculum of the university generally. The next item was “It is the duty of students to protect the Nigerian masses by protesting against perceived injustice in the policies and operation of government outside the university” with mean score of 2.69. Further, some students believed the item “It is the duty of students to protect the Nigerian masses by protesting against perceived injustice in the policies and operation of government outside the university” with mean score of 2.57. The next item on the list was “I personally do not

believe when university policies and administration do not exhibit fairness, equity and justice on students' matters" with mean score of 2.50. This was followed by item "The transportation system in this school is too stressful for students" with mean score of 2.49. Also, the item "when school fees are increased without adequate consultation, students' violent agitations are just and necessary and I would actively participate in such agitations" has mean score of 2.3. The next item was "If I deem it necessary, I will actively participate in students' protest against university authority." This item was scored 2.34. In addition, students were also disposed to item "where there is lack of fairness, equity and justice in school policies, I will not hesitate to participate in violent agitation against the university authorities". This was scored 2.25. Also, students were disposed to the item "Secret cult activities are so prevalent in this university that in future peace and order may be compromised by cult activities" with mean score of 2.15. Students were slightly disposed to item "Personally, I do not feel bothered whether there is peace or not in my university with mean score of 2.09". Furthermore, item "If I deem it necessary, I will actively participate in students' protest against university authority" with mean score of 2.02. Among the items that students were indisposed about was item "Personally, I do not feel too much worried whether there is peace or not in my university with mean score of 1.99." Students were indisposed about the item "if I am hired by people or politician outside or inside the university and the price offered is alright, I may cooperate" with mean score of 1.89. On the disposition to increase in school fees without consultation, 44.6% of students were prepared to be

involved in violence protest against the university authorities. This is a major signal for all policy makers that increase in school fees must be preceded by adequate consultation by almost all stakeholders in the university environment. A large section of the students would not mind joining violent protest in matters pertaining to school fees. The history of violent protest in universities would also reveal that hike in school fees is usually a major causative factor. The profile of responses of students to other items reflects that the pursuit of peace on university campuses is not a battle that has been completely won. The percentage of students indisposed to items that have implications for maintenance of peace is still high enough for disquiet on most items. This implies that the pursuit of peace is a dynamic process that should be continually ongoing. Peace is perhaps too precious to be taken for granted among a virile population of young adults that constituted the major sample of the study. This view is corroborated by Ghosn (2005) who asserted that the rationale for bringing peace education to the classroom is strategically based on general aims of education. Albert (2009) also made an important remark that for any meaningful peace education curriculum to be introduced into Nigerian universities, there should be skill-based and attitude changing rather than being primarily knowledge-based. This is what the transformative theory (Mezirow 1997) adopted for this study emphasized- attitude changing. Mezirow believed that transformative learning occurs when individuals change their frames of reference by critically reflecting on their assumptions and beliefs and consciously implementing plans about new ways of defining their

worlds. Transformative learning is absolutely critical to the process of peace education vis a vis the culture of peace. If peace education is considered as a practice for transforming society from a culture of war to a culture of peace then it is implicit that our current worldview is embedded in the culture of war. Our knowledge, behaviors and actions are influenced by this worldview and must change in order to shift towards a culture of peace. Therefore, transformative learning is a necessary part of peace education (Ogunrin 2016).

Findings from the analysis of the qualitative data support the quantitative analysis as well. The students' union leaders as well as the chief security officers of the students' union that were interviewed at various times were of the opinion that the line of communication and dialogue between student union and management is always not good enough. They all opined that university management must improve the culture of dialoguing and communicating with the students. For instance, rules and regulations of universities should be brought into awareness of majority of students. All the student union leaders interviewed are of the opinion that students' unions are the natural vehicles for achieving this awareness. For the sake of sustaining peace therefore, there should be more synergy and cooperation between university administration on the one hand and the Student Union on the other. In order to create and maintain consensual peace, relationships among relevant parties must be dominated by cooperation and not competition. This issue of cooperation is perhaps the underpinning factor of the social interdependence theory — one of the theories adopted for this study. The theory embraces

cooperation and believes that for understanding the culture of peace, the issue of cooperation is fundamental to the ways and patterns of behavior that exist among university undergraduates in southwestern Nigeria. The premise of the theory is that the way in which goals are structured determines how individuals interact which in turn creates outcomes that ultimately leads to a culture of peace.

Recommendation

A major trend in undergraduates' Disposition to Culture of peace is the identification of some factors as potentials threats to maintenance of peace on university campuses. These include as indicated in this study unilateral increase in undergraduates' fees, poor provision of municipal services and lack of adequate communication and effective dialogue between school authorities and university undergraduates and negative factors predisposing them to campus violence .

It is hereby recommended for policy makers and university administrators to make adequate provisions for these identified threats highlighted in this study. university policies and practice must be seen covertly and overtly as safeguarding and promoting undergraduates' welfare and progress. Perhaps nothing prepares and disposes undergraduates to sustainable peace more than this policy. Ultimately there seems to be no substitute for peace.

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