AYÍKÁ

JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENT AND POLITICS IN AFRICA

Vol 4, No 1
Nov., 2022

Copyright and Permissions

Correspondence

Send manuscripts and Inquiries to:

On behalf of the Editorial Board, thank you for the interest in Ayika.

AYIKA: JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENT AND POLITICS INAFRICA

BOARD OF EDITORS

Ms Chukwuekwu Kesiena Ojakorotu- South Africa (Editorial Secretary)

Professor Victor Ojakorotu
(Editor in Chief)School of
Government Studies,
Department of Political Studies &
International RelationsFaculty of
Humanities
North-West
University,
Mafikeng
victor.ojakorotu@nw
u.ac.za

EDITORIAL POLICY

AYIKA: JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENT AND POLITICS IN AFRICA is

a journal that provides an avenue to scholars, researchers, policy analysts, think tank groups, as well as the civil society community to ventilate the various ramifications of the relations between environment and politics and development in Africa. The causal relationship between the environment and politics and vice versa has grown such that the scientific and political communities have fundamentally and unprecedentedly come to agreement as to the cause(s) of environmental problems. Hence, there is a growing recognition of government as the consumer of scientific findings on the environment such as that this journal portends. This point, in many respect, led to the inauguration of this journal. It is as a consequence of addressing environmental governance issues from the global level right to the local and municipal levels across the world and with special interest on Africa's landscape that AYIKA: JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENT AND POLITICS
IN AFRICA was established.

Coupled with an ever-growing number of environmental movements and the broadening scope of environmental protection and environmental security advocacy and activism, the journal garners relevance. That is, a meaningful venture therefore to critically periscope the environment-politics nexus that this journal represents is because it appreciates the environment's complex realities in our modern world. The necessity of this journal too stems from many cases of

resource-rich nations in Africa that have largely failed to translate their endowments into mass wealth and development, and thereby give rise to what scholars have tagged ''resource curse'' and/or affliction, toentrench sustainable environment in the continent.

Hitherto in the African continent, there has been recognised absence of muchintellectual, academic and advocacy platforms upon which to discuss issues of environment-politics linkages in the continent in tandem with the rest of the world. While many existing academic mediums treat issues on the relationship between environment and politics as part of larger themes on geography, agricultural science and the sciences generally, regrettably those in the humanities and social sciences have not fared better on this. It is for the reason of providing a platform for intellectuals in the humanities and social sciences alongside those in all other spheres of academic research that the Editorial Team purposefully pursued to ground AYIKA: JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENT AND POLITICS IN AFRICA.

Vision/Mission Statement

The vision and mission statements of *AYIKA: JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENT AND POLITICS IN AFRICA* revolves around ''Ayika''- a Yoruba word that refers to the environment. The linkage that the environment has to Africa's socio-political development is no more under contestation. In fact, such a linkage is now established such that every discourse – be it an academic discussion and every other form of dialogue – notes the relationship between the environment and development in

general. Thus, existing and emerging environmental problems are ever more politicaland now require political solutions more than ever. Whereas, the nature of the African continent is such that environmental problems are increasing and rising steadily and by the day, and in many cases, the negations are as a resultof existing poor public infrastructure, disjointed socio-structural arrangements, lack of good policies and abysmal governmental investments in the continent's environment sector. Therefore, *AYIKA: JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENT AND POLITICS IN AFRICA* sets ultimately as its vision/mission statement the pursuit to bridge the gap of Africa's underdevelopment emanating from her ''Ayika''. This is given that new environmental problems such as climate change continues to impact on the daily lives of the African man and woman, yet mitigation and adaptation policies and strategies are chiefly nascent, ineffectual and in most cases poor. This journal, therefore, will aid to illuminate the views of scholars that argue that new environmental realities deemed developmental problems - as is the actual case in Africa- flow from political culture and politics that places very weak emphasis on thorough and concrete conceptualisation of the environment-politics nexus for the continent's development.

Scope of the Journal

''Ayika'' means environment in Yoruba language of Nigeria. Hence,
AYIKA: JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENT AND POLITICS IN AFRICA is
established to treat issues of environment in ways that will provide sound policy and socio-economic and political

perspectives from scholars within and outside the African continent. Papers to feature in this journal may speak to the global dimension of environmental issues, but must have profound bearing on the African connection in terms of abating tremendously the environmental inducing underdevelopment variables in the continent. By implication, the journal will provide, and be, an avenue to proffer practical policy and political insights to Africa's most pressing and strategic environmental issues.

Aim of the Journal

AYIKA: JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENT AND POLITICS IN AFRICA is an
environment politics journal in Africa that so much focuses on the African continent. It covers theoretical, policy, programmatic and other overarchingdimensions and dynamics of environmental politics, governance and diplomacy in Africa. As a result of this, original review articles and every other kind of intellectual manuscript from academic fields cum disciplines such as philosophy, geography, international relations, economics, political science, sociology, psychology and related scholarly areas will be publishedin the journal.

House Style

The journal is based on universal standards of presentation of papers for academic journal publication. That is, papers should be segmented and should begin with an Abstract. The Abstract should not exceed 300 words and should be in italics. The author(s) are at liberty to segment the body of their papers according to a preference. Paper length will differ with every

other publication based on the Editorial Team's designation. The Harvard and APA referencing styles are preferable amongst other referencing techniques. Author(s) will be provided with an email address where their paper(s) should be sent to every quarterly and the sending frame for papers should be in Word Format.

Issues

This journal is published two times annually. Meaning that, each issue will be published once within six months of the year. The journal will be committed to global best practices in academic journal publication. There will be double blind review for every article submitted to this journal.

Editorial Note

Ayika: Journal of Environment and Politics in Africa continues to prove to be Africa's leading platform for the discourse of environmental and political dynamics in the continent. This is attested to by the high-quality articles published in successive issues of the journal since its inception. As a journal, it also continues to demonstrate the extricate linkage between the dynamics of the environment and politics. This is to the extent, that issues and challenges in one area affect the other. For example, environmental problems such as drought, water scarcity, and even climate change, among others continue to exert pressure on political systems across the continent. Hence, in a nuanced manner, environmental dynamics continue to be one of the leading drivers of political crisis in Africa.

This issue of Ayika: Journal of Environment and Politics in Africa contains a rich collection of articles. They touch on important themes of environmental and political themes affecting countries on the continent. Some of these themes include geopolitics, conflict resolution, resource conflict, internal security, terrorism, and conflict media, among others. These themes were expertly discourse, thereby unearthing the

causes and effects of the issues around and also recommending practical solutions as ways out of quagmire.

We extend our heartfelt gratitude to everyone involved in the publication process of this issue of Ayika: Journal of Environment and Politics in Africa. Our committed reviewers deserve commendation for taking the time to critically engage the submissions and showing ways of improving them. In the same vein, the contributors are also commended for adhering to the publication codes and ethics. Your commitment ensures that Ayika continues to be a leading forum for policy-relevant and practical recommendations on environmental and political issues in Africa.

Bamidele Olajide, PhD

Editor

CONTENTS

THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE POLITICISATION OF INTERNAL SECURITY IN NIGERIA

James Chukwuemeka Mbah
Institute for Peace & Conflict Resolution (IPCR)
Nigerian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
chukwuemekajmbah@gmail.com

Kelechi Johnmary Ani
International Relations and Diplomacy
Division of Humanities and Social Sciences
School of Arts and Sciences
University of the Gambia
kjani@utg.edu.gm

ABSTRACT

Nigeria, a microcosm of the African continent is a very complex country. With over 250 ethnic nationalities and several religious sects who strive to always work in outdoing each other in the polity, the country is a breeding ground for security breaches. As a result of this no love lost syndrome among the various groups, internal security issues are usually hijacked for political expediencies; thereby making it difficult and cumbersome to solving these internal security issues in the country. This paper intends to analyse the implications of the politicization of internal security in Nigeria, with the country at the brink of being overrun. It was discovered that lack of political will on the part of the country's leaders are responsible for the persistence of these crisis, especially terrorism from the second decade of this 21st century. Rather, political leaders in a bid to champion certain parochial interests, creates an avenue for the escalation of insecurity in the polity. The paper makes use of qualitative research methodology and consulted books, journal articles, newspaper publications, internet materials, etc in the course of the research. The paper concludes by recommending that until the government, religious leaders, and politicians desist from misinterpreting internal security issues to suit their whims, the country will continue to boil and degenerate further into anarchy. Government should be decisive in tackling and nipping in the bud, skirmishes of insecurity before they escalate and become subject of national debate.

INTRODUCTION

A former Nigeria Military Head of State, Gen. Sani Abacha once quoted as saying authoritatively that "if insurgency lasts more than 24 hours, the government has a hand in it" (Daily Trust, June 8, 2021). This statement tallies with what Chief Oliseh Metuh, former PDP Publicity Secretary who asserted in the build-up to the 2015 general elections, that "we accept the reality of terrorism as a global phenomenon, however, the peculiar trend of the Nigeria version which subsists on a welter of nebulous demands and masked identities, hacking down innocent Nigerian women, children and the elderly in awful scorch earth fashion, and in an obstinate ridicule of dialogue, defies all reason and logic and only summarizes a well-considered agenda of national destabilization for a purely selfish political cause" (Premium Times, March 18, 2014). This then underscores the fact that there is an unseen hand in the various conflicts bedevilling the country.

Nigeria in recent times, especially from the second decade of this 21st century has witnessed an unprecedented level of insecurity. This has placed internal national security discourse at the centre of Nigeria's national debate. This insecurity takes the form of the various factors that affect the fabric of the country, thereby easily given a colouration. If it's not religious insecurity, it will be for the advancement of parochial economic interests. If it's not for ethnic superiority, then it will be for the consolidation of segregated political interests. While it will be easy for the availability of political will to solving the previous trio, the latter is encapsulated in the prison of self-delusion. Due to irreconcilable ethnic conflagrations, political leaders play the ostrich, claiming to be tackling insecurity, while it is same political actors and opinion leaders that enhance the insecurity through their actions and inactions.

In Nigeria, the politicization of national security has constrained efforts to uncover the forces behind the activities of the various non – State actors that are responsible for the insecurity and conflicts rampaging the country. Any attempt by the government to decisively deal with the factors are perceived as anti-people and misinterpreted. In this paper, the implications of this politicization will be analysed on the internal security posture of the country. It will evaluate the views of the writer on the subject or related to it, situate the theoretical framework, and clarifies the concepts for easy digestion of the subject. Findings and recommendations will be discussed as a means of proffering solutions to the ugly phenomenon.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Nigeria is no stranger to insecurity and security crisis that has continued to generate debate among policy makers, international security observers and experts on the country's polity, and scholars of high repute. It can therefore attest that literatures on this subject are ubiquitous. However, literatures on the specific subject of politicization of internal security in Nigeria are few or not available; hence this paper will contribute to the growing list of literatures on politicization of internal security in Nigeria. It is instructive to acknowledge that when politics is not handled satisfactorily but allow the infiltration of ethnic and religious biases, so that a peaceful environment subsists, then security becomes a problem for everyone. Okolie and Ugwueze (2015; 33) highlighted that certain reasons are responsible for this scenario, ranging from marginalization, neglect and pauperization, and the quest for power of places where minerals exploited. This means that indigenous citizens, in order to attract the attention of the Federal government, allow insecurity elements to fester in their localities kill, maim and destroy lives and properties for parochial reasons and self-advancement.

While we understand that Boko Haram's origin seem to lie when a group of radical Islamist youths who worshipped at the Muhammadu Ndimi's mosque in Maiduguri in 2002 declared the city and the Islamic establishment to be intolerably corrupt and irredeemable, and in need of cleansing (Anyadike: 2013; 16); the politicization of the Sect's insurgency has confined effort to uncover the forces behind the activity of the deadly Sect into the realm of speculation. Chikodiri Nwangwu and colleagues (2016; 42) acknowledged this fact by asserting that, "the seeming intractable status the sect has acquired since 2011 in Adamawa, Borno and Yobe, a hotbed of Boko Haram operations as a political ping pong". This politics were so glaring preparatory to 2015 General Elections, when all efforts by the then President Goodluck Jonathan to nip the sect's destructive activities in the bud, were viewed as an attack against Northern Nigeria. President Buhari in 2013 accused the then Federal Government of bias when he asserted that, "special treatment is given to the Niger Delta militants by the Federal Government, while the Boko Haram members were being killed and their houses demolished by government" (PointBlank News, June 2, 2013).

It is a well-established fact that security is often viewed as being the opposite of politics, in the sense that security framework legitimizes extraordinary powers and privileges enjoyed by experts and technocrats in politics (Hagamann, et al; 2018). For instance,

Aggestam and Bergman Rosamond's (2018) engagement with Swedish's feminist foreign policy shows how overlapping processes of de- and re-politicisation can shape security politics. At the core of their analysis lies the way these dynamics shape a specific political rationality of the state and its foreign policy. They argued that a re-politicisation of Swedish foreign policy led to a more politicized understanding of gender mainstreaming as can be observed in other international arenas. Following this interest in de- and re-politicisation, Dunn Cavelty and Leese (2018) discuss how privacy can foster the politicization of security. They emphasize the dimension of contestation which they define as the opening up of a space for deliberation. Importantly, they also demonstrate that the mere observation of the politicization of an issue does not tell us much about the de-facto impact of politicization.

Be that as it may, a focus on the everyday permits a rethinking of the underlying concept of politics in the context of the politicization of security and its implication in a society. Most instances of everyday politicization ultimately argue for the significance of these politicization moves by referring to the impact on policies or state actors. Focusing on emotions is one way to try to think about politicization by including

politics beyond or below the nation-state. This research allows us to consider how the politicization of everyday phenomenon like internal security can have negative effects for the society. It brings issues into the political arena which governments would rather suppress, but more generally in the way it traces how controversies emerge and can be situated.

THEORETICAL AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

Conflict theory is associated with Karl Marx and Frederich Engels, which regards society as a theatre of conflict and power struggle. In their work, *Communist Manifesto,* they asserted that "the history of all hitherto existing societies is the history of class struggles" (Marx & Engels: 1987; 3). This focuses on a materialistic interpretation of history, dialectical method of analysis and insistence that social unity is a mirage based on suppression. However, while it is a truism that conflicts result when individuals or groups try to assert their authority or resist subjugation from a superior power; it is in this case, individuals or groups trying to incite or support dissidents in order to achieve a parochial interest. For instance, the farmers – herders security issues are struggle to control lands for farming and grazing, arising from the prevailing

desertification in many parts of Northern Nigeria, that is responsible for massive Southern migration in search of green vegetation. Hence, this theory is a perfect description of the reasons for conflict, but cannot fit into this study which is evaluating the implications of escalation of internal security in the Nigerian society, by the various ethnic and religious groups.

Consequentiality theory suits our argument and is appropriate for this paper. Consequentialism is a theory that says whether something is good or bad depends on its outcomes. It is a type of normative ethical theory and in its purest form; it holds that the moral quality of an action is completely determined by its consequences. Therefore, according to the theory, the end justifies the means in all circumstances. This is typical mindset of the various nationalities within the Nigeria context. Uche Chukwumerije observed this fact when he faulted Supreme Court treason sentence on MASSOB leaders against the lenient treatment melted to Odua Peoples' Congress (OPC), Niger Delta militants, and Boko Haram (Vanguard; April 30, 2013). He then reiterated that "youths are the teeth of the fangs of any disadvantaged group struggling for redress" (Vanguard; October 17, 2011). This position was reiterated by President Buhari when

in 2013, he criticized the declaration of State of Emergency in Adamawa, Borno and Yobe States and the subsequent military offensive against Boko Haram Islamic sect. He said such action was a gross injustice against the North (ThisDay; June 3, 2013). These means Nigeria leaders and policy makers don't mind instigating crisis and/or supporting miscreants in order to score some political points.

Conceptually, the word 'politicisation' is derived from 'politics.' According to Nnoli (2003:12), politics refers to "all activities that are directly or indirectly associated with the emergence, consolidation and use of state power". However, politicisation in this context is used pejoratively to indicate that a given phenomenon which is meant to serve an altruistic and populist objective is perverted for the advancement of the private and self-seeking goals of certain individuals, groups, classes, parties, etc. Thus, the politicisation of Nigeria's internal security in this context means the use of and tacit support of insurgent group's operations as a basis for the pursuit and advancement of the selfish political agenda of some politicians, political parties, religious groups, and ethnic nationalities. This paper, hence, attempts to demonstrate, using some specific incidents, the various

ways in which all government's efforts to curb insecurity in the country has been trivialised and politicized, enhancing the persistence of security threats in the country and emboldening already established groups.

On the other hand, internal security is the act of keeping peace within the borders of a sovereign State or other self-governing territories, generally by upholding the national law and defending against internal security threats. In an Inaugural Lecture, Solomon E. Arase (IGP, Rtd) acknowledged in 2018 that;

Internal security has been widely defined within the context of the protection of the values, critical human and infrastructural assets, territorial integrity, and lives and property of citizens from threats. The principle underlying internal security is governed Thomas Hobbes' Social Contract Theory while the process is driven by the citizens and State's law enforcement agencies with the Police holding the primacy, under an ideal security architecture.

With the definition above, it means the citizens has a supportive role to play in ensuring internal security. When same citizens conniving with State institutions and agencies, to sabotage the efforts of sister or similar agencies, just to achieve certain primordial and parochial interests; then it means internal security has been politicized. At this stage, all efforts by the government to maintain and keep peace in the society will amount to nothing, because the corporations of the citizens are lacking.

ANALYSING THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE POLITICISATION OF INTERNAL SECURITY IN NIGERIA

It is worthwhile to highlight the internal security question in Nigeria, in order to grasp adequate understanding the reasons for its politicization and implications on the polity. The major threats to Nigeria's internal security in recent years are terrorism which is accentuated by violent religious extremism and fanaticism; separatist agitations and proliferation of ethnic militias engineered by perceived marginalization; kidnapping for ransom; armed robbery which at times, could be orchestrated by trans-border criminal networks; farmers – herders crises which is a particularly potent threat to national security because they can trigger ethnic and religious interpretation; cattle rustling and banditry; oil theft, piracy and militancy; amongst others. Some of these problems derives from and/or

are aggravated by economic and social conditions such as erosion of ethical and moral conduct in private and public life, corruption, ethnic and religious intolerance, deterioration of infrastructure and service delivery, steady rise in unemployment and mass poverty, widening social and economic inequality, proliferation of arms, drug abuse and climate change that leads to environmental degradation like desert encroachment, landslide and flood.

Nigeria's internal security condition is seen as one of the most fragile among other countries in the African continent. This fragility again and again threatens the territorial integrity of the country. Environmental concerns raise the most eye-brows of the masses in Nigeria due to the immediate impact on their daily lives. Oil exploration in the Niger Delta is responsible for militancy in that region and the harbinger of politicization of internal security. Also, the quest for green vegetation and arable land for agricultural practices is responsible for the farmers – herders' crises as both struggles to cultivate crops and rear animals in same piece land. Hence, creating a culture of mistrust and parochial satisfaction before of the fear of the unknown; and the quest to achieve personal safety and survival by any means possible. The circle has continued, to the extent that ethnic

nationalities have adopted it with no end in sight.

The scenario captured by Mbah & Nwangwu (2014; 67 – 78) is playing out in the build-up to the 2023 General Elections. Although it is inexorable that the current security record of Nigeria makes internal security an electoral issue as the country prepares for to the 2023 General Election, none of the political gladiators in the scenery has advanced an unambiguous alternative defence and security agenda for the country, or pay little attention to it. Instead, the daunting security challenges occasioned by the varying security crises has been reduced into a blame game by both the ruling All Progressive Congress (APC), who promised in 2015 to tackle insecurity in the country head-on and the leading opposition party – Peoples' Democratic Party (PDP), on whose time in office the country's internal security architecture was brought to their lowest ebb – as well as their ever-surging army of apologists. These political parties are unrelenting in their quest to make political capital out of the insurgence which has primarily targeted innocent citizens, government institutions, security formations, telecommunications masts, banks, religious organizations, educational institutions, media houses, beer halls, markets and local communities.

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The stability of the security architecture of any country is widely upheld as a prerequisite for political, economic, social and cultural sustainability of the counry. Besides the human casualties that have attended Boko Haram insurgence in the North-East, Unkown Gunmen in the South-East, Militancy in Niger Delta, Banditry in the North-West, Farmers – Herdsmen clashes all over the country, religious extremists in the North, Ethnic clashes in the Middle Belt, amongst others in the country; all facet Nigeria's society has remained the most adversely affected by the politicisation of internal security in the country. First, since 2011, Nigeria has experienced an unprecedented diversion of humungous scarce capital in the national budget for the procurement of hi-tech equipment. Thus, the proportion of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) devoted to military spending, especially purchasing of arms has increased exponentially. This has correspondingly denied capital projects in the education, health, agriculture and construction sectors that needed attention. For instance, the 2012 Report of the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) indicates that in the 2008, 2009, 2010 and 2011 fiscal years, the total expenditure earmarked for both internal security and defence in the approved budgets were N164.5 billion, N276.5 billion, N422.9 billion and N563.2 billion respectively (CBN, 2012). This and others have adversely affected the country's economic growth trajectory. The country therefore needs to look inwards by embarking on constitutional reforms that will devolve economic powers to the federating States, while the centre focuses on tackling the internal security challenges.

Second, the politicization of internal security has contributed to the decline in popular trust in government and widespread mutual distrust among Nigerians. This provides a favourable environment for communal groups to organise for their own security or political aims, creating dangerous competition that can easily erupt into violence. In his address to the Press after the formation of Amotekun (a security outfit established on January 9, 2020 by the six State Governors of the South-Western States, Lagos, Oyo, Ogun, Ondo, Osun and Ekiti States), Dr Kayode Fayemi of Ekiti State said that the outfit was not a duplication or replacement for the Nigeria Police. But "is a complement that will give our people confidence that they are being looked after by those they elected into office" (Pulse; January 9, 2020). Similar thing posited by Ebonyi State Commissioner for Information, Orji

Uchenna Orji as the reason behind the formation of Ebubeagu (South-East internal Security outfit), even though he said "its function is to assist the police in carrying out lawful activities. It is not an alternate police force. They are to operate in utter obedience to the police force" (The Guardian; January 9, 2022). All these because the Nigerian Security agencies either abdicated from their responsibilities, choose to play the ostrich, or is being manipulated by unseen hands against the interest of the majority in favour of a section. In order to avoid political manipulation of these sectional security outfits and restore confidence of the people, certain aspect of internal security should be left in the hands of the federating states. The current unified policing system seems not to be working and is responsible for the mistrust between security agencies and the people.

Third, this issue has destroyed the social fabrics of Nigeria fragile society, dividing the citizens the more and halted the nation-building. For instance, in the memo which was not addressed to then President Goodluck Jonathan but his regional Governor colleagues, Muritala Nyako, then Governor of Adamawa State ostensibly wants to mobilise and incite the northerners against other ethnic nationalities, the

Federal Government, and its security agencies who are engaged in the counter-terrorism operation in the north-east. He said that (Daily Post; May 19, 2014):

fulani communities in parts of the North who have been in their locations for over 100 years are now being raided and uprooted by paid killers within the Nigerian Army for the satisfaction of the federal administration instead of being protected as citizens with their rights and dignity safe-guarded. This has happened to those communities at Keana L.G. in Nasarawa State and Laddoga and Kachia in Kaduna State. It is presently extended to Benue, Zamfara and Katsina States. Furthermore, it is a well-known fact that virtually all the soldiers of Northern Nigerian origin recently recruited to fight Boko Haram have been deceived in that aspect. They are being poorly trained, totally ill - equipped, given only uniform and are killed by their trainers in Nigerian Army training centres as soon as they arrive in the Nigerian Army camps being used by so called Boko Haram insurgents. Virtually all the Nigeria soldiers killed/murdered in those operations so far are of Northern Nigerian origin.

It is pertinent to note that the then Governor's vituperation derives

expressly from his strong opposition to the emergency rule and subsequent deployment of military personnel in the troubled states of Adamawa, Borno and Yobe. Such call which is not supported by any credible alternative security roadmap is an open endorsement of the activities of the Boko Haram insurgents. Thus, Nyako's criticism is not only diversionary but clearly shows his poverty of understanding of the fact that the operational tactics of the insurgents go beyond ethnic, religious, political and ideological considerations. By virtue of career antecedents and exposure, it is obligatory for Mr. Nyako to display an unmatchable commitment to nationalism. Alas, the extremely divisive letter which is meant to create disaffection among Nigerians, incite one section of the country against the other and polarise the country along ethnic lines exposes his dearth of history and inability to rise above parochial sentiments. Government needs to exhibit sincerity and decisiveness in tackling such issues in order to raise the peoples' confidence in the system.

Fourth, politicization has also permeated the cultural fabrics of the Nigerian society. The traditional value system of the Nigerian society like most African societies is characterized by such endearing features as collectivism, loyalty to authority and community, truthfulness, honesty, hard work, tolerance, love for others, mutual harmony and coexistence, and identification of individual with one another. Other distinctive features of Nigerian traditional society are abhorrence for theft and high value for live. Stealing was considered extremely disgraceful and lives were also highly valued. All of these values which made society secured and safe have all gradually been thrown away and lost. New values have taken over their place over the years, with the advent of 'modernity and civilization'. All our endearing values and morals have been traded off for western values. The evidence is more in the increasing rate of corruption without corresponding punishment among public officers. Rather, such punishment is perceived as victimization of the culprit, because of differences in the individual wielding the power. The judiciary needs to live up to expectation and be ready to dispense justice without fear or favour, ethnicity or religion, political and other petty alliances.

CONCLUSION
It is important to posit here that the current seemingly intractable internal security challenges in the country are direct consequences of the alienation of the policed citizens, absence of an internal security policy framework, and

poor understanding of the requirements and dynamics of internal security management by strategic actors including legislators, policy makers and political actors which engender evolution of ill – thought – approaches. Other militating factors include the failure to appreciate the dynamics of technology in crime and policing, and inability to evolve new security strategies and systems towards security governance in the country. But these are human and system factors that can be put in sharp with the right political will; compared to when the people on their own are sabotaging the little efforts and sacrifices shown by the Nigerian State represented by the Federal Government, for the purpose of achieving a sectional agenda against the interest of the majority. Or a situation where those who are fortunate control the security apparatuses of the Nigerian State use it to favour their ethnic, religious or sectional interest against the collective interest. Consequently, a new internal security architecture that is citizens-based, technology-driven, collectively-owned, generally-accepted, and system/institutionally-governed is proposed.

REFERENCES

Anyadike, Nkechi O. (2013) "Boko Haram and National Security Challenges in Nigeria; Causes and Solutions", *in Journal of Economics and Sustainable Development,* Vol. 4, No. 5.

Aggestam, Karin & Bergmann Rosamond, Annika (2018) "Re – Politicising the Gender – Security Nexus: Sweden's Feminist Foreign Policy", in *European Review of International Studies,* Vol. 5, No. 3, pp. 30 – 48.

Arase, Solomon E. (2018) "Inaugural Lecture on Strengthening Internal Security Frameworks and Community Policing in Nigeria: Models, Policy Options and Strategies", delivered at the National Institute of Policy and Strategic Studies, Kuru – Jos.

Boko Haram Sponsored to stop Jonathan, PDP says. Premium Times, March 18, 2014. https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news Accessed on 17/07/2022.

Central Bank of Nigeria Annual Report (2012); *Functional Classification of Federal Government Expenditure in Nigeria.* Lagos: CBN Publication

Chukwumerije and the Rise of Ethnic Militias: Issues at Stake. Vanguard, October 17, 2011.

https://www.vanguardngr.com/2011/10/chukwumerije-and-the-rise/ Accessed on 19/07/2022.

Dunn Cavelty, Myriam & Leese, Matthias (2018) "Politicising Security at the Boundaries: Privacy in Surveillance and Cybersecurity", in *European Review of International Studies,* Vol. 5, No. 3, pp. 49 – 69.

Ebubeagu Security outfit not Politically Motivated, says Orji. The Guardian, January 9, 2022. https://www.guardian.ng/news/ebubeagu-security-outfit-not-politically/ Accessed on 20/07/2022.

Hagamann, Jonas; Hegemann, Hendrik; & Neal, Andrew (2018) "The Politicisation of Security: Controversy, Mobilisation, Arena Shifting", in *European Review of International Studies,* Vol. 5, No. 3, pp. 3 – 39.

Remembering General Sani Abacha. DailyTrust Newspaper, June 08, 2021. https://www.dailytrust.com/remembering.general.sani.abacha/ Accessed on 17/07/2022.

Marx, Karl & Engels, Frederich (1987); *Communist Manifesto.* London: Wordsworth Editions Limited.

MASSOB: Sen. Chukwumerije Faults Supreme Court on Treason. Vanguard, April 30, 2013. https://www.vanguardngr.com/2013/04/massob-sen-chukwumerije/ Accessed on 19/07/2022.

Mbah, P & Nwangwu, C. (2014) "The Counter – Insurgence Operations of the Joint Task Force and Human Rights Abuses in Northern Nigeria, 2011 - 2013". *Journal of Educational and Social Research,* Vol. 4, No 5.

Nigeria: Buhari – Military Offensive Against Boko Haram, Anti – North. ThisDay, June 3, 2013. https://www.thisdaylive.com/ Accessed on 19/07/2022.

Nnoli, O. (2003); *Introduction to Politics,* 2nd Edition. Enugu: PACREP

Nwangwu, C., Olihe, A. & Okoye, K. (2016) "Politicisation of the Counter-Insurgence Operations in Nigeria: Implication for the Political Economy", in Global Journal of Arts, Humanities and Social Sciences, Vol. 4. No. 2, pp. 42 – 63

Okolie, Aloysius-Michaels & Ugwueze, Michael Ikechukwu (2015) "Securitization of Politics and Insecurity in Nigeria: The Boko Haram Experience", in *International Affairs and Global Strategy,* Vol. 36

South West Governors explain why Operation Amotekun was established. Pulse, January 9, 2020. https://www.pulse.ng/news/local/south-west-

governors-explain/ Accessed on 20/07/2022.

Stop Killing Boko Haram Members – Buhari tells FG. Point Blank News, June 2, 2013. https://www.pointblanknews.com/pbn/exclusive/stop-killing-boko-haram-members-buhari-tells-fg/ Accessed on 19/07/2022.

INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR THE WAR AGAINST BOKO HARAM IN THE LAKE CHAD BASIN REGION

Adedoyin Jolaade Omede
Department of Political Science
University of Ilorin
Ilorin Kwara State
Email:medajol@yahoo.com

Arinze Ngwube
Department of Political Science
Federal University Oye-Ekiti
Oye-Ekiti Ekiti State
Email:arinze22ng@yahoo.com

Chigozie Sebastine Onu
Department of Social Science Education
(Political Science Unit)
University of Nigeria
Nsukka,
Nigeria
capricononu@gmail.com

ABSTRACT
Since the end of the cold war, the Lake Chad Basin region has been embroiled in a multitude of conflicts, internal and interstate. The fear of terror and extreme violence associated with the killings of innocent civilians through indiscriminate suicide bombings, attacks on civil infrastructure and military installations, along with the kidnappings of men, women, children and the decimation of entire communities. The activities of Boko haram have led to loss of lives, the breakdown of law and order. It has put a brake on economic development. This has been a source of concern on the part of the international community. The involvement of the international community is geared towards ensuring international peace and security in the region. Notable stakeholders include the United Nations (UN), African Union (AU), The European Union (EU), The US, Britain, France, Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), the Arab League, several other groups and individuals. These stakeholders, especially the UN, AU and the EU, have made concerted efforts

like commissioning special groups to visit the LCBR. The paper relied a strong reliance on both the primary and secondary sources of data including documents derived from the various resolutions of the United Nations, European Union, the African Union as well as speeches of political leaders'/country representatives, relevant textbooks, newspaper publications and other on-line materials. Notwithstanding the assistance by the international community, Boko Haram is still active and continues to attack military installations and kill civilians in the LCBR.

Keywords: *Boko Haram, African Union, European Union, United Nations, Lake Chad Basin Region*

INTRODUCTION

Two African proverbs aptly describe the premise on which the effort to fight the menace of Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Basin Region (LCBR) is hinged. The first is the saying that *one cannot leave a fire on one's rooftop and sleep with the two eyes closed*. The second is the cliché which holds that *looking dispassionately at the fire on a neighbours' rooftop portends disaster not only to the neighbour but also to oneself and the entire community.* The fear of terror and extreme violence associated with the killings of innocent civilians through indiscriminate suicide bombings, attacks on civil infrastructure and military installations, along with the kidnappings of men, women, children and the decimation of entire communities has engendered the spirit of collective action among members of the international community (Global Terrorism Index – 2017; Ban-Ki Moon, 2015; Allen, 2018). International organizations and their member states, concerned individuals and civil society groups, are peeved by the hardships and suffering unleashed by Boko Haram. In addition, the humanitarian disaster characterized by the shortage of food, shelter and clothing, the upsurge of internally displaced persons and the emigration of local populace seeking refuge across state boundaries, are notable reasons for international intervention. The International support so needed according to Ban-Ki Moon (2016) "requires a unified response that stays faithful to the world's common humanity and to the aspirations to secure peace and security, sustainable development, rule of law and respect for human rights" in the LCBR and other countries

affected by violent extremism.

The spillover effect of Boko Haram described in the preceding paragraph is not only palpable but also portends grave danger to the entire international system. One cannot discountenance the 'snowballing' impact and continuing influence of extremist jihadist groups in Africa and in the LCBR in particular. The heightened state of insecurity; the incessant recourse to small arms by Boko Haram; and its impact on the entire global system is what motivated the international community to take up the gauntlet against Boko Haram. Notable efforts include UN Presidential Statements S/PRST/2015/12 (15 June 2015), S/PRST/2017/2 (20 January 2017) and S/PRST/2018/7-14 (11 August2018) expressing concerns about the persisting violence in the LCBR. The adoption of resolutions UNSC/1267 (Al Qaeda Sanctions List) and UNSCR/2349 - 31 March 2017, which aimed to come up with a regional strategy, increase security assistance and humanitarian support to the LCBR. These attempts are, premised on the principle of 'shared responsibility' and the 'responsibility to protect' which contends that efforts to create peace are collective and should be shared among members of the international system irrespective of 'hemispheric divide,' political-economic ideology, colour or creed.

In dealing with the threat of terrorism, nation-states have adopted joint measures including both military and non-military options with particular emphasis on the establishment of a 'pre-emptive' Global Counter-terrorism Network (GCTN), to detect, track and eliminate terrorists' threats before they materialise. Also, states such as the US, Britain and Australia have canvassed that the global war on terrorism involves the pooling together of resources in a coalition of the willing in which forces from the global North seek to improve the capabilities of vulnerable and threatened nations in the global South (Baylis, Smith, and Owens 2008, 303).

Notable stakeholders include the United Nations (UN), African Union (AU), The European Union (EU), The US, Britain, France, Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), the Arab League, several other groups and individuals. These stakeholders, especially the UN, AU and the

EU, have made concerted efforts like commissioning special groups to visit the LCBR. Examples of such visits is the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) visiting mission of March 2017, EU donor mission to Nigeria February 2017; representatives of the Counter Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate visit to LCBR–February 2017; the British Minister of State's (Baroness Anelay) visit to Nigeria in 2016 and the UNSC visit to Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria–March 2017. They also organised conferences to create awareness on the implication of the terror tactics of Boko Haram in the LCBR. Examples are the 2016 AU Peace and Security Council Meeting /Abuja Regional Summit. The UN Security Council adopted resolutions (1267 of 2014 & 2349 of 2017) based on reports submitted by its members and other civil society groups. The AU, had through its many summits, canvassed for funding from international donors (Africa Donor Conference February 2015). The US had provided counterterrorism and urban warfare and established a joint military rapport with members of the LCBR. The EU (including Britain and France) also made financial contributions toward the cause (Oslo International Humanitarian Conference, 2017, Berlin International Donor Conference 2018). Several other nations and international agencies have also pitched in their efforts in various ways. For example, the United Nations Development Programme - UNDP, United Nations High Commission for Refugees - UNHCR, the Red Cross & Red Crescent have assisted in terms of human management and distribution of relief materials, while Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch are engaged in canvassing for the fair treatment of belligerents and protecting the human rights of all concerned parties.

As much as these efforts are in top gear, evidence abounds that the fight against Boko Haram in the LCBR is not over. Member states of the LCBR still have to contend with incessant attacks by Boko Haram on their citizens. Their national security is, continuously being, breached, while their territorial integrity and sovereignty is, continuously eroded and compromised. As we proceed in our analysis, the paper hopes to provide answers to the following questions: What are the international efforts adopted to resolve terrorism in the LCBR?

Are the efforts adequate and possess the capacity to end the misery and spiral of violence and insecurity associated with Boko Haram? Have the efforts so far yielded the desired outcome: peace and development in the LCBR?

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The paper adopted qualitative methods which involve argumentative, critical analysis. The research will obtain relevant and available data from secondary sources. Data was deployed for the task of understanding the problem under consideration. The paper also explored and critically analyse scholarly journals, information openly available online and other social media sources.

International Efforts to Fight Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Basin Region

Boko Haram has attracted the attention of the international community because of its terror tactics, the decimation of human lives, the consequent humanitarian crisis and the unchecked effect on the LCBR and the West Africa subregion. Besides, the financial investment of the military action of the Multinational Joint Task force

(MNJTF) was a major burden on national budgets and development efforts of the LCBR member states. To combat Boko Haram, the world led by the UN had embarked on a series of political and diplomatic initiatives. Stakeholders such as the United Nations (and some of its specialized agencies like the UNHCR, UNICEF, FAO), European Union, Britain, France, Germany, AU, among others have shown their commitment toward the 'African Anti-Insurgency Project'. Most of these efforts are in the form of reports, resolutions, peace summits and conferences, mobilization of funds, military and technical assistance.

The United Nations (UN)

We can find a determinant factor in the UN fight against Boko Haram in the UN Security Council Resolution 2349 (2017) which affirmed that terrorism in all its forms and manifestation makes up one of the most serious threats to international peace and security. In addition, one other reason is the onus to muster international cooperation to resolve economic, social, cultural or humanitarian problems and promote respect for human rights and freedom for all (Kegley and Blanton 2011, 143). To achieve these aims, the UN since 2015

had severally expressed concern and dismay at the rate of killings, the humanitarian impact and the ensuing volatile insecurity situation in the LCBR (news.un.org, 2018). Due to the large-scale attacks by Boko Haram, the Security Council stressed that the group represented a "threat for Nigeria, the region and international peace and security" (Delattre 2015, onu.delegatefrance.org). Because of the humanitarian impact and the threat posed by Boko Haram to the stability of peace in West and Central Africa, the UN. encouraged its members to increase security assistance and humanitarian support to the LCBR (UN Security Council Resolution–S/PRST/2015/12, 2015) (unoca.unmissions.org). In 2017, through the adoption of UN resolution 2349, the global organization strongly condemned Boko Haram terrorist attacks, violations of international humanitarian law and human rights abuses.

The UN has undertaken series of initiatives and actions through its various platforms like the UN Security Council, the General Assembly, UNHCR, UNICEF, UNDP, and the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) among others, to create awareness, campaign against and raise funds to fight Boko Haram insurgents in the LCBR. Other prominent activities include discussions on the global consequences and collaborating with other international organizations and agencies to canvass and muster financial, technical and humanitarian assistance. The following diplomatic activities and measures undertaken so far by the UN include:

- The UN Security Council Presidential Speech - 30 March 2015, S/PRST/2017/2 and S/PRST/2018/7 (14) - August 10, 2018 declarations that the crisis in Africa's Lake Chad Basin is of global concern hence, the need to take urgent actions to address the situation. This declaration provided the background for the UNSC Presidential statements commending: i. Nigeria's President Muhammadu Buhari's initiative to convene a high-level Regional Security Summit to evaluate regional response to Boko Haram (13 May, 2016 - S/PRST/2016/7) (S/PV.7692) and ii. Lake Chad Basin members and Benin for their efforts to establish the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) - UN/PRST/28 July 2015.

- The initiation of visits and fact-finding missions to the LCBR prominent of which is that of the 1st–7th March 2017 by the UNSC and spearheaded by France, Senegal and the United Kingdom. The purpose of this mission was to show support for the LCBR states; define a joint action for the fight against terrorism in the region and to encourage and strengthen the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF). In addition, both the United Nations Office for Central Africa (UNOCA) and its West African counterpart (UNOWA) have undertaken a series of assessment missions including those of October 2014 and June 2015, to address the impact of the Boko Haram threat on the political, socio-economic and humanitarian situation in the region.

- The 22 May 2014 adoption of Resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) by the UN al-Qaeda sanctions committee, which proclaimed Boko Haram a terrorist group and thus subjecting the organisation to an arms embargo, assets freeze and travel ban. The Committee added Boko Haram to its terror list because of the group's association with al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) for its training, material and financial support. Although the US had declared the group a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) since November 2013 (Open Doors 2017), the UN declaration of Boko Haram as a terrorist group in 2014 further empowered the international community to take decisive and drastic measures in the fight against the group. To ensure the effectiveness of the sanction, the U.N., implored member states to implement tough sanctions as a significant tool in combating terrorist activities in the LCBR (United Nations 2014).

- The 26 June 2014 UNSC Sanctions Committee which added the Ansaru group and the Boko Haram leader Abubakar Mohammed Shekau to the Al-Qaida sanctions list. Another effort is the embargo placed on the sect in early 2014. The embargo was in pursuant to the UN Security Council Resolution 2068 (2012)

which emphasised the Council's readiness to adopt targeted sanctions against armed groups like the Boko Haram (SERAP, 2014). By invoking sanctions on Boko Haram, the UN (UNSCR/ 1267) aimed at cutting off the group avenues of funding, travel and weapons acquisition as well as blacklisting and sanctioning anybody or groups offering assistance to Boko Haram (Powers 2014, Quinlan 2014).

The impact of the sanctions has become debatable. Some have noted that the sanctions coupled with the coordinated efforts of the MNJTF have weakened the combat capacity of Boko Haram (Feltman 2017). Other groups have noted, however, that UN sanctions were mostly symbolic and have not been able to stop Boko Haram's source of funding, travel and weapons acquisition (The 22nd Report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team 2017, Global World Report 2018–Global Terrorism Index 2017, *Premium Times* 2018). Some of the reasons adduced by the aforementioned groups include the predominance of a cash economy in the LCBR, extortion, charitable donations,

smuggling and ransom on kidnapping by Boko Haram. Other reasons are the porosity of borders in the region as commanders of the group travel unhindered without passports, engaging in the black market and illegal arms trade as well as looting of barracks to cart away weapons and carrying out bank robberies to access illegal monies (US Department of State - Country Report on Terrorism 2017, 290). Other actions and measures undertaken by the UN include but not limited to,

- Briefings by UN officials on the situation report and the root causes of the Boko Haram crisis. Examples of such briefings include that of 4 August 2017 (S/PV8020); 13 September 2017 (S/PV8047) and that of 22 March 2018 (S/PV8212).
- UNSC press statements condemning various activities of Boko Haram. These include the condemnation of; kidnapping of schoolgirls in Dapchi (North – Eastern Nigeria) (2 March 2018 – SC/13233); killing of soldiers, officers of the Nigerian police force and civilians in Dalori village in Northern Eastern Nigeria (2 February 2016 – SC/12233)

and; the October 10 and 11, 2015, killings in Baga, Sola – Chad and Kangaleri in Cameroon (SC/1207512–October 2015).

- The adoption of resolution 2349 of 31 March 2017. This was the first resolution adopted by the UN to condemn terrorist attacks, violations of international humanitarian law and human rights abuses by both Boko Haram and Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) in LCBR. The Resolution (2349), also admonishes member states to implement consistent policies and ensure regional military cooperation as well as cut funding to sponsors of the group. Besides, the resolution restated the significance of timely and adequate response to issues such as economic inequalities, countering violent extremism and women empowerment.

- The report (S/2017/764) submitted by the UN Secretary General is also worth noting. The report - an assessment of the security situation five months after passaging Resolution 2349 contained a critical examination of the progress made by the UN in the fight against Boko Haram, the challenges encountered in the process and suggestions of futuristic practical measures.

Mobilization of other Stakeholders

The UN is also at the forefront of mobilizing nations to support the fight against Boko Haram. In addition, the UN designation of Boko Haram as a terrorist group has opened the portal for a flurry of international mobilization against the group. It has also raised the consciousness among the international community to the fact that Boko Haram is not just a domestic problem but also an international one that requires an increased support to regional efforts to fight the menace. The UN has also been active in mobilizing countries for operational and military support as well as raising funds to ameliorate the sufferings of the victims. The highlights of these efforts include;

- The United Nations (UN) Humanitarian response plans for the year 2017, which made a proposal for the

provision of $1.5 billion worth of supplies to the victims of Boko Haram in LCBR and especially, in North-East Nigeria. The UN said it met 70% of the $1.5 billion required in 2017, but claimed it carried over a total of $196 million to 2018 – a sum it hoped will go towards such needs as the provision of food, shelter, clean water, education for out of schoolchildren and medical care. Similarly, in 2018, the UN developed another humanitarian response plan aimed at providing assistance for 6.1 million people in the LCBR.

- The convening of the Oslo 2017 summit jointly organised by the UN, Nigeria, Germany and Norway in which Norway led the effort by pledging $192m (£153m) of the $672m promised by international donors for the next three years. This is one of the UN awareness campaign efforts in which more than $470million was raised and mobilised to respond to humanitarian needs and prevent famine in Nigeria and the Lake Chad region. This donation, however, amounted to a third of the $1.5bn sought by the UN (OCHA Report 2017).

- The convening of the Berlin 2018 conference for the LCBR jointly organised by the UN, Nigeria, Germany and Norway. The UN. expressed its readiness to grant the LCBR the sum of $2.5 billion to battle insurgency and poverty. It also affirmed that the UN has helped the LCBR states raise $2.17 billion and another $467 million concessional loan aimed at providing humanitarian assistance, civilian protection, crisis prevention and the stabilization of the LCBR.

However, as beneficial as the UN efforts may seem, they are nonetheless insufficient. The UN has no mechanisms to compel its member states to enforce its resolutions, nor redeem monies pledged to provide humanitarian assistance to the LCBR. This accounts for the intervention of other international governmental and non-governmental organizations and concerned countries within the international system.

The European Union (EU) Initiatives and the Fight against Boko Haram in the LCBR

The European Union has been consistently supportive in the fight against the Boko Haram insurgency. It is a major donor and partner with the LCBR. At the initial stage of the MNJTF operations in 2014, the EU, though cautious in its approach, mainly provided diplomatic and humanitarian assistance. As Boko Haram's activities became intense, the EU increased its assistance to include summits, financial and technical aid. The EU collaborated with the AU to establish the Multinational Joint Task Force (MJTF), which brings together Nigeria, Niger, Chad and Cameroon in a counteroffensive against Boko Haram. The EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa established at the Valletta Summit (November 2015), and aimed at providing funding for stability and addressing the root causes of irregular migration and displaced persons in Africa, is a mechanism to strengthen cooperation and address the current security and migration challenges both in the LCBR and the African Continent (Consillium 2015).

The EU, UN and World Bank in January 2016, established a tripartite post-insurgency recovery and peace-building assessment program in the LCBR. The parties who were to provide the funding valued the cost of repairing the damage to the region at $5.9 billion (Human Rights Watch – World Report 2017). The EU between 2014 and 2017 provided about €700 million in humanitarian aid and development assistance. In early 2018, the EU provided another round of €138 million funding in humanitarian and development assistance to vulnerable communities in the LCBR to, "invest in social services, tackle poverty, environmental degradation and climate change, strengthen girls' education, hasten up reintegration efforts and provide health care services" (European Commission 2018).

Suffice to say that the EU has been active at various summits organized by the international community to fight Boko Haram. This activism was given expression through two major conferences: the Oslo International Humanitarian Conference (February 2017) and the Berlin International Donor Conference (September 2018). The two conferences were organized by the United Nations Development Programme

(UNDP), Nigeria, Norway and Germany and were aimed at sourcing resources to alleviate the humanitarian crisis in the LCBR. The EU played a significant role in helping to muster funds from its member states and other partners.

The EU during the Berlin Conference pledged the sum of €231.5 million to help countries in the LCBR fight Boko Haram. Each of the LCBR nations was given a specific amount of money for humanitarian and development programs (See: Table I). Participating donor members also pledged financial contributions to the cause (See Table II). Still using the Berlin platform, certain EU members pledged extra assistance. For instance, the German government expressed its plan to support the effort with an additional €40 million for security projects while Norway also promised to increase its humanitarian support to the tune of $40 million for three years (Al-Jazeera 2018). In addition, the EU promised to collaborate with the Nigerian army in the fight against terrorism in the country and in the LCBR. The partnership will be in areas of providing intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assistance in the fight against insurgency (Nwafor

2018).

The African Union (AU) and the Pursuit of Peace and Security in the LCBR

The African Union's fight against terrorism on the continent is enshrined in its constitutional provisions and given expression through visits, conferences and mobilization of support from the international community. The 1994 and 1999 O.A.U Convention, the AU high-level intergovernmental meeting on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism in Africa are notable. Measures taken by the AU included the 2015 authorization of the formation and deployment of the MNJTF, the designation of Boko Haram as a threat to the peace and security of the LCBR and the call to the UN and partner nations to intensify their support to the LCBR states (AU Niamey Ministerial Meeting January, 2015 - The National Mirror, 2015; AU Summit July, 2017). Two other initiatives are also noted. The signing of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) that empowers the AU to receive funds from international partners on behalf of member states of the LCBR, in addition to administering the same in support of the MNJTF. The other is the convening of the AU Plan of

Action by the high – level inter-governmental meeting on the prevention and combating terrorism in Africa (Algiers, 11 – 14 September 2002).

The United Kingdom's (UK) Assistance to the LCBR

The United Kingdom (UK) is also a key and active participant in the struggle to ensure peace and security in the LCBR. The UK renewed its interest in the war on terror in Africa in 2013 when two British born Nigerians in Woolwich, England (Mantzikos, 2014) killed a soldier. Although the Woolworth incident was not directly related to Boko Haram it, however, signalled a warning to the British government of the possibility of home - grown terrorism and radicalism often inspired by actions abroad (Mantzikos, 2014). To forestall such an occurrence, the British government constituted a House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee Inquiry, which recommended non-military approaches and regional collaboration to tackle the menace of Boko Haram (Mantzikos, 2014). Prominent among the UK contributions are the:

- Provision of military assistance to the MNJTF and military intelligence, humanitarian and development support and the 2015, promise of financial assistance to Niger ($34 million) and Nigeria (nearly $11million) while it pledged to give an additional $42 million between 2015 and 2018 (United Nations Security Council Report *S/PV.7748)*.

- Pledging (at the 71st Session of the UN General Assembly in 2016) of an additional £80 million to the LCBR states to complement an earlier £90 million given for humanitarian assistance (Akinloye 2016). Out of the £80 million, £50 million was allocated to meet the needs of workers in affected communities while the remaining £30 million was to be expended on people affected by Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad and Niger (Akinloye 2016).

- Deployment in 2016 of 300 personnel to provide medical, infantry, air defence and counter insurgency support. In the same 2016, the UK Minister of State - Baroness Anelay visited Nigeria and on behalf of the British government donated £6.5

million ($8.4 million) to support humanitarian assistance in Nigeria's North East (Human Rights Watch - World Report 2017).

- Establishing the UK–Nigeria security and partnership to promote shared stability, prosperity and growth through a series of initiatives such as the provision of counter improvised explosive devices (IEDs) training to Nigerian troops in support 'Operation Lafiya Dole' and training of full army units before deployment to the theatre of operation (vanguard 2018).

- Donation by the UK government of £146 million at the Berlin International Donor Conference to provide for humanitarian assistance, civilian protection and stabilization of the LCBR. The UK made another contribution of $3.1 million to the UN response fund. This was to address immediate humanitarian and medical needs in the LCBR. This money amounted to 20% of the UK's 2018 flash appeal fund (vanguard December 2018).

Table I: Amount Allocated to LCBR Individual Member States (2018) By Donor Countries at the 2018 Berlin Conference

Country	Humanitarian Funding in € (N)	Development Funding
Nigeria	€ 47 million (₦19.5 billion)	€74.5 million (₦30.9 billion)
Niger	€15 million (₦13.4 billion)	€32.2 million (₦6.2 billion)
Chad	€11.8 million (₦13.8 billion)	€33.2 million (₦4.9 billion)
Cameroon	€15.1 million (₦1.1 billion)	€2.7 million (₦6.2 billion)

Source: https://ec.europa.eu/europeaidnewsandevents (Accessed on 4th September of 2018). Also monitored on Channels - TV News (Nigeria), 14.00 GMT (September 4, 2018)

Table II: Financial Pledges by Donor Countries and Partners at the 2018 Berlin International Donor Conference on Boko Haram

Countries	Amount Pledged
Germany	€265 million
Norway	$125 million
United States of America	$420 million
Switzerland	$20 million
France	€131 million
Belgium	€45 million
Finland	€2.3 million
Denmark	€72.5 million
United Kingdom	£146 million
Canada	$68 million (Canadian dollars)
European Union	€231.5 million
Luxembourg	€40 million
Spain	€3.2 million

Source:
https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/top-news/282446-berlin-conference-on-boko-haram-rakes-in-2.52bn.html Accessed September 4, 2018.

The US Support for the Fight against Boko Haram
Since September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, there have been marked shifts in the US security and counter-terrorism policies. The counter terrorism strategies have become more concretized and highly decisive especially in Middle-East and Africa. Over the years, successive administrations have shown the resolve to adopt an "open-ended policy on the war on terror" (Baylis et al. 2008, 565). Adogamhe (2006, 109) noted that the Bush administration strategy against terrorism was multifaceted. It involves the imposition of sanctions and embargo on states that sponsored terrorism and, replacing terror-sponsoring regimes with democratic government and utilizing its military capability to maintain its global hegemonic power. According to Levan (2015, 4) President Barack Obama's strategy was cautious and comprised diplomatic and developmental approaches.

The Buhari administration encountered similar issues with the US in 2015. President Buhari emphasised that the application of the Leahy Law by the US against Nigeria "has denied the country access to strategic weapons to prosecute the war against Boko Haram" (NTA, July 2015). To assure the US of his administration's compliance with the Leahy Law, Buhari explained that his government had embarked on security sector reforms and "have re–written the rules of engagement, protecting the rights of combatants and

safeguarding civilians in theatre of conflict (Buhari–Speech at the US Institute for Peace – USIP (NTA, July 2015).

In reaction to Buhari's appeal which is predicated on promises to reform the military and investigate officers culpable of human rights violation, the Trump administration in compliance with exceptions to the Leahy law notified the US Congress (in September, 2016) of its preparedness to sell 12 A - Super Tucano Light Attack aircraft and weapons including laser (guided and unguided) rockets valued at $592 million to Nigeria (World Report 2017). These new aircrafts are aimed at improving Nigeria's air power capability and protect civilians in the LCBR (The Eagle Online 2017). In spite of the controversies generated by the Leahy Law, the under-listed efforts by the US will suffice:

- The establishment of the US Africa Command (AFRICOM) in 2008– a quick response group aimed at containing and degrading Boko Haram, as well as building peacekeeping, providing humanitarian assistance and enhancing the disaster response capacity of

African partners are worth mentioning.

AFRICOM's mission is also designed to disrupt and neutralize transnational threats and build selected African nations' defence capability and capacity to ensure regional security, stability and prosperity (AFRICOM 2008).

- The deployment of counter-terrorism team to Nigeria in January 2016. This action is a part of the US government Security Governance initiative (SGI) under which it is creating partnerships with six (6) African countries (Ghana, Kenya, Mali, Niger, Nigeria and Tunisia) in order to improve governance in the security sector. This effort also aims to strengthen the military and civilian institutions, provide oversight functions rather than providing armaments or manpower (The Economist, 2015).

- Training of military personnel and advising troops to help build the capacity of the regional forces. This includes i. the Security Assistance Training and

Management Organization (SATMO) training of regional forces on advanced infantry tactics, patrolling, counter-IED raids, ambushes, as well as search and rescue operations, and ii. a six-week training and advice session in Jaji, Kaduna State, Nigeria with emphasis ranging on exercises such as 'pack-out' preparations to redeployment operations (Sheehan 2018).

• The initiation of a joint- fund between the Department of State and Defense known as the Global Security Contingency Fund (GSCF) which combines diplomacy and military strategies to build coordinated security assistance and aimed at enhancing the capabilities of the military, police, border guards and law enforcement institutions of the LCBR. In realizing its aims, the GSCF has between 2015 and 2017, invested $40 million into the project (Dukharn, 2018).

• The building by the US Air Force of a $110 million armed drone base in the Republic of Niger. The base is intended to house several fighter jets and MQ9 drones with surveillance and intelligence gathering capabilities with a wider range that will cover the LCBR and Sahel region (Egbas 2018).

• The imposition of new sanctions on Boko Haram and its factional leader – Mus'ab al- Barnawi in February 2018. This new sanction initiated by the US treasury department is a part of global action against IS and its affiliate network. Significantly, the embargo is intended to deny the terrorist leaders access to the US financial system, destroy ISIS in its safe havens, denying its ability to recruit foreign fighters, stifling its financial resources and negating the false propaganda it disseminates over the internet and social media (Adeyemo 2018).

It is instructive that the US remains the largest donor to the LCBR response. It has made a vast amount of funding available to the LCBR states through the creation of the Lake Chad Basin Disaster Assistance. In 2016, for instance, the US provided $40 million funding in humanitarian assistance to the LCBR, a sum which the Americans reiterated

amounted to $237 million for both 2015 and 2016 fiscal years– FY. In March 2018, the US government announced the release of $128 million (FY 2018) as new humanitarian funding for the LCBR (US Embassy 2016-Lake Chad Basin Emergency Fact Sheet #9 2018). Table III gives a detailed breakdown of the amount the US expended on the LCBR between 2017 and 2018. In reacting to the US support, President Muhammadu Buhari of Nigeria acknowledged, "the USA has been, to date, the biggest contributor to the humanitarian response in the LCBR" (France24 2018).

Table III: US Humanitarian Funding for the Lake Chad Basin Response in 2017-2018

United State' Government/ Agency	Fund Expended
USAID/OFDA	$147,694,288
USAID/FFP[2]	$404,754,604
State/PRM	$90,010,000
USAID/Nigeria	$6,182,734
Total	**$648,641,626**

Source: Lake Chad Basin-Complex Emergency Fact Sheet #9 Fiscal Years (FY) 2018 of March 8, 2018.

France and the Burden of

Shared Responsibility in the Fight against Boko Haram
France's political, economic and military presence in West Africa is well noted. All the LCBR states (Niger, Chad and Cameroon and by extension Benin), with the exception of Nigeria, had colonial ties with France. The countries are French former colonies. In addition, France has tremendous economic investments in Nigeria and the country has military alliances with its Francophone LCBR states. It is, therefore, no coincidence that France has been at the forefront in the fight against Boko Haram in the LCBR. France's active involvement and the consistent synergy it had with the LCBR states could be traced to 2014 when former Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan appealed to former President Francoise Holland of France to help curb the Boko Haram menace. During this period, international presence and action (except for the International Red Cross (ICRC) and Doctors without Borders -MSF) were virtually non-existent in the LCBR (Nwachukwu 2018).

On the diplomatic level, France has used her presence at the UNSC to mobilize regional coordination and support. Two (2) instances readily come to mind.

First, it hosted a summit-level gathering of the LCBR countries in Paris on 17 May 2014 - the UK convened a similar high-level meeting on 12 June the same year (Peace and Security Council Report, 2014). This singular effort, among others, resulted in the decision to operationalize a regional intelligence fusion unit and the establishment of a multinational joint task force to enhance border security. Second, France initiated (jointly with Senegal and the United Kingdom) a UNSC visit to the LCBR in March 2017. This measure shows France's commitment to supporting counter-insurgency operations, define joint action, encourage and strengthen the MNJTF in the fight against Boko Haram (French Delegate Report to the UNSC 7748th Meeting: 2016).

Other salient efforts of France include:

- The establishment and creation of the Lake Chad Basin initiative being implemented by the French Development Agency which seek to, through the Pan-African project, restore the Lake towards achieving peace and security in the region and address the problems caused by the shrinking of the Lake (Campbell 2018).

- Providing and sharing of intelligence reports, logistical support to Chad and Niger as well as the provision of equipment and training to Cameroon (French Delegate Report to the UNSC 7748th Meeting: 2016)

- The commencement, in August 2014, of a permanent 'Operation Barkhane' with an operational headquarters in N'Djamena, Chad. In 2015, France deployed about 3000 soldiers whose mandate include the provision of logistical and intelligence support to the MNJTF; contain the al-Qaeda threat in the Maghreb and elicit cooperation with partner countries to inhibit a linkup between Boko Haram and similar groups in the Sahel region (French Delegate Report to the UNSC 7748th Meeting: 2016)

- More importantly, "Operation Barkhane" was designed as a rapid and efficient intervention force aimed at pre-empting Islamic extremist groups in Chad,

Niger and Mali and above all, operating across borders. "Operation Barkhane" assisted the MNJTF in 2016 to fight Boko Haram, and conducted joint border raids with Chad and Niger, particularly in monitoring and controlling the movement of traffickers and terrorist groups in the LCBR. It also helped in training members of the Chadian defence force in areas such as monitoring missions, combat, shooting and mine risk education.

While France's efforts as well as those of the UN, EU, and the US examined in the preceding paragraphs are diplomatic and military in character, the humanitarian dimensions of the initiatives are undertaken by specialized agencies of the UN and other non-governmental organizations who have taken steps to focus on the humanitarian impact engendered by the Boko Haram insurgency. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) are at the centre of these efforts.

The UNDP was part of the initiators of the Oslo and Berlin Conferences. Above all, the agency in conjunction with the Borno State government (North-East Nigeria) initiated the Lake Chad Basin Governors' Forum (May 2018) for regional cooperation on stabilization, peacebuilding and sustainable development. This forum sought, among others, to come up with a community-based approach as a lasting solution to the crisis in the LCBR. It also directed its attention at addressing sub-national and cross border challenges and opportunities with a view to providing a better life for the people that live and depend on the Lake Chad basin for survival.

The activities of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) is geared mainly towards ameliorating the ecological impact, disruptions of economic activities, the challenges of food insecurity, hunger, poverty and famine posed by the crisis in the LCBR. The FAO has been engaged in the provision of financial assistance and cash transfer to people in the LCBR. FAO is also engaged in key activities such as the distribution of cereal seeds, animal feeds and veterinary care. To ensure the effectiveness of its operation however, FAO has developed a Lake Chad Basin Response

Strategy (2017-2019) to improve food security and strengthen the resilience of vulnerable communities in the affected areas (FAO Rome 2017).

Critical Analysis of International Efforts to Fight Boko Haram

The effectiveness of international support to curtail Boko Haram activities has become debatable. The Nigerian government (Buhari 2016 and some UN representatives (Feltman, 2016; Chambers, 2018) have argued that international financial and military assistance to the MNJTF, imposing sanctions and the designation of Boko Haram as a terrorist organisation has enabled the LCBR states in taking back much of the territories seized by the group. Boko Haram's access to funding and purchase of weapons (Feller, 2018) also diminished. The Nigerian government too on numerous occasions has asserted that Boko Haram has been technically defeated because the group's capacity tocontrol territories and carry out large scale attacksin North Eastern Nigeriahave been curtailed and degraded (Buhari, 2015; Mohammed, 2015; Buratai, 2020).

However, there is a counter-view.

This view stressed that though the LCBR through its MNJTF recorded some gains in the fight against Boko Haram in the period between 2015 and 2017. Between 2017 to the present on the other hand, the group and its splinter – the Islamic State of West Africa (ISWA), has increased the frequency, range and sophistication of their violent activities thereby, contributing to the "rapidly deteriorating security and humanitarian situation in the LCBR" (Allen 2018). Recognising that Boko Haram has not been 'technically defeated' President Buhari (Nigeria) in his speech to members of the Lake Chad Basin Commission - LCBC (15 December 2018) acknowledged the resurgence of Boko Haram attacks particularly on military barracks and abduction of civilians for ransom across the LCBR.

The resurgence of Boko Haram attacks and the inability of the LCBR states to counter the upsurge despite international support is due to several factors. The inability of the Nigerian government (an arrowhead of the MNJTF) to purchase weapons and technology at the height of the attacks in 2014 was due largely to the application of the Leahy law by the US (Buhari 2015–Speech

at the United States Institute for Peace). The reluctance of the Israeli government willing to sell arms to Nigeria but had to do a rethink to align itself with the US arm-sales ban policy is also a case in point. (Jonathan 2018; Toramade 2018). Also of importance is the refusal of the US government (even though it had helped in conducting surveillance flights and sharing commercial imagery) to share raw intelligence data (Soillum 2015) that could have been useful in tracking Boko Haram in the unmapped terrain surrounding the LCBR states.

The imposition of sanctions on funding, travel and arms sale to Boko Haram by the United Nations (UN Security Council 1267 - Al-Qaeda Sanctions List 2014) had no significant impact on the ability of the group to access various forms of funding which it used to carry out its activities (22nd Report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team 2017). The porosity of the borders and a predominantly cash economy within the LCBR coupled with Boko Haram's access to diverse revenue sources such as charitable donations, smuggling, remittances/money transfers, extortion and ransom on kidnappings accounts for this (22nd Report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team 2017; Global Terrorism Index 2015, 5).

In Nigeria, there are reports of the prevalence of corruption among military Service Chiefs who diverted funds meant to purchase arms and logistical support for troops, accepted bribes from and colluded with Boko Haram to coordinate attacks on military infrastructure (Uwimana & Wawro 2014; Doukhan 2016; Buhari's Speech on YouTube 2017). Cases also abound of commanders abandoning their positions in the theatre of operation against Boko Haram, leading to the death of troops and loss of equipment to Boko Haram (Ogundipe 2018). There are also instances of soldiers protesting about such welfare needs as inadequate supply of food and equipment, arbitrary deductions from soldiers' salaries, late/non reinforcements for detachments and the state of disrepair of equipment (Ogundipe 2018; Adekunle 2018). Mismanagement and misappropriation of funds and relief materials for Internally Displaced Persons (IDP's) are rife among public officials (International Crisis Group 2016, Ubah 2017; Haruna 2018). The

former Secretary to the Federal Government – Babachir Lawal was implicated in awarding contracts to companies he had interests, while the former Chief of the National Intelligence Agency (NIA)–Ayo Oke was exposed for keeping in a private apartment monies totalling $43million.

The paper wishes to acknowledge the intractable and non-seamless relationship between the Nigeria military and some international partners in the country. The military had criticised UNICEF on certain occasions for undermining the nation's sovereignty by training selected persons for clandestine activities intending to spy for Boko Haram (premiumtimes, December 2018). Based on the accusation, the army ordered the suspension of United Nations Children Emergency Fund (UNICEF) activities in Nigeria. The army rescinded the order because of interventions by the Federal Government and Civil Society Organisations like Amnesty International, which observed that the suspension order was "an attempt to demonise UNICEF life-saving work in North Eastern Nigeria" (premiumtimes, December 2014). President Buhari in 2016 expressed his dissatisfaction with

the UN for exaggerating the humanitarian needs in Nigeria to get more funding from donors (Akinwotu 2016). In the same vein, Governor Kashim Shettima of Borno State had in 2017 criticised UN agencies including UNICEF and 126 other non-governmental agencies for non-performance and alleged failure to justify funds spent on IDPs. Governor Shettima asserted that most of the agencies use donor funds to "service only their overheads, logistic needs and personnel costs, enriching themselves in the process" (premiumtimes, January 2017).

International agencies have also reacted to the restricted and unfavourable environment they had to carry out their humanitarian activities. Amnesty International, for example, accused the security forces of the LCBR of human rights violation like extrajudicial killing, torture and looting, creating a climate of impunity and deepening frustration of families and victims affected by the crisis (Amnesty International 2016). The International Crisis Group averred that the sensitivity of the Nigerian Military to its national security and sovereignty has resulted in the dependence of international agencies on the Army for

protection, assessment of local security conditions and sometimes humanitarian service delivery. The result is a lack of aim and in-depth reporting of the situation as well as difficulty in mobilising international support for resources (International Crisis Group August 2016). Two other factors also hinder the effectiveness of international agencies. First, many implementation partners of the UN agencies lack the capacity to access remote parts of North Eastern Nigeria and adjoining LCBR towns where the terrain is challenging. Second, humanitarian workers could not establish credible contacts with Boko Haram to negotiate access and get guarantees that can reduce risks to acceptable levels (International Crisis Group August 2016; Cormaic 2017).

Conclusion and Recommendations

The paper examines the series of initiatives embarked upon by the international community in its fight against Boko Haram in the LCBR. The actions and involvement of the world became noticeable in 2014 on the heels of the abduction of over two-hundred (200) schoolgirls in Chibok, North Eastern Nigeria, alongside the terrorist tactics of

Boko Haram to enforce Sharia law, expunge western influences, especially education, and conquer territories around the LCBR.

To stem the tidal wave of terrorism, several organizations and countries have joined forces to share the burden of maintaining peace, order and security in the LCBR. Initiatives and actions taken by the international community to confront the Boko Haram threat identified in this paper include awareness, debates, discussions in different peace conferences/ summits, scheduled visits to the LCBR, adoption of resolutions, press briefings, mobilization of funds, training assistance, in addition to the provision of military equipment and logistical supplies. The endeavours of the UN, EU, Norway, Germany, the UK and USA, France, the AU in addition to those of the UNDP and FAO are noted.

The paper acknowledges the combined efforts of the international community and the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) in the last three years. The capacity of the group to seize and expand its area of operations declined between 2015 and 2018. With the adoption of counter-terrorism strategies of stifling of

funds, cutting the group's supply route, pressuring and imposing sanctions on States that sponsor terror coupled with constant attack form land, aerial reconnaissance and bombardment, the group no longer controls territory and has resorted to conducting attacks on the LCBR States from its safe haven in the Sambisa Forest.

In spite of the assistance by the international community, Boko Haram is still active and continues to attack military installations and kill civilians in the LCBR. The group has not been "completely defeated" because of insufficient funding for the operations of the MNJTF, pervasive corruption within the top echelon of the military, neglect of soldiers' welfare needs and lack of sophisticated equipment that could effectively counter those of Boko Haram. The inaccessibility of international agencies to remote communities within the LCBR to deliver humanitarian assistance to IDPs and the problematic relationship between the Nigerian government, its military and international partners are noted. More importantly, the support the group enjoys in terms of finance, training and logistic supply with other extremists' groups like al-

Qaeda and IS and their affiliates in the Maghreb and Sahel regions of Africa in spite of international sanctions has propelled Boko Haram to renew its attacks in the LCBR in recent times.

In order to ensure the effectiveness of international efforts, all stakeholders should:

- Work in a cooperative and coordinated manner to evolve common strategies that will be coherent, consistent and sustainable to counter Boko Haram threats.

- Ensure the timely release of monies pledged and scale up their financial commitments to match the pace of humanitarian operations with increased needs of the people. Essentially, response should go hand in hand with the reintegration and long-term recovery needs of displaced persons.

- Ensure that enduring moral and financial commitments are capable of sustaining the MNJTF in addition to carrying out development programs in the area. Hence, the need to come up with practical and viable political

and military solutions that will bring about enduring good governance, peace and sustainable development in the LCBR.

- Carry out oversight functions on the LCBR states by ensuring that the MNJTF and militaries of member states uphold and respect principles of international law, like a sense of humanity, neutrality and respect for the fundamental human rights of all parties on both sides of the divide.

Finally, while taking cognizance that Boko Haram is a military threat which needs an equal response of coercive force, this chapter supports the UN Security Council (S/PV. 7748) observation that a military approach, while essential, will not end the Boko Haram threat. Therefore, affected countries must tackle the humanitarian consequences and the root causes that contributed to the emergence of the group.

REFERENCES

Adeyemo.I.(2018).US Places New Sanctions on Boko Haram, Leader https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/260066-u-s-places-new-sanctions-boko-haram-leadr.html.Accessed October 8, 2018.

Adogamhe, G. (2006). Rethinking the North-South Relations: An Analysis of the US -Nigerian Hegemonic Overtures. *Nigerian Journal of International Affairs 32* (1): 99-132.

Against Terrorism and Boko Haram".Accessed January 21, 2019.

Agbiboa. D. (2014). Peace at Daggers Drawn? Boko Haram and the State of Emergency in Nigeria. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 37*: 56 DOI: 10.1080/1057610X.2014.853602

Akinloye. D (2016). UK, Donates additional $80 million, while US gives $41million to support Nigeria (https://www.pulse.ng/news/local /boko-haram-uk-donates-additional-80m-while-us-gives-41m-to-support-nigeria-id55272621.html.Accessed October 15, 2018.

Akinwotu. E. (2016). Nigeria's President Accuses UN of Hyping up Humanitarian Crisis for $1billion Appeal Available in, https://www.theguardian.com. December 5, 2016 Accessed February 1, 2019.

Al Jazeera News (2018).

http://www.aljazeera.com/amp/news/2018/09/germany-norway-pledge-funds-crisis-hit-lake-chad-region-180903151100231.html. Accessed September 4, 2018.

Al Jazeera News(2015). AU calls for regional force to fight Boko Haram. http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2015/01/au-calls-regional-force-fight-boko-haram-150130032244124.html.Accessed August 15, 2018.

Allen.J.(2018). Security Council Briefing on the UN office for Central Africa In, https://www.legit,ng>12009610 "Boko Haram: UK Reacts to Insurgency in Nigeria" by Rahamman Abiola. See also: https://www.pulse.ng. - December 14, 2018 "UK Rallies Support for Nigeria over Boko Haram" Both accessed January 25, 2019.

Ban Ki-Moon. (2015). "Address to the African Union" Available at https://www.iol.co.za – January 13, 2015 "UN, AU to help Nigeria Tackle Boko Haram" Accessed January 25, 2019.

Baylis,J etal . (2008). The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations (4th Edition). U.S.A.: Oxford University Press.

BBC News. (2014). "UN Committee Imposes Sanctions on Nigeria's Boko Haram" http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-27529566.Accessed June 30, 2018.

Blacklists Boko Haram.https://www.bbc.com. "UN Committee Imposes Sanctions on

Buhari. M.(2018). "Speech Delivered at the Extraordinary Summit of Heads of State and Governments of LCBC to Address Prevailing Security Challenges in the Sub Region" In, www.pulse.ng>local>by SeunAdeyeye. See also: Speech at the 71st Session of the UN September 20, 2016.https://www.gadebate.un.org. Both Accessed January 30, 2019.

Buratai. T (2020). Speech at COAS 2020 Al-adha Luncheon with Troops… www.von.gov.ng – Nigerian Army Experiencing Rapid Development by Nokai Origin. Accessed August 14, 2020

Campbell, Horace. 2018. Saving Lake Chad: A Pan African Project   https://allafrica.com/stories/201803200302htm. Accessed November 10, 2018.

Chambers, I. (2018). Speech at a 2-Day Lake Chad Governor's Forum for Regional Cooperation on Stabilization, Peace-Building and Sustainable Development" In, https://www.dailypost.ng. March 9, 2018. Accessed January 30, 2019.

Cormaic. R.(2017). Access and Aid, Key to Humanitarian Effort in Nigeria's North East www.irishtimes.com. - April 20, 2017 Accessed February 1, 2019.

Delattre,F. (2015). UN Security Council President's Remark to the Press on March 31, 2015 available at https://onu.delegatefrance.org>BokoHarak-a-threat-to-international-peace-and-secuirty. Accessed January 21, 2019.

Doukhan. D. (2016). The Nigerian Reality in the War against Boko Haram: Between Hope and Despair. Available at www.ict.org.il. – March 22, 2016. Accessed February 1, 2019.

Dukharn. K.(2018). Taking the Fight to Boko Haram: The Global Security Contingency Fund Strengthens Chad's Security Sector. Available in https://www.blogs.state.gov>2018>09. Accessed January 25, 2019.

Egbes. J.(2018). Boko Haram - US Sets Up $110 million Drone Base to Fight Terrorism in Nigeria - https://www.pulse.ng/news/local.id/8291926.html-US-set-up-$110million-drone-base-to-fight-terrorism.Accessed September 23, 2018.

European Commission, (2018). Africa's Lake Chad Region will receive 138 million in EU Humanitarian and Development Funding. htpps://www.ec.europa.eu/echo/news/africas-lake-chad-region-will-receive-138-million-eu-humanitarian-and-development-funding_en.com.Accessed September 4, 2018.

Extremism Plaguing West Africa".Accessed January 21, 2019.

Felter. C.(2018). Nigeria's Battle with Boko Haram. Available at https://www.cfr.org. - August 8, 2018 Accessed January 30, 2019.

Feltman. J. (2017). Under Secretary Briefing to the Security Council on the Situation in LCBR (S/2017/764) In, www.un.org.September 13, 2017; see also: Briefing at the UN 7748th Meeting of July 26, 2016. Accessed January 30, 2019.

Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) 2017 April 11. Director General Talking Point Press Conference, Rome. http://www.fao.org. Accessed August 25, 2018.

Global Terrorism Index: 2017, Meaning and Understanding the Impact of Terrorism. USA: Institute for Economics & Peace (PDF) See also, Global Terrorism Index: 2014 & 2015. Also available at www.pulse.ng. accessed January 21, 2019.

Henry, Solomon. April 4, 2017, Mathew Rycroft (UK Permanent

Representative to the UN): "Why UN Security Council Adopted Resolution 2349" http://www.nta.ng/news/20170404. Accessed May 23, 2018.

https://news.un.org>story>2018. August 21, 2018. "Peace and Security: Secretary General Call for Support to Lake Chad Countries after Latest Boko Haram Attacks". Accessed January 21, 2019.

https://www.crisisgroup.org. – August 4, 2016 "North - Eastern Nigeria and Conflicts' Humanitarian Fallout".Accessed January 22, 2019.

https://www.intervention.ng. – August 8, 2016. "The Deepening Humanitarian Challenge in North Eastern Nigeria" Accessed February 1, 2019.

https://www.premiuntimesng.com.December 23, 2015 edition - "We Have Defeated Boko Haram, December Deadline Met, Nigeria Says".Accessed January 30, 2019.August 16, 2018 edition, "How Boko Haram is Funded" by Abdullah, Haruna Accessed January 21, 2019; December 14, 2018 - "Nigerian Army Accuses UNICEF of Impropriety, Announces Suspension of its Activities in North East"; August 3, 2018 - "Boko Haram: Army Chief Spits Fire, Warns Commanders Against Fleeing from Terrorists"; January 11 2017 - "Boko Haram: Borno Governor Lambasts UNICEF and 126 other Non-Performing NGO's" & March 19, 2018 - "How Books, Food Donated by UN, WFP to Nigerian IDPs are Repackaged and Sold". All accessed January 23, 2019.

https://www.punch.com - October 6, 2016 "Greater International Cooperation Key to Defeating Boko Haram – Military Commanders" Accessed January 30, 2019.

https://www.securitycouncilreport.org "March 2017 Monthly Forecast: The Security Council Visiting Mission to the LCBR". Accessed January 23, 2019.

https://www.state.gov>drl>rls - March 9, 2018. 2 Leahy Fact Sheet".Accessed January 23, 2019.

https://www.un.org "Security Council Condemns Terrorist Attacks, Other Violations in LCBR, Unanimously Adopts Resolution 2349 (2017)" Accessed January 23, 2019.

https://www.un.org.au>2016/10/20 - January 10, 2016. "UN Introduces New Action Plan to Prevent Violent Extremism" Accessed January 25, 2019.

Kegley. C and Shannon. B. (2011). World Politics: Trend and Transformation.USA: Wadsworth, Engage Learning.

Killings available at http://dailypost/2018/7/15/france-speaks-foreigners-involvement-boko-haram-herdsmenkillins-amp/.Accessed August 28, 2018.

Levan. Carl. (2012). Respond to Boko Haram with Diplomacy, Development and Demilitarization http://wwwcarllevan.com/ 201205/book-haram-letter-to Clinton-from-scholars.Accessed June 3, 2018.

Lumpe.L(2014).What the Leahy Law Means for Human Rights - In, https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org – April 24, 2014.Accessed January 22, 2019.

Mantzikos. I (2014). Africa in Transition "In, www.cfr.org>blog>uk-stance-boko haram May 19, 2014. Accessed January 21, 2019.

Matthieu.J. (2015).UN Adopts Resolution Calling for International Coordination against Boko Haram" http://news.vice.com.Accessed May 23, and October 17, 2018.

Mohammed. L. (2015). I stand by what I said . . . Boko Haram has been technically defeated. Available in, www.cable.ng - by DyepkazahShibayan.Accessed August14, 2020.

News24 (2018) Feb 9. UN 2018 Report http://www.news24.com. Accessed May 23, 2018.

News24 (2018) May 1. Report of the Secretary General on the Situation in Lake Chad Basin. http://relief.web,int.Accessed May 23, 2018.

Nigeria's Boko Haram - May 23, 2104. Both accessed January 22, 2019.

Nwachukwu. J. (2018). France Speaks on Foreigners Involvement in Boko Haram – Herdsmen Killings Being Address by France Ambassador to commemorate French National Day Abuja, Nigeria. https://dailypost/2018/7/15/france-speaks-on-foreigners-involvenent-boko-haram-herdsmen-killings/amp/. Accessed September 28, 2018.

Nwachukwu.O. (2016). France Speaks on Foreigners Involvement in Boko Haram, Herdsmen

Nwafor.P.(2018).EU Agrees to Partner with Nigerian Army to Fight Boko Haram https://www.vanguardngr.com/2018/03/eu-agrees-partner-nigerian-aarmy-fight-boko-haram/amp/. Accessed October 19, 2018.

OCHA Report, (2017). Oslo Humanitarian Conference for Nigeria and the Lake Chad Region Raises $672 million to Help in Need.https://reliefweb.int/report/nigeria/oslo-humanitarian-conference-nigeria-and-lake-chad-region-raises-672-million-help.com.Accessed October 119, 2018.

Onuoha.C. (2013). Porous Borders and Boko Haram's Arms Smuggling Operations in Nigeria." Al Jazeera Center for Studies, September 8. http://studies.aljazeera.net/en/reports/2013/09/201398104245877469.html. Accessed August 23, 2018.

Open Doors. (2014). "US Declare Boko Haram a Terrorist Foreign Group". https://www.opendoorsusa.org/christian-persecution/stories/declares-boko-haram-foreign-terrorist-group/.Accessed July 5, 2018.

Peace and Security Council Report. (2014). Nigeria; Boko Haram Not Just a Domestic Problem. Available at https://issafrica.org/pscreport/situation-analysis/nigeria-boko-haram-not-just-a-domestic-problem.Accessed June 25, 2018.

Peace and Security Department of the AU (2015). The African Union Counter Terrorism Framework. http://www.peaceau.org/en/page/64-counter-terrorism-ct#sthash.4QJizBnS.pdf. Accessed September 20, 2018.

Powers. S.(2014). Address to Pressmen In, https://www.m.dw.com – UN Security Council

Quinlay.G(2014). UN Al-Qaeda Sanctions Committee Chairman Press Statement available at https://www.mobile.abc.net.au May 23, 2014 "Boko Haram Blacklisted: UN Security Council Sanctions Nigeria Islamist Group".Accessed January 22, 2019.

Root Causes of Boko Haram Threat in Lake Chad Basin - 2016. http://www.allafrica.comAccessed July 26, 2018.

Sanctions List".Available at https://www.un.org/press/en/2014/sc11410.doc.htm. Accessed June 24,

Sheehan.J(2018).US Soldiers Train Nigerian Army Troops. https://dod.defense.gov/news/article/article/1490619/us-soldiers-train-nigerian-army-troops/. Accessed October 19, 2018.

Socio-Economic Rights and Accountability Project, SERAP. (2014). Missing School Girls, SERAPSeek Security Council Sanctions against Boko Haram. available at http://www.serapnigeria.org/missing-schoolgirls-serap-seeks-un-security-council-sanctions-against-boko-haram.ngo/.Accessed June 22, 2018.

Soillum. M.(2015). No Helicopters for You Available in, https://www.foreignpolicy.com>nigeria – February 3, 2015.Accessed January 22, 2019.

Soonest.N.(2018). Feb. 9. Good-News: United Nations take up Fight for

Victims of BokoHaram Attacks.http://www.naija.com.Accessed May 23, 2018.

The 22nd Report of the Analytical Support and Monitoring Team, Pursuant to Resolution 2368 (2017).In, https://www.premiumtimesng.com – August 16, 2018.Accessed January 21, 2019.

The Eagle Online (2017). Pentagon to US Senate: We are Selling Super Tucano Fighter Jets, Bombs to Nigeria, available at:https://www.theeagleonline.com.ng/amp/pentagon-to-us-senate-wer-selling-super-tucano-fighter-jets-bombs-to-nigeria. Accessed October 19, 2018.

The Economist (2015). "US to Send Counter-Terrorism Team to Nigeria". Available at: https://country.ieu.com/article.aspx?articleid=1763750160&country =Nigeria&topic=Politics&subtopic=Forcast&subtopic=International +relations&u=1&PID=744007858&oid=744007858&uid=1.

The U.S. Department of State Report (2012). Bureau of African Affairs Fact Sheet available at,http://m.state.gov/md2836.htm.Accessed June 3, 2018.

The United States Institute for Peace (USIP) (2012). US - Nigeria Bi-national Commission Convenes at USIP". http://www.usip.org/publication/usnigeria-binational-commission-onvenes-usip.Accessed June 3, 2018.

Toramade.S (2018). Jonathan Accuses Obama of Setting Him Up to Fail in Rescue of Chibok School Girls Available in, www.pulse.ng – December 11, 2018. December 11, 2018 "Presidency Says Boko Haram is Beyond Technically Defeated: Begs for Patience from Nigerians".www.pulse.ng - Accessed January 30, 2019.

U.S. Department of State (2003), Patterns of Global Terrorism Report 2003. U.S.A. Washington, D.C.

UN Document 2017, March 31. UN Document for Security Council Report. http://www.vanguard.ng.com.

UN Presidential Statement –SPRST/2018/7/14 (August 11, 2018) & SPRST/2017/2 (January 20,

UN Security Council 1267 Al- Qaeda Sanctions List May 2014.

UN Security Council Decision S/PRST/2015/12 – June 15, 2015 in, https://unoca,missions.org "Fight

United Nations 2014. "Security Council Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee Adds Boko Haram to its

United Nations Security Council (UNSC) 71 Years & 7748th Meeting, July

26, 2016, (PDF Version).Available at www.securitycouncilreport.org. (S/PV.7748). Accessed October 13, 2018.

Uwimana. C & Wawro. L.(2014). Corruption in Nigeria's Military & Security Forces: A weapon in Boko Haram Hands.Accessed February 1, 2019.

Walker.A.(2012).What is Boko Haram?" United States Institute of Peace 308 (June). 8. http://www.xtome.org/docs/groups/boko-haram/SR308.pdf.Accessed May 23, 2018.

World Report(2017). Nigeria - Events of 2016 in, https://www.hrw.org.Accessed January 21, 2019.

www.amnestyinl>actueel>boko-haram "Boko Haram Summit: Human Rights Must Be Foundation of Regional Response"- 14 Mei, 2016.Accessed January 25, 2019.

www.bbc.com2014. "UN Committee Imposes Sanctions on Boko Haram". Accessed January 25, 2019;www.bbc.com>news>world-africa "Boko Haram Crisis: Nigeria Fury over US Arms Refusal – November 11, 2015.Accessed January 21, 2019.

www.forbes.com   "Arms Trade: The World's 10 Richest"- December 12, 2014.Accessed January 25, 2019.

www.gov.uk. "UK & Nigeria Step up Cooperation to End Boko Haram Threat– August 29, 2018. Accessed January 21, 2019.

www.saharareporters.com - "From Borno, Soldier Writes Buhari about Deadly, Lethal, Gruesome Corruption by Army Generals" - August 27, 2018.Accessed February 1, 2019."US Denies it Refuses to Sell Military Equipment to Nigeria" - November 13, 2014 Edition. Accessed January 22, 2019.

www.state.gov>organization. "Country Reports on Terrorism: 2017– September 6, 2018. Accessed January 25, 2019.

www.vanguardngr.com –November 16, 2018. "UK Restates Commitment to Support Fight against Boko Haram by Urowaniyo Warami, Accessed January 21, 2019; December 14, 2018 edition, "Boko Haram: UK Campaigns International Support for Nigeria. Accessed January 21, 2019 &Erunke, Joseph, "Why US Refused to Sell Arms to Jonathan".Accessed January 22, 2019.

SHEIKH AHMAD GUMI'S MEDIATION STRATEGIES IN NORTHERN NIGERIA'S ABDUCTION CONFLICT

Adegoke Olusegun Steve & Umukoro, Omonigho Simon
Department of Psychology
Faculty of Social Sciences
University of Lagos

ABSTRACT
This study employs a qualitative research approach, to examine the mediatory role of Sheikh Gumi's Public Relations approach as a conflict management strategy in securing the release of abducted students from Greenfield University in Nigeria. The study extensively explores relevant sources, including books, journal articles, and newspapers, directly addressing the subject matter. The data extracted from these sources was subjected to meticulous analysis. Thematic analysis revealed several key themes, each shedding light on different aspects of Sheikh Gumi's mediation efforts in the context of the abduction crisis. These identified themes encompass the following: Sheikh Gumi's advocacy for amnesty, the role of an external 'contact person' in mediating with the abductors, information pertaining to the non-Fulani leadership within the abductors' group, Sheikh Gumi's pro-negotiation stance with terrorist groups, his perception of the government's commitment to negotiations, his knowledge of the whereabouts of the abductees, the positive outcomes resulting from Sheikh Gumi's interventions, the potential linkages between Boko Haram and the Bandits involved in the Greenfield abduction, and the fact that Sheikh Gumi's self-appointed mediation activities lack official government endorsement. These themes are thoroughly examined and discussed in the context of existing literature, providing valuable insights and a deeper understanding of Sheikh Gumi's role in mediating the release of the abducted students.

Keywords: *Abduction, Conflict, Northern Nigeria*

BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY

For over a decade, the nation has been embroiled in a persistent cycle of conflicts, including disputes between farmers and herders, religious clashes, and ethnic tensions. Additionally, there are notorious security challenges such as the Biafra issue, insurgency in the North East, and conflicts in the Niger

Delta region. More recently, there has been a disturbing increase in large-scale kidnappings, particularly the targeting of school children, which has added to the country's turmoil. This all contributes to a nation still reeling from the aftermath of a protest that shook the country. It's evident that the nation is currently facing internal strife, primarily related to banditry and kidnappings (Punch, 2020). Armed bandits are increasingly causing insecurity in the north-western part of the country. The Northwest region is feeling the devastating impact of these groups, which are determined to violate human rights and take human lives. While not widely known in Nigeria, banditry was reported during the pre-civil war era when the government's authority weakened in some areas of the country (Odinkalu, 2018). The situation has worsened due to the lack of effective security measures and the failure of local justice systems in the face of poorly staffed and coordinated border control, exacerbating the banditry crisis in North-West Nigeria.

These bandits engage in a range of atrocities, including kidnapping, robbery, murder, and sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV), among other human rights violations. They act with impunity due to the weak security presence (ICG, 2020). The roots of banditry violence in northwest Nigeria can be traced back to conflicts between farmers and herders in the early 2010s, often linked to diminishing land and water resources. This violent conflict primarily involves the predominantly farming Hausa population and the prevalent Fulani herder population. Some view banditry as a struggle for control over resources (ICG, 2020). Despite significant investments in national security, joint task forces have been unable to overcome or contain these insecurity challenges. Various efforts and strategies, including those by traditional leaders, politicians, and scholars, have failed to yield meaningful progress. Recently, mediation strategies have shown promise in resolving conflicts, as mediation gains acceptance worldwide due to the shortcomings of today's judicial system.

Mediation can be described as a conflict management process that involves the assistance of an external party to change perceptions or behaviour without resorting to physical force or legal authority (Prokic, 2017).

International mediation is a complex interaction between mediators, protagonists, or their representatives (Bercovitch, 2009). Mediators employ three fundamental strategies, ranging from low to high intervention: communication facilitation, procedural strategies, and directive strategies. While communication facilitation is commonly used, directive strategies tend to be more successful, especially in high-intensity conflicts where active mediator involvement can motivate agreement (Bercovitch, 2009). Mediators become part of the conflict, and effective ones align with the interests, costs, and rewards of the conflicting parties (Johannes, 2015). The evaluation of mediation should ideally consider participants' goals, including fairness, satisfaction, and improved relationships. While not all conflicts can be mediated, the increasing number of ethnic and internal conflicts presents opportunities for expanding mediation for conflict resolution (Egwu, 2016). The choice of mediation strategy depends on various factors, including conflict intensity, issue type, parties' characteristics, mediator identity and rank, and the context of the mediation. Mediation strategies may range

from negotiation in low-intensity conflicts to more active approaches in high-intensity conflicts to prevent escalation.

In conflicts involving emotional issues like identity and autonomy, building trust through communication is often the most effective mediation approach. For concrete issues such as security and resources, mediators can push for concessions. Parties with similar systems may be open to active mediation, while those with fewer similarities may require trust-building, negotiation skill development, and issue clarification. Mediators and NGOs may use different strategies, from communication-based approaches to leveraging official positions and resources (Bercovitch, 2009).

STUDY OBJECTIVES
The primary aim of this study is to conduct a systematic review of Sheikh Ahmad Gumi's role as a mediator in the release of abducted students from Greenfield University in Nigeria. Sheikh Gumi, a former army captain and a prominent Muslim cleric, has garnered significant attention for his self-appointed role as a mediator in the ongoing kidnap-for-ransom crisis in northern Nigeria. This crisis has

witnessed the abduction of over 800 students in recent months. Notably, Sheikh Gumi was involved in the release of 27 students who were abducted in March from a forestry college in Kaduna state, Nigeria. Given his involvement in securing the release of these students, a key question that has arisen among the public and stakeholders is whether Sheikh Gumi is also playing a mediatory role in the case of the abducted students from Greenfield University. Addressing this question is of paramount importance in this study, which employs a systematic review approach to analyze and evaluate Sheikh Gumi's involvement in mediating the release of the Greenfield University abducted students.

PUBLIC RELATIONS APPROACH OF MEDIATION

Public Relations (PR) is a set of communication-oriented philosophical principles aimed at achieving individual or collective objectives. It goes beyond mere communication between an entity and its surroundings; it serves as a powerful tool for societal coordination, transformation, organization, reorganization, rehabilitation, restoration, resuscitation, and rejuvenation (Aliede, 2016). PR is notably multifaceted, boasting various perspectives. Harlow (as cited by Black, 1989) presents nearly five hundred conceptualizations of PR, defining it as a distinctive management function that facilitates mutual communication, understanding, acceptance, and cooperation between an organization and its publics. It involves addressing issues and problems, keeping management informed about public opinion, emphasizing management's responsibility to serve the public interest, monitoring and utilizing changes effectively, and using research and ethical communication techniques as its primary tools.

This comprehensive definition underscores the significance and indispensability of PR in managing systems and sectors. Organizations that understand and embrace PR are better equipped to anticipate and identify potential sources of conflict or contention before they escalate and cause irreparable damage (Aliede, 2016). The Public Relations Society of America (PRSA) also highlights the importance of PR in making informed decisions and achieving optimal functionality in a diverse society, emphasizing its role in fostering mutualism among various entities. In a

nation like Nigeria, characterized by linguistic, religious, cultural, and political diversity, PR becomes crucial in addressing the myriad security challenges plaguing the country. PR is fundamentally rooted in communication, while insecurity often stems from negative attitudes, behaviors, viewpoints, and opinions (Aliede, 2012). PR, with its communication-driven approach, is thus a potential solution to the problem of banditry. Effective communication is key to bringing about attitudinal and behavioral change (Ozoh, 2001). This requires well-conceived, planned, packaged, and implemented communication strategies, given the need to mobilize the populace effectively. Persuasive and motivational strategies can be employed to address social issues like banditry (Ozoh, 2001).

Dimitrov and Yankov (2020) highlight various PR activities, including communication to the media, communication with the media, crisis communication, and communication with all parties involved. They emphasize the importance of effective communication among bandits, the media, the government, and society. UNESCO (1980) defines communication as the exchange of news and messages, encompassing all forms of idea, fact, and data transmission and sharing. Omale (2013) advocates for close communication between the government and other stakeholders to effectively address security-related matters. Achalonu (2012) suggests that the media engage in regular campaigns against banditry and insecurity to drive attitudinal and behavioral change, socialization, and mitigation of banditry. This underscores the importance of PR as a powerful tool with its associated communication principles, techniques, and strategies. Understanding the grievances, perspectives, and modus operandi of bandits is crucial for devising effective PR measures to address banditry. Additionally, studying relevant assumptions or theories that explain the subject is equally important in formulating strategies to combat this issue.

METHODS
This study adopted primarily, qualitative method of research. In all, a research design is the guide from start to end of the research work. This research is a case study of banditry activities in northwest Nigeria. Geographically and temporally, however, the research is limited to

the Public Relations approaches to addressing banditry and/or in another clime and Nigeria within the last decade. Data for this study were obtained from respondents primarily through a qualitative method and in-depth interviews were carried out. This method is important for this study as it provides an insight into the problem and in essence helps to develop ideas with which to solve the problem. The instrument utilised is in-depth desk review. That is, the analysis in this work were complemented by information from desk review of secondary sources – newspapers, reports, academic literature, online journals, workshop papers as well as publications of non-governmental organizations. In essence, the data for the study were not obtained from one form of secondary sources. Moreover, this process ensured the triangulation of the information collected was ensured, as far as possible, so as to make sure the data and findings are reliable. Analysis of data consisting of words was done logically using content analysis to examine and analyse the narratives. Alterations in context and meaning were avoided by reviewing the data as many times as needed during the analysis. Then the emergent themes from the publications

were assessed in line with the objectives of the study. The information was then interpreted and summarized and the findings were explained with the support of literature and previous studies. The researchers acted in line with best ethical desk review standards.

EMERGENT THEMES AND DISCUSSION

A number of themes emerged from the content analysis of archived publications gathered for the study. A summary of the emergent themes is highlighted in the Table 1. This table outlines various newspaper excerpts related to Sheikh Ahmad Gumi's stance and involvement in the Greenfield University abduction crisis. The excerpts cover his amnesty position for bandits, insights into the abductors' circle, information on non-Fulani leadership among the abductors, Gumi's pro-negotiation stance with terrorists, and his perception of the government's seriousness towards

negotiations.

Themes	Newspaper Excerpts
Gumi's amnesty position	Reacting to the murdered students from Greenfield University abduction, murder, Islamic cleric, Sheik Ahmad Gumi, on Friday said the incident had underscored his position that bandits were now at war with the nation. He said the only way forward was for the government to take his advice and grant amnesty to the bandits for them to lay down their arms. Punch-24 April, 2021
Mediation is with a 'contact person' outside the abductors' circle	"Yes, really. When we tried to trace them and put some sense into them, the contact who is also a nomadic Fulani, they threatened him. They said if he insists on them they were going to catch him and he will have to pay a ransom before he gets out." Vanguard May 4, 2021
Information of non-fulani leadership of the abductors' group	"And the leader is from Jalingo. He is from Adamawa. He is not the local Fulani we have here. So this means that the Northeastern element is coming into this area and we have to move fast. We don't have that luxury of time." Vanguard- May 4, 2021
Gumi's pro-negotiation stance with terrorists	Gumi urged the government to negotiate with the abductors to avoid further loss of students' lives, stressing that no amount of money was worth the lives of the students. He said government could eventually track and recover the ransom paid. International Centre for Investigative Reporting-May 5, 2021 He said, "The money they are asking for is too much;
	if I give you that money, you cannot run away with it. Nobody can run. So, why not give them the money, they release the boys and then we pursue them and get our money back and do what is necessary; it is simple logic. So, bring the money from the central bank. How can they move that money? We should not be stupid. Punch- 5 May 2021
Gumi's perception of government's seriousness towards negotiations	Speaking on the issue of bandits reneging on the terms of past negotiations, Gumi said that the bandits had no belief in the seriousness of the government. "They told us no government is serious and I can tell you, yes, no government is serious. Because after negotiating with them, leaving their weapons or given out some of their weapons, the reaction of the government is aloof. They leave them alone with nothing, no programme of rehabilitation, no programme to see into their welfare, nothing. And so they definitely have to go back there," he said International Centre for Investigative Reporting-May 5, 2021
Gumi's knowledge of abductees' whereabouts	The cleric noted that he had provided security agencies with the information he had on the whereabouts of the Greenfield students, and that their location was no more a secret. "Everybody knows where they are. The Security operatives and parents know where they are. But the lives of the students are in danger. We don't want to see 19 corpses

	of our students," he said. International Centre for Investigative Reporting-May 5, 2021
Positive outcomes of Gumi's interventions	"The talk with the Greenfield University students' abductors is also going on because we are. You know they threatened to kill all of them after a particular deadline, but after talking to them, they are now lowering their bar. ………So, we are thankful they have stopped killing. And we are still negotiating with them." Vanguard- May 8, 2021
Linkages between Boko-Haram and Bandits in Greenfield abduction	"The Greenfield abduction is unique because for the first time we saw a cooperation between some bandits and Boko Haram elements which confirm that Boko Haram are encroaching into the field, which is a bad situation," Mr Gumi said. But the Greenfield abduction is proving difficult because of the linkage between the bandits and Boko Haram, Mr Gumi said. Premium Times-May 16, 2021
Gumi's self-appointed mediation activities is not backed by government	Gumi's media aide, Malam Salisu Hassan, told SaharaReporters in an interview on Thursday that the cleric halted his plans because the state government was not interested in negotiations. "No, it is not that Sheikh is busy. The problem is that since the government is not interested in reconciling with those people, so Sheikh just tried to have some other way

	so that he can achieve his goals." Hassan said. Sahara Reporters-April 22, 2021

The Table further highlight's themes of Gumi's amnesty advocacy for bandits and emphasizes the need for the government to negotiate with them. He shares information about the abductors' circle, including a nomadic Fulani contact person, and notes the non-Fulani leadership of the abductors' group. Gumi stresses the importance of negotiation to prevent further loss of students' lives and criticizes the government's perceived lack of seriousness in past negotiations. Gumi claims to have provided security agencies with information on the abducted students' whereabouts, expressing concern for their safety. Positive outcomes of his interventions include a reduction in threats to kill the students. The table also highlights the unique cooperation between bandits and Boko Haram in the Greenfield abduction, signalling a concerning development. Notably, Gumi's

self-appointed mediation activities lack official government backing, with his aide citing the government's disinterest in negotiations as a reason for Gumi's independent efforts

Discussion of Themes

At the onset, when Gumi started his rapprochement with the murderous forest militias in February of 2021, his intervention seemed acceptable. He appeared to mean well, and may well do. Except that his utterances now undermine his goals and endanger the collective security of Nigerians, upending the security set-up in ways that should be repugnant to all supporters of order and justice. He offers a rather romantic and generally sympathetic account and justification of the activities of the criminals. One could mistake these beastly terrorists who have murdered hundreds of Nigerians in cold blood and received ransoms running into hundreds of millions of naira from both the state and traumatised relations of kidnap victims- one would be excused to take these terrorists' activities for mere circus shows by listening to Gumi. For him, the deadly criminalities of the terrorists are like childish pranks that could simply be excused

away as some form of youthful delinquency. While Gumi has being a person of interest in narratives of banditry, kidnapping and book haram negotiations in Nigeria, the thematic analysis of this study is based on Gumi's interventions as reported in the pages of the dailies as regards the Greenfield University abductions which occurred in Kaduna state, Nigeria around April of 2021. Significant themes obtained from the analyses are highlighted and discussed in the following paragraphs.

Gumi's Amnesty Position

In the wake of the Greenfield University abductions, Sheik Gumi's position on granting amnesty for the kidnappers and bandits in Northern Nigeria was reiterated by the Sheik himself. Granting amnesty for outlaws in Nigeria is not a new phenomenon as witnessed with the Niger-Delta militants in 2007 after initially dismissing MEND as criminals. The Nigerian state began to recognize the adverse impact of growing insecurity in the form of huge losses in oil production and revenues, and the strong reverberations of the insurgent attacks on the global oil prices (in the context of a global war on terror). The regime therefore began to consider an alternative to

the military approach that had largely failed to halt MEND's attacks on oil infrastructure in the Niger Delta. This culminated in the inauguration of the Presidential Niger Delta Peace and Conflict Resolution Committee (NDPCRC) in July 2007, with the following terms of reference: recommend to the federal government how to adequately address issues of the Niger Delta; liaise with the groups in the Niger Delta region, security agencies and report to the federal government (Nigeriafirst.org 2007 cited in Obi 2014, p.255).

A similar body was also inaugurated by the then Bayelsa state governor, Timipre Sylvia, to replicate the same peace-building process in the state (Obi 2014: 255). In June 2009, due to the exigencies of implementing peace in the region, Yar'Adua announced an offer of unconditional amnesty to all militants in the Delta. In addition, the Presidential Committee on Amnesty and Disarmament for Militants under the Minister of the Interior, Major General Godwin Abbe (rtd), was established to execute a post-amnesty programme of socio-economic development in the Niger Delta worth about 50

billion Naira (Adeyeri 2012, Ketefe 2009). The training that former militants received in the Obubra Camp88 was the first step at transforming the erstwhile militants, and deconstructing their past characterised by militancy. This is expected to give them new orientation about peaceful coexistence and prepare them to become members of civil society.

The Niger-Delta militants' amnesty approach is a similar position which Sheik Gumi advocated for the abductors of the Greenfield University students. *"The Federal government should give them blanket amnesty, then if somebody continues, then we will deal with them,"* Sheik Gumi said while giving updates on the demands of the kidnappers. As part of his rhetoric of appeasement, he compared the terrorists, who he claims lack a voice, to coup plotters and demanded the state pardons them as it did coup plotters during the military era. He described the devastating onslaught of the terrorists on farming communities and the attendant conflict as ethnic wars. Gumi further made the outstanding claim that the northern terrorists learned their art from Niger-Delta militants. Just as he demanded that an amnesty programme in the manner of the

one President Umar Yar'Adua emplaced for Niger-Delta militias should be instituted for the terror-bandits of the North.

Mediation with a 'contact person' outside the abductors' circle

In conflict negotiations, no party is forced to participate in a negotiation. The parties are free to accept or reject the outcome of negotiations and can withdraw at any point during the process. Parties may participate directly in the negotiations or they may choose to be represented by someone else. One important deduction that can be made from some of Gumi's interviews with members of the press concerning the Greenfield abductions was that the abductors were not in direct contact with Gumi. Instead, contact was made through a representative of the group who was not part of the group's circle. Mediation, as a concept, is a process where the parties in a dispute come together to discuss their matter with the assistance an independent mediator. It is a process of negotiation which assists the parties to identify and explore options for the resolution of their dispute. The mediator will not hand down a decision, but rather help the parties to reach their own agreement. The

mediator is supposed to have direct access to either party directly or through the party representatives.

The latter situation is what played out in Gumi's mediation with a neutral representative of the abductors. Excerpts from his interview as reported by the Vanguard (May 4, 2021) suggested that Gumi was able to maintain contact with the abductors through a nomadic Fulani man. Further narratives showed that the Fulani contact was also under threat from the abductors if their messages and responses obtained were not in tandem with their position. It should however be pointed out that Sheik Gumi, while acting as an impartial arbiter, was never appointed by the government nor the abductors. The first time he took what looked like an extremely dangerous journey to the forest to meet the terrorists, his justification was that the entire process needed an impartial arbiter, noting that the state had serially violated previous agreements with the terrorists.

Non-Fulani Leadership of Greenfield Abductors

The Fulani have often been in the forefront of banditry and kidnapping narratives, such that a

stereotypic association of Fulani with banditry and kidnapping has begun to brew within the Nigerian society. However, within the context of Gumi's interventions in the Greenfield abductions, Gumi was able to establish that the leadership of the Greenfield University abductors was of non-Fulani descent. Gumi informed the public through the news media that the leader of the Greenfield abduction was a non-Fulani from Jalingo in Adamawa. This however does not rule out the fact that other members of the group may have been Fulani. Either way, as observed from Gumi's mediatory interventions, not all of the atrocities of kidnapping and banditry are led by Fulani entities. For instance, the Greenfield abductions was perpetrated by north-eastern element with linkages to Boko Haram.

"The Greenfield abduction is unique because for the first time we saw a cooperation between some bandits and Boko Haram elements which confirm that Boko Haram are encroaching into the field, which is a bad situation. But the Greenfield abduction is proving difficult because of the linkage between the bandits and Boko Haram"

Gumi's pro-negotiation stance with terrorists

The American ideology of not negotiating with terrorists has been adopted by several governments across various nations. In the wake of the Boko Haram insurgencies and other terrorists' attacks, the Nigerian government, amongst other strategies, adopted negotiation positions with these criminal elements. On March 25 2018, Nigeria's Information Minister Lai Mohammed announced that the government is negotiating with Boko Haram about a possible ceasefire and ultimately a permanent end to the conflict. He said the talks have been underway for "some time," though his was the first public reference to them. However, the irregularities obtained from some of these negotiations culminating in eventual killing of hostages and non-release of kidnapped victims has dampened the effectiveness of negotiating

with terrorists in Nigeria. However, there are still some persons who believe that secret negotiations with some terrorists have continually been adopted by the Nigerian Government.

While the Nigerian Government is now becoming vehemently against negotiating with terrorists, Sheik Gumi's mediatory approach is geared towards reaching a mutually acceptable ransom payment for both parties (i.e., the government and the kidnappers). This is highlighted in narratives of Gumi's negotiations with representatives of the Greenfield abductors where he was virtually coaxing the Nigerian government to give into the demands of the terrorists; as this was the only possible solution to saving the lives of the Greenfield students who were abducted. According to Gumi, he was of the opinion that not negotiating with the terrorists and paying the ransom being demanded was a stupid stance by the Government; stressing that no amount of money was worth the lives of the students. In his words 'why not give them the money, they release the boys and then we pursue them and get our money back and do what is necessary; it is simple logic. So, bring the money from the central bank. How can

they move that money? We should not be stupid'. The Kaduna state government, and indeed the federal government were however unwilling to negotiate with the Greenfield abductors

A further assertion that can be deduced from Gumi's utterances above is the element of being a partial arbitrator. His suggestion for the government to negotiate with the terrorists would seem welcome from the abductors' perspective. But his further statement of how the government can then track down the terrorists and reclaim the ransom money would certainly not be welcome from the abductors' perspective. The literature suggests that an arbitrator must perform his or her duties impartially, without bias or prejudice, and must not, in performing these duties, by words or conduct manifest partiality, bias, or prejudice, including but not limited to partiality, bias, or prejudice based upon race, sex, religion, national origin, disability, age, sexual etc. So, one begins to wonder how impartial or otherwise Gumi's mediation is as a self-appointed arbitrator.

Gumi's knowledge of abductees' whereabouts

One of the issues that limit the activities of security agencies in rescuing kidnapped victims in Nigeria is their claim not to know the exact whereabouts of the kidnappers' den where the victims are supposedly being held. On the contrary, Gumi's mediation talks with the Greenfield abductors show that the whereabouts of the abductees and their kidnappers is public knowledge; so, one would have felt that securing the release of the victims by Nigerian security agents would have been possible. However, the novel challenge lies in getting back these victims alive. This is because, Gumi's narratives suggest that the abductors are ready to execute every hostage in their custody at the slightest provocation. In one of the newspaper excerpts, "The cleric noted that he had provided security agencies with the information he had on the whereabouts of the Greenfield students, and that their location was no more a secret". In his words, "Everybody knows where they are. The parents know where they are. But the lives of the students are in danger. We don't want to see 19 corpses of our students," he said

Outcomes of Gumi's Mediation
While Gumi's mediation tactics

may not be laudable amongst many stakeholders, there are some categories of persons who believe that his efforts yield positives in securing the release of kidnappers. For instance, it is believed that Sheik Gumi and former president Olusegun Obasanjo were instrumental in the release of the 27 Afaka students who were kidnapped prior to the Greenfield abductions. There are also narratives in the front pages of the dailies of how parents of kidnapped victims are quick to liaise with Sheik Gumi to assist them in negotiating the release of their children and wards. Moreover, these same parents also come back to show gratitude for Gumi's input whenever their children/wards are released. This may suggest that while Gumi's efforts may not be too popular, his efforts may have positive outcomes in securing the release of kidnapped victims. Within the context of the Greenfield abductions, the abductors killed about three students during the initial phase of the abduction. These killings may have been a show of how seriously their actions should be taken. There are however insinuations by Gumi himself that the killing of the students being held hostage had stopped due to his interventions and that the abductors were now

ready to negotiate.

"The talk with the Greenfield University students' abductors is also going on because we are. You know they threatened to kill all of them after a particular deadline, but after talking to them, they are now lowering their bar. ………So, we are thankful they have stopped killing. And we are still negotiating with them."

In the long run, students of Greenfield University were released. It may not be entirely ideal to disregard the efforts of Gumi while considering all the factors that led to the final release of the students. The Kaduna State Government confirmed the release of abducted Greenfield University students, who had been in captivity since April, 2021. Samuel Aruwan, Commissioner, Ministry of Internal Security and Home Affairs in Kaduna State,disclosed this in a statement.

Gumi's Mediation Styles
Gumi's mediation strategies are quite informal in nature because there are not based on a designed structure. He is also a self-imposed mediator in the negotiations between the government and the Greenfield abductors. Moreover, there is no information on Gumi's knowledge, skills, abilities and certifications in the art of mediation, arbitration and negotiation. While Gumi's mediation style is informal in nature, there are elements of established mediation styles embedded in Gumi's approach. Some of these mediation styles will be highlighted within the context of Gumi's approach.

- **Co-mediation**
Co-mediation is a process in which *two mediators* try to help the parties resolve their differences. One mediator works with each party, thereby eliminating any concerns about fairness or objectivity sometimes associated with traditional mediation. Other than that, the process is no different than traditional mediation. Each mediator helps the parties try to reach consensus by creating an environment where they can
(i) pinpoint the source of the grievances

(ii) develop potential solutions
(iii) consider other options

As in traditional mediation, co-mediators cannot give the parties advice about the merits of the dispute or make any decisions about the result. However, they can offer advice about the mediation process. They can also decide which mediation techniques to use to promote resolution. The use of co-mediation can be observed in Gumi's mediation approach during the Greenfield abductions when he disclosed that his contact with the abductors was through a representative who was not part of the group, but acted on behalf of the group. While not much evidence on the exact role of abductors' representative is known, there are statements that suggest that the abductors passed and received messages from their representative via interactions with Gumi. This is a clear element of co-mediation.

- **Shuttle mediation**

Shuttle mediation is a technique in which one mediator works with both disputants. But instead of engaging everyone as a group, the parties are separated. Sometimes the disputants will have meetings with the mediator on different days, or at different times. The mediator speaks with each party separately to convey proposals, terms or concerns. This means that the mediator shuttles between both parties involved in negotiations and conflict resolutions. Within the context of the Greenfield abductions, Gumi's role in shuttle mediation is highlighted in his to and from movement between the abductors and the government to deliver and receive messages from each party. In as much as Gumi's mediatory role is not in an official capacity, the government and the abductors were able to reach out to each other through Gumi's mediatory interventions.

- **Evaluative Mediation**

Evaluative mediation is the style of mediation where the mediator exerts control over the mediation process by being the most vocal about the position of the parties and their offers. An evaluative mediator will offer opinions on the strengths and weaknesses of the parties and usually is in control of how and when the parties interact. This style tends to work well if there is an uneven power dynamic in the mediation, and allows the mediator to drive the conversation to focus on important issues and what the parties need. In line with the

tenets of evaluative mediation, some of its basic elements can be observed in Gumi's style of mediation. Firstly, Gumi was the most vocal entity during the Greenfield abductions. It was through Gumi that the position of the abductors (in terms of demands and ransoms) was known by the government and the public at large.

They are demanding for money…… So, why not give them the money, then they release the boys …. It is simple logic.

Gumi was also very vocal in describing the position of the government towards the negotiation process. For instance, in one of his numerous media interviews, Gumi describes the government as being unserious and unwilling to negotiate with the abductors. Another notable feature that fosters the use of evaluative mediation is the imbalance in power between both parties. In the case of the Greenfield abductions, a clear power imbalance existed between the abductors and the government. While the government has the advantage of more ammunition to stage an attack and overpower the abductors, the hostages in the abductors' custody are an ace which gives the abductors their own measure of power in the process. Thus, evaluative mediation style used by Gumi is appropriate within this context of power imbalances. Gumi as an evaluative mediator points out the strengths and weaknesses of both parties in several of his media interviews when he noted that he had provided security agencies with the information he had on the whereabouts of the Greenfield students, and that their location was no more a secret.

"Everybody knows where they are. The security operatives and parents know where they are. But the lives of the students are in danger. We don't want to see 19 corpses of our students," he said.

In evaluative mediation, the mediator also presents recommendations for settlement. This can be informal suggestions after the initial evaluation or it can be formal suggestions in written formats which are presented to the parties as an opening option. This can encourage the parties to consider a settlement based on the strengths of their case. This is clearly exhibited in Gumi's mediation style as he is initially

proffering an amnesty solution for the crisis. Reacting to the murdered students from Greenfield University abduction, murder, Islamic cleric, Sheik Ahmad Gumi, on Friday said the incident had underscored his position that bandits were now at war with the nation.He said the only way forward was for the government to take his advice and grant amnesty to the bandits for them to lay down their arms.

CONCLUSION

Gumi's mediation strategies are quite informal in nature because there are not based on a designed structure. He is also a self-imposed mediator in the negotiations between the government and the Greenfield abductors. Moreover, there is no information on Gumi's knowledge, skills, abilities and certifications in the art of mediation, arbitration and negotiation. Meanwhile, this study has found and concluded that Gumi's mediation style is informal in nature but it contains some elements of established mediation styles. Also, this study determined the effectiveness of Sheikh Gumi's mediatory role in the release of abducted students by the Bandits in the Northern Nigeria and in the process

discovered that Gumi's mediation tactics may not be laudable amongst many stakeholders, there are some categories of persons who believe that his efforts yield positives in securing the release of kidnappers. For instance, it is believed that Sheik Gumi and former president Olusegun Obasanjo were instrumental in the release of the 27 Afaka students who were kidnapped prior to the Greenfield abductions. There are also narratives in the front pages of the dailies of how parents of kidnapped victims are quick to liaise with Sheik Gumi to assist them in negotiating the release of their children and wards. Moreover, these same parents also come back to show gratitude for Gumi's input whenever their children/wards are released. This suggests that Sheikh Gumi's mediatory role in the release of abducted students was effective as interventions and that the abductors were ready to negotiate and at the end, the abducted students were released.

However, the findings revealed that there are other ways of addressing the phenomenon of banditry in Nigeria based on the evaluative mediation as observed in this study. This can be informal suggestions after the initial evaluation or it can be formal

suggestions in written formats which are presented to the parties as an opening option. This can encourage the parties to consider a settlement based on the strengths of their case. This is clearly exhibited in Gumi's mediation style as he is initially proffering an amnesty solution for the crisis. Therefore, government should always consider other public relations negotiation methods, and avoid using force whenever similar cases of kidnapping occur in our society to safe the victims from their abductors. However, alternative approaches can be helpful during crisis management and interventions to restore peace through settlement.

Recommendations
The current study has contributed so much to knowledge in the area of crises and conflict management and proffer solution to the release of abducted victims regardless of region or ethnic diversities. Therefore, the role of mediation strategies cannot be underestimated in promoting peace and crisis intervention management in Nigeria. However, the following recommendations are highlighted:

- Government should not ignore non-governmental

interventions during crisis especially when individuals or organizations volunteer to assist or support government agency to strengthen national security so as to reduce the level of insecurity in the country. For example, this study has revealed the effectiveness of Gumi's mediatory role in the release of abducted students, and also the interventions made by former President Olusegun Obasanjo, just to mention but few.

- Also, there can be inaugurations of several NGOs for local security report and support to improve on the conventional structure of security outfit in existence currently in the country to make Nigerian border a better place to live for all.

- Further studies should investigate autonomous agencies for promoting national security to reduce the rate of kidnapping and banditry in the country across regions.

REFERENCES

Aliede, J. E. (2012). "Communication Approach to Finding Solution to the Quagmire of Vital Statistics and Civil Data Acquisition/Management for Nigeria's Development." In Aliede, J. E. (Ed.), Today's Readings in Mass Communication: Issues, Insights and Perspectives. Enugu: Prime Targets Ltd.

Aliede, J. E. (2016). "Public Relations, Quest for Sustainable Peace and Security: *A Reflection on the Boko Haram Impasse in Nigeria." Vol. 6*, No. 19, 2016.

Bercovitch, J. (2009). "Mediation and Conflict Resolution." In The SAGE Handbook of Conflict Resolution. SAGE, London, pp. 340-354.

Egwu, S. (2016). "The political economy of rural banditry in Contemporary Nigeria." In M.J. Kuna and J. Ibrahim (Eds.), Rural Banditry and Conflicts in Northern Nigeria, Abuja: Centre for Democracy and Development.

ICG, (2020). "Violence in Nigeria's North West: Rolling Back the Mayhem." International Crisis Group Report. Retrieved from https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/nigeria/288-violence-nigerias-north-west-rolling-back-mayhem

Johannes, W. (2015). Mediation in the Conflict Resolution Process. Munich, GRIN Verlag.

Odinkalu, 2018. "Banditry in Nigeria: A brief history of a long war," The Punch. Retrieved from https://punchng.com/banditry-in-nigeria-a-brief-history-of-a-long-war/

Ozoh, H. C. (2001). "Knowledge, Attitude, Practice and Behaviour (KAPB), Studies in Public Relations for Community Development." *Journal of Public Relations Management, 1*(2).

Prokic, A. (2017). "The Link between Organized Crime and Terrorism." FACTA UNIVERSITATIS-Law and Politics, 15(1), 85–94.

A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LOCUS OF CONTROL AND ENTREPRENEURIAL MINDSET OF STEM AND NON-STEM STUDENTS IN THE UNIVERSITY OF LAGOS

Echeruo, Rose Ijeoma & Oloko, Timothy Oluwarotimi

Department Of Psychology,
University Of Lagos,

ABSTRACT

The current study compares the locus of control and entrepreneurial mindset of stem and non-stem undergraduate students in the University of Lagos. A survey research design was employed in this study using a questionnaire as a mode of data collection. A total number of three hundred (300) undergraduates between the age of 16 and 40 years participated in this study, stem students accounted for 50% of the total population, and non-stem constituted 50%. Forty-four (44%) of the participants were males and fifty-six (56%) were females. five hypotheses were raised and tested using a t-test for independent samples, and correlation. The result of the study revealed significant differences in the locus of control among stem and non-stem students, given the p-values to be [t (2,298) = -2.560, p<.05] which is lower than the chosen significant value (0.05). Secondly, the result of the study revealed no significant difference in entrepreneurial mindset among stem and non-stem students given the p-values to be [t (2,298) = -.167, p>.05] which is higher than the chosen significant value (0.05). Thirdly, the result also reveals that locus of control and entrepreneurial mindset was not significantly and positively correlated (r = -.010, p>.05) among stem and non-stem students. Fourthly, the result of the study revealed no significant difference in gender on entrepreneurial mindset among stem and non-stem students, given the p-values to be (.680) which is higher than the chosen significant value (0.05). Lastly, the result revealed a significant difference in gender on locus of control among stem and non-stem students, given the p-values to be [t (2,298) = .438, p>.05] which is higher than the chosen significant value (0.05). The study, therefore, concludes that there exists a significant difference in the locus of control among stem and non-stem students, ascertaining that there is no significant difference in entrepreneurial mindset, that there is no significant relationship between locus of control and entrepreneurial mindset, there was no significant gender difference in entrepreneurial mindset, there is a significant gender difference in the locus of control among stem and non-stem students, with Male students having higher scores on locus of control than Female student.

Key Words: *STEM, non-STEM, Locus of control, Entrepreneurial mindset, Students*

BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY

The term entrepreneurial mindset refers to a way of thinking and approaching situations that are characterized by creativity, innovation, and a willingness to take risks in order to achieve success. It involves being able to identify opportunities where others might see only challenges and being able to envision and implement new and innovative solutions to problems. Individuals with an entrepreneurial mindset are often self-starters who are driven by a strong sense of purpose and are willing to work hard and persevere in the face of obstacles. Recent research has emphasized the importance of this mindset for individuals seeking to succeed in today's rapidly changing and uncertain business environment (Chen & Martin, 2021); they have been found to be comfortable with uncertainty and willing to take calculated risks in order to achieve their goals.

According to Cardon, Zietsma, Saparito, Matherne, and Davis, (2005), some of the key characteristics of an entrepreneurial mindset include: Resilience and Persistence, Creativity and Innovation, opportunity-driven, resourcefulness, and tenacity.

Entrepreneurs exhibit resilience in the face of challenges and setbacks. They are determined, persistent, and willing to learn from failures. They view obstacles as opportunities for growth and adaptability. They are full of Creativity which is the ability to think outside the box and come up with new and innovative solutions to problems. An entrepreneurial person is expected to be a trailblazer in his/her areas of endeavor. They think on their feet and always find their way out of difficulties, entrepreneurs are often creative thinkers who are capable of generating novel ideas and solutions. They are open-minded, willing to explore unconventional approaches and strive to create value through innovation.

The opportunity-driven characteristic refers to a focus on identifying and seizing opportunities, rather than being limited by obstacles, it is a mindset or approach where individuals or organizations actively seek and capitalize on opportunities that arise in their environment. It involves recognizing and leveraging favorable circumstances or events to achieve desired outcomes furthermore, the Resourcefulness characteristic is the ability to find

creative and effective solutions to problems or challenges using the resources at hand. It involves being adaptable, flexible, and innovative in order to make the best use of limited or available resources. A resourceful person is skilled at identifying and leveraging existing assets, whether they are physical resources, such as materials or tools, or intangible resources, such as knowledge, skills, or relationships. Being resourceful often requires thinking outside the box and approaching problems from different angles. It involves being proactive and taking the initiative to explore various options and alternatives.

Instead of becoming discouraged by obstacles or limitations, resourceful individuals view them as opportunities to exercise their problem-solving abilities and find new pathways to success. Lastly, Tenacity in this context refers to the willingness to persevere and be hard in the face of Challenges and setbacks. Comfort with uncertainty: Being able to tolerate ambiguity and take calculated risks in order to achieve success, it is can also mean the quality of being persistent, determined, and resilient in the face of challenges, setbacks, or difficult situations. It is the ability to stay focused on a

goal or objective and to keep striving towards it, even when faced with obstacles or adversity. A tenacious person possesses a strong sense of determination and is willing to put in the necessary effort and perseverance to achieve their desired outcome. They have a firm belief in their abilities and are willing to work hard, often going above and beyond what is expected, in order to overcome obstacles and reach their goals. It involves a mindset of never giving up, even in the face of failure or disappointment. It means being willing to learn from mistakes and setbacks, rather than being discouraged by them, a tenacious individual sees challenges as opportunities for growth and improvement, and they use setbacks as stepping stones toward eventual success. Also, according to Sarasvathy, (2001).

Entrepreneurial mindset involves risk-taking and Tolerance for Uncertainty: Entrepreneurs are comfortable with taking calculated risks and are willing to step out of their comfort zones. They understand that uncertainty is inherent in the entrepreneurial journey and are able to manage and navigate through it. An individual's entrepreneurial capabilities, including business

planning, opportunity recognition, financial management, marketing, and networking could be developed through Entrepreneurial education, which is aimed at imparting knowledge, skills, and competencies related to entrepreneurship. Entrepreneurial education can take various forms, such as academic programs, training workshops, mentoring, and experiential learning opportunities. An entrepreneurial mindset and entrepreneurial education are two-fold.

First, entrepreneurial education seeks to cultivate and enhance the entrepreneurial mindset among individuals. It aims to develop and nurture the attitudes, behaviors, and qualities that are essential for successful entrepreneurship. By providing knowledge and experiences related to entrepreneurship, educational programs can help individuals adopt an entrepreneurial mindset and develop the confidence and motivation to pursue entrepreneurial ventures. On the other hand, an entrepreneurial mindset can also influence the effectiveness and impact of entrepreneurial education. Individuals with an entrepreneurial mindset are more likely to engage actively in entrepreneurial education programs, apply the knowledge and skills they acquire, and leverage educational experiences to drive entrepreneurial success. Their mindset enables them to embrace the opportunities and challenges presented by entrepreneurial education and utilize the resources and support available to them, an entrepreneurial mindset and entrepreneurial education are interrelated and mutually influential. Entrepreneurial education seeks to cultivate an entrepreneurial mindset, while individuals with an entrepreneurial mindset are more likely to benefit from and contribute to entrepreneurial education programs. Together, they play a crucial role in fostering entrepreneurial thinking and action, thereby facilitating the growth and success of entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurial education can take many forms, including formal education programs at universities and business schools, workshops, seminars, mentoring, and coaching.

Some of the key components of entrepreneurial education include Business planning: Entrepreneurial education teaches aspiring entrepreneurs how to

create a business plan, which is a comprehensive document that outlines the company's goals, strategies, operations, and financial projections. Marketing and sales: Entrepreneurs need to know how to market and sell their products or services effectively. Entrepreneurial education teaches marketing strategies, sales techniques, and customer relationship management. Financial management is critical for any business, and entrepreneurial education teaches financial planning, budgeting, accounting, and other financial skills. Entrepreneurial education encourages innovation and creativity, which are essential for identifying and pursuing new business opportunities. Starting a business involves risk, and entrepreneurial education teaches risk management strategies, such as risk assessment and mitigation. Entrepreneurial education can have many benefits, such as fostering a culture of entrepreneurship, creating jobs and economic growth, and promoting innovation and creativity. Entrepreneurial education often provides opportunities for networking with other entrepreneurs, investors, mentors, and experts in the field. Building a network of contacts can help entrepreneurs access

resources, funding, and support for their ventures. Leadership and team building: Entrepreneurial education teaches leadership skills and team-building strategies, which are important for managing employees, delegating tasks, and motivating teams. Entrepreneurial education also emphasizes ethical and social responsibility, such as sustainable business practices, corporate social responsibility, and community engagement.

In today's digital age, entrepreneurial education also includes teaching technology and digital skills, such as digital marketing, social media management, and e-commerce. Starting and running a business requires adaptability and resilience to overcome challenges and pivot when necessary. Entrepreneurial education teaches these skills and mindset, which are essential for navigating the ups and downs of entrepreneurship. Also, Entrepreneurial education is a comprehensive approach to developing the knowledge, skills, and mindset required to start and grow a successful business, and social responsibility, by fostering a culture of entrepreneurship, entrepreneurial education can have significant economic and

social benefits for individuals and communities (Jones, & Jayawarna, 2022).

Entrepreneurial education can benefit both stem (Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics) and non-stem students in various ways. Here's how it relates to each group; it can help stem Students through Enhancing Innovation: Entrepreneurial education encourages stem students to think creatively and develop innovative solutions to real-world problems. It helps them apply their technical knowledge to create new products, services, or technologies. It can also help in the Commercialization of Inventions, stem students often come up with ground-breaking ideas or inventions and entrepreneurial education can equip them with the skills and knowledge necessary to commercialize their inventions, turn them into viable businesses, and potentially have a positive impact on society. It also has a principal function in Business and Leadership Skills: While stem students may have strong technical skills, they might lack business acumen and leadership qualities. Entrepreneurial education provides them with the necessary knowledge of

marketing, finance, management, and leadership to effectively manage and grow a business based on their stem expertise. It also provides them with collaboration opportunities: this means that Entrepreneurial education often involves team-based projects and collaboration with students from diverse backgrounds. This allows stem students to work with non-stem peers, fostering interdisciplinary collaboration, and developing skills in teamwork and communication. While for Non-stem Students, entrepreneurial education can be beneficial in Bridging the Gap: what it means here is that Entrepreneurial education helps non-stem Students Bridge the gap between their domain knowledge and entrepreneurship. It enables them to leverage their expertise in fields like arts, humanities, social sciences, or business into entrepreneurial ventures. It also impacts non-stem students with Technological Literacy.

In today's technology-driven world, having a basic understanding of stem concepts and emerging technologies is crucial for non-stem students. Entrepreneurial education exposes them to these concepts, enabling them to make informed decisions

and explore opportunities at the intersection of their field and technology. Entrepreneurial Mindset: Regardless of their field, non-stem students can benefit from developing an entrepreneurial mindset, which includes qualities like problem-solving, resilience, adaptability, and risk-taking. This mindset can be nurtured through entrepreneurial education, allowing them to approach their careers and future endeavours with an entrepreneurial perspective. Collaboration Opportunities: Entrepreneurial education provides non-stem students with opportunities to collaborate with stem students and gain insights into their technical expertise. Such collaborations foster interdisciplinary innovation and offer non-stem students a chance to work on projects that require a combination of skills from various fields. Also, entrepreneurial education has the potential to empower both stem and non-stem students by fostering innovation, developing business acumen, encouraging interdisciplinary collaboration, and cultivating an entrepreneurial mindset. It equips students with the skills and knowledge needed to succeed in an increasingly dynamic and entrepreneurial world.

According to the National Science Foundation. (2019). stem stands for Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics. Stem students are those who are pursuing academic programs in these fields. Stem education is an interdisciplinary approach to learning where students are taught to apply scientific, mathematical, and engineering principles to real-world problems. Stem students can include undergraduates, graduate students, and researchers who are studying and conducting research in fields such as biology, chemistry, computer science, physics, mathematics, engineering, and many others. Stem education is becoming increasingly important as technology and science continue to advance, and there is a growing need for professionals who can apply these principles to solve complex problems.

Also, Thomas (2022) refers to non-stem students as those who are not majoring in science, technology, engineering, or mathematics fields. They may be pursuing degrees in fields such as the humanities, social sciences, fine arts, education, law, or business. Non-stem students generally do not have as much

training in quantitative or technical skills as stem students, but they may have strengths in areas such as critical thinking, writing, and communication. Non-stem majors include English, history, psychology, sociology, political science, philosophy, art, music, theater, education, business, marketing, and accounting. These students often focus on developing skills in areas such as critical thinking, creativity, problem-solving, communication, and teamwork. Non-stem fields often require different skills and knowledge than stem fields. While stem fields require a strong foundation in math and science, non-stem fields may require skills in writing, research, analysis, and interpretation. Non-stem students may also be more focused on developing their interpersonal skills, such as communication, leadership, and collaboration. In recent years, there has been a growing recognition of the value of non-stem fields, as they provide essential skills and perspectives to a wide range of industries and organizations. Many employers are seeking candidates with a diverse range of skills and backgrounds, and non-stem graduates are well-positioned to fill these roles. A recent study carried out by the

Department of Education and the Workforce (2021).

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

Several research has been done comparing either locus of control or entrepreneurial mindset among stem and non-stem students, But no study has compared both locus of control and entrepreneurial mindset among Stem and Non-stem students, Also studies have been carried out exploring the entrepreneurial mindset among stem students but little research has been done extended same to the non-Stem student, And most of the research was done in the western regions but not much work has been done to research same using Nigeria University students. Quite a number of researchers have acknowledged an entrepreneurial mindset as qualities that is valuable in today's constantly-changing business and work environment, which is why more and more employers are looking for candidates who possess it. Solomon and Muir (2018). Argue that individuals with an entrepreneurial mindset are more likely to be creative problem solvers, able to identify and capitalize on opportunities and have a strong sense of self-efficacy, which all contribute to

their employability in a variety of contexts. According to Ferreira and Marques, (2018), more entrepreneurial mindsets were more likely to have positive attitudes towards entrepreneurship and were more likely to pursue entrepreneurial careers, which in turn increased their employability. Also, Heidi, Neck, and Murray argue that an entrepreneurial mindset is critical for success in today's rapidly changing job market, where individuals must be adaptable, innovative, and willing to take risks to succeed. They suggest that employers are increasingly looking for candidates with an entrepreneurial mindset and that individuals with this mindset are better equipped to create their own opportunities for employment and advancement.

Another important concept regarding employability is the locus of control. Rotter, (1954) defines the locus of control as an individual's belief about the underlying causes of events in their life, whether they are due to internal factors within their control or external factors beyond their control.

Albert Bandura. n his social learning theory, he emphasizes the importance of individual agency and the ability to exert control over one's environment. He argues that individuals with an internal locus of control are more likely to take proactive steps to achieve their goals and overcome obstacles, while those with an external locus of control may be more likely to give up in the face of challenges. The concept of locus of control has since been widely researched and applied in fields such as personality psychology, social psychology, education, and organizational behavior, as it can have significant implications for how individuals approach challenges, cope with stress, and achieve their goals Emphasis on the need for students in tertiary institutions to have an entrepreneurial mindset has been emphasized over the years. Research paper on "The Role of Entrepreneurship Education. (Obinna. 2015). Therefore, this research is aimed at comparing the locus of control and entrepreneurial mindset of stem and non-stem students in the University of Lagos.

OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

The main objective of this study is to compare the locus of control and entrepreneurial mindset of stem and non-stem undergraduate students. Specifically, this

research seeks to:
1. investigate the relationship between locus of control and the entrepreneurial mindset
2. establish the difference in an entrepreneurial mindset and locus of control
3. ascertain gender differences in the locus of control
4. establish gender differences in the entrepreneurial mindset.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Entrepreneur mindset can be defined as the process by which individuals seek opportunities regardless of the resources they control (Barringer & Ireland, 2010). The entrepreneurial mindset is a set of cognitive and behavioural characteristics that distinguish entrepreneurs from non-entrepreneurs. These traits are not inherent or fixed but can be cultivated and developed over time Baron, (2008). An entrepreneurial mindset involves a set of cognitive orientations and behavioural dispositions that enable individuals to identify and exploit opportunities for creating new ventures or innovating within existing organizations. This mindset goes beyond the traditional personality traits associated with entrepreneurs, such as risk-taking propensity or

needs for achievement. Shane, and Venkataraman. (2000).

Individuals possess one of two mindsets: a fixed mindset or a growth mindset. People with fixed mindset believe that their abilities, intelligence, and talents are fixed traits that cannot be significantly developed. They tend to avoid challenges, fear failure and are more concerned with looking smart or talented rather than with learning and growing. On the other hand, individuals with a growth mindset believe that their abilities can be developed through dedication, effort, and learning. They embrace challenges, see failure as an opportunity for growth, and are motivated by the process of learning and improving Dweck. (2006)

As noted by Daspita, Corey, and Findley (2023), who argue that despite growing interest in understanding the entrepreneurial mindset, there is still little consensus on what entrepreneurship is the manner in which it developed or its exact results. Due to the fragmentary nature of multidisciplinary research on the entrepreneurial mindset. This led them to review 61 publications on the topic and provide an integrated, empirical

definition of an entrepreneurial mindset.

In addition, they consider factors related to the entrepreneurial mindset and offer specific directions for future research. Therefore, entrepreneurs who are just starting a business require creativity and innovative efforts to improve and accelerate their business operations, so that they can enter a market that can compete with their competitors. Other (Kadir, Salim & Kamarudin, 2012). Entrepreneurs form the most effective and powerful army in the global world. They change society not with their shields, but through their products and services. According to Naumann (2017), business thinking is a way of thinking and making decisions that can be applied in complex, unpredictable and dynamic contexts.

Thus, entrepreneurial mindset can also be described as the behaviour of a person who is inclined to discover, evaluate and take advantage of opportunities for business actions and outcomes. (Bosman & Fernhaber, 2018). The entrepreneurial mindset is also characterized by the identification of opportunities, the propensity to take risks, tolerance

for uncertainty and confidence. According to reports, this set has a direct relationship with entrepreneurial education (Anuar & Sahid, 2020). However, entrepreneurship education was discovered to enhance the development of students' behaviour and entrepreneurial mindset in the government's attempts to generate more entrepreneurs among graduates, reduce unemployment, and expand business prospects (Anuar & Sahid, 2020).

Thus, entrepreneurial leaders need to have an entrepreneurial mindset that can be used to encourage entrepreneurial behavior (Renko, Tarabishy, Carsrud, & Brännback, 2015). The mindset is a comprised cognitive belief system from mutual beliefs, assumptions and knowledge related used to process information, inform decisions and control behaviour (Rettig, 2017). A set of beliefs, knowledge, and mental processes that drive entrepreneurial conduct is known as the entrepreneurial mindset. Entrepreneurship can be cultivated and honed through practical experience. (Solesvik, Westhead, Matlay & Parsyak, 2013). In addition, to cultivate this mindset, entrepreneurship involves creating business

learning experiences in classrooms, organizations, and communities.

In the study of Safiah et al. (2016) young people involved in decision-making can develop leadership skills. Traits such as friendliness, confidence, maturity, and a risky attitude can all influence how a person makes judgments. (Green Bank, 2010).

Problem-solving skills are cognitive processes that help identify situations for improvement and obtain acceptable feedback in a variety of ways (Hassan & Buang, 2019). Azizi (2010) defines problem-solving as a cognitive process, using information to find the appropriate method to achieve a goal. According to Ayu and Ariyadi (2018), students' problem-solving ability can be used to measure their learning. However, the problem-solving experience in everyday life is often unstructured, complex, and diverse, making it impossible for students to handle problems outside of the classroom due to a lack of opportunities for problem-solving and learning. Full set, application of knowledge in real-life situations. (Kuang, Szu & Kuen, 2014).

Opportunity-tracking skills are the third factor in the minds of entrepreneurs. According to Liza et al. (2019), Opportunity tracking involves identifying a product or service that has value and can be converted into profit. Opportunity tracking skills not only identify insights into potential opportunities but can also inspire a person to turn an opportunity into a successful endeavour (Wasdani & Manimala, 2015). Cristian et al. (2011) argue that by considering and acting on reality when looking for opportunities, entrepreneurship education will have a significant impact on students. Process models, perceptions, and tactics for enhancing creativity, as well as ways to develop skills to seize opportunities, all have similarities.

Mohamad and Radin, (2019)) also agree with the statement that taking risks is a characteristic of entrepreneurship that an entrepreneur must have, but not blindly bold. For Nahid et al. (2019) meanwhile, individuals who are less willing to take risks are often described as risk avoiders, and individuals more willing to take risks are often described as risk seekers.

The ability to work in a team is

the last aspect of the entrepreneurial mind-set. A group of people who can work as a team work together and independently to achieve a goal, have the authority to manage at least part of the activity and communicate freely and effectively. (Sulaiman, *et al*., 2017). The ability of a person to collaborate with people from diverse sociocultural backgrounds to achieve similar goals is often referred to as teamwork. Ngadiman and Jamaludin, (2018). Each team member must contribute ideas for the decisions to be made to be effective. The conclusions of the study by Norazila *et al*. (2017) show that students' participation in extracurricular activities is related to the formation of students' teamwork skills. Akindele (2012) states that group work activities that often take place in the classroom prepare students to interact with others in the workplace later in life.

In the face of uncertain conditions, there are three mind maps that help leaders engage their organizations. People-oriented thinking, goal-oriented thinking and learning-oriented thinking are the three entrepreneurial brains. According to Obschonka and Stuetzer (2017), leaders who are inclusive

and open are classified as people-oriented thinkers, as are leaders who are optimistic and appreciate their subordinates. This factor can help leaders win the respect and trust of their employees and team members. This is key to fostering an entrepreneurial culture within the company and encouraging people to think and behave in an entrepreneurial spirit. Leaders who can maintain openness and inclusion can get support from subordinates and even external stakeholders. As a result, a people-oriented business perspective can have an impact on the type of business action taken.

Furthermore, Gerba (2012) showed a significant relationship between the need for achievement and the entrepreneurial intention of Ethiopian students. Recently, the need for success has been verified as an essential factor explaining the significant difference in business intent Ndofirepi, (2020). Need for Achievement which posits that Entrepreneurs often have a strong desire to accomplish challenging goals and demonstrate high levels of motivation and persistence. They are driven by a need to achieve success and are willing to take on risks and overcome obstacles to reach their goals.

Internal Locus of Control indicates that Successful entrepreneurs tend to have an internal locus of control, which means they believe that they have control over their own actions and outcomes. They take personal responsibility for their decisions and believe that their efforts can influence the outcomes of their entrepreneurial endeavors. Tolerance for Ambiguity meaning Entrepreneurship involves dealing with uncertainty and ambiguity. Entrepreneurs must be comfortable with situations where outcomes are uncertain and information is limited. They are willing to take risks and make decisions despite incomplete information. Innovativeness, Proactivity, Persistence, and Resilience: Successful Entrepreneur, Passion and Self-Confidence. Rauch, and Frese. (2007)

Entrepreneurial alertness is an attitude that is receptive to changes that have so far gone unnoticed. Vigilance, as an antenna, allows individuals to detect market changes and opportunities (Kirzner, 1997). They can discover and exploit unnoticed opportunities to benefit the market through vigilance (Kirzner, 2009). In addition, Tang *et al.* (2012) affirms that business

sanity is related to finding and creating opportunities. Vigilance can boost an individual's cognitive abilities, leading to new business initiatives (Lin *et al*., 2017).

Family experience in business refers to people whose parents or relatives are self-employed. Carr and Sequeira (2007). Believe that a family business will influence the attitudes and intentions of family members toward entrepreneurial action. Prut et al. (2009) indicated that students from a business family are more likely to start a business because their family members can serve as role models. Students who have experienced family businesses also show a strong desire to become entrepreneurs (Karhunen & Ledyaeva, 2010). The positive correlation between business family history and interest in business intentions was also verified by Mungai and Velamuri (2011). On the other hand, Gerba (2012) revealed that students from an entrepreneurial family have no more entrepreneurial intentions than students from a non-business family. However, we believe that people who grew up in a business family can learn from their independent parents and plan to start a business.

Rotter (1966) used Skinner's (1974) theory of reinforcement which stated that if the outcomes of responses by an individual are favorable or unfavorable, then the likelihood of the behavior to occur in the future is increased or decreased respectively. Thus, reinforcement, experienced by an individual, acts directly to strengthen the reoccurrence of a particular behavior or strengthen to reduce the occurrence of another behavior or event, which will be followed by similar reinforcement in the future (Rotter, 1966). This expectation of reinforcement is regarded as expectancy. With the development of expectancy, individuals learn to discriminate between behaviors, outcomes, and simplify these anticipations for the future. This simplification of this expectancies will then control and defines the reinforcements which will then now formulates one's locus of control (Rotter, Seeman & Liverant, 1962).

On the other hand, according to (Landy & Contre (2004), Martin, Thomas, Charles, Epitropaki & McNamara, (2005), people with high external locus of control believe that their actions are solely dependent on factors outside their personal control. The results of their behavior are randomly administered and are believed to be influenced and controlled by outside forces (Connolly, 1980). Although, Rotter himself proposed four types of beliefs for people having an external locus of control, which includes: powerful others, luck or chance, fate, and a belief that the world is too complex to be predicted (Marks, 1998). Popularly, the external locus of control has separated external control into control by powerful others, and control by chance and luck (Levenson (1973), Levenson and Miller (1976). people with a high external locus of control are said to be reluctant in chaninge behaviors as they do not see it as a primary source for fluctuating reinforcements (Marks, 1998). Even when the reinforcement is positive, the praise may not be taken personally, but instead, they'll reflect it upon ease of task, luck or on a helpful hand by a powerful other (Hyatt & Prawitt, 2001).

Rotter's Social Learning Theory

Rotter's Social Learning Theory was developed by Julian B. Rotter in 1954. Rotter was a psychologist who was interested in understanding how individuals' behaviors are influenced by their environment. His theory posits

that individuals learn through observation, imitation, and reinforcement of the behaviors of others in their social environment. Rotter's Social Learning Theory was a significant departure from traditional behaviorist theories that emphasized the role of environmental rewards and punishments in shaping behavior.

Instead, Rotter emphasized the importance of cognitive factors, such as expectations, beliefs, and values, in shaping behavior. Over time, Rotter's theory has been refined and expanded upon by other psychologists and has influenced a range of fields, including education, psychology, and sociology. Today, his theory remains a key framework for understanding how individuals learn and develop their behaviors. This theory suggests that individuals develop a generalized expectancy regarding the extent to which they can control events in their lives.

This expectancy is shaped by their experiences of reinforcement or punishment, as well as the social models they observe in their environment. Rotter's Social Learning Theory is a theoretical framework that seeks to explain how people's behavior is shaped by their interactions with the environment. Developed by psychologist Julian Rotter in the 1950s, this theory posits that people's behavior is determined by their beliefs about the relationships between their actions, the outcomes of those actions, and the environmental conditions in which those actions occur. At the core of Rotter's Social Learning Theory is the concept of reinforcement. According to this theory, people are more likely to repeat behaviors that are reinforced, or rewarded, and less likely to repeat behaviors that are punished or not reinforced. Reinforcement can be either positive (rewarding) or negative (punishing). Rotter also emphasized the importance of locus of control or the extent to which people believe that their behavior is under their own control versus being determined by external factors such as luck or fate. People with an internal locus of control believe that their behavior is largely determined by their own choices and actions, while those with an external locus of control believe that their behavior is largely determined by factors outside of their control.

Rotter's Social Learning Theory has been applied in a variety of domains, including education, health care, and organizational

behavior. For example, in education, this theory suggests that teachers should provide positive reinforcement for desired behaviors and use punishment sparingly, as punishment may lead to resentment and resistance rather than behavioral change. In health care, this theory suggests that interventions should be designed to help people develop internal locus of control beliefs, as these beliefs have been linked to better health outcomes. In organizational behavior, this theory suggests that organizations should use rewards and incentives to motivate employees and encourage desirable behaviors.

Research Hypotheses
1. There will be a significant difference in the locus of control among stem and non-stem students.
2. There will be a significant difference in entrepreneurial mindset among stem and non-stem students
3. There will be a significant relationship between locus of control and entrepreneurial mindset among stem and non-stem students.
4. There will be a significant gender difference in entrepreneurial mindset among stem and non-stem students.

5. There will be a significant gender difference in locus of control among stem and non-stem students.

METHOD
Research Setting
The study was carried out using the University of Lagos in which, Six (6) Departments in total include Science, Mathematics, Engineering (STEM Students), and Psychology, Law, and Management Science (Non-stem students), out of the 63 Departments in the University.

Sampling Techniques
For the purpose of this study Systematic sampling techniques was employed in selecting six (6) departments in the University of Lagos. University of Lagos website cutoff in September (2021), estimated that the University of Lagos is made of 12 faculties and there are various departments within each faculty. Systematic sampling is a statistical sampling technique that involves selecting every nth item from a population or sampling frame. This was done by first randomly selecting a starting point in the population, and then selecting every nth item after the starting point until the desired sample size is reached. A simple

random sampling method was used in picking the participants: Simple random sampling is a statistical sampling technique in which every individual or unit in a population has an equal chance of being selected for the sample. In other words, each member of the population is selected at random, and each possible sample of a given size has an equal probability of being chosen.

Research Design
This study adopted a Survey research design which allows the researcher to gather larger data consisting of multiple variables at a specific point in time. Survey design also helps describe the variables of interest as they existed in the population and also allows checking the relationship that exists between variables

Research Instruments
A batter of research instruments was used to obtain data from the participants. This battery in the form of a questionnaire that includes a measure of demographic variables, the measure of locus of control, and a measure of an entrepreneurial mindset. The instrument was divided into three sections and accommodated all measures for the study. In which the first section,

Section A; aimed to get details of the participant's demographic variables such as Age, Sex, and Department. Section B; this part of the questionnaire is used to assess the extent to which an individual possesses internal or external locus of control and this will be done using The Julian Rotter (1966) Locus of Control Scale which is a 20-item, self-report rating inventory that measures the extent to which an individual possesses internal or external reinforcement beliefs which can be used for both normal and psychiatric population. The maximum total score is 20, and the higher your score the greater the extent to which you would take control of your life. Any score of 14 or above would suggest you have an internal focus of control which you indicated true of false

Section C = Entrepreneurial Mindset Scale (EMS) by Kern Entrepreneurial Engineering Network KEEN developed in (2013) It is a 37-item inventory that assesses an individual ability to rapidly sense, act, and mobilize, even under certain conditions. The internal consistency and stability reliability indices of the Entrepreneurial Mindset Scale (EMS) were found to be 0.769

and 0.843 respectively. All items were responded using a 4-point Likert scale pattern which range from 1 = Strongly Disagree, 2 = Disagree, 3 = Agree, 4 = Strongly Agree. The real limit of numbers was used to take decisions on the extent of the entrepreneurial mindset of students as follows: using Very low extent as (1-1.49), low extent (1.5-2.49), high (2.5-3.49), and very high extent (3.5-4.00).

Procedure

The researcher chooses three months for this study which one month will be dedicated to getting data from the students at the University of Lagos. The researcher will then proceed to brief the students on the research concept. After the researcher had ensured that the questionnaires were properly completed, they will be taken for scoring and analysis. Scoring for the measures will be done based on the scoring manuals contained in the instruments that will be used. Responses to the questionnaires will be coded into Statistical Product and Service Solutions (SPSS) version 26 to generate both the descriptive statistics and to test the hypotheses. Hypothesis one will be tested using a t-test independent, Hypothesis Two will be tested with a t-test independent, Hypothesis Three will be tested using Correlational Analysis, and Hypothesis Four will be tested with a t-test independent.

RESULTS
Hypothesis Testing

This section presents the hypotheses that were tested and the results analyzed, the hypotheses were grouped into four (4) categories. Hypothesis one was tested using t-test independent, Hypothesis two was tested with t-test independent, Hypothesis three was tested using Correlational Analysis and Hypothesis four was tested with t-test independent.

Hypothesis one: There will be a significant difference in the locus of control among stem and non-stem students. An independent t-test was conducted to examine if There will be a significant difference in the locus of control among stem and non-stem students. There was a significant difference which revealed (P=.011) in the scores for Stem Students (M=29.19, S.D= 2.37) and in the score for Non-Stem Students (M= 29.91, S.D=2.26), with non-stem students having higher score on locus of control than stem student. Therefore, the hypothesis which states there will

be a significant difference in locus of control among stem and non-stem student was confirmed.

Table 1: *t-test independent showing difference STEM and non-STEM student locus of control*

	N	x̄	SD	df	T	P
Stem	150	29.19	2.38			
				298	-2.560	<.05
Non-Stem	150	29.91	2.26			

Hypothesis two: There will be a significant difference in entrepreneurial mindset among stem and non-stem students. An independent t-test was conducted to examine if There will be a significant difference in entrepreneurial mindset among stem and non-stem students. There was no significant difference (P=.009) in the scores for Stem Students (M=108.43, S.D= 22.44) and in the score for Non-Stem Students (M= 108.85, S.D=16.02), with non-stem students having a higher score on entrepreneurial mindset than stem student. Therefore, the hypothesis which states that "There will be a significant difference in entrepreneurial mindset among stem and non-stem students' was **refuted**

Table 2: *t-test independent showing difference in STEM and non-STEM student entrepreneurial mindset*

	N	x̄	SD	df	T	P
Stem	150	108.43	22.44			
				298	-.167	>.05
Non-Stem	150	108.85	16.02			

Hypothesis three: There will be a significant relationship between locus of control and entrepreneurial mindset among stem and non-stem students. The Hypothesis was tested using Pearson Correlation the result shows that there was no significant relationship between the locus of control of respondents (r = -.010, p<.05) and entrepreneurial mindset. As such, the hypothesis state that "There will be a significant relationship between locus of control and entrepreneurial mindset among stem and non-stem student. Was **refuted.**

Table 3: *Pearson Correlations showing the relationship between locus of control and entrepreneurial mindset*

	Variables	1	2
1	Locus of Control	1	
2	Entrepreneurial Mindset	-.010	1

*. Correlation is significant at *p<.05 and **p<.01

Hypothesis four: There will be a significant gender difference in the entrepreneurial mindset. An independent t-test was conducted to examine if Gender significantly influences entrepreneurial mindset among stem and non-stem students in the University of Lagos. The results indicated that there is no significant difference (P=.680) in the scores for Males (M=109.23, S.D= 23.23) and in the score for Females (M= 108.29, S.D=13.45), with Male students having higher scores on entrepreneurial mindset than

Female student. Therefore, the hypothesis which states that "There will be a significant gender difference in entrepreneurial mindset among stem and non-stem students." was **refuted.**

Table 4: *t-test independent showing gender influences the entrepreneurial mindset*

variable	N	x̄	SD	df	t	p-value
Male	132	109.23	23.23	298	.438	>.05
Female	168	108.29	13.45			

Hypothesis five there will be a significant gender difference in locus of control among stem and non-stem students. An independent t-test was conducted to examine if Gender significantly influences on locus of control among stem and non-stem students in the University of Lagos. A significant difference was revealed (P=0.022) in the scores for Males (x̄=109.23, S.D= 23.23) and in the score for Females (x̄= 29.33, S.D=2.212), with Male students having higher scores on locus of control than Female student. Therefore, the hypothesis which states that "There will be a significant gender difference in locus of control among stem and non-stem students." was **confirmed.**

Table 7: *t-test independent showing gender influences the locus of control*

Variable	N	x̄	SD	df	t	p-value
Male	132	29.33	2.212	298	-2.296	<.05
Female	168	29.94	2.369			

Discussion

This section contains a detailed discussion of the research findings on the comparative study of locus of control and entrepreneurial mindset of stem and non-stem students, five hypotheses were tested in this study and the result goes thus.

According to the first result, the findings of the study revealed that there exist significant differences between the score of stem and non-stem students on the locus of control, with a significant difference of 0.02 level, non-stem students reported a higher level of locus of control. This is in contrast a study conducted by Smith and Smith (2018) examined the locus of control among stem and non-stem students in a large university sample. The results indicated that stem students tended to have a higher internal locus of control compared to non-stem students. This finding suggests that stem students believe they have more control over their academic and career outcomes.

Also, another study by Bulut, O., 2019). Which examines Locus of control and career choices among stem and non-stem students the study explored the differences in locus of control and career

choices between stem and non-stem students. That is the study aimed to examine whether the locus of control orientation of students influenced their decision to pursue careers in stem or non-stem fields. The researcher hypothesized that individuals with a higher internal locus of control would be more likely to choose stem careers, as they perceive themselves to have more control over their academic and professional success. The findings suggested that stem students exhibited a higher internal locus of control and were more likely to choose stem-related careers compared to non-stem students. In contrast, a study by Johnson *et al*. (2019). found no significant difference in the locus of control between stem and non-stem students. The researchers argued that the locus of control might not be influenced by the field of study but rather by individual characteristics or experiences.

According to the second result, it was revealed that there are no significant differences between the Stem and non-stem students on the entrepreneurial mindset. With a significant difference of .009 level. This is in line with a study by Brown and Jain (2017). Who found no significant difference in entrepreneurial

mindset between stem and non-stem students. They argued that while stem students may possess technical skills, they might not necessarily exhibit the entrepreneurial mindset required for venturing into business or startups.

Conversely, A study by Thompson and Truell (2020) investigated the entrepreneurial mindset among stem and non-stem students in a sample of undergraduate students. The findings revealed that stem students displayed a higher level of entrepreneurial mindset compared to non-stem students. The researchers suggested that stem education might enhance problem-solving skills and foster innovative thinking, which are important components of an entrepreneurial mindset.

Also, a study by Santos, *et al*. (2017). Explored the entrepreneurial mindset of University Students. the study aimed to understand the entrepreneurial mindset of university students and identify differences based on gender, academic major, and prior entrepreneurial experience. According to the Third result, it was revealed that there was no significant relationship between

locus of control and the entrepreneurial mindset of stem and non-stem students in the University of Lagos, However, A study by Lee and Wong (2019) examined the relationship between locus of control and entrepreneurial mindset among stem and non-stem students in a university setting. The results indicated a positive correlation between internal locus of control and entrepreneurial mindset in both stem and non-stem students. This finding suggests that individuals who believe they have control over their outcomes are more likely to exhibit entrepreneurial characteristics.

Another relevant study is the one by Zahra, Jennings, and Kuratko (1999). Which examined the factors that influence entrepreneurial behavior at the organizational level. One of the factors they investigated was the locus of control, which refers to an individual's belief in the extent to which they have control over events and outcomes in their lives. The authors found that individuals with an internal locus of control, who believe they have a significant degree of control over their own lives, are more likely to exhibit an entrepreneurial mindset. This means they tend to be proactive,

take initiative, and actively seek opportunities for innovation and growth. On the other hand, individuals with an external locus of control, who attribute events and outcomes to external forces such as luck or fate, are less likely to display entrepreneurial characteristics.

According to the fourth result it was revealed that there is no significant gender difference in entrepreneurial mindset among stem and non-stem, this is in contrast with a study conducted by Smith and Cooper, (2020). Examined the entrepreneurial mindset of stem and non-stem students in relation to gender. The findings suggested that there was a significant gender difference in entrepreneurial mindset among both stem and non-stem students. Female students in stem disciplines exhibited lower levels of entrepreneurial mindset compared to their male counterparts.

Conversely, non-stem female students displayed higher levels of entrepreneurial mindset compared to non-stem males. These results imply that the gender disparity in entrepreneurial mindset may be influenced by the specific academic domain.

Further research by Johnson and Thompson (2020) explored the underlying factors contributing to the gender differences in entrepreneurial mindset among stem and non-stem students. They discovered that societal gender norms, stereotypes, and career aspirations played a significant role. Female students in stem fields often faced cultural and social barriers that discouraged them from pursuing entrepreneurial activities, resulting in lower levels of an entrepreneurial mindset. In contrast, non-stem female students benefited from a more favorable social environment that supported and encouraged entrepreneurship.

However, some studies have provided insight into gender differences in entrepreneurial mindset among males and females. One of these studies is by Alsos, Ljunggren, and Hytti (2016). titled Gender and Innovation. Which provided an overview of the relationship between gender, innovation, and entrepreneurial thinking. The authors explore how gender differences can influence various aspects of the innovation process and its outcomes. One of the key areas discussed in the study was the impact of gender on risk perception. The authors highlight that men and women may have different attitudes toward risk, which can affect their willingness to engage in innovative activities. Understanding these differences is important for promoting a more inclusive and diverse innovation ecosystem. The authors also examine how gender influences opportunity recognition, which refers to the ability to identify and capitalize on entrepreneurial opportunities. They discuss how social and cultural factors can shape individuals' perceptions of opportunities, potentially leading to different outcomes for men and women in terms of innovation and entrepreneurship.

According to the fifth result, it was revealed that there was a gender difference in the locus of control among stem and non-stem students, with a significant difference of 0.02 level. Male students demonstrated a higher level of locus of control. This is in line with a study by Anderson *et al*. (2012) who investigated the gender differences in locus of control among stem and non-stem students. The results revealed a significant gender difference in the locus of control among both stem and non-stem students. Specifically, male students in both stem and non-stem

disciplines exhibited a stronger internal locus of control compared to their female counterparts. This finding suggests that males are more likely to believe that they have control over their actions and outcomes, which may influence their entrepreneurial inclinations.

Conversely, Klein (2014) who studied Gender Differences in Locus of Control and their Relationship to Academic Achievement by Newby and This study investigated gender differences in locus of control and their relationship to academic achievement among undergraduate stem and non-stem students. The findings indicated that female stem students exhibited a more internal locus of control compared to male stem students. However, no significant gender differences were found among non-stem students.

Furthermore, Lyman *et al*. (2018) investigated gender differences in Locus of Control among Engineering Students this study specifically focused on gender differences in locus of control among engineering students. The findings revealed that female engineering students had a more internal locus of control compared to male engineering students. The

researchers suggested that these gender differences in locus of control might contribute to the underrepresentation of women in engineering fields.

Another study that examined Gender Differences in Locus of Control among College Students is a Study by Howard and Bray (2019) which examined gender differences in locus of control among college students, including both tem and non-stem majors. The results showed that female stem students had a more internal locus of control compared to male stem students. Similarly, female non-stem students had a more internal locus of control compared to male non-stem students.

Roberts and Johnson (2019) delved deeper into the factors contributing to the gender disparities in the locus of control among stem and non-stem students. They found that societal expectations and gender socialization played a crucial role. Traditional gender roles often emphasize assertiveness, independence, and self-reliance, which align with an internal locus of control. Females, on the other hand, are frequently socialized to be more dependent and conforming, which may contribute to a more external

locus of control. These societal dynamics may explain the observed gender differences in locus of control among stem and non-stem students.

Conclusion

The main objective of this study was to compare stem and non-stem students on locus of control and entrepreneurial mindset. The research explored relationship between locus of control and entrepreneurial mindset, and ascertain gender differences in locus of control and the entrepreneurial mindset among undergraduate students

This study demonstrated that there exists a significant difference in the locus of control among stem and non-stem students. This study concluded that with non-stem students have a higher score on locus of control than stem student. This study ascertains that there is no significant difference in entrepreneurial mindset scores for Stem and non-stem students

This study demonstrated that there is no significant relationship between locus of control and entrepreneurial mindset among stem and non-stem students. With male students having higher scores on entrepreneurial mindset than female student.

This study ascertained that there was no significant gender difference in entrepreneurial mindset. This study demonstrated that there is a significant gender difference in locus of control among stem and non-stem students, with Male students having higher scores on locus of control than Female student.

Recommendations

The following recommendations are made based on the findings of this study:

The government and school administrators should introduce a curriculum on entrepreneurial development and based on the findings, develop interventions to cultivate an entrepreneurial mindset among students. This could involve workshops, mentoring programs, or curriculum changes that promote self-efficacy, resilience, and proactive behavior.

REFERENCES

Ahmed, A. (1985). Risk taking in entrepreneurship. Academy of Management Review, 10(4), 847-859.

Akindele, B. A. (2012). Impact of collaborative learning on critical thinking and team performance. *International Journal of Education and Research*, 1(7), 1-14.

Alias, A. K., Akasah, Z. A., & Kesot, M. J. (2016). Relationships between self-efficacy, locus of control, learning efforts, and academic achievement among engineering students. Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences, 224, 298-304. doi:10.1016/j.sbspro.2016.05.452

Andrisani, P. J., & Nestel, G. (1976). Internal-external control and achievement motivation: A review. Psychological Bulletin, 83(3), 452-473. doi:10.1037/0033-2909.83.3.452

Anuar, A. S., & Sahid, S. (2020). Kerangka Konseptual Set Minda Keusahawanan, Inspirasi Keusahawanan dan Faktor Kognitif. Proceeding: International Conference of Future Education and Advances (pp. 44-49). Bangi: Pertubuhan Penyelidikan dan Pendidikan Pendidik Malaysia.

Anuar, M. A., & Sahid, I. A. (2020). Entrepreneurship education and entrepreneurial intention among university students: The mediating role of entrepreneurial mindset. *Journal of Entrepreneurship Education*, 23(2), 1-10.

Ayu, G. A., & Ariyadi, A. W. (2018). The development of students' problem-solving ability in the context of scientific-based learning. *In Journal of Physics: Conference Series* (Vol. 1108, No. 1, p. 012023). IOP Publishing.

Baron, R. A. (2008). The role of affect in the entrepreneurial process. Academy of Management Review, 33(2), 328-340.

Barringer, B. R., & Ireland, R. D. (2010). Entrepreneurship: Successfully launching new ventures. Pearson Prentice Hall.

Barringer, B., & Ireland, R. (2008). *What's Stopping You? Shatter the 9 Most Common Myths Keeping You from Starting Your Own Business*. Upper Saddle River, NJ: FT Press.

Boone, C., van Olffen, W., & van Witteloostuijn, A. (2005). Team locus-of-control composition, leadership structure, information acquisition, and financial performance: A business simulation study. *Journal of Management Studies*, 42(7), 1509-1532. doi:10.1111/j.1467-6486.2005.00542.x

Bosman, J., & Fernhaber, S. (2018). Entrepreneurial mindset. In J. C. Chrisman, R. H. McMullan, & J. A. Neck (Eds.), *The Palgrave Handbook of Heterogeneity among Entrepreneurship Scholars: Vol. 1* (pp. 385-406). Palgrave Macmillan.

Bosman, L. B., Duval-Couetil, N., Mayer, B., & McNamara, P. (2019). Using Online Discussions to Develop the Entrepreneurial Mindset in Environmental Engineering Undergraduates: A Case Study. International Journal of Engineering Pedagogy (iJEP), 9(3). doi:https://doi.org/10.3991/ijep.v9i3.9491

Chinedu, O.R. and Nwizuzu, C.B. (2021) Relationship between Locus of Control and Academic Achieve- ment of Secondary School Students in Abia State. Journal of Analytical Sciences, Methods and Instrumentation, 11, 15-22. https://doi.org/10.4236/jasmi.2021.112002

Cristian, E., Iorgulescu, M. C., & Saied, A. I. (2011). The role of entrepreneurship education in shaping entrepreneurial intentions and in developing entrepreneurial competences. In International Conference on Economics, *Business and Economic Education* (pp. 23-34)

Curth, A., Chatzichristou, S., Devaux, A., and Allinson, R. (2015) Entrepreneurship Education: A Road to Success. *Luxembourg: European Union*

Gautam, M. K., & Singh, S. K. (2015). Entrepreneurship education; concept, characteristics and implications for teacher education. *An international journal of education, 5(1), 21-35.*

Karhunen, P., Ledyaeva, S. (2010) "Determinants of Entrepreneurial Interest and Risk Tolerance among Russian University Students: Empirical Study", *Journal of Enterprising Culture,* Vol. 18, No. 3, pp. 229–263, https://doi.org/10.1142/ S0218495810000574.

Kirzner, I. M. (1997) "Entrepreneurial Discovery and the Competitive Market Process: An Austrian Approach", *Journal of Economic Literature,* Vol. 35, No. 1, pp. 60– 85, Available at: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/2729693> [Accessed: June 6, 2022].

Kirzner, I. M. (2009) "The Alert and Creative Entrepreneur: A clarification", *Small Business Economics,* Vol. 32, No. 2, pp. 145–152, https://doi.org/10.1007/ s11187-008-9153-7.

McCullough, P. M., Ashbridge, D., & Pegg, R. (1994*). The effect of self-esteem, family structure, locus of control, and career goals on adolescent leadership behavior. Adolescence, 29(115), 605-611.*

Murugesan, R., Jayavelu, R. (2017) "The Influence of Big Five Personality Traits and Self-Efficacy on Entrepreneurial Intention: The Role of Gender", *Journal of Entrepreneurship and Innovation in Emerging Economies,* Vol. 3, No. 1, pp. 41–61, https://doi.org/10.1177%2F2393957516684569.

Naumann, C. (2017). Entrepreneurial Mindset: A Synthetic Literature Review. Entrepreneurial Business and Economic Review, 5(3), 149-172.

Ndofirepi, T. M. (2020) "Relationship between Entrepreneurship Education and Entrepreneurial Goal Intentions: Psychological Traits as Mediators", *Journal of Innovation and Entrepreneurship,* Vol. 9, No. 1, pp. 1–20, https://doi. org/10.1186/s13731-020-0115-x.

Okon, Y. K., & Friday, D. (2011). "Inclination Towards Entrepreneurship among University Students: An Empirical Study of Malaysian University Students. *International Journal of Business and Social Science, 2 (4), 206-220.*

Pruett, M. et al. (2009) "Explaining Entrepreneurial Intentions of University Students: A Cross-Cultural Study", *International Journal of Entrepreneurial Behavior & Re- search,* Vol. 15, No. 6, pp. 571–594, https://doi.org/10.1108/13552550910995443.

Renko, M., El Tarabishy, A., Carsrud, A. L., & Brännback, M. (2015). Understanding and measuring entrepreneurial leadership style. Journal of small business Management, 54-74.

Zemlyak, S.; Naumenkov, A.; Khromenkova, G. Measuring the Entrepreneurial Mindset: The Motivations behind the Behavioral Intentions of Starting a Sustainable Business. *Sustainability* **2022**, *14*, 15997. https://doi.org/10.3390/ su142315997

BAKASSI BOYS, JUNGLE JUSTICE AND EXTRA JUDICIAL KILLING IN ABA, 1999-2007

Angela O. Odo
Department of History and Strategic Studies,
Alex Ekwueme Federal University,
Ndufu-Alike, Ikwo, Ebonyi State.
angelamichael300@gmail.com; angela.ogochukwu@funai.edu.ng

Chinedu J. Uzochi
Department of History and Strategic Studies,
Alex Ekwueme Federal University,
Ndufu-Alike, Ikwo, Ebonyi State.

ABSTRACT
The industrial and commercial nature of Aba town had, by the close of 1998 led to an upsurge in the population of the town as people from other parts of Nigeria became migrants including the Yoruba, Hausa, Ibibio, Kalabari, all for their commercial interests. Even foreigners from within and outside Africa converged in the town for trade. With the steady rise in population coupled with the attendant hike in unemployment rate, poverty and high economic depreciation, Aba town gradually became a harbor for educated but unemployed youths who took to robbery, thuggery, violence and other social vices as means of survival in the face of the harsh economic conditions. This led to an escalation in organized crime with heavy consequences such as unprecedented loss of lives and properties. The Bakassi Boys security outfit which was formed to curb the rising menace of heightened insecurity was short-lived as it metamorphosed into a group of hardened criminals. This paper seeks to investigate the formation and operations of the notorious Bakassi Boys security outfit, the reasons for its disbandment and the inception of the Abia State Vigilante Service. The paper adopts a narrative and analytical methodology

Keywords: *Armed robbery, Bakassi Boys, Vigilante group, Aba*

INTRODUCTION
Security is indispensable in the development of every Nation. Security depends on the machineries put in place by the Government of that Nation and the effectiveness of the security is promulgated and ensured by the

extent of gadgets available to the security agents and their dedication to duty. These empower them to discharge their responsive duties effectively and diligently.

Prior to 1999, insecurity challenges in Aba were quite alarming. Between 1990 to early years of the 21st century, insecurity in Aba was at its peak. Unlike the predominant Nigerian town by the 20th century that was troubled with uncertainties. Aba was not an exception as a whole lot had occurred before the formation of an anti-crime group in Aba which later spread out to other parts of the south-south and south-eastern Nigeria by the year 1998 under the political administration of the then military administration of Anthony Obi. Insecurity remains the bane of any nation's socio-economic and political development. Insecurity may be present in various forms such as armed robber, abduction, etc. One thing is clear, Insecurity in whatever form retards development. In Aba precisely, Insecurity has disrupted the socio-economic and political achievements of the inhabitants. Kidnapping, robbery, cultism and religious crisis had been a source of discomfort to Aba people for several years until the formation

of the Aba Bakassi Group. There was physical brutality, assault, murder, armed robbery, pick pocketing, rape and other dastardly acts by hoodlums in broad-day light. An intense search for a lasting solution led to the formation of the Bakassi Boys' security outfit. But the Bakassi boys employed extra-judicial means in fighting crime and ultimately became a threat to Aba residents. They were later phased out and were replaced with the people friendly Abia State Vigilante Group.

The industrial and commercial nature of Aba had, by the close of 1998 led to an upsurge in the population of Aba as people from different places became migrants including the Yoruba, Hausa, Ibibio, Kalabari… and even foreigners from within and outside Africa as a matter of fact, "Aba-made products" have become a household name with the excessive rise in population coupled with the attendant hike in unemployment rate.

Consequent upon the Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) which was introduced by the General Sani Abacha administration which was characterized by excess rate of unemployment, poverty and high

economic depreciation, Aba gradually became a harbour for qualified unemployed youths who took to robbery, thuggery, violence and other social vices as means of survival in the face of hardship during the military era. This led to an escalation in organized crime with heavy consequences such as unprecedented loss of lives and properties (Chinedu John, 2023)

This study may be considered a trailblazer in documentation of the activities of the Bakassi Boys security outfit which has formed an indelible part of the history of Aba city and indeed Igbo land. Subsequent efforts made by individuals and the government of Abia state to curb insecurity in that mega commercial city also make headlines in this research. Hence, this study will contribute to the growing literature on the subject of jungle justice and extrajudicial killings in parts of the world. Hopefully, an exposure of the disastrous consequences of such practice will instill some sanity into new generations of Nigerian youths with the lesson that unemployment is no rationale for violence and murder.

Methodology and Scope of the Study

This research covers the period from 1999-2007. Following the high rate of Insecurity by the late 1998, and the agreement by the union of traders (Bakassi Shoe Makers) to form and build a wall of defense for themselves. By this time, traders were being terrorized, kidnapped, and robbed at gun point, killed in droves. The female ones were sexually abused and molested. In order to checkmate the excesses of the criminals, the traders formed the Bakassi boys. By the year 2007, the Abia State government had recognized these traders and their security group and by extension the Bakassi Group had taken all-over Aba and has spread to other South –Eastern States like Anambra. The Abia State government led by Theodore Orji, know moved for motion for the name to be changed and rebranded to the" Abia State Vigilante Group".

Socio-Economic History of Aba
Aba is a major Southeast City in Nigeria and the commercial nerve center of Abia State. Upon the creation of Abia State in 1999, Aba was divided into two Local governments areas namely: Aba South and Aba North. Aba South is the main City center and the commercial heartbeat of Abia

State, Southeast Nigeria. It is located on the Aba River. Aba consists of many communities from Ohazu merged for administrative convenience (Alulor interview, 2022).

Aba was established by the people of Igbo land as a commercial city and then later a military post was placed there by the British colonial administration in 1901. It lies along the west bank of the Aba River, and is at the intersection of roads leading to Port-Harcourt, Umuahia, Owerri, Ikot-Ekpene and Ikot-Abasi. The city became a major depot for agricultural produce following the British made railway which passed through it to Port-Harcourt. Aba is a major urban settlement and commercial center in a region that is surrounded by small villages and towns. The dominant group in Aba are the Ngwa people. Aba is well known for its craftsmen notably shoe and fabric and also the most popular city in the Southeastern Nigeria. Aba has estimated population of about 2,534'265. The State's slogan is "God's Own State". Location in Nigeria: Coordinates: 5^7N, 7^22E, Country-Nigeria. It comprises of two Local Government Area namely; Aba South and Aba North[1] Aba

development has expended to Osisioma Ngwa, Obi Ngwa, and Ugwunagbo.

Aba is among the major producers of Agricultural palm produce like: Palm oil and palm kernel oil. It comprises smaller communities namely, Aba-Ukwu, Eziukwu, Obuda-Aba, Umuokpoji-Aba, but the villages in Ohazu have been merged with Aba so as to achieve administrative convenience. Aba-Ukwu is apparently the primer village in Aba, little wonder the late Eze W. E Ukaegbu of Aba-Ukwu was known and referred to as the 9th grandson of Aba. It eventually became an administrative center of British Colonial government. Aba has been a major commercial center since it became part of old eastern region.

The *Aro* Expedition, which was part of a larger military plan to quell anti-colonial sentiment in the region, this military action, the British easily, conquered the native *Aro* people with heavy casualties. In 1901, the British founded a military post in Aba and later in 1915, a railway was constructed to link it to Part-Harcourt, which transported agricultural goods such as palm oil, palm kernel and gins. By

1929, Aba was the site of a revolt by Igbo women, historically known as "The Aba Women Riot", a protest of the colonial taxation policy. The riot started first as a peaceful protest against the initial census of women in the region and subsequent assumed taxation of the women based upon rumour. The protest spread throughout the palm oil belt, but remained peaceful until a pregnant woman was knocked over during a scuffle and the lady losing her child. After more deaths, some accidental, others planned, occurred, a mass ofabout10,000 women revolted in Aba. Aba was becoming a large urban community with an established Industrial Complex. During the height of Nigerian Civil War in 1967, the capital of Biafra was moved to Umuahia from Enugu. Aba was very strategic in the old Biafra area ad was heavily bombed and air raided during the Biafra War (Itiri & Onele). Aba is the home of many distinguished families such as the popular Ezijiaka Egbu family of Aba La Ohazu, Ogbonna family of Eziukwu-Aba, the prestigious Ichita family of Umuokpoji-Aba, the Omenihu family of Obud- Aba the Ugbor Family of Aba-Ukwu, the Ugwuzor Family of Umuokpoji-Aba, the Ihemadu family of Ahunanya family of Ohabiam and so forth.

Economically, Aba is capable of generating 80% of the funds required to finance the Annual budget of a fiscal year of Abia State, this is possible due to the variety of economic activities done in Aba and it is believed that Ariaria International Market alone could do that, this is because its products are been distributed and consumed by several other African countries. Aba is surrounded by oil wells which distinguish it from the city of Port-Harcourt. A 30 kilometres pipeline powers Aba with gas from the Imo River natural gas repository. Aba's major economic contributions are textiles and palm oil along with pharmaceuticals, plastic, cement and cosmetics like in the Ariaria International Market, Ahia Ehere and Eziukwu Road Market respectively. This trade makes the Ariaria International Market the second largest market in Nigeria after the Onitsha Main Market. There is also the Heineken brewery, a glass company and distillery within the city. Aba is famous for its craftsmen, notably the shoemakers and vehicle mechanics. The following are some of the markets situated in Aba; Ariaria, Eziukwu Road

Market, Ngwa Road Market, School Road Market, Ahia Alein, Ogbo-Osisi Market, to mention but a few.

The city has played a lasting role in the Christian evangelism of the Southeast of Nigeria since the British brought the Church Missionary Society (CMS), an evangelism vehicle of the church of England used to plant what today has become the Anglican Church of Nigeria. The Church named All Saints emerged from the Evangelical Initiative of three oil traders from Opopo namely Joseph Cookey, Gabriel Cookey and Zedekiah Cookey. These men sealed up the Aba, Azumini, Blue River in 1896 for their trading and also for the planting of the Christian religion. In 1897, they negotiated with Abayi and Umuocham people for A piece of land to establish their oil business at two beaches, which they built at Abayi and Umuocham Waterside. As a result of the population density of Aba city, it has diverse cultures and religion and has been that way since the Nigerian Civil War. Most of the migrants came for business.

The city has played a lasting role in the Christian evangelism of the Southeast of Nigeria since the British brought the Church Missionary Society (CMS), an evangelism vehicle of the church of England used to plant what today has become the Anglican Church of Nigeria. The Church named All the Saints, originated out of the Evangelical Initiative of three oil traders from Opopo-Joseph Cookey, Gabriel Cookey and Zedekiah Cookey. These men sealed up the Aba, Azumini, Blue River in 1896 for their trading and also for the planting of the Christain religion. In 1897, they negotiated with Abayi and Umuocham people for land to establish their oil business at two beaches, which they built at Abayi and Umuocham Waterside. Muslim and Mosques are also present in Aba; the largest mosque is the Hospital Road Mosque. A chief Imam is resident among the Hausa-speaking settlement in the heart of the city himself. Due to the population density of Aba, it has diverse cultures and religion inherent in it since after the Nigerian Civil War.

Insecurity and Justice System in Aba

In general, Security in Aba, and environs was watered down by the activities of Hoodlums whose activities defied the powers of constituted authority and the state government in general. On a

regular basis, corpses of people killed by armed robbers were seen scattered along refuse dump and in some streets in Aba like: Emejiaka street, where majority of the culprits came from. Also, homes, shops especially the ones within the market axis and major streets were vandalized, while the die-hard ones (capon as they were popularly called) among them refined themselves to writing notice letters to residents informing them of their intention to "visit" them. This period was a very severe one that both the rich and the poor had no hiding place. (Egwu John, interview, 2022).

Aba was faced with an unprecedented wave of different but overlapping security crises – from kidnapping to extremist insurgencies – almost every corner of the state was affected by violence and crime. The scale of the insecurity threatened the very fabric of the people's life. **With every attack, human lives** were **lost or permanently damaged.**

Instructively, national security is a panacea for national economic growth and development of nations. This is because peaceful nations attract foreign investors while the domestic investors freely operate within the economy with little or no tensions and apprehensions. Poverty rate was so high that many residents could not afford standard primary and secondary schools to enrol their wards in Aba.

Prior to the inception of democracy into the Nigerian political space, the Igbo communities already practiced aspects of democracy which made it difficult for the British to successfully subjugate them at the onset of colonization. Aba was no exception to this direct democracy where people gathered to elect individuals who would represent them at the council of *Umunna*. This council at each point acted as a judicial council in the different communities where they exist. An average setting comprised of; the Age grade, the deities/oracles, the *umuada*, the council of elders. These groups had their functions clearly stipulated and there was no conflict so far, of functions rather they complimented each other and ensured no group dominated the other even though boundaries were set. (Wood, 2009). The functions of these groups are expounded below

The Age grades
This was organized on a village basis. The association or age grade grew from boyhood and took a common name to

commemorate an event associated with the time of their birth. When they grew up, they would appoint a leader. The age grade was strongly organized among the north and southern Igbo and Cross River peoples. The non-centralized communities organized themselves through the age grade for war, work and government. Those who were still youths cleared paths and public places, streams and also served as "police." The adults enforced the decisions reached by the elders and in war, guarded the settlement and fought on the battlefields.

The Titleholders

The titleholders were regarded as men of character, able to build up some following and contribute to project of the community. Titled men were called *Ndinze* and they virtually monopolized authority in their wards or villages. Their functions include providing law and order as they took part in the process of promulgating laws and regulating customs and had positions in the council which exercised jurisdiction in "civil and criminal cases." They helped in reducing stress and strains in the society. They equally aided in instilling discipline in the inhabitants, particularly the men.

The Umuada

They played a very vital role in the maintenance of peace, law and order and co-operate existence of the society. The institution as the name implies was made up of married women from a particular town or community but whose matrimonial homes were outside their ancestral home. Their role can be said to have started from curbing the excesses of its members to those of non-members in their ancestral home. Cases that appeared to be intractable or not easily resolved by other institutions were always referred to the *Umuada*. It was in this way that they helped in sustaining peace, law and order and a co-operate existence of their ancestral home**.** In Igbo land, the *Umuada* is an institution that is always called upon to hear and try cases between couples and other members of the community. They have therefore, brought their influence to bear on the course of "Justice" between villages or families.

The Chief Priest, deities/oracles

Deities in Igbo land acted as the Supreme Court in the cases of intractable dispute. In Igbo land, cases that defied human solution/judgments were referred to deities for arbitration. In some circumstances, cases were instituted before oracles or deities

to determine the innocence of an accused. Famous among these deities included; the *ibini-ukpabi, amadioha, iIgweka-ala*. These deities/oracles continue to hold sway in Igbo Justice System.

Aba is a town that has over-time faced enormous security challenge ranging from local community insecurity which took different forms and shapes such as kidnapping, ritual killing, human trafficking, rape, stealing, armed robbery, etc. These were some of the issues that affected Aba and posed a challenge on her peace and security.

The Concept and Practice of Jungle Justice in Aba

The phrase "Jungle justice or mob justice" is a form of open extrajudicial killings prevalent in Sub-Saharan Africa, and most notably Nigeria and Cameroon, where an alleged criminal is humiliated, beaten and summarily executed by a crowd or vigilantes .Some scholars had further explained that the causes of jungle justice are illiteracy, anger due to the economic realities, the flaccid court system, disregard for human rights, Lack of Trust in the Police and other law enforcers are reasons given for jungle justice. Though it is in human and barbaric, the harmful effects of

criminal elements on innocent citizens in recent times has led to the rise in execution by jungle justice extra-judicial killing (Amnesty International, 2007) Only in May 2022, 32 cases of jungle justice were reported in Nigeria. Most of these mob actions have resulted in gruesome, inhumane torture and extra-judicial killing of people accused of committing an offence. Dozens have suffered death through beatings or burning.

The recent lynching of David Imoh in Lagos has once again centered jungle justice in the national discourse, leading to concerned citizens calling on authorities to make committed efforts to end this barbarous practice. Mob actions have had a long history and predate Nigeria. It was pervasive in the United States as a tool white America used in terrorizing its black population.[7] This system of extra-judicial execution sometimes based on false accusations, such as the case of the Aluu 4, oron flimsy arguments like the dispute over a N100 change that cost Mr Imoh his life in Lagos, has become the bane of the Nigerian state and its woeful justice system (Nonyelum Ossai, interview, 2022).

The cases have been exacerbated by state-sanctioned extra-judicial killings. In the early 2000s, state-backed vigilantes in the southeast, otherwise called Bakassi Boys, went on a public lynching spree of suspects after they were given a free rein by the governors in the region to help curb crime. It was the clearest demonstration of the failings of the justice system up to that point. While these extra-judicial killings often drag out for hours, its perpetrators believe that the police are hardly ever at hand to stop them. In other instances, it would appear the police directly sanction the killings.

Miss Ibisobia Elkannah for instance, witnessed the murder of her own brother and his friends in Aluu, Rivers State, in 2012, when on a visit to a friend she heard a commotion outside. Upon investigation, she found her brother and three others being tortured by a crowd for alleged robbery, a false accusation from a debtor they had gone to collect money from. Her attempts to speak for her brother led to direct threats against her own life and in an interview, she recounts how the police arrived at the scene, talked with the mob and then drove off laughing, just before her brother and his friends were burnt alive. The increasing spread of jungle justice in the country and recourse to it is a clear signal for authorities to wake up to their responsibility of ensuring law and order and upholding justice. These actions, if left unchecked, could trigger widespread conflicts, as demonstrated in the Dei-Dei market recently, where reckless driving and lynching led to a violent confrontation between different groups. The resultant deaths and losses in business may seem small compared to other violent clashes in the country, but it is a warning of the anarchy to come if this dangerous impulse is not contained.

The authorities must draw a line in the sand and make clear examples of recent incidents by diligently hunting down leaders of such ravenous mobs, and making a public example of their trial and sentencing. This should serve as a deterrent to others. In the short term, the public information organs of the government must create and design a campaign to sensitize Nigerians, through TV, radio, social media and face-to-face engagements at markets, motor parks and other spots, on how to report offenders, handle them and surrender them to the authorities. In the medium term, civic education and human rights must be properly taught in

schools and through public awareness campaigns. While these steps are crucial, authorities must do the most important aspect on their part. This is to bolster the police to provide adequate security cover to the country, train and retrain the police on suspect handling in a fair, just and transparent fashion, and the importance of being accountable to the people they are sworn to protect. The justice system as a whole must be reformed to deliver justice with a swift and steady hand and in a transparent manner that will remove doubt from the minds of citizens and engender trust in the process. Authorities must act now before these extra-judicial killings and self-help 'justice' snowball into a dangerous avalanche that could consume thousands of lives and lead to a complete breakdown of law and order.9

Figure 1: Map of Aba city

SourceWikipedia

Jungle justice is becoming an epidemic in Nigeria. With the lynching of Deborah Samuel and David Imoh still fresh in our minds; we are left to wonder if there is any hope left. The youths are the major victims and culprits in extrajudicial killings. Images of the mob of young people excited and jubilant in the process of killing another human being in public leave one wondering if there is any humanity left in them. The frequent occurrence of jungle justice in Nigeria has shown that life has no value anymore. The situation is so bad that anything can trigger it. A mere accusation of blasphemy and a shout of *ole! ole!* (Thief! Thief!), can brutally end anyone's life in a few minutes. Jungle justice in Nigeria does not come without consequences, and it has taken Nigeria several centuries backward. The rest of the world now sees Nigerians as corrupt, uncultured, and primitive. With a population of over 250 million people, Nigeria's diversity has proven over time to be a burden rather than an asset to the country.

History of Jungle Justice in Nigeria

Jungle justice in Nigeria has no particular history as it has been happening for decades. For record purposes, however, it can be

traced to the Bakassi Boys, a group established in 1999 by various associations of Igbo people of the South-East, Nigeria. Gilbert Okoye was the first leader of the association. Armed robbers and gangsters were terrorizing the region's people, especially Aba, Abia State, in the 1990s. So, the Bakassi Boys were introduced by the then governor, Orji Uzor Kalu, to stop the menace. Members of the association were armed with machetes, guns, and charms, which they wore around their bodies. It was said that the group lynched suspected petty thieves, armed robbers, ritual killers, murderers, corrupt persons, and anyone they considered evil. The Bakassi Boys enjoyed support from Igbo people because crimes greatly reduced after they began to operate. Other states in the region began to employ their services to help reduce crime. *Odeshi* became a popular term among the Igbo people, which means "It does not leak" or "it would not leak." The term actually means gunshot bullets wouldn't pierce the skin of the Bakassi Boys as they have already been fortified against them. The Bakassi Boys still exist today, but they have been renamed Anambra Vigilante Services, and their activities have reduced significantly (Osisi

Alulor John, interview, 2022)

Although they researcher did not always like to witness the execution of their victims but on that fateful day the researcher witnessed the killing of a young man at that Bakassi Market. Who they beheaded and took the other lady who also was a victim to Uratta Head office to behead her too. They were both tied up like a goat ready to be slaughtered that same day four able-bodied men were also killed by beheading also their place of execution was usually the Bakassi roundabout, where people usually gather to watch them been killed and die also it was generally believed that whoever they planned to execute, the parts were already sold out to human traffickers, ritualists and organ sellers. There and then people began to rumor that before mid-night they would still come and harvest the sensitive parts of those victims they had killed. This continued until the year 2002, when a motion was moved for the end in Bakassi operation which did not succeed because they had backing and support of the politicians who were in power, who had already lobbied the government also those human parts were also harvest for these politicians who were never seen but with the level of extra-judicial

killing with no response from the government to explain the whole situation and made the speculations clearer. These politicians used the Bakassi boys as trading channel and usually cut some percentage to them. This business continued and got so much engaged that the functions were delegated. They were the informant and the delivery guys. This business got linked to outside of Aba and Abia State. (Osisi, Alulor John interview, 2022)

Formation and Activities of Bakassi Boys Security Outfit
The Bakassi Boys group was created in 1998 by traders in the city of Aba who wanted to protect themselves from armed robbers and hoodlums who by that time had become a serious security threat to the inhabitants of the city. Having had success in curbing crime in Aba, the Bakassi Boys became in high demand and their activities spread to other cities in eastern Nigeria. Their activities include; fighting against robbery, ritual killing, as can be observed in the charismatic Eddy Nawgu, an alleged prophet and occultist was eventually apprehended and beheaded. These Bakassi Boys moved around with guns, machetes and usually operate with an array black magic artifacts and juju which they wear round their waist and their manhood most times.

They usually operate in the Igbo area of the country and over time have been engaged in several extra-judicial killings of suspected armed robbers, ritual killers and murderers. The manner in which they know or discovered if anyone was evil or not was by the use of black magic in which they placed a magical silver-colure machete on the chest of any suspicious person and if the machete's color changed from silver to blood- red, it meant the person had committed a heinous crime at some point in their life, and invariably such a person would be killed immediately (Obinna Nna, interview, 2022)

They enjoyed popular support in the areas where they operated because criminal activities were greatly reduced since their inception in 1998. Their greatest mysterious power was their ability to evade gunshot, even when they are shot multiple times at close range, they wouldn't flinch nor sustain any injuries. This metaphysical power was referred to as *Odeshi* amongst the people. *Odeshi* is an Igbo word that meant "it does not leak" or "it would not leak", which meant if

anyone shot them with a gun it wouldn't pierce their skin hence their blood would not leak. Vigilante group otherwise known as the "Bakassi Boys" originated in Aba, a city made up of different autonomous communities. It is made up of two local governments of Aba North and South which situates within the Southern Senatorial district of the state. With the birth of Abia State in 1991, Aba became the commercial nerve center of the state owing to its booming commercial activities coupled with its centralized location and proximity to south-south states. Meanwhile, Umuahia is the administrative headquarters of the state. Aba South is the main city center and the heartbeat of Abia state, southeast Nigeria. The industrial nature of Aba had by the close of 1998 led to an upsurge in the population as people from different places migrated to the area. However, due to its enterprising nature, Aba town has been popularly referred to as the Japan of Africa, while the name" Aba made" has become a popular Nigerian expression for cheap local manufactures. But that did not imply that Aba products were cheap or inferior as the name suggests. In view of these economic factors and the rising insecurity in the town,

people's properties became unsafe and non-indigenes and traders were forced out of Aba in their numbers in search of safer places for their various economic activities.

The Mafs were a cult group whose criminal activities disrupted the economic activities in Aba and her environs. They were the menacing cult group that hindered the growth, the economic and social welfare of Aba. However, the height of crime in Aba on the eve of the Fourth Republic can be likened to that of Onitsha where it was reported that criminals moved about with such confidence that on some occasions, they would tell people the exact date on which they would be robbed. On that same day, they would force their way into the houses they had earlier marked, regardless of whether the occupants had fled or not. Thus, by the close of the military era, Aba could be said to be likened with the novel as *One Week, One Trouble* as no day could pass by without shootouts, killings, rapes and robbery incidents. These crimes happened within few minutes, and people lived in fear, (the fear of armed robbers and Mafs a measure of self-defence, people became their own security forces, taking up the

security role of the police which they had abandoned. Among the self-defence security measures were the purchase of fire arms and other weapons, and the erection of high walls around residences. This situation however, brought a slow pace in the wealth making of the shoe and garment manufacturers in particular and the public at large, who were faced with the challenge of curbing armed robbery activities perpetrated by gangs of armed robbers popularly referred to as Mafias. It appeared as though the challenge was not only to put a stop to Robbery activities but also to lead the revolt against the excessive harassment and extortion by the hoodlums in the town. The leadership however came from the shoe makers of the 'Bakassi' area of Ariaria Market where the name was coined. Thus, they resorted to settling the hoodlums who have gained much control of the city by settling with money so as to appease them from taking it from them by force. In the remote past, criminals were known to fear and tremble when they see the owners of the house they have come to rob, but recently the owners fear, tremble and run away for the criminals.

By 1998, in a bid to shake off the chains of oppression by these hoodlums, the traders decided to confront the Mafs. When the traders got to Aba Mosque, a serious fight had ensured. There were sporadic shootings from the two camps. The traders kept pressing on until they overran the Mosque area which forced the Mafs to leave Emejiaka's house which they used as their hideout. With the decimation of their hideouts, the trader continued their onslaught against the Mafs and their accomplices in such a way that some die-hard ones among them were killed and burnt while others were forced into exile. Mention the period that this happened (a den of robbers). It was at this point that they deemed it fit to establish a self-help security outfit to keep the Mafs permanently out of Aba as they promised to deal with armed criminals ruthlessly and decisively. The traders vowed to embark on an operation of capturing and executing suspected armed robbers until nearly all suspected criminals had been executed or had fled the state. (Obinna Nna, interview, 2022)

This could not have been possible if not for the support given to the Boys by the populace who always provided them with information concerning criminals and criminal

activities. There were many reasons for the formation of the group in Aba at the time, but the last straw that broke the camel's back was the murder of a pregnant Calabar woman in October 1999 and the inefficiency and widespread corruption of the police force which led them to mounting frustration with a steady increase in violent crimes. The Power Line contest between the traders and the Mafs that eventually saw to the 'eclipse' of the later was the immediate cause of the formation of the Bakassi Boys.

In appreciation of the efforts of the shoe makers from the Bakassi area in the campaign against the Mafs, the traders decided to honor the outfit with the name, the Bakassi Boys. The Bakassi Boys as an informal security outfit originated from the civil society who saw the need to establish a 'community police' to guard lives and property in a community where the security agents, the Police were unable to live up to their expectations. The Boys emerged as a result of lack of trust of the Aba populace in the existing formal criminal justice system and the lack of confidence in the Police as security providers. Thus, it can be rightly summarized that, threatened with

criminal activities and the minimal provision of security by the Police or better still deprivation of security which the populace was entitled to, the Ariaria traders with the majority of them coming from among shoe makers banded together in a collective action to wage war against organized crimes perpetrated by a group of armed gangs.

Like minded citizens from Ariaria Market and later other markets in Aba came together and formed the Bakassi Boys; a vigilante group which had the objective of fighting crime in Aba. It can also be said that the Bakassi Boys, as a 'self-help' security outfit developed amongst the Aba populace, against armed civilians (armed robbers) in the interest of the populace. With time, the Boys became an alternative security outfit in Nigeria's South-East zone, where law enforcement agents were performing below the expectations of the society.

The sudden exit of the military from power and the run-down police force that they bequeathed to the civilian regime made it impossible to cope with crime upsurge in the country. To fill the gap, people formed vigilante groups. These vigilante groups go

by different names across the country. The primary reason for setting them up was to protect the people from incessant raids by armed robbers in their neighbourhoods. These groups have usually been composed of individuals from the local community. They have derived their credibility, and unofficial authority, from the community in which they serve. One of the main purposes of these initiatives had been to complement the police in identifying and handing over criminal suspects to the appropriate judicial authorities. They have also sometimes tried to settle other conflicts between individuals in the community. Local leaders have on occasion abused their power and used these groups for other purposes.

The vigilantes rose to the challenge of combating the spiralling crime waves across many cities in the country especially in the early years of democratic transition. Initially there was a reduction in crime. Commercial activities picked up in the commercial cities of Aba, Onitsha, Lagos, etc. And people could move around freely once again. The acclaimed success of the Bakassi Boys in reducing crime in Aba, resulted to the clamour for and the introduction

of this group to Onitsha (Anambra state), and Owerri (Imo state). Their feat in catching and fishing-out criminals were legendary across the south-east. They won the admiration and goodwill of the people. However, with time these vigilante groups in most cases deviated from the original purpose for which they were formed to engage in other activities such as settling civil matters, recovering debts, ejecting tenants for landlords and in some cases meddling in husband-and-wife matters, and serving as ready hands to unleash violence during elections. In other words, they were sometimes recruited as political thugs. They were largely uneducated and so obeyed only the commands of whoever hired their services. Their nefarious operations revolved only around apprehension and cold-blooded murder of a supposed criminal.

Recruitment and Training of the Bakassi Boys

Bakassi Boys were primarily of the Igbo ethnicity and very few of settlers of another tribe resident in Aba. They are able-bodied young men in their 20s and 30s although there were instances where younger persons were considered and accepted into the organization. Members were usually recruited from traders

from different markets. Those markets were usually divided in zones with the Bakassi Boys situated systematically in these markets to ensure safety of lives and properties of people. New members receive months of training on the rules of the Bakassi Boys prior to participating in the group's operations.

Members of the Bakassi Boys join the organization voluntarily Formal recruitment generally takes place at the age of seventeen, although many members are involved as informants at around the age of sixteen. The Bakassi Boys initially had about 500 members, but have since grown to approximately 3,500 members. According to Amnesty International, members of the local community believe that members of the Bakassi Boys group possessed magic powers and carry charms that made them invincible.

The only accepted young people whom they considered not to be a threat to them that is someone whom they can easily control. These persons must undergo series and rigorous trainings before they were allowed fully to parade himself as a member of the group. They took oaths of secrecy not to expose their secrets which the consequence was death. Although not everybody was allowed to join, this is because before one could join; he must be brought or introduced by anybody considered to be influential in the society. This discouraged most persons from joining because it was very difficult for people who didn't have referees to help them join. This was because, it became a lucrative business. Also, educated people were considered who had the knowledge of reading and writing; that interacted with buyers outside the state. They would not accept an illiterate man. The educated persons had meetings and represented them in meetings with top government officials and also who received funds from business deals were distributed amongst them. There were ex-members of the Bakassi Boys that posed threat to the Abia State government. Like Osisikankwu who was later killed by the Abia State government in 2010 (Iriri & Onele, 2009). Their mode of recruitment was through fortification: they take their new members to their specific native doctor to prepare charms for the person. Those charms resisted bullets from penetrating the bodies of their members in cases

of open fire with suspects and also disappearance charms. They were well fortified and equipped with charms and that was why they preferred to use machetes instead of guns (Rebecca, interview, 2022)

The Bakassi boys operate under a highly systematic and detailed administrative structure. The leader is the national chairman, who in 2002 was also the state chairman of Abia State. State chapters are autonomous yet cooperate with one another and make routine consultations with the national headquarters. State chairmen coordinates branches activities; branches are led by branch chairmen, although chairman may be considered as been in control of every major operation, this can vary in certain situations as some operations may be carried out under the command of the youth members but answerable to the state coordinator. According to the News release in 2005 identified "Kingsley Chimezie" as the leader of the Bakassi boys reported the murdered along with nineteen other persons by alleged members of the Bakassi Boys (Human Rights Watch & Cleen, 2002).

The Bakassi Boys now formed their own legal system and instituted judges, magistrates, and Barrister in their headquarters, who tried cases and convicted offenders. The even reduced to collecting fines and sanctions from offenders. They had two major head offices in Bakassi and Uratta road, off Port-Harcourt Road by Rail. The Bakassi Boys believed solely in the use of juju to administer justice, although nobody could say of a truth if those charms were potent or it was just mere instinct they worked with. On several occasions people were killed and their death weren't questioned and the Bakassi Boys weren't answerable to anybody except for their commanders. They had their own courts where their suspect was tried, once the person is tried and found guilty, they administered their own sanction which was usually death by beheading and thrown into the pit. They weren't working with the police; they were autonomous and they gradually began to carry fire arms. They had their units too but paid tribute to the commander in the headquarters at Bakassi Market.

Crime Reduction in Aba Under the Bakassi Boys
The Bakassi Boys were

introduced in 1999 in response to the high levels of crime in the Southeastern part of Nigeria, particularly in the city of Aba, Abia State. The group was initially formed as a vigilante group but later took on the role of a law enforcement agency. The Bakassi Boys gained notoriety for their violent and extrajudicial methods of crime control, which included jungle justice, torture, and summary execution. Despite their violent tactics, the Bakassi Boys succeeded in significantly reducing crime rates in areas under their control. Their presence in Aba led to a drastic reduction in armed robbery and other violent crimes such as kidnapping and murder. According to a report by the Human Rights Watch, "The Bakassi Boys' enforcement of law and order in Onitsha was supported by many residents who were fed up with the rampant crime in the city which Aba was no exception". The Bakassi Boys' crime reduction efforts were also acknowledged by the Nigeria Police Force. A former Inspector General of Police, Sunday Adewusi, in an interview with Vanguard, stated that the Bakassi Boys helped to reduce the crime rate in Onitsha and environs significantly. He said, "When we went there, we found out that the

Bakassi Boys had done marvelously well. They had restored law and order, which the police had been unable to do" (Adigwe, 2005)

The Group Managing Director of the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC), Mr. Andrew Yakubu, also commended the efforts of the Bakassi Boys in reducing crime in Aba. He said, "We commend the Bakassi Boys for their unwavering commitment to ensuring peace, security and stability in Aba and its environs." (Andrew Yakubu, interview, 2022)

Bakassi Boys as an Instrument of Retaliation

The main aim of which this Bakassi Boys were formed was to help control the excesses of the different cult groups that operated in Aba in the 1990s, which they did their best in achieving until a certain stage when they turned against the people they were meant to protect and became a societal menace that needed to be stopped. Initially, the Bakassi Boys were welcomed by the people of the southeast who were tired of the high rate of crime in the region. However, the group soon became notorious for its brutal methods, including extra-

judicial killings and torture. Despite the criticisms and controversies surrounding the Bakassi Boys, they became an instrument of retaliation for many Nigerians who felt let down by the government's inability to tackle crime in the southeastern region. The group's tactics were seen as effective in reducing crime, and many people felt that the government had failed them, leading to a proliferation of vigilante groups across the country. Even years after the disbandment of the Bakassi Boys, the name remains a reference point in discussions around crime and security in Nigeria. Many people still see the group as a necessary evil, while others continue to criticize their methods and question the legitimacy of vigilante groups in maintaining law and order (Osisi Alulor John, interview, 2022).

Failure of The Bakassi Boys and Inception of the Abia State Vigilante Service
Consequent upon the failure of the Bakassi Boys and their activities put to a stop due to the level of anarchy which took over the entire streets of Aba. This act discredited their further existence and their effort in reducing crime was totally forgotten. This prompted the inception of the Abia State Vigilante Service although what changed particularly was just their name but gradually their mode of operation began to change positively

With the height of jungle justice and extra judicial killings in Aba and the communities within it, the government decided that there should be a stop to it and that the government should know about every case. They were now changed from Bakassi Boys Group to Abia State Vigilante Service in the year 2007. Since then, it has continued to exist and known as Abia State Vigilante Service. The new headquarters is at Amauba Estate Umuahia South Local Government Area of Abia State. It was the son of former Governor of Abia State Chief Theodore. A. Orji, famously known as Ikuku who made sure Bakassi is and has continued to be in existence even though another group called the Homeland Security that operate mostly in Umuahia seriously fought to replace the Abia State Vigilante Service. They were quite similar to the Abia State Vigilante Service, except that they didn't possess firearms while the Abia State Vigilante Service did. The payment system is that which we are been paid through them. They

are very powerful administratively. This is because the current administration led by Dr Okezie Victor Ikpeazu do not like them but because the former Governor's son instituted our Commander General by name Idika Martins Mbathat is why they are still in existence. The ASVS has helped in providing and guaranteeing safety of lives and properties of people of Aba. The unit with its Commander joined forces with the Nigerian Army to institute peace and capture Osisikankwu On several occasion, they had been attacked by the notorious Osisikankwu and his men. Now ASVS has spread to other cities and States of Southeast. Since that time till now crime reduced, whenever there is a problem within the villages under our unit; we were usually called upon and we invite them to our office to register the case. The new vigilante group worked under the police culprits were handed over to the police who took over the case Simple cases were settled within the group while complex ones were handed over to the police. They made sure suspects do not stay more than 24 hours in detention. They work with the police because sometimes the police don't really know these remote areas but we are closer to these villages than they are.

Simply put, we help the police in the discharge of their duties and they enjoy working with us. Also, we work with them because they government stopped us from executing judgments. One could say that ASVS is a well-organized service commission. (Udowa Victor interview in Aba)

**Figure 1:** Some official documents of the new Abia State Vigilante Service.

Source: researcher's fieldwork

Source: Researcher's fieldwork

Recruitment and Structure of the Abia State Vigilante Service
Just as the law states once an individual is above 18 years of age he is been considered as an adult and can take decision for himself, the same applies in Abia

State Vigilante Service. Once an individual shows and indicates interest in joining the service, he would be issued a form which he has to fill and would be signed by the commander General Idika Martins Mba (Mr Ekene Ibe, interview at Ugwunagbo).

Official document of the Abia State Vigilante Service.

Source: Researcher's field work

Cases of Jungle Justice in Other Parts of Nigeria
Just like it was stated earlier it was just mere name that was changed in the Bakassi group and following the high level of

unemployment in Nigeria, the Abia State Vigilante Service is no exception because it's same people that make up the service. Also, with no arranged payment system stipulated for this group of people they still struggle to make ends meet for their families. This triggered them into doing all manner of evil for the purpose of making money. One could say that in the light of these they still indulge in acts of crime. Although the act of jungle justice has reduced among the Abia State Vigilante Group, they have already planted the seed in the minds of Aba citizens and across Aba, the citizens no longer have regard for human life. The ASVS have continued to perpetuate jungle justice presently, but at a minimized level.

There were prevalent cases of this sickening act in the South-East. In July, 2005, about 10 cases of mob action were reported. Three suspected robbers in Anambra State were set ablaze by an angry mob. Last week, two of the suspected robbers were burnt and on July 14, the last member who was said to have escaped death by a whisker was caught and set ablaze by an irate mob. On July 4, in Aba, Abia state, three Point of Sale robbers were set ablaze by an angry mob. Also, on July 11, In

Akwa Ibom State, a fuel seller poured fuel and set fire to a university student who complained of being sold adulterated fuel. On June 8, an angry mob lynched a suspected cultist to death in Akwa Ibom. A few days after, in Lagos, a motorcyclist alleged of one-way driving and hitting a pedestrian was nearly lynched by an angry mob before policemen rescued him (Udowo Victor, interview in Aba).

In May 2022, mob violence was recorded in Lagos when commercial motorcycle riders lynched a sound engineer, David Imoh, a 200-level Home Economics student of the Shehu Shagari College of Education, Sokoto State, Deborah Samuel, lynched over alleged blasphemy and lynching of a motorcyclist at the Dei-Dei market, Abuja which later resulted into violence. The Nigeria Police Force in 2019, following a mob justice, meted out to 45-year-old Blessing Odugu, tweeted via its verified Twitter handle that the then Inspector General of Police, Mohammed Adamu expressed concerns over the increasing acts of impunity and jungle justice. However, from 2019 till now, several cases of mob actions which have led to gruesome death

or life-threatening injuries on hapless victims remained unchecked (COAV, 2005).

Guaranteed Peace and Security in Aba.

To a large extent, the Abia State Vigilante Service have instilled peace and Security in ABA. Unlike in time past when traders could barely come to ABA to buy goods without either being attacked, or abducted with a demand for ransom but now just like the Bakassi boys started with guaranteeing peaceful economic activities, the Abia State Vigilante Service also has continued on that footpath they planted. This has been possible because following the number of Abia State Vigilante Service offices in ABA alone and are mostly situated near different market in Aba. Like the Ugwnagbo Unit covers the Alaoji Spare Parts Market, the Eziukwu Unit cover the Eziukwu Road Market (Cemetery Market ABA), The Ogboosisi Unit covers the Timber Market, The Ariaria Unit covers both the Bakassi Market and the Ariaria Main Market, to mention but a few (Ossai).

Conclusion

The study focuses on Jungle Justice and extra judicial killing in Aba from 1999-2007, with a case study of the Bakassi Boys. It aims to examine the prevalence of such acts in the area, the reasons for their occurrence, and the impact they had on the society. The Bakassi Boys, a vigilante group formed in response to rising crime rates in Aba, are used as a case study to understand the role of vigilante groups in perpetrating jungle justice and extra judicial killing. The project seeks to highlight the need for improved law enforcement and the dangers of allowing vigilante groups to take the law into their own hands.

The issue of Jungle Justice and Extra Judicial Killing in Aba is a complex and multifaceted problem that requires urgent attention. The case study of the Bakassi Boys highlights the role of vigilante groups in perpetuating this problem. While the group initially gained support due to high levels of crime in the area, their methods of extrajudicial killing and torture quickly spiralled out of control. The Nigerian government must take decisive action to address the problem of jungle justice and extra judicial killing. This includes not only holding perpetrators accountable for their actions but also addressing the underlying issues of crime and poverty that contribute to the

problem. There is also a need for greater transparency and accountability in the justice system to ensure that individuals are not subjected to arbitrary detention or punishment.

Additionally, there is a need for greater public awareness and education on human rights and the rule of law. This will help to shift the culture away from violence and vigilantism towards a society that values human life and due process. Ultimately, the problem of jungle justice and extra judicial killing can only be fully addressed through a comprehensive and coordinated effort involving government, civil society organizations, and the public.

Referencing

Amnesty International | Working to Protect Human Rights Archived, at the Wayback Machine. August 10, 2007

Amnesty International Members, (19 Nov. 2002; BBC 20 May, 2002)

Azogu F. Adigwe_ *Crime, vigilantism, and Electoral Violence in Nigeria;The roles of Vigilante group in Crime fighting*

Berg, Manfred and Wendt, Simon,*Globalizing Lynching History :Vigilantism and Extralegal Punishment from an International Perspective.* Palgrave Macmillan. ISBN 978-0-230-11588-0,2011.

COAV 2005, 254. 30 May 2005

Human Rights Watch (HRW) and CLEEN. *Nigeria.21 The Bakassi Boys: The Legitimization of Murder and Torture.* 14 (5), May 2002.

Human Rights Watch. *The Bakassi Boys: The Legitimization of Murder and Torture.*https://www.hrw.org/legacy/backgrounder/africa/nigeria0502/bakassi.htm

Nnaemeka Ukakwe Itiri, Onele Jacob. *The Transformation of The Bakassi Boys Vigilante Group among the Igbo Ethnic Group Nigeria into a Community Police Force.* Rebecca, 2008.

The Nation Online. "NNPC GMD commends Bakassi Boys", 2013. https://thenationonlineng.net/nnpc-gmd-commends-bakassi-boys/

Udowo Victor, Abia State Vigilante Service Office and Secretary Ugwunagbo Unit.

Vanguard press release.2005

Wood, Amy Louise. *Rough Justice: Lynching and American Society, 1874–1947.* North Carolina University" Press, 2009.

S/N	Name Of Informant	Age	Occupation of Informant	Place Of Interview	Date Of Interview
1	Chioma John	42	Trader	No_MbutuAlaoji, Ugwunagbo	03-06-2022
2	EkeneIbe	37	Bakassi Officer	Bakassi Office Ugwunagbor Unit	28-02-2023
3	ObinnaNna	30	Fashion Designer	Block C6, COLPAS; Michael Okpara University	27-12-2022
4	Udowo Victor	55	Sectary Abia State Vigilante Service, Ugwunagbor Unit	BakassiOffice, Ugwunagbor Unit	05-03-2023
5	OsisiAlulor John	72	Retired Priest	No 4_ Edu Avenue, Alaoji	03-03-2023
6	Chinedu John Nna	53	Trader	Block C3 Shop, Flyover Market Aba	12-01-2023
7	Ruth Chinedu	45	Trader	Mbutu-Alaoji	19-05-2023