

INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR THE WAR AGAINST BOKO HARAM IN THE LAKE CHAD BASIN REGION

Adedoyin Jolaade Omede

Department of Political Science
University of Ilorin
Ilorin Kwara State
Email:medajol@yahoo.com

Arinze Ngwube

Department of Political Science
Federal University Oye-Ekiti
Oye-Ekiti Ekiti State
Email:arinze22ng@yahoo.com

Chigozie Sebastine Onu

Department of Social Science Education
(Political Science Unit)
University of Nigeria
Nsukka,
Nigeria
capricononu@gmail.com

ABSTRACT

Since the end of the cold war, the Lake Chad Basin region has been embroiled in a multitude of conflicts, internal and interstate. The fear of terror and extreme violence associated with the killings of innocent civilians through indiscriminate suicide bombings, attacks on civil infrastructure and military installations, along with the kidnappings of men, women, children and the decimation of entire communities. The activities of Boko haram have led to loss of lives, the breakdown of law and order. It has put a brake on economic development. This has been a source of concern on the part of the international community. The involvement of the international community is geared towards ensuring international peace and security in the region. Notable stakeholders include the United Nations (UN), African Union (AU), The European Union (EU), The US, Britain, France, Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), the Arab League, several other groups and individuals. These stakeholders, especially the UN, AU and the EU, have made concerted efforts

like commissioning special groups to visit the LCBR. The paper relied a strong reliance on both the primary and secondary sources of data including documents derived from the various resolutions of the United Nations, European Union, the African Union as well as speeches of political leaders'/country representatives, relevant textbooks, newspaper publications and other on-line materials. Notwithstanding the assistance by the international community, Boko Haram is still active and continues to attack military installations and kill civilians in the LCBR.

Keywords: *Boko Haram, African Union, European Union, United Nations, Lake Chad Basin Region*

INTRODUCTION

Two African proverbs aptly describe the premise on which the effort to fight the menace of Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Basin Region (LCBR) is hinged. The first is the saying that *one cannot leave a fire on one's rooftop and sleep with the two eyes closed*. The second is the cliché which holds that *looking dispassionately at the fire on a neighbour's rooftop portends disaster not only to the neighbour but also to oneself and the entire community*. The fear of terror and extreme violence associated with the killings of innocent civilians through indiscriminate suicide bombings, attacks on civil infrastructure and military installations, along with the kidnappings of men, women, children and the decimation of entire communities has engendered the spirit of collective action among members of the

international community (Global Terrorism Index – 2017; Ban-Ki Moon, 2015; Allen, 2018). International organizations and their member states, concerned individuals and civil society groups, are peeved by the hardships and suffering unleashed by Boko Haram. In addition, the humanitarian disaster characterized by the shortage of food, shelter and clothing, the upsurge of internally displaced persons and the emigration of local populace seeking refuge across state boundaries, are notable reasons for international intervention. The International support so needed according to Ban-Ki Moon (2016) “requires a unified response that stays faithful to the world’s common humanity and to the aspirations to secure peace and security, sustainable development, rule of law and respect for human rights” in the LCBR and other countries

affected by violent extremism. The spillover effect of Boko Haram described in the preceding paragraph is not only palpable but also portends grave danger to the entire international system. One cannot discountenance the 'snowballing' impact and continuing influence of extremist jihadist groups in Africa and in the LCBR in particular. The heightened state of insecurity; the incessant recourse to small arms by Boko Haram; and its impact on the entire global system is what motivated the international community to take up the gauntlet against Boko Haram. Notable efforts include UN Presidential Statements S/PRST/2015/12 (15 June 2015), S/PRST/2017/2 (20 January 2017) and S/PRST/2018/7-14 (11 August 2018) expressing concerns about the persisting violence in the LCBR. The adoption of resolutions UNSC/1267 (Al Qaeda Sanctions List) and UNSCR/2349 - 31 March 2017, which aimed to come up with a regional strategy, increase security assistance and humanitarian support to the LCBR. These attempts are, premised on the principle of 'shared responsibility' and the 'responsibility to protect' which contends that efforts to create peace are collective and should be

shared among members of the international system irrespective of 'hemispheric divide,' political-economic ideology, colour or creed.

In dealing with the threat of terrorism, nation-states have adopted joint measures including both military and non-military options with particular emphasis on the establishment of a 'pre-emptive' Global Counter-terrorism Network (GCTN), to detect, track and eliminate terrorists' threats before they materialise. Also, states such as the US, Britain and Australia have canvassed that the global war on terrorism involves the pooling together of resources in a coalition of the willing in which forces from the global North seek to improve the capabilities of vulnerable and threatened nations in the global South (Baylis, Smith, and Owens 2008, 303).

Notable stakeholders include the United Nations (UN), African Union (AU), The European Union (EU), The US, Britain, France, Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), the Arab League, several other groups and individuals. These stakeholders, especially the UN, AU and the

EU, have made concerted efforts like commissioning special groups to visit the LCBR. Examples of such visits is the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) visiting mission of March 2017, EU donor mission to Nigeria February 2017; representatives of the Counter Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate visit to LCBR–February 2017; the British Minister of State’s (Baroness Anelay) visit to Nigeria in 2016 and the UNSC visit to Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria–March 2017. They also organised conferences to create awareness on the implication of the terror tactics of Boko Haram in the LCBR. Examples are the 2016 AU Peace and Security Council Meeting /Abuja Regional Summit. The UN Security Council adopted resolutions (1267 of 2014 & 2349 of 2017) based on reports submitted by its members and other civil society groups. The AU, had through its many summits, canvassed for funding from international donors (Africa Donor Conference February 2015). The US had provided counterterrorism and urban warfare and established a joint military rapport with members of the LCBR. The EU (including Britain and France) also made financial contributions

toward the cause (Oslo International Humanitarian Conference, 2017, Berlin International Donor Conference 2018). Several other nations and international agencies have also pitched in their efforts in various ways. For example, the United Nations Development Programme - UNDP, United Nations High Commission for Refugees - UNHCR, the Red Cross & Red Crescent have assisted in terms of human management and distribution of relief materials, while Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch are engaged in canvassing for the fair treatment of belligerents and protecting the human rights of all concerned parties.

As much as these efforts are in top gear, evidence abounds that the fight against Boko Haram in the LCBR is not over. Member states of the LCBR still have to contend with incessant attacks by Boko Haram on their citizens. Their national security is, continuously being, breached, while their territorial integrity and sovereignty is, continuously eroded and compromised. As we proceed in our analysis, the paper hopes to provide answers to the following questions: What are the international efforts adopted to resolve terrorism in the LCBR?

Are the efforts adequate and possess the capacity to end the misery and spiral of violence and insecurity associated with Boko Haram? Have the efforts so far yielded the desired outcome: peace and development in the LCBR?

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The paper adopted qualitative methods which involve argumentative, critical analysis. The research will obtain relevant and available data from secondary sources. Data was deployed for the task of understanding the problem under consideration. The paper also explored and critically analyse scholarly journals, information openly available online and other social media sources.

International Efforts to Fight Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Basin Region

Boko Haram has attracted the attention of the international community because of its terror tactics, the decimation of human lives, the consequent humanitarian crisis and the unchecked effect on the LCBR and the West Africa subregion. Besides, the financial investment of the military action of the Multinational Joint Task force

(MNJTF) was a major burden on national budgets and development efforts of the LCBR member states. To combat Boko Haram, the world led by the UN had embarked on a series of political and diplomatic initiatives. Stakeholders such as the United Nations (and some of its specialized agencies like the UNHCR, UNICEF, FAO), European Union, Britain, France, Germany, AU, among others have shown their commitment toward the 'African Anti-Insurgency Project'. Most of these efforts are in the form of reports, resolutions, peace summits and conferences, mobilization of funds, military and technical assistance.

The United Nations (UN)

We can find a determinant factor in the UN fight against Boko Haram in the UN Security Council Resolution 2349 (2017) which affirmed that terrorism in all its forms and manifestation makes up one of the most serious threats to international peace and security. In addition, one other reason is the onus to muster international cooperation to resolve economic, social, cultural or humanitarian problems and promote respect for human rights and freedom for all (Kegley and Blanton 2011, 143). To achieve these aims, the UN since 2015

had severally expressed concern and dismay at the rate of killings, the humanitarian impact and the ensuing volatile insecurity situation in the LCBR (news.un.org, 2018). Due to the large-scale attacks by Boko Haram, the Security Council stressed that the group represented a “threat for Nigeria, the region and international peace and security” (Delattre 2015, onu.delegatefrance.org). Because of the humanitarian impact and the threat posed by Boko Haram to the stability of peace in West and Central Africa, the UN encouraged its members to increase security assistance and humanitarian support to the LCBR (UN Security Council Resolution–S/PRST/2015/12, 2015) (unoca.unmissions.org). In 2017, through the adoption of UN resolution 2349, the global organization strongly condemned Boko Haram terrorist attacks, violations of international humanitarian law and human rights abuses.

The UN has undertaken series of initiatives and actions through its various platforms like the UN Security Council, the General Assembly, UNHCR, UNICEF, UNDP, and the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) among others, to create awareness, campaign against and

raise funds to fight Boko Haram insurgents in the LCBR. Other prominent activities include discussions on the global consequences and collaborating with other international organizations and agencies to canvass and muster financial, technical and humanitarian assistance. The following diplomatic activities and measures undertaken so far by the UN include:

- The UN Security Council Presidential Speech - 30 March 2015, S/PRST/2017/2 and S/PRST/2018/7 (14) - August 10, 2018 declarations that the crisis in Africa’s Lake Chad Basin is of global concern hence, the need to take urgent actions to address the situation. This declaration provided the background for the UNSC Presidential statements commending: i. Nigeria’s President Muhammadu Buhari’s initiative to convene a high-level Regional Security Summit to evaluate regional response to Boko Haram (13 May, 2016 - S/PRST/2016/7) (S/PV.7692) and ii. Lake Chad Basin members and Benin for their efforts to establish the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) - UN/PRST/28 July 2015.

- The initiation of visits and fact-finding missions to the LCBR prominent of which is that of the 1st–7th March 2017 by the UNSC and spearheaded by France, Senegal and the United Kingdom. The purpose of this mission was to show support for the LCBR states; define a joint action for the fight against terrorism in the region and to encourage and strengthen the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF). In addition, both the United Nations Office for Central Africa (UNOCA) and its West African counterpart (UNOWA) have undertaken a series of assessment missions including those of October 2014 and June 2015, to address the impact of the Boko Haram threat on the political, socio-economic and humanitarian situation in the region.
- The 22 May 2014 adoption of Resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) by the UN al-Qaeda sanctions committee, which proclaimed Boko Haram a terrorist group and thus subjecting the organisation to an arms embargo, assets freeze and travel ban. The Committee added Boko Haram to its terror list because of the group's association with al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) for its training, material and financial support. Although the US had declared the group a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) since November 2013 (Open Doors 2017), the UN declaration of Boko Haram as a terrorist group in 2014 further empowered the international community to take decisive and drastic measures in the fight against the group. To ensure the effectiveness of the sanction, the U.N., implored member states to implement tough sanctions as a significant tool in combating terrorist activities in the LCBR (United Nations 2014).
- The 26 June 2014 UNSC Sanctions Committee which added the Ansaru group and the Boko Haram leader Abubakar Mohammed Shekau to the Al-Qaida sanctions list. Another effort is the embargo placed on the sect in early 2014. The embargo was in pursuant to the UN Security Council Resolution 2068 (2012)

which emphasised the Council's readiness to adopt targeted sanctions against armed groups like the Boko Haram (SERAP, 2014). By invoking sanctions on Boko Haram, the UN (UNSCR/1267) aimed at cutting off the group avenues of funding, travel and weapons acquisition as well as blacklisting and sanctioning anybody or groups offering assistance to Boko Haram (Powers 2014, Quinlan 2014).

The impact of the sanctions has become debatable. Some have noted that the sanctions coupled with the coordinated efforts of the MNJTF have weakened the combat capacity of Boko Haram (Feltman 2017). Other groups have noted, however, that UN sanctions were mostly symbolic and have not been able to stop Boko Haram's source of funding, travel and weapons acquisition (The 22nd Report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team 2017, Global World Report 2018–Global Terrorism Index 2017, *Premium Times* 2018). Some of the reasons adduced by the aforementioned groups include the predominance of a cash economy in the LCBR, extortion, charitable donations,

smuggling and ransom on kidnapping by Boko Haram. Other reasons are the porosity of borders in the region as commanders of the group travel unhindered without passports, engaging in the black market and illegal arms trade as well as looting of barracks to cart away weapons and carrying out bank robberies to access illegal monies (US Department of State - Country Report on Terrorism 2017, 290). Other actions and measures undertaken by the UN include but not limited to,

- Briefings by UN officials on the situation report and the root causes of the Boko Haram crisis. Examples of such briefings include that of 4 August 2017 (S/PV8020); 13 September 2017 (S/PV8047) and that of 22 March 2018 (S/PV8212).
- UNSC press statements condemning various activities of Boko Haram. These include the condemnation of; kidnapping of schoolgirls in Dapchi (North – Eastern Nigeria) (2 March 2018 – SC/13233); killing of soldiers, officers of the Nigerian police force and civilians in Dalori village in Northern Eastern Nigeria (2 February 2016 – SC/12233)

and; the October 10 and 11, 2015, killings in Baga, Sola – Chad and Kangelari in Cameroon (SC/1207512–October 2015).

- The adoption of resolution 2349 of 31 March 2017. This was the first resolution adopted by the UN to condemn terrorist attacks, violations of international humanitarian law and human rights abuses by both Boko Haram and Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) in LCBR. The Resolution (2349), also admonishes member states to implement consistent policies and ensure regional military cooperation as well as cut funding to sponsors of the group. Besides, the resolution restated the significance of timely and adequate response to issues such as economic inequalities, countering violent extremism and women empowerment.
- The report (S/2017/764) submitted by the UN Secretary General is also worth noting. The report - an assessment of the security situation five months after passing Resolution 2349 contained a critical

examination of the progress made by the UN in the fight against Boko Haram, the challenges encountered in the process and suggestions of futuristic practical measures.

Mobilization of other Stakeholders

The UN is also at the forefront of mobilizing nations to support the fight against Boko Haram. In addition, the UN designation of Boko Haram as a terrorist group has opened the portal for a flurry of international mobilization against the group. It has also raised the consciousness among the international community to the fact that Boko Haram is not just a domestic problem but also an international one that requires an increased support to regional efforts to fight the menace. The UN has also been active in mobilizing countries for operational and military support as well as raising funds to ameliorate the sufferings of the victims. The highlights of these efforts include;

- The United Nations (UN) Humanitarian response plans for the year 2017, which made a proposal for the

provision of \$1.5 billion worth of supplies to the victims of Boko Haram in LCBR and especially, in North-East Nigeria. The UN said it met 70% of the \$1.5 billion required in 2017, but claimed it carried over a total of \$196 million to 2018 – a sum it hoped will go towards such needs as the provision of food, shelter, clean water, education for out of schoolchildren and medical care. Similarly, in 2018, the UN developed another humanitarian response plan aimed at providing assistance for 6.1 million people in the LCBR.

- The convening of the Oslo 2017 summit jointly organised by the UN, Nigeria, Germany and Norway in which Norway led the effort by pledging \$192m (£153m) of the \$672m promised by international donors for the next three years. This is one of the UN awareness campaign efforts in which more than \$470million was raised and mobilised to respond to humanitarian needs and prevent famine in Nigeria and the Lake Chad region. This donation, however, amounted

to a third of the \$1.5bn sought by the UN (OCHA Report 2017).

- The convening of the Berlin 2018 conference for the LCBR jointly organised by the UN, Nigeria, Germany and Norway. The UN expressed its readiness to grant the LCBR the sum of \$2.5 billion to battle insurgency and poverty. It also affirmed that the UN has helped the LCBR states raise \$2.17 billion and another \$467 million concessional loan aimed at providing humanitarian assistance, civilian protection, crisis prevention and the stabilization of the LCBR.

However, as beneficial as the UN efforts may seem, they are nonetheless insufficient. The UN has no mechanisms to compel its member states to enforce its resolutions, nor redeem monies pledged to provide humanitarian assistance to the LCBR. This accounts for the intervention of other international governmental and non-governmental organizations and concerned countries within the international system.

The European Union (EU) Initiatives and the Fight against Boko Haram in the LCBR

The European Union has been consistently supportive in the fight against the Boko Haram insurgency. It is a major donor and partner with the LCBR. At the initial stage of the MNJTF operations in 2014, the EU, though cautious in its approach, mainly provided diplomatic and humanitarian assistance. As Boko Haram's activities became intense, the EU increased its assistance to include summits, financial and technical aid. The EU collaborated with the AU to establish the Multinational Joint Task Force (MJTF), which brings together Nigeria, Niger, Chad and Cameroon in a counteroffensive against Boko Haram. The EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa established at the Valletta Summit (November 2015), and aimed at providing funding for stability and addressing the root causes of irregular migration and displaced persons in Africa, is a mechanism to strengthen cooperation and address the current security and migration challenges both in the LCBR and the African Continent (Consillium 2015).

The EU, UN and World Bank in January 2016, established a

tripartite post-insurgency recovery and peace-building assessment program in the LCBR. The parties who were to provide the funding valued the cost of repairing the damage to the region at \$5.9 billion (Human Rights Watch – World Report 2017). The EU between 2014 and 2017 provided about €700 million in humanitarian aid and development assistance. In early 2018, the EU provided another round of €138 million funding in humanitarian and development assistance to vulnerable communities in the LCBR to, “invest in social services, tackle poverty, environmental degradation and climate change, strengthen girls’ education, hasten up reintegration efforts and provide health care services” (European Commission 2018).

Suffice to say that the EU has been active at various summits organized by the international community to fight Boko Haram. This activism was given expression through two major conferences: the Oslo International Humanitarian Conference (February 2017) and the Berlin International Donor Conference (September 2018). The two conferences were organized by the United Nations Development Programme

(UNDP), Nigeria, Norway and Germany and were aimed at sourcing resources to alleviate the humanitarian crisis in the LCBR. The EU played a significant role in helping to muster funds from its member states and other partners.

The EU during the Berlin Conference pledged the sum of €231.5 million to help countries in the LCBR fight Boko Haram. Each of the LCBR nations was given a specific amount of money for humanitarian and development programs (See: Table I). Participating donor members also pledged financial contributions to the cause (See Table II). Still using the Berlin platform, certain EU members pledged extra assistance. For instance, the German government expressed its plan to support the effort with an additional €40 million for security projects while Norway also promised to increase its humanitarian support to the tune of \$40 million for three years (Al-Jazeera 2018). In addition, the EU promised to collaborate with the Nigerian army in the fight against terrorism in the country and in the LCBR. The partnership will be in areas of providing intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assistance in the fight against insurgency (Nwafor

2018).

The African Union (AU) and the Pursuit of Peace and Security in the LCBR

The African Union's fight against terrorism on the continent is enshrined in its constitutional provisions and given expression through visits, conferences and mobilization of support from the international community. The 1994 and 1999 O.A.U Convention, the AU high-level intergovernmental meeting on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism in Africa are notable. Measures taken by the AU included the 2015 authorization of the formation and deployment of the MNJTF, the designation of Boko Haram as a threat to the peace and security of the LCBR and the call to the UN and partner nations to intensify their support to the LCBR states (AU Niamey Ministerial Meeting January, 2015 - The National Mirror, 2015; AU Summit July, 2017). Two other initiatives are also noted. The signing of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) that empowers the AU to receive funds from international partners on behalf of member states of the LCBR, in addition to administering the same in support of the MNJTF. The other is the convening of the AU Plan of

Action by the high – level inter-governmental meeting on the prevention and combating terrorism in Africa (Algiers, 11 – 14 September 2002).

The United Kingdom’s (UK) Assistance to the LCBR

The United Kingdom (UK) is also a key and active participant in the struggle to ensure peace and security in the LCBR. The UK renewed its interest in the war on terror in Africa in 2013 when two British born Nigerians in Woolwich, England (Mantzikos, 2014) killed a soldier. Although the Woolworth incident was not directly related to Boko Haram it, however, signalled a warning to the British government of the possibility of home - grown terrorism and radicalism often inspired by actions abroad (Mantzikos, 2014). To forestall such an occurrence, the British government constituted a House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee Inquiry, which recommended non-military approaches and regional collaboration to tackle the menace of Boko Haram (Mantzikos, 2014). Prominent among the UK contributions are the:

- Provision of military assistance to the MNJTF and military intelligence,

humanitarian and development support and the 2015, promise of financial assistance to Niger (\$34 million) and Nigeria (nearly \$11million) while it pledged to give an additional \$42 million between 2015 and 2018 (United Nations Security Council Report *S/PV.7748*).

- Pledging (at the 71st Session of the UN General Assembly in 2016) of an additional £80 million to the LCBR states to complement an earlier £90 million given for humanitarian assistance (Akinloye 2016). Out of the £80 million, £50 million was allocated to meet the needs of workers in affected communities while the remaining £30 million was to be expended on people affected by Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad and Niger (Akinloye 2016).
- Deployment in 2016 of 300 personnel to provide medical, infantry, air defence and counter insurgency support. In the same 2016, the UK Minister of State - Baroness Anelay visited Nigeria and on behalf of the British government donated £6.5

million (\$8.4 million) to support humanitarian assistance in Nigeria’s North East (Human Rights Watch - World Report 2017).

- Establishing the UK–Nigeria security and partnership to promote shared stability, prosperity and growth through a series of initiatives such as the provision of counter improvised explosive devices (IEDs) training to Nigerian troops in support ‘Operation Lafiya Dole’ and training of full army units before deployment to the theatre of operation (vanguard 2018).
- Donation by the UK government of £146 million at the Berlin International Donor Conference to provide for humanitarian assistance, civilian protection and stabilization of the LCBR. The UK made another contribution of \$3.1 million to the UN response fund. This was to address immediate humanitarian and medical needs in the LCBR. This money amounted to 20% of the UK’s 2018 flash appeal fund (vanguard December 2018).

Table I: Amount Allocated to LCBR Individual Member States (2018) By Donor Countries at the 2018 Berlin Conference

Country	Humanitarian Funding in € (N)	Development Funding
Nigeria	€ 47 million (₦19.5 billion)	€74.5 million (₦30.9 billion)
Niger	€15 million (₦13.4 billion)	€32.2 million (₦6.2 billion)
Chad	€11.8 million (₦13.8 billion)	€33.2 million (₦4.9 billion)
Cameroon	€15.1 million (₦1.1 billion)	€2.7 million (₦6.2 billion)

Source:

<https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/news-events> (Accessed on 4th September of 2018). Also monitored on Channels - TV News (Nigeria), 14.00 GMT (September 4, 2018)

Table II: Financial Pledges by Donor Countries and Partners at the 2018 Berlin International Donor Conference on Boko Haram

Countries	Amount Pledged
Germany	€265 million
Norway	\$125 million
United States of America	\$420 million
Switzerland	\$20 million
France	€131 million
Belgium	€45 million
Finland	€2.3 million
Denmark	€72.5 million
United Kingdom	£146 million
Canada	\$68 million (Canadian dollars)
European Union	€231.5 million
Luxembourg	€40 million
Spain	€3.2 million

Source:

<https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/top-news/282446-berlin-conference-on-boko-haram-rakes-in-2.52bn.html> Accessed September 4, 2018.

The US Support for the Fight against Boko Haram

Since September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, there have been marked shifts in the US security and counter-terrorism policies. The counter terrorism strategies have become more concretized and highly decisive especially in

Middle-East and Africa. Over the years, successive administrations have shown the resolve to adopt an “open-ended policy on the war on terror” (Baylis et al. 2008, 565). Adogamhe (2006, 109) noted that the Bush administration strategy against terrorism was multifaceted. It involves the imposition of sanctions and embargo on states that sponsored terrorism and, replacing terror-sponsoring regimes with democratic government and utilizing its military capability to maintain its global hegemonic power. According to Levan (2015, 4) President Barack Obama’s strategy was cautious and comprised diplomatic and developmental approaches.

The Buhari administration encountered similar issues with the US in 2015. President Buhari emphasised that the application of the Leahy Law by the US against Nigeria “has denied the country access to strategic weapons to prosecute the war against Boko Haram” (NTA, July 2015). To assure the US of his administration’s compliance with the Leahy Law, Buhari explained that his government had embarked on security sector reforms and “have re-written the rules of engagement, protecting the rights of combatants and

safeguarding civilians in theatre of conflict (Buhari–Speech at the US Institute for Peace – USIP (NTA, July 2015).

In reaction to Buhari’s appeal which is predicated on promises to reform the military and investigate officers culpable of human rights violation, the Trump administration in compliance with exceptions to the Leahy law notified the US Congress (in September, 2016) of its preparedness to sell 12 A - Super Tucano Light Attack aircraft and weapons including laser (guided and unguided) rockets valued at \$592 million to Nigeria (World Report 2017). These new aircrafts are aimed at improving Nigeria’s air power capability and protect civilians in the LCBR (The Eagle Online 2017). In spite of the controversies generated by the Leahy Law, the under-listed efforts by the US will suffice:

- The establishment of the US Africa Command (AFRICOM) in 2008– a quick response group aimed at containing and degrading Boko Haram, as well as building peacekeeping, providing humanitarian assistance and enhancing the disaster response capacity of

African partners are worth mentioning.

AFRICOM’s mission is also designed to disrupt and neutralize transnational threats and build selected African nations’ defence capability and capacity to ensure regional security, stability and prosperity (AFRICOM 2008).

- The deployment of counter-terrorism team to Nigeria in January 2016. This action is a part of the US government Security Governance initiative (SGI) under which it is creating partnerships with six (6) African countries (Ghana, Kenya, Mali, Niger, Nigeria and Tunisia) in order to improve governance in the security sector. This effort also aims to strengthen the military and civilian institutions, provide oversight functions rather than providing armaments or manpower (The Economist, 2015).
- Training of military personnel and advising troops to help build the capacity of the regional forces. This includes i. the Security Assistance Training and

Management Organization (SATMO) training of regional forces on advanced infantry tactics, patrolling, counter-IED raids, ambushes, as well as search and rescue operations, and ii. a six-week training and advice session in Jaji, Kaduna State, Nigeria with emphasis ranging on exercises such as ‘pack-out’ preparations to redeployment operations (Sheehan 2018).

- The initiation of a joint- fund between the Department of State and Defense known as the Global Security Contingency Fund (GSCF) which combines diplomacy and military strategies to build coordinated security assistance and aimed at enhancing the capabilities of the military, police, border guards and law enforcement institutions of the LCBR. In realizing its aims, the GSCF has between 2015 and 2017, invested \$40 million into the project (Dukharn, 2018).
- The building by the US Air Force of a \$110 million armed drone base in the Republic of Niger. The base is intended to house several fighter jets and MQ9 drones with surveillance and

intelligence gathering capabilities with a wider range that will cover the LCBR and Sahel region (Egbas 2018).

- The imposition of new sanctions on Boko Haram and its factional leader – Mus’ab al- Barnawi in February 2018. This new sanction initiated by the US treasury department is a part of global action against IS and its affiliate network. Significantly, the embargo is intended to deny the terrorist leaders access to the US financial system, destroy ISIS in its safe havens, denying its ability to recruit foreign fighters, stifling its financial resources and negating the false propaganda it disseminates over the internet and social media (Adeyemo 2018).

It is instructive that the US remains the largest donor to the LCBR response. It has made a vast amount of funding available to the LCBR states through the creation of the Lake Chad Basin Disaster Assistance. In 2016, for instance, the US provided \$40 million funding in humanitarian assistance to the LCBR, a sum which the Americans reiterated

amounted to \$237 million for both 2015 and 2016 fiscal years–FY. In March 2018, the US government announced the release of \$128 million (FY 2018) as new humanitarian funding for the LCBR (US Embassy 2016-Lake Chad Basin Emergency Fact Sheet #9 2018). Table III gives a detailed breakdown of the amount the US expended on the LCBR between 2017 and 2018. In reacting to the US support, President Muhammadu Buhari of Nigeria acknowledged, “the USA has been, to date, the biggest contributor to the humanitarian response in the LCBR” (France24 2018).

Table III: US Humanitarian Funding for the Lake Chad Basin Response in 2017-2018

United State’ Government/ Agency	Fund Expended
USAID/OFDA	\$147,694,288
USAID/FFP ²	\$404,754,604
State/PRM	\$90,010,000
USAID/Nigeria	\$6,182,734
Total	\$648,641,626

Source: Lake Chad Basin-Complex Emergency Fact Sheet #9 Fiscal Years (FY) 2018 of March 8, 2018.

France and the Burden of

Shared Responsibility in the Fight against Boko Haram

France’s political, economic and military presence in West Africa is well noted. All the LCBR states (Niger, Chad and Cameroon and by extension Benin), with the exception of Nigeria, had colonial ties with France. The countries are French former colonies. In addition, France has tremendous economic investments in Nigeria and the country has military alliances with its Francophone LCBR states. It is, therefore, no coincidence that France has been at the forefront in the fight against Boko Haram in the LCBR. France’s active involvement and the consistent synergy it had with the LCBR states could be traced to 2014 when former Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan appealed to former President Francoise Holland of France to help curb the Boko Haram menace. During this period, international presence and action (except for the International Red Cross (ICRC) and Doctors without Borders -MSF) were virtually non-existent in the LCBR (Nwachukwu 2018).

On the diplomatic level, France has used her presence at the UNSC to mobilize regional coordination and support. Two (2) instances readily come to mind.

First, it hosted a summit-level gathering of the LCBR countries in Paris on 17 May 2014 - the UK convened a similar high-level meeting on 12 June the same year (Peace and Security Council Report, 2014). This singular effort, among others, resulted in the decision to operationalize a regional intelligence fusion unit and the establishment of a multinational joint task force to enhance border security. Second, France initiated (jointly with Senegal and the United Kingdom) a UNSC visit to the LCBR in March 2017. This measure shows France's commitment to supporting counter-insurgency operations, define joint action, encourage and strengthen the MNJTF in the fight against Boko Haram (French Delegate Report to the UNSC 7748th Meeting: 2016).

Other salient efforts of France include:

- The establishment and creation of the Lake Chad Basin initiative being implemented by the French Development Agency which seek to, through the Pan-African project, restore the Lake towards achieving peace and security in the region and address the problems caused by the

shrinking of the Lake (Campbell 2018).

- Providing and sharing of intelligence reports, logistical support to Chad and Niger as well as the provision of equipment and training to Cameroon (French Delegate Report to the UNSC 7748th Meeting: 2016)
- The commencement, in August 2014, of a permanent 'Operation Barkhane' with an operational headquarters in N'Djamena, Chad. In 2015, France deployed about 3000 soldiers whose mandate include the provision of logistical and intelligence support to the MNJTF; contain the al-Qaeda threat in the Maghreb and elicit cooperation with partner countries to inhibit a linkup between Boko Haram and similar groups in the Sahel region (French Delegate Report to the UNSC 7748th Meeting: 2016)
- More importantly, "Operation Barkhane" was designed as a rapid and efficient intervention force aimed at pre-empting Islamic extremist groups in Chad,

Niger and Mali and above all, operating across borders. “Operation Barkhane” assisted the MNJTF in 2016 to fight Boko Haram, and conducted joint border raids with Chad and Niger, particularly in monitoring and controlling the movement of traffickers and terrorist groups in the LCBR. It also helped in training members of the Chadian defence force in areas such as monitoring missions, combat, shooting and mine risk education.

While France’s efforts as well as those of the UN, EU, and the US examined in the preceding paragraphs are diplomatic and military in character, the humanitarian dimensions of the initiatives are undertaken by specialized agencies of the UN and other non-governmental organizations who have taken steps to focus on the humanitarian impact engendered by the Boko Haram insurgency. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) are at the centre of these efforts.

The UNDP was part of the initiators of the Oslo and Berlin Conferences. Above all, the

agency in conjunction with the Borno State government (North-East Nigeria) initiated the Lake Chad Basin Governors’ Forum (May 2018) for regional cooperation on stabilization, peacebuilding and sustainable development. This forum sought, among others, to come up with a community-based approach as a lasting solution to the crisis in the LCBR. It also directed its attention at addressing sub-national and cross border challenges and opportunities with a view to providing a better life for the people that live and depend on the Lake Chad basin for survival.

The activities of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) is geared mainly towards ameliorating the ecological impact, disruptions of economic activities, the challenges of food insecurity, hunger, poverty and famine posed by the crisis in the LCBR. The FAO has been engaged in the provision of financial assistance and cash transfer to people in the LCBR. FAO is also engaged in key activities such as the distribution of cereal seeds, animal feeds and veterinary care. To ensure the effectiveness of its operation however, FAO has developed a Lake Chad Basin Response

Strategy (2017-2019) to improve food security and strengthen the resilience of vulnerable communities in the affected areas (FAO Rome 2017).

Critical Analysis of International Efforts to Fight Boko Haram

The effectiveness of international support to curtail Boko Haram activities has become debatable. The Nigerian government (Buhari 2016 and some UN representatives (Feltman, 2016; Chambers, 2018) have argued that international financial and military assistance to the MNJTF, imposing sanctions and the designation of Boko Haram as a terrorist organisation has enabled the LCBR states in taking back much of the territories seized by the group. Boko Haram's access to funding and purchase of weapons (Feller, 2018) also diminished. The Nigerian government too on numerous occasions has asserted that Boko Haram has been technically defeated because the group's capacity to control territories and carry out large scale attacks in North Eastern Nigeria have been curtailed and degraded (Buhari, 2015; Mohammed, 2015; Buratai, 2020).

However, there is a counter-view.

This view stressed that though the LCBR through its MNJTF recorded some gains in the fight against Boko Haram in the period between 2015 and 2017. Between 2017 to the present on the other hand, the group and its splinter – the Islamic State of West Africa (ISWA), has increased the frequency, range and sophistication of their violent activities thereby, contributing to the “rapidly deteriorating security and humanitarian situation in the LCBR” (Allen 2018). Recognising that Boko Haram has not been ‘technically defeated’ President Buhari (Nigeria) in his speech to members of the Lake Chad Basin Commission - LCBC (15 December 2018) acknowledged the resurgence of Boko Haram attacks particularly on military barracks and abduction of civilians for ransom across the LCBR.

The resurgence of Boko Haram attacks and the inability of the LCBR states to counter the upsurge despite international support is due to several factors. The inability of the Nigerian government (an arrowhead of the MNJTF) to purchase weapons and technology at the height of the attacks in 2014 was due largely to the application of the Leahy law by the US (Buhari 2015–Speech

at the United States Institute for Peace). The reluctance of the Israeli government willing to sell arms to Nigeria but had to do a rethink to align itself with the US arm-sales ban policy is also a case in point. (Jonathan 2018; Toramade 2018). Also of importance is the refusal of the US government (even though it had helped in conducting surveillance flights and sharing commercial imagery) to share raw intelligence data (Soillum 2015) that could have been useful in tracking Boko Haram in the unmapped terrain surrounding the LCBR states.

The imposition of sanctions on funding, travel and arms sale to Boko Haram by the United Nations (UN Security Council 1267 - Al-Qaeda Sanctions List 2014) had no significant impact on the ability of the group to access various forms of funding which it used to carry out its activities (22nd Report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team 2017). The porosity of the borders and a predominantly cash economy within the LCBR coupled with Boko Haram's access to diverse revenue sources such as charitable donations, smuggling, remittances/money transfers, extortion and ransom on

kidnappings accounts for this (22nd Report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team 2017; Global Terrorism Index 2015, 5).

In Nigeria, there are reports of the prevalence of corruption among military Service Chiefs who diverted funds meant to purchase arms and logistical support for troops, accepted bribes from and colluded with Boko Haram to coordinate attacks on military infrastructure (Uwimana & Wawro 2014; Doukhan 2016; Buhari's Speech on YouTube 2017). Cases also abound of commanders abandoning their positions in the theatre of operation against Boko Haram, leading to the death of troops and loss of equipment to Boko Haram (Ogundipe 2018). There are also instances of soldiers protesting about such welfare needs as inadequate supply of food and equipment, arbitrary deductions from soldiers' salaries, late/non reinforcements for detachments and the state of disrepair of equipment (Ogundipe 2018; Adekunle 2018). Mismanagement and misappropriation of funds and relief materials for Internally Displaced Persons (IDP's) are rife among public officials (International Crisis Group 2016, Ubah 2017; Haruna 2018). The

former Secretary to the Federal Government – Babachir Lawal was implicated in awarding contracts to companies he had interests, while the former Chief of the National Intelligence Agency (NIA)–Ayo Oke was exposed for keeping in a private apartment monies totalling \$43million.

The paper wishes to acknowledge the intractable and non-seamless relationship between the Nigeria military and some international partners in the country. The military had criticised UNICEF on certain occasions for undermining the nation’s sovereignty by training selected persons for clandestine activities intending to spy for Boko Haram (premiumtimes, December 2018). Based on the accusation, the army ordered the suspension of United Nations Children Emergency Fund (UNICEF) activities in Nigeria. The army rescinded the order because of interventions by the Federal Government and Civil Society Organisations like Amnesty International, which observed that the suspension order was “an attempt to demonise UNICEF life-saving work in North Eastern Nigeria” (premiumtimes, December 2014). President Buhari in 2016 expressed his dissatisfaction with

the UN for exaggerating the humanitarian needs in Nigeria to get more funding from donors (Akinwotu 2016). In the same vein, Governor Kashim Shettima of Borno State had in 2017 criticised UN agencies including UNICEF and 126 other non-governmental agencies for non-performance and alleged failure to justify funds spent on IDPs. Governor Shettima asserted that most of the agencies use donor funds to “service only their overheads, logistic needs and personnel costs, enriching themselves in the process” (premiumtimes, January 2017).

International agencies have also reacted to the restricted and unfavourable environment they had to carry out their humanitarian activities. Amnesty International, for example, accused the security forces of the LCBR of human rights violation like extrajudicial killing, torture and looting, creating a climate of impunity and deepening frustration of families and victims affected by the crisis (Amnesty International 2016). The International Crisis Group averred that the sensitivity of the Nigerian Military to its national security and sovereignty has resulted in the dependence of international agencies on the Army for

protection, assessment of local security conditions and sometimes humanitarian service delivery. The result is a lack of aim and in-depth reporting of the situation as well as difficulty in mobilising international support for resources (International Crisis Group August 2016). Two other factors also hinder the effectiveness of international agencies. First, many implementation partners of the UN agencies lack the capacity to access remote parts of North Eastern Nigeria and adjoining LCBR towns where the terrain is challenging. Second, humanitarian workers could not establish credible contacts with Boko Haram to negotiate access and get guarantees that can reduce risks to acceptable levels (International Crisis Group August 2016; Cormaic 2017).

Conclusion and Recommendations

The paper examines the series of initiatives embarked upon by the international community in its fight against Boko Haram in the LCBR. The actions and involvement of the world became noticeable in 2014 on the heels of the abduction of over two-hundred (200) schoolgirls in Chibok, North Eastern Nigeria, alongside the terrorist tactics of

Boko Haram to enforce Sharia law, expunge western influences, especially education, and conquer territories around the LCBR.

To stem the tidal wave of terrorism, several organizations and countries have joined forces to share the burden of maintaining peace, order and security in the LCBR. Initiatives and actions taken by the international community to confront the Boko Haram threat identified in this paper include awareness, debates, discussions in different peace conferences/ summits, scheduled visits to the LCBR, adoption of resolutions, press briefings, mobilization of funds, training assistance, in addition to the provision of military equipment and logistical supplies. The endeavours of the UN, EU, Norway, Germany, the UK and USA, France, the AU in addition to those of the UNDP and FAO are noted.

The paper acknowledges the combined efforts of the international community and the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) in the last three years. The capacity of the group to seize and expand its area of operations declined between 2015 and 2018. With the adoption of counter-terrorism strategies of stifling of

funds, cutting the group's supply route, pressuring and imposing sanctions on States that sponsor terror coupled with constant attack from land, aerial reconnaissance and bombardment, the group no longer controls territory and has resorted to conducting attacks on the LCBR States from its safe haven in the Sambisa Forest.

In spite of the assistance by the international community, Boko Haram is still active and continues to attack military installations and kill civilians in the LCBR. The group has not been "completely defeated" because of insufficient funding for the operations of the MNJTF, pervasive corruption within the top echelon of the military, neglect of soldiers' welfare needs and lack of sophisticated equipment that could effectively counter those of Boko Haram. The inaccessibility of international agencies to remote communities within the LCBR to deliver humanitarian assistance to IDPs and the problematic relationship between the Nigerian government, its military and international partners are noted. More importantly, the support the group enjoys in terms of finance, training and logistic supply with other extremists' groups like al-

Qaeda and IS and their affiliates in the Maghreb and Sahel regions of Africa in spite of international sanctions has propelled Boko Haram to renew its attacks in the LCBR in recent times.

In order to ensure the effectiveness of international efforts, all stakeholders should:

- Work in a cooperative and coordinated manner to evolve common strategies that will be coherent, consistent and sustainable to counter Boko Haram threats.
- Ensure the timely release of monies pledged and scale up their financial commitments to match the pace of humanitarian operations with increased needs of the people. Essentially, response should go hand in hand with the reintegration and long-term recovery needs of displaced persons.
- Ensure that enduring moral and financial commitments are capable of sustaining the MNJTF in addition to carrying out development programs in the area. Hence, the need to come up with practical and viable political

and military solutions that will bring about enduring good governance, peace and sustainable development in the LCBR.

- Carry out oversight functions on the LCBR states by ensuring that the MNJTF and militaries of member states uphold and respect principles of international law, like a sense of humanity, neutrality and respect for the fundamental human rights of all parties on both sides of the divide.

Finally, while taking cognizance that Boko Haram is a military threat which needs an equal response of coercive force, this chapter supports the UN Security Council (S/PV. 7748) observation that a military approach, while essential, will not end the Boko Haram threat. Therefore, affected countries must tackle the humanitarian consequences and the root causes that contributed to the emergence of the group.

REFERENCES

- Adeyemo.I.(2018).US Places New Sanctions on Boko Haram, Leader
<https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/260066-u-s-places-new-sanctions-boko-haram-leadr.html>.Accessed October 8, 2018.
- Adogamhe, G. (2006). Rethinking the North-South Relations: An Analysis of the US -Nigerian Hegemonic Overtures. *Nigerian Journal of International Affairs* 32 (1): 99-132.
- Against Terrorism and Boko Haram".Accessed January 21, 2019.
- Agbiboa. D. (2014). Peace at Daggers Drawn? Boko Haram and the State of Emergency in Nigeria. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 37: 56 DOI: 10.1080/1057610X.2014.853602
- Akinloye. D (2016). UK, Donates additional \$80 million, while US gives \$41million to support Nigeria (<https://www.pulse.ng/news/local/boko-haram-uk-donates-additional-80m-while-us-gives-41m-to-support-nigeria-id55272621.html>).Accessed October 15, 2018.
- Akinwotu. E. (2016). Nigeria's President Accuses UN of Hyping up Humanitarian Crisis for \$1billion Appeal Available in, <https://www.theguardian.com>. December 5, 2016 Accessed February 1, 2019.
- Al Jazeera News (2018).

- <http://www.aljazeera.com/amp/news/2018/09/germany-norway-pledge-funds-crisis-hit-lake-chad-region-180903151100231.html>. Accessed September 4, 2018.
- Al Jazeera News(2015). AU calls for regional force to fight Boko Haram. <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2015/01/au-calls-regional-force-fight-boko-haram-150130032244124.html>. Accessed August 15, 2018.
- Allen.J.(2018). Security Council Briefing on the UN office for Central Africa In, <https://www.legit.ng>12009610> “Boko Haram: UK Reacts to Insurgency in Nigeria” by Rahamman Abiola. See also: <https://www.pulse.ng.> - December 14, 2018 “UK Rallies Support for Nigeria over Boko Haram” Both accessed January 25, 2019.
- Ban Ki-Moon. (2015). “Address to the African Union” Available at <https://www.iol.co.za> – January 13, 2015 “UN, AU to help Nigeria Tackle Boko Haram” Accessed January 25, 2019.
- Baylis,J etal . (2008). *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations* (4th Edition). U.S.A.: Oxford University Press.
- BBC News. (2014). “UN Committee Imposes Sanctions on Nigeria’s Boko Haram” <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-27529566>. Accessed June 30, 2018.
- Blacklists Boko Haram.<https://www.bbc.com>. “UN Committee Imposes Sanctions on
- Buhari. M.(2018). “Speech Delivered at the Extraordinary Summit of Heads of State and Governments of LCBC to Address Prevailing Security Challenges in the Sub Region” In, www.pulse.ng>local>by SeunAdeyeye. See also: Speech at the 71st Session of the UN September 20, 2016.<https://www.gadebate.un.org>. Both Accessed January 30, 2019.
- Buratai. T (2020). Speech at COAS 2020 Al-adha Luncheon with Troops... www.von.gov.ng – Nigerian Army Experiencing Rapid Development by Nokai Origin. Accessed August 14, 2020
- Campbell, Horace. 2018. Saving Lake Chad: A Pan African Project <https://allafrica.com/stories/201803200302htm>. Accessed November 10, 2018.
- Chambers, I. (2018). Speech at a 2-Day Lake Chad Governor’s Forum for Regional Cooperation on Stabilization, Peace-Building and Sustainable Development” In, <https://www.dailypost.ng>. March 9, 2018. Accessed January 30, 2019.

- Cormaic. R.(2017). Access and Aid, Key to Humanitarian Effort in Nigeria's North East www.irishtimes.com. - April 20, 2017 Accessed February 1, 2019.
- Delattre,F. (2015). UN Security Council President's Remark to the Press on March 31, 2015 available at <https://onu.delegatefrance.org>>BokoHarak-a-threat-to-international-peace-and-securiry. Accessed January 21, 2019.
- Doukhan. D. (2016). The Nigerian Reality in the War against Boko Haram: Between Hope and Despair. Available at www.ict.org.il. – March 22, 2016. Accessed February 1, 2019.
- Dukharn. K.(2018). Taking the Fight to Boko Haram: The Global Security Contingency Fund Strengthens Chad's Security Sector. Available in <https://www.blogs.state.gov>>2018>09. Accessed January 25, 2019.
- Egbes. J.(2018). Boko Haram - US Sets Up \$110 million Drone Base to Fight Terrorism in Nigeria - <https://www.pulse.ng/news/local.id/8291926.html>-US-set-up-\$110million-drone-base-to-fight-terrorism.Accessed September 23, 2018.
- European Commission, (2018). Africa's Lake Chad Region will receive 138 million in EU Humanitarian and Development Funding. https://www.ec.europa.eu/echo/news/africas-lake-chad-region-will-receive-138-million-eu-humanitarian-and-development-funding_en.com.Accessed September 4, 2018.
- Extremism Plaguening West Africa".Accessed January 21, 2019.
- Felter. C.(2018). Nigeria's Battle with Boko Haram. Available at <https://www.cfr.org>. - August 8, 2018 Accessed January 30, 2019.
- Feltman. J. (2017). Under Secretary Briefing to the Security Council on the Situation in LCBR (S/2017/764) In, www.un.org.September 13, 2017; see also: Briefing at the UN 7748th Meeting of July 26, 2016. Accessed January 30, 2019.
- Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) 2017 April 11. Director General Talking Point Press Conference, Rome. <http://www.fao.org>. Accessed August 25, 2018.
- Global Terrorism Index: 2017, Meaning and Understanding the Impact of Terrorism. USA: Institute for Economics & Peace (PDF) See also, Global Terrorism Index: 2014 & 2015. Also available at www.pulse.ng. accessed January 21, 2019.
- Henry, Solomon. April 4, 2017, Mathew Rycroft (UK Permanent

- Representative to the UN): “Why UN Security Council Adopted Resolution 2349” <http://www.nta.ng/news/20170404>. Accessed May 23, 2018.
- <https://news.un.org/story/2018>. August 21, 2018. “Peace and Security: Secretary General Call for Support to Lake Chad Countries after Latest Boko Haram Attacks”. Accessed January 21, 2019.
- <https://www.crisisgroup.org>. – August 4, 2016 “North - Eastern Nigeria and Conflicts’ Humanitarian Fallout”. Accessed January 22, 2019.
- <https://www.intervention.ng>. – August 8, 2016. “The Deepening Humanitarian Challenge in North Eastern Nigeria” Accessed February 1, 2019.
- <https://www.premiuntimesng.com>. December 23, 2015 edition - “We Have Defeated Boko Haram, December Deadline Met, Nigeria Says”. Accessed January 30, 2019. August 16, 2018 edition, “How Boko Haram is Funded” by Abdullah, Haruna Accessed January 21, 2019; December 14, 2018 - “Nigerian Army Accuses UNICEF of Impropriety, Announces Suspension of its Activities in North East”; August 3, 2018 - “Boko Haram: Army Chief Spits Fire, Warns Commanders Against Fleeing from Terrorists”; January 11 2017 - “Boko Haram: Borno Governor Lambasts UNICEF and 126 other Non-Performing NGO’s” & March 19, 2018 - “How Books, Food Donated by UN, WFP to Nigerian IDPs are Repackaged and Sold”. All accessed January 23, 2019.
- <https://www.punch.com> - October 6, 2016 “Greater International Cooperation Key to Defeating Boko Haram – Military Commanders” Accessed January 30, 2019.
- <https://www.securitycouncilreport.org> “March 2017 Monthly Forecast: The Security Council Visiting Mission to the LCBR”. Accessed January 23, 2019.
- <https://www.state.gov/drl/rls> - March 9, 2018. 2 Leahy Fact Sheet”. Accessed January 23, 2019.
- <https://www.un.org> “Security Council Condemns Terrorist Attacks, Other Violations in LCBR, Unanimously Adopts Resolution 2349 (2017)” Accessed January 23, 2019.
- <https://www.un.org.au> >2016/10/20 - January 10, 2016. “UN Introduces New Action Plan to Prevent Violent Extremism” Accessed January 25, 2019.
- Kegley. C and Shannon. B. (2011). *World Politics: Trend and Transformation*. USA: Wadsworth, Engage Learning.

- Killings available at <http://dailypost/2018/7/15/france-speaks-foreigners-involvement-boko-haram-herdsmenkillins-amp/>. Accessed August 28, 2018.
- Levan. Carl. (2012). Respond to Boko Haram with Diplomacy, Development and Demilitarization <http://www.carllewan.com/201205/book-haram-letter-to-clinton-from-scholars>. Accessed June 3, 2018.
- Lumpe.L.(2014). What the Leahy Law Means for Human Rights - In, <https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org> – April 24, 2014. Accessed January 22, 2019.
- Mantzikos. I (2014). Africa in Transition “In, www.cfr.org/blog/uk-stance-boko-haram May 19, 2014. Accessed January 21, 2019.
- Matthieu.J. (2015). UN Adopts Resolution Calling for International Coordination against Boko Haram” <http://news.vice.com>. Accessed May 23, and October 17, 2018.
- Mohammed. L. (2015). I stand by what I said . . . Boko Haram has been technically defeated. Available in, www.cable.ng - by DyepkazahShibayan. Accessed August 14, 2020.
- News24 (2018) Feb 9. UN 2018 Report <http://www.news24.com>. Accessed May 23, 2018.
- News24 (2018) May 1. Report of the Secretary General on the Situation in Lake Chad Basin. <http://relief.web.int>. Accessed May 23, 2018.
- Nigeria’s Boko Haram - May 23, 2104. Both accessed January 22, 2019.
- Nwachukwu. J. (2018). France Speaks on Foreigners Involvement in Boko Haram – Herdsmen Killings Being Address by France Ambassador to commemorate French National Day Abuja, Nigeria. <https://dailypost/2018/7/15/france-speaks-on-foreigners-involvement-boko-haram-herdsmen-killings-amp/>. Accessed September 28, 2018.
- Nwachukwu.O. (2016). France Speaks on Foreigners Involvement in Boko Haram, Herdsmen
- Nwafor.P.(2018). EU Agrees to Partner with Nigerian Army to Fight Boko Haram <https://www.vanguardngr.com/2018/03/eu-agrees-partner-nigerian-army-fight-boko-haram-amp/>. Accessed October 19, 2018.
- OCHA Report, (2017). Oslo Humanitarian Conference for Nigeria and the Lake Chad Region Raises \$672 million to Help in Need. <https://reliefweb.int/report/nigeria/oslo-humanitarian-conference-nigeria-and-lake-chad-region-raises-672-million-help.com>. Accessed October 19, 2018.

- Onuoha.C. (2013). Porous Borders and Boko Haram’s Arms Smuggling Operations in Nigeria.” Al Jazeera Center for Studies, September 8. <http://studies.aljazeera.net/en/reports/2013/09/201398104245877469.html>. Accessed August 23, 2018.
- Open Doors. (2014). “US Declare Boko Haram a Terrorist Foreign Group”. <https://www.opendoorsusa.org/christian-persecution/stories/declares-boko-haram-foreign-terrorist-group/>. Accessed July 5, 2018.
- Peace and Security Council Report. (2014). Nigeria; Boko Haram Not Just a Domestic Problem. Available at <https://issafrica.org/pscreport/situation-analysis/nigeria-boko-haram-not-just-a-domestic-problem>. Accessed June 25, 2018.
- Peace and Security Department of the AU (2015). The African Union Counter Terrorism Framework. <http://www.peaceau.org/en/page/64-counter-terrorism-ct/#sthash.4QJizBnS.pdf>. Accessed September 20, 2018.
- Powers. S.(2014). Address to Pressmen In, <https://www.m.dw.com> – UN Security Council
- Quinlay.G(2014). UN Al-Qaeda Sanctions Committee Chairman Press Statement available at <https://www.mobile.abc.net.au> May 23, 2014 “Boko Haram Blacklisted: UN Security Council Sanctions Nigeria Islamist Group”. Accessed January 22, 2019.
- Root Causes of Boko Haram Threat in Lake Chad Basin - 2016. <http://www.allafrica.com> Accessed July 26, 2018.
- Sanctions List”. Available at <https://www.un.org/press/en/2014/sc11410.doc.htm>. Accessed June 24,
- Sheehan.J(2018).US Soldiers Train Nigerian Army Troops. <https://dod.defense.gov/news/article/article/1490619/us-soldiers-train-nigerian-army-troops/>. Accessed October 19, 2018.
- Socio-Economic Rights and Accountability Project, SERAP. (2014). Missing School Girls, SERAP Seek Security Council Sanctions against Boko Haram. available at <http://www.serapnigeria.org/missing-schoolgirls-serap-seeks-un-security-council-sanctions-against-boko-haram.ngo/>. Accessed June 22, 2018.
- Soillum. M.(2015). No Helicopters for You Available in, <https://www.foreignpolicy.com>nigeria> – February 3, 2015. Accessed January 22, 2019.
- Soonest.N.(2018). Feb. 9. Good-News: United Nations take up Fight for

- Victims of BokoHaram Attacks.<http://www.naija.com>. Accessed May 23, 2018.
- The 22nd Report of the Analytical Support and Monitoring Team, Pursuant to Resolution 2368 (2017). In, <https://www.premiumtimesng.com> – August 16, 2018. Accessed January 21, 2019.
- The Eagle Online (2017). Pentagon to US Senate: We are Selling Super Tucano Fighter Jets, Bombs to Nigeria, available at: <https://www.theeagleonline.com.ng/amp/pentagon-to-us-senate-wer-selling-super-tucano-fighter-jets-bombs-to-nigeria>. Accessed October 19, 2018.
- The Economist (2015). “US to Send Counter-Terrorism Team to Nigeria”. Available at: <https://country.ieu.com/article.aspx?articleid=1763750160&country=Nigeria&topic=Politics&subtopic=Forcast&subtopic=International+relations&u=1&PID=744007858&oid=744007858&uid=1>.
- The U.S. Department of State Report (2012). Bureau of African Affairs Fact Sheet available at, <http://m.state.gov/md2836.htm>. Accessed June 3, 2018.
- The United States Institute for Peace (USIP) (2012). US - Nigeria Bi-national Commission Convenes at USIP”. <http://www.usip.org/publication/usnigeria-binational-commission-onvenes-usip>. Accessed June 3, 2018.
- Toramade.S (2018). Jonathan Accuses Obama of Setting Him Up to Fail in Rescue of Chibok School Girls Available in, www.pulse.ng – December 11, 2018. December 11, 2018 “Presidency Says Boko Haram is Beyond Technically Defeated: Begs for Patience from Nigerians”. www.pulse.ng - Accessed January 30, 2019.
- U.S. Department of State (2003), Patterns of Global Terrorism Report 2003. U.S.A. Washington, D.C.
- UN Document 2017, March 31. UN Document for Security Council Report. <http://www.vanguard.ng.com>.
- UN Presidential Statement –SPRST/2018/7/14 (August 11, 2018) & SPRST/2017/2 (January 20,
- UN Security Council 1267 Al- Qaeda Sanctions List May 2014.
- UN Security Council Decision S/PRST/2015/12 – June 15, 2015 in, <https://unoca.missions.org> “Fight
- United Nations 2014. “Security Council Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee Adds Boko Haram to its
- United Nations Security Council (UNSC) 71 Years & 7748th Meeting, July

- 26, 2016, (PDF Version). Available at www.securitycouncilreport.org. (S/PV.7748). Accessed October 13, 2018.
- Uwimana. C & Wawro. L.(2014). Corruption in Nigeria’s Military & Security Forces: A weapon in Boko Haram Hands. Accessed February 1, 2019.
- Walker. A.(2012). What is Boko Haram?” United States Institute of Peace 308 (June). 8. <http://www.xtome.org/docs/groups/boko-haram/SR308.pdf>. Accessed May 23, 2018.
- World Report(2017). Nigeria - Events of 2016 in, <https://www.hrw.org>. Accessed January 21, 2019.
- www.amnestyinl.org>actueel>boko-haram “Boko Haram Summit: Human Rights Must Be Foundation of Regional Response”- 14 Mei, 2016. Accessed January 25, 2019.
- www.bbc.com2014. “UN Committee Imposes Sanctions on Boko Haram”. Accessed January 25, 2019; www.bbc.com>news>world-africa “Boko Haram Crisis: Nigeria Fury over US Arms Refusal – November 11, 2015. Accessed January 21, 2019.
- www.forbes.com “Arms Trade: The World’s 10 Richest”- December 12, 2014. Accessed January 25, 2019.
- www.gov.uk. “UK & Nigeria Step up Cooperation to End Boko Haram Threat– August 29, 2018. Accessed January 21, 2019.
- www.saharareporters.com - “From Borno, Soldier Writes Buhari about Deadly, Lethal, Gruesome Corruption by Army Generals” - August 27, 2018. Accessed February 1, 2019. “US Denies it Refuses to Sell Military Equipment to Nigeria” - November 13, 2014 Edition. Accessed January 22, 2019.
- www.state.gov>organization. “Country Reports on Terrorism: 2017– September 6, 2018. Accessed January 25, 2019.
- www.vanguardngr.com –November 16, 2018. “UK Restates Commitment to Support Fight against Boko Haram by Urowaniyo Warami, Accessed January 21, 2019; December 14, 2018 edition, “Boko Haram: UK Campaigns International Support for Nigeria. Accessed January 21, 2019 & Erunke, Joseph, “Why US Refused to Sell Arms to Jonathan”. Accessed January 22, 2019.