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# Money Politics and conduct of credible Election in Nigeria: a case study of Kano State 2015 Gubernatorial Election

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#### Abstract

One of the challenges of conducting free, fair and credible election in Nigeria has been recognized to be excessive monetization of politics. Due to the use of money, elections were not uncredible but the beneficiaries of these fraudulent elections fail to recognize the people as the main focus of democracy. It is on this premise that this study was designed to investigate the nexus between money politics and conduct of credible election in Nigeria the 2015 gubernatorial election in Kano State as a reference case. Using documentary content analysis as methodology and elite theory of clientelism and prebendalism as theoretical framework of analysis, the study revealed that money politics and credible election have serious relationship in Kano State political arena. It is imperative to note that the implications discussed are by no means exhaustible but they are by all means clear analysis of the Nigerian experience, but in this case, 2015 gubernatorial election in Kano State. The study therefore concluded that money plays important role in the electoral process in Kano State. It was recommended that the electoral and other institutional reforms should be effective. Anti-corruption agencies should collaborate with banks and other financial institutions to monitor the movement of cash during elections. Also essential, is a culture of democratic citizenship that begins with a citizenry ready to insist on credible and transparent elections. Voters should be sensitized to imbibe moral objections to money politics.

**Keywords:** Politics, Election, Godfatherism, Money Politics, General Election, Credible Election, Electoral Act and INEC.

## **Background of the Study**

Money has become a dominant factor in African politics. Money seems to have taken the centre stage in the political process in most countries and in the Nigerian politics in particular. It is, sadly, now playing an increasingly

Avika: Journal of Environment and Politics in Africa Vol. 2, No 1, 2020 critical role. It even appears to be so dominant in the electoral process to such an extent that the word 'money politics' with a pejorative connotation, has crept into the country's political lexicon. It is now a critical variable when assessing the level of political corruption in the country. Many Scholars such as (Davies, 2005, Walecki 2006, Saliu 2008, Schedler 2005, Ojo 2006) cited in Kwaghga and Tarfa (2015) have written on money politics and vote buying in Nigerian politics because of the devastating impact of the phenomenon on the body politics. Money politics can be defined as the phenomenon in the Nigerian electoral process whereby contenders for elective positions use money or money is used on their behalf as an inducement to mobilize and get the support of the electorates which is not based on persuading the electorates to vote according to their wish and conviction but on the force of money that has changed hands. Related to this, is outright vote-buying. Vote-buying in its literal sense, is a simple economic exchange (Ovwasa, 2013) cited in Kwaghga and Tarfa (2015).

According to (Adetula 2008), money politics is shrinking the political space, and becoming a key variable in determining who participates in electoral politics and how. For example, nomination fees for party members seeking elective positions have become so high that only the rich and daring political entrepreneurs can participate in party primaries (IFES Survey 2007:xxviii). Adetula also asserted that in 1992, for example, presidential hopefuls spent over one billion naira during the primaries while other not-so-rich contenders had about 120 million naira as a budget for primaries. Today, money drawn votes and voices in Nigeria as godfathers' openly confess about shady deals, funding or sponsoring elections for 'godsons' and purchasing electoral victory. Businessmen and women are not left out in this illegitimate and illicit use of money for political influence. In an interview, in 1999 General T.Y Danjuma admitted, I helped to finance his (President Olusegun Obasanjo) first term election. I raised \$7 million. Slightly more than half of

Ayika: Journal of Environment and Politics in Africa Vol. 2, No 1, 2020 it came from my business associates. General Danjuma also added, Not once did he (Obasanjo) find out from me where this money came from. Was it from me, from my business associates, whether I stole it or whatever he didn't ask me! (Adetula, 2008: xxviii) There are many such as the aforementioned in the political writing of Nigeria and on the conscience of many political merchants (Adetula, 2008). This worrisome development, has in no measure, complicated the electoral and democratic process in Nigeria.

#### **Literature Review**

## The Meaning and Forms of Money Politics

Money politics can be defined as the phenomenon in the electoral process whereby contenders for elective positions use money as an inducement to get electorate's support which is not based on persuading the electorates to vote according to their wish and conviction but on the force of money that has changed hands. Related to this, is outright vote-buying. Vote buying in its literal sense, is a simple economic exchange (Kwaghga and Tarfa 2015). According to Charles and Schedler, (2005) cited in Beetseh, and Tarfa (2015) candidates buy and citizens/electorates sell vote, as they buy and sell apples, shoes or television sets. The act of vote-buying by this view is a contract or perhaps an auction in which voters sell their votes to the highest bidder. Parties and candidates buy vote by offering particularistic material benefits to voters.

According Callahan (2000) money politics, as a practice which rests upon pay offs that are not directly and explicitly tied to reciprocity in the polling booth, is sometimes referred to as indirect vote-buying. This practice, according to him, was well known in 19th century England and early 20th century in France and is common today in the Philippines and in the squatter settlements of Quito, Ecuador. He further stated that, In Taiwan, vote brokers typically approach relatives, friends and neighbors. A similar tactics is also

Ayika: Journal of Environment and Politics in Africa Vol. 2, No 1, 2020 employed in Thailand. For example, in the 1992 election in Thailand campaign workers for one candidate sought in each village to recruit the person best placed to deliver support, generally someone with significant social status in the village. (pg 66) Other qualifications include: being respectable, well known, a local leader (either official or unofficial), the candidate's relative or close friends, or some other characteristics that would make people honour their vote promises (Callahan, 2000 cited in Kwaghga, and Tarfa 2015).

Money politics in Nigeria will be better understood if situated within the context of the nature of the political economy of the country. The Nigerian state plays a dominant role in the national economy in the face of the underdevelopment of private capitalist enterprise. This throws up the state as a primary instrument of accumulation. As a facilitator of the capitalist development process, the Nigerian state is a major owner of the means of production. Buoyed by the expanded oil revenues of the early 1970s, the state effectively dominated all aspects of the national political economy (Jega, 2000:30 cited in Daily Trust 2011). President Babangida alleged irregularities and other acts of bad conduct against the presidential candidates in the 1993 national elections. He said: There were proofs as well as documented evidence of widespread use of money during the party primaries as well as the presidential election (Babangida, 1993 cited in Adetula, 2015:5). He went further to say that: Evidence available to government put the total amount of money spent by the presidential candidates as over two billion, one hundred million naira (N2.1 billion).

Wilhelm (2013:1) argued that Money is ubiquitous in politics. Election campaigns, political parties, interest groups, nonprofit organizations and the media depend heavily on money, or more broadly speaking on material resources. They are all organizing collective action and reaching out to voters, journalists or politicians depends on funding for staff and rent to run

Ayika: Journal of Environment and Politics in Africa Vol. 2, No 1, 2020 offices or for communication services to reach out to citizens. According to Wright (1985) cited in Lucky (2013) the use of money to buy votes does not even stop at election time. It is a common practice in Nigeria as it is in many other countries, for numerous private interest groups and political action Committees which seek policy goals and legislations to serve their small private.

# The Implication of Money Politics on Credible Election and Democratic Governance in Nigeria

Money has become a dominant factor in the Nigerian electoral process. Political parties and candidates in their minds believe that money is the major player during campaigns and election. They believe that party manifestos and the integrity of the candidates seeking their votes are no longer in existence because all of them cannot be guaranteed. However, candidates resort to vote buying or money politics. Many of the electorate has been increasingly exhibiting cynical electoral behavior to sell their vote to the highest bidder. This practice constitutes a blemish danger to the democratic process of electing public officers which prevents goods governance and credible election because the voters sell out their votes to the highest bidder not the good candidates or party with good manifestoes and integrity. Although it may be difficult to eliminate the phenomenon of money politics, because political parties and campaigns cannot take place without money in the sphere politics.

Money Politics and vote-buying has made election results to have little or nothing to do with the performance in office of politicians. Precisely because performance is not a critical factor in electoral outcome, the incentive to perform is very weak, and since vote-buying is very effective in achieving electoral victory the resort to it is very high. Consequently, elected public office holders who spent huge sums of money to secure victory at the polls would usually have a greater propensity to pursue their private business and

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financial interest and sometimes those of their corporate sponsors or mentors and financiers, euphemistically referred to in Nigeria as political god-fathers. In this situation, public interest takes the back seat in the calculation, thus degrading the responsibilities of the elected officials to the people. It is for this reason that the Nigeria National Orientation Agency, a public enlightenment body sponsored a radio and television jingle during political campaigns and rallies by which it warned the electorate to be wary of politicians who want to buy their votes because according to the jingle, anyone who uses "wuru-wuru" (crooked, illicit means) to get elected could certainly render "wuru-wuru" service to the people (Davies, 2006:79).

Money and violence exert far-reaching influence over electoral politics in Nigeria. Elections in the country have been generally marred by violence ranging from verbal attacks to outright killings. Also, the domination of the political landscape by the godfathers and money bags politicians has further complicated the electoral violence trends in the country. The national elections held in the country since 1999 had their share of violent conflicts and illicit use of money as well as the complicity of the moneybags politicians who equally engaged in the manipulation of ethnicity and religion. Paul Collier's remark on money and politics in Nigeria is quite revealing. It shows the domination of electoral politics in the country by the moneyed elites. According to him; One reason for the conflict between decent governance and the other options is money....How do you win a Nigerian election for an unknown candidate in only a few months, facing an entrenched opponent? The answer is you probably need a lot of money (Collier, 2009:45 cited in Adetula 2015).

Money politics and vote-buying on good governance is that the winner in the elections when he occupies a public office that gives him access to public fund becomes more prone to corruption. For instance, if he is a legislator, he becomes more prone to receiving gratification to promote and support the

Ayika: Journal of Environment and Politics in Africa Vol. 2, No 1, 2020 private interest of his sponsors. There is now a popular feeling, indeed thinking, among a coterie of Nigerian politicians, that political contest is a high risk investment opportunity. The higher the risk the greater are the returns. This type of thinking has been corroborated by a former President of the Nigerian Senate, Senator Ken Nnamani when he affirmed in an interview that because votes are not free, politicians considered electoral contest for seats in the National Assembly as an investment and that many of them invest their fortunes, incurred debts and even sold their houses to contest and get elected (Sunday Punch June, 5, 2005).

## **Theoretical Framework**

Clientalism and Prebendalism are two theories used to analysis the research work, However the fundamental principles of political organization and behavior in Nigeria. Where an individual will seek the support and protection of his "Oga" or his Godfather, while trying to acquire the basic social and material goods-loans scholarships licenses, plots of urban land employments, promotions and the main resource of the patron in meeting these requests is quite literally a piece of the state. Examples can be seen in the appointment of misters or position on government boards. It is also ply to individual in there private sector.

Joseph (1987) also posits that the existence of prebendalised politics and the easy adoption of traditional patron client relationships to the pursuit of modern material goods, means that these two features of the system prebendalism and clientalism are mutually rein enforcing. To obtain and keep clients, one must gain prebendal office. To is to say that an individual or his kin have a reasonable chance of procuring in the distribution of the prebendal office. In Nigerian politics clients are gathered together to make their collective claims as well as to prove the aspirant patron (prebendal office) that there cooption would be rewarded by the political entrepreneurs.

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Due to abject poverty and illiteracy among the Nigerians and the somewhat hostile or closed political atmosphere the elites continue to consolidate their stance and determine the formulation and implementation of all public policies which are largely reflective of their interest. For example, in Nigeria as long as a leader enjoys the support of other leaders the agitation of his people is of little consequences. Hence, though people have the right to institute the recall of their elected leaders and in some instances, the suspension of these officials, such process have never yielded the desire result. Money has always been the determining factor consequently, frustrating the exercise of the democratic rights of the people even before it was put to test as enshrine in the country's constitution and electoral act. This was made manifest in the horse-trading that characterized the moves to recall senators such as Senator Waku, Jibril Aminu, Nzeribe and Ibrahim Mantu

by the leadership of the party at various levels. Walecki (2003).

The theory can also explain the Feud going in Kano State between the former governor and incumbent governor, Sen. Rabiu Musa Kwankwaso and Governor Abdullahi Umar Ganduje. Few Months in to the administration of Governor Abdullahi Umar Ganduje the feud between the governor and his predecessor and also godfather is threatening governance in the state. The crisis involving the governor political god-father, Senator Rabiu Musa Kwankwaso began since the first term inauguration of his political god-son, Governor Abdullahi Ganduje. Among other things, Governor Ganduje is being accused of derailing from the *Kwankwasiyya* political ideology of its leader Senator Rabiu Kwankwaso by deliberately sidelining all political associates of his boss, abandoning of the controversial 5km road projects in all the 44 Local Governments across the state. He is also accused of turning a blind eye towards the completion of 5.8km fly-over bridges, and forming alliances with the former Minister of Education, Malam Ibrahim Shekarau. The Governor has been accused of deliberately leaking out some vital

Ayika: Journal of Environment and Politics in Africa Vol. 2, No 1, 2020 documents to political enemies of Kwankwaso who have petitioned EFCC with allegations against him bordering on financial dealings with pensioners funds and other sundry charges.

#### Methods

Content analysis as a method of investigation was adopted in the study. This involves technique for systematically describing written, spoken or visual communication. It provides a quantitative (numerical) description. Many content analyses involve media-print (newspapers, magazines), television, video, movies, and the internet. The researcher adopted correlational analysis of secondary data sources using descriptive research methodology to view what others have written or said in relation to the topic of study. The research consulted textbooks, journals, magazines, newspaper, online materials, electoral act and other government publications and gazette within reach. The research approach tends to reveal the characteristics of Nigerian politicians and incidences of financial inducement of electorate in the conduct of general elections more specifically in the 2015 gubernatorial election in Kano State.

# **Findings**

# Rules and Regulation Guiding Electoral and Political Expenses

In Nigeria, there are various constitutional and other legal instruments guiding the operation of political parties, especially as it relates to campaign financing and vote buying. These include the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended), the 2002 and 2006 Electoral Acts, and 2010 Electoral Act as amended. Others include the statutory rules of the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) and other informal rules. These laws provide copious provisions of the extent and limitation of political parties with respect to campaign/political financing and vote buying. The 1999 Constitution, for instance, is the first ground-norm

Ayika: Journal of Environment and Politics in Africa Vol. 2, No 1, 2020 governing the activities of political parties in the country. What is of utmost interest is the limitations placed on political parties especially with respect to their funding activities by the 1999 Constitution.

Section 225 sub section 2 of the 1999 Constitution on the Finances of political parties. It states that: —Every political party shall submit to the Independent National Electoral Commission a detailed annual statement and analysis of its sources of funds and other assets together with a similar statement of its expenditure is such form as the commission may require. Sub sections 3, 4, 5 and 6 of the same provision are even more forthcoming on the roles of INEC in checking the financial dealings and status of political parties. For instance, sub section 3 states that no political party shall —

- (a) Hold or possess any funds or other assets outside Nigeria; or
- (b) Be entitled to retain any funds or assets remitted or sent to it from outside Nigeria.

Sub-section 4 states that: Any funds or other assets remitted or sent to a political party from outside Nigeria shall be paid over or transferred to the commission within twenty-one days of its receipt with such information as the commission may require. Sub-section 5 further states that:

The Commission shall have power to give directions to political parties regarding the books or records of financial transactions which they shall keep and, to examine all such books and records.

Significantly, section 226 sub-section 1 permits INEC to mandatorily prepare and submit annually to the National Assembly a report of the accounts and balance sheet of every political party. In preparing its report, sub-section 2 of the same provision empowers INEC to: Carry out investigations as will enable it form an opinion as to whether proper books of account and proper records have been kept by any political party, and if

Ayika: Journal of Environment and Politics in Africa Vol. 2, No 1, 2020 the Commission is of the opinion that proper books and accounts have not been kept by a political party, the Commission shall so report.

These are constitutional instruments aimed at closely monitoring and supervising the activities of the income and expenditure of political parties. There are, however, some gaps, especially in the implementation of these provisions. Looking at the provision of section 228, it is clear that the framers of the 1999 Constitution bestowed on the National Assembly the powers to make laws to provide for the type of punishment that should be imposed on. The 2010 electoral Act as amended does not only grant INEC the power to place a limit on the amount of money or other assets, which an individual or group of persons can contribute to a political party, it also stipulates spending limits to candidates section 90(1). For instance, section 91(2) of the same Act puts the spending limits for Presidential candidates at N1 billion, while candidates for Governorship election are required not to spend more than N200 million [section 91(3)]. Similarly, the maximum elections expenses to be incurred in respect of Senatorial and House of Representatives seat are N40 million and N20 million respectively Section. 91(4) says that —in the case of State Assembly election, the maximum amount of election expenses to be incurred shall be N10 million section 91(5). In the case of a chairmanship election to an Area Council, the maximum amount of election expresses to be incurred shall be ten million naira (N10, 000,000). (Section 91 (6)). In the case of councillorship election to an Area Council, the maximum amount of election expenses to be incurred shall be one million naira (N1, 000, 000). (Section 91 (7)). In determining the total expenditure incurred in relation to the candidature of any person at any election no account shall be taken of:-

(a) any deposit made by the candidate on his/her nomination in compliance with the law; (b) any expenditure incurred before the notification of the date fixed for the election with respect to services rendered or material supplied

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(9) No individual or other entity shall donate more than one million naira (N1, 000,000) to any candidate. (Section 91 (9)). A candidate who knowingly acts in contravention of this section

commits an offence and on conviction shall be liable - (a) in case of presidential election to a maximum fine of N1,000,000.00 or imprisonment of 12 months or both:

(b) in the case of a governorship election to a fine of N800, 000.00 or imprisonment for 9 months or both; (c) in case of senatorial seat election in the National Assembly election to a fine of N600, 000.00 or imprisonment for 6 months or both; (d) in the case of House of Representatives seat election in the National Assembly election to a fine of N500, 000.00 or imprisonment for 5 months or both; (e) in the case of a State House of Assembly election to a fine of N300, 000.00 or 3 months imprisonment or both; (f) in the case of Chairmanship election to a fine of N300, 000.00 or 3 months imprisonment or both; and (g) in the case of Councillorship election to a fine of N100, 000.00 or 1 month imprisonment or both. (Section 91 (10)) Any individual who knowingly acts in contravention of subsection (9) shall on conviction be liable to a maximum fine of N500, 000.00 or 9 months imprisonment or both. (Section 91 (11)) .Any Accountant who falsifies or conspires or aids a candidate to forge or falsify a document relating to his expenditure at an election or receipt or donation for the election or in any way aids and abets the breach of the provision of this section of this Act commits an offence and on conviction is liable to 10 years imprisonment. (Section 91 (11)).

# **Expenses of Major Parties during the 2015 General Election**

There are no reliable sources of the actual amount used in the 2015 General election in Nigeria. Quite often, most of the donations that candidates and political parties received were classified, while it is also difficult to track and quantify those that come in kind. For example, it is difficult to quantify the amount of money expended on media advertorials, which consumes a chunk of campaign finances and that of vote buying. This is largely attributed to the haphazard nature of the political parties. The 2010 Electoral Act (amended) requires political parties not only to

submit their campaign expenses to INEC within six months after an election but shall ensure that same is published in at least two national newspapers [section 92(6)]. In this connection, much of what is available is derived from newspaper reportage. Against this background, the analysis here would be restricted to campaign finances of the two major political parties - the People's Democratic Party (PDP) and the All Progressive Congress (APC), especially as it had to do with the presidential election. For instance, as soon as INEC gave the nod to political parties to commence electioneering activities, candidates commenced the process of raising funds and expending for their campaigns. For instance, the PDP organized a fund raising dinner for its presidential candidate, President Goodluck Jonathan, where it raised more than N22 billion. From just one fund raising dinner, Jonathan breached the maximum limits prescribed by the 2010 Electoral Act.

**List of Donors to Goodluck Jonathan 2015 Campaign** 

S/N	NAMES	AMOUNT
1.	Tunde Ayeni	N1 billion
2.	Tunde and Group of friends	N2.6 billion
3.	Jerry Gana and friends	N5 billion

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4.	National Automotive Council	N450 million
5.	PDP Governors Forum (N50 million each x 21 governors	NN1.05 billion
6.	Bala Shagaya Representing the Oil and Gas sector	N5 billion
7.	Construction Sector	N310 million
8.	Transport and Aviation Sector represented by Didi Ndimou	N1 billion
9.	The Real Estate Sector represented by Oluchi Okoye	N4 billion
10.	Food and Agric Sector represented by Chief Ominife Uzeogbu	N500 million
11.	Cizally Limited	N250 million
12.	Power sector represented by Tunde Ayeni	N500 million
13.	National association of Stevedores	N25 million
14.	Mr. Sam Egwu	N1 million
15.	Halima Jibril	N5 million
16.	Ajuji Best Hotel	N1 million
	TOTAL	N22.442 Billion

Source: ThisDayLive, 21st December, 2014

This is aside from the \$2.1 billion that is allegedly used for the election in favour of the PDP. This is being revealed from what is tagged as Dasukigate i.e. Colonel Sambo Dasuki \$2.1 billion arms scandal. The former Security Adviser has given details on how some of the People's Democratic Party (PDP) leaders received slushes funds. He confessed that some former and serving members of the PDP has collected money from his office to ensure

Ayika: Journal of Environment and Politics in Africa Vol. 2, No 1, 2020 the reelection of President Jonathan. Such PDP figures and the amount allegedly distributed to them include:

S/N	NAMES	AMOUNT
1.	BODE GEORGE	N100M /\$30,000
2.	YERIMA ABDULLAHI	N100M /\$30,000
3.	PETER ODILI	N100M /\$30,000
4.	ATTAHIRU BAFARAWA	N100M /\$30,000
5.	JIM NWOBODO	N100M /\$30,000
6.	AHMADU ALI,	N100M /\$30,000
7.	MAHMUD ALIYU SHINKAFI	N100M /\$30,000
8.	BELLO SARKIN YAKI	N200M
9.	TONY ANENIH	N260M
10.	IYORCHIA AYU'S COMPANY	N345M
11.	BAM PROPERTIES	N300M
12.	DALHATU INVESTMENT LIMITED	N1.5BILLION

Source: Dailypost January 8, 2016

The former NSA Colonel Sambo Dasuki, the AIT chairman Raymond Dokpesi, the former Minister of State for Finance, Bashir Yuguda among others are being are prosecuted on the shady deals. The diverted money was meant to be spent on arms procurement to fight the insurgency in the Northeast of the country, but has been revealed, was used to \_fight' the 2015 election \_war'. Dasuki is said to have spent the stolen money on a number of things including re-election campaigns, real estate, —spiritual purposes, as well as payments to a number of public officials.

Avika: Journal of Environment and Politics in Africa Vol. 2, No 1, 2020 According to the Guardian Newspaper The campaign finances of the APC presidential candidate, Muhammed Buhari are sketchy, but as at January 2015, the Buhari Support Group (BSO) claimed that it raised N54 million from Nigerians in support of his campaign. However, a study of the campaign expenditure of both Jonathan and Buhari indicated that they breached the maximum limits encapsulated in the Act. For instance, a Coalition of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) under the aegis of the Centre for Social Justice (CSJ) in conjunction with United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), raised an alarm over the threats posed to the growth of the Nigerian economy by election spending, contending that there is an inextricable link between election spending and the health of the economy. According to the consortium of CSOs. With attention shifted from governance and a lot of expenditure on campaign, the state of the economy in terms of depreciating exchange, inflation and reduced economic growth rate were bound to occur (Guardian, March 12, 2015).

The report put the total amount spent by the two major political parties - PDP and APC on advertisements in the print media alone at N1.382 billion. Specifically, the group said —the total up to February 14, 2015 for the APC presidential candidate is N332.583 million, while the total up to February 14, 2015 for the PDP presidential candidate is N1.049 billion. (*Guardian*, March 12, 2015). The group went further to list other campaign expenses of both candidates to justify the breach of the Act. The PDP spent N1.057 billion on campaign rallies while the APC spent N595.082 million. On bill boards, the PDP expended N155.13 million as against the APCs N99.23 million. Others are electronic media campaign coverage which catted N508.35 million from the PDP and N391.05 million from the APC; while electronic media advert gulped N7.399 million and N5.556 million for the PDP and APC respectively as revealed in table 8. In all the PDP expended

Avika: Journal of Environment and Politics in Africa N2.5 billion while the APC spent N1.091 billion. When you add this amount to the expenditure incurred in the print media, you will arrive at a total of N3.882 billion for the PDP and N1.433 billion for the APC. All these are conservative figures since they have not taken into account other expenditures like hotel accommodation, transportation cost (air, sea and road), security, feeding, to mention but a few.

The point being established here is that, both candidates breached the income and expenditure limits set up in the 2010 Electoral Act. Despite spirited efforts by the PDP to cover up for the campaign funds it raised, their expenditure profile clearly shows that the two main political parties flagrantly flouted laid down laws on campaign financing since they both raised and spent more than N1 billion. The donation of N21 billion to the PDP during its fund raising dinner violated Nigeria's electoral laws. The individuals and groups who donated also breached the Act since it stipulates that neither individuals nor groups/entity may donate more than N1 million. (Guardian, March 12, 2015).

Aspects of Campaign Expenditure by Presidential Candidates of the PDP and APC

S/N	EXPENDITURE	PDP	APC
1.	Campaign Rallies	N1.057 billion	N595,082 million
2.	Bill Boards	N155.13 million	N99.23 million
3.	Electronic Media Campaign Coverage	N508.35 million	N391.05 million
4.	Electronic Media Advert	N7.339 million	N5.556 million
	TOTAL	N2.5 billion	N1.091 billion

Source: Guardian, March 12, 2015

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## **Conclusion and recommendation**

## Conclusion

Money politics and godfatherism in Nigeria are in-separable. In fact the amount of influence of godfather to pioneer the activities of godson lies in the ability of former to fancied the political ambition of the later with —Kayan aiki (Money). 2015 election which is adjudged to be among fairest is of no doubt the worst ever in term of money-bag politics, as revealed in the study the People's Democratic Parties the then ruling Party raised almost N22.442 Billion from its financers, and proceed of arm purchased to the tune of \$2 billion USD (Sambogate) while former Minister of Petroleum Resources, Mrs. Maduke, spent \$1.22 billion to bribe INEC officials, Civil Society organization, Nongovernmental organizations and TMG (which is presently being investigated by EFCC while the opposition All Progressive Congress spent almost half of the PDP expenditure even though there is no reliable data as how much they expended.

In short the study is of the conclusion that money politics will continue to hinder credible election in Nigeria unless a legal, enforceable frame work is put in place to checkmate the menace of excess use of money in vying for political office. Today politics has become business and politicians buy the coveted seat at cost which necessitates them to recoup their initial outlay and reap profit. While the masses continue to complain of non-performance of elected official an eye witness reported to have from the hear former senator of Kano Central Late Kura Muhammad to inform his constituent people that —Leave my house *dan Ubanku*|| (you are very stupid leave my house) I will not do anything for you because I buy the seat|| as they threat him with non-re-election, he informed them that, he is not interested in re-contesting and even if he is re-contesting he is going to use his money again.

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#### Recommendations

Based on the finding of this research work I adopted the following recommendations from Walecki (2003) which says, Nigeria can employ different strategies to regulate the use of money in politics and create a framework within which political parties and individual candidates can operate. An effective formula for public control of political money will require the existence of a comprehensive system of political finance based on the following pillars:

- Full disclosure,
- Doctrine of agency,
- Appropriate sanctions,
- Elimination of patronage politics and control over costs of elections,
- Control of donations,
- Effective implementation and enforcement.

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