




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Editorial Note:

Strengthening Accountability, Confronting Violence, and Reimagining Security in Africa

This Special Issue of African and Global Issues Quarterly arrives at a critical juncture. Across Africa, nations grapple with interconnected crises: the erosion of public trust in financial governance, the devastating rise of organised violence among youth, the persistent marginalisation of vulnerable populations, and the enduring legacy of colonial and neocolonial institutions that continue to shape contemporary realities. The thirteen papers presented here dissect these challenges with intellectual rigour and practical urgency.

We open with Nakabago and Hofisi's forensic examination of Uganda's Universal Primary Education capitation grant. For decades, UPE has been hailed as a pro-poor triumph. Yet, as the authors reveal, weak monitoring and evaluation of internal controls have turned a lifeline into a leaky vessel. Without real-time auditing and community-based oversight, financial accountability remains aspirational. This paper is a clarion call: education funding cannot be separated from forensic vigilance.

The crisis of youth violence, examined across two complementary studies by Somtochukwu, Muyideen, and colleagues, forces us to look where society often refuses to look: inside Ogun State's correctional facilities. Their first paper critically submits that socioeconomic indicators unemployment, broken kinship networks, and educational exclusion are causal pathways into cultism. The second adds a psychosocial layer, revealing how trauma, identity displacement, and the search for belonging drive young inmates deeper into violent collectives. Together, these studies argue that incarceration without therapeutic intervention is not rehabilitation but a factory for recidivism.

History matters. Daniel Oluwafemi John takes us into Igangan Town, Oyo State, between 1973 and 2021. The farmer-herder crisis is often framed as a contemporary emergency, but John demonstrates its long arc: decades of land tenure ambiguity, climate-induced migration, and state neglect. Understanding 1973 is essential for solving 2026. This is a sobering lesson in how unresolved grievances become inherited wars.

Joel Odaudu moves beyond Africa's borders with a multidimensional causal analysis of terrorism. Rejecting single-factor explanations, Odaudu insists on the confluence of political exclusion, economic inequality, and social fragmentation. His framework is a necessary tool for any government designing a counterterrorism policy that does not merely react but prevents.

The international justice system faces a necessary reckoning in Avitus A. Agbor's incisive critique of the International Criminal Court's racist image and agenda. Through comparative analysis of the situations in Ukraine and Palestine, Agbor exposes the selective application of international law a double standard that undermines the Court's legitimacy and perpetuates global hierarchies of victimhood.

Choma, Thobejane, and Rannditsheni's revisiting of human rights for people living with albinism foregrounds a community too often marginalised in both policy and scholarship. Their work reminds us that human rights discourse must move beyond abstract universality to address specific, lived vulnerabilities rooted in superstition, stigma, and systemic neglect.

Governance and accountability receive comprehensive treatment. Mohono, Gabanakgosi, and Shopola's Public Value Theory perspective on parliamentary oversight provides a fresh

framework for understanding democratic governance in Southern Africa. Zweni and Mahlala extend this conversation to grassroots public participation in municipal budget development, demonstrating that budgets are political statements about whose needs are prioritised.

The spectre of fragmentation looms large in Kelechi Johnmary Ani's unravelling of secessionist movements in Ambazonia and Biafra. By examining governance failures, identity politics, and historical grievances, Ani illuminates the root causes of separatist aspirations rather than merely managing their symptoms.

The private sector's challenges in volatile environments are explored by Parsad and Chummun, whose study of operational excellence in VUCA (Volatile, Uncertain, Complex, and Ambiguous) environments focuses on South Africa's insurance industry, offering practical insights for navigating uncertainty.

Academic rigour and methodological integrity come under the spotlight in Musaigwa, Nojiyeza, and Tabane's practical guide to writing strong conclusion chapters, addressing a perennial challenge in research dissemination and preempting reviewer criticism.

Nthambeleni Charles Netshisaulu's conceptual analysis of reversible metaphors in Tshivenda adds a rich linguistic dimension, demonstrating how language reflects and shapes cognition, culture, and social relations.

Taken together, these contributions remind us that accountability is not a bureaucratic checkbox. It is the thread linking school grants to classroom outcomes, correctional policies to safe communities, land history to peaceful coexistence, international law to genuine justice, and linguistic expression to cultural identity. The papers collectively argue that sustainable development in Africa demands simultaneous attention to financial probity, social inclusion, historical reckoning, and institutional reform.

We extend our deepest gratitude to all contributing authors for their intellectual rigour and commitment to advancing knowledge that serves African communities. In a world increasingly characterised by complexity and contestation, the role of critical scholarship has never been more vital. This Special Issue intervenes with rigour, compassion, and hope.

Editor

Dr. Nicholas Idris Erameh

Nigerian Institute of International Affairs

Lagos, Nigeria

Email. Eramehnickolas@gmail.com

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UNRAVELLING THE DIMENSIONS OF SECESSIONIST MOVEMENTS IN AFRICA: FOCUS ON AMBAZONIA AND BIAFRA

Kelechi Johnmary Ani

Senior Research Fellow,

School of Public Management, Governance and Public Policy,

University of Johannesburg, South Africa

Kani4christ@gmail.com

Orcid ID: <https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6617-1484>

Abstract

The history of the world is characterized by the emergence of independent states at different times in the global village. While some countries attain their independence relatively peacefully, others engage in years of secessionist struggle in order to achieve their goal. This study used secondary sources to unravel the causes, growth and trends of the Ambazonia as well as Biafran struggle for independence. The study found that the political and economic marginalisation, regional underdevelopment, human insecurity, lack of balance in the federating units that make up Cameroon and Nigeria are the major drivers of secessionism in both countries. The study also reveals that the secessionist agitations have caused massive refugee and migration problems. It has also diverted the attention of some international governmental and non-governmental organisation/ firms from domestic investments in the conflict ravaged secessionist zones while undermining the contributions of those in diaspora towards the development of their communities due to insecurity. The study recommends constitutional amendments, referendum, restructuring and sustainable mediation of international governmental and non-governmental actors in the secessionist debate as the path to sustainable peace in the affected African states.

Keywords: secessionism, armed conflict, protests, Ambazonia, Biafra,

Introduction

The principle of self-determination is inherent in many legal and international instruments (Muharremi, 2008). Article 1 and 55 of the United Nations Charter advocates the principles of equal rights and self-determination of people (United Nations, 2012). Consequently, secessionism is used in many literature from the point of self-determination (Mavric, 2012). Secessionism is therefore agitations from a group of people in order to form a sovereign

(independent) state. Secession is the process in which a group of people, who are bonded by geographical and other values, seek to separate themselves from a sovereign state, where they currently belong and form a new independent state. Secessionism is driven by popular voices of people from a geopolitical area who are out to attain their independence peacefully or violently within a country. When the circle of secessionist struggle is completed, the new independent state would enact her own laws and form a

government, while the parent state remains and amend her constitution in line with the changes that would emerge after the secessionist experience (Mavric, 2012).

In 2016, lawyers, teachers and university students carried a peaceful protests calling for the use of more of English language in official communication within the English speaking regions of Cameroon. Though the country has two official languages: French and English, the use of the French language has dominated the later particularly in the English-speaking regions of Cameroon. The use of French language most often in English-speaking regions of Cameroon has generated much debate in recent years and has developed with other intervening protest factors into what is known as the Ambazonia crisis by citizens of Southern Cameroons, who are calling for the independence.

The principal cause of secessionism in Cameroon and Nigeria are poor quality of governance. The state in both countries are not building sustainable institutions but has continued to tilt towards ethnic, cultural and group interest protection as against ensuring the emancipation of the greater percent of the citizenry. According to Al Jazeera News (2016), thousands of teachers and lawyers have staged a protest in Anglophone Cameroon because they believe they have been marginalised by the Biya government in Cameroon through the imposition of French language on their regional school curriculum and in the courts. History has it that after independence in 1960, Cameroon had ten semi-autonomous administrative regions, out of which eight of the regions are purely

Francophone, while the North and Southwest regions which make up Southern Cameroon or Ambazonia, are home to close to eight million English speakers. Al Jazeera News added that many people living in the Anglophone part of the country, have for long poured out their feelings over the challenges they faced for decades. More often than not, they are excluded from state jobs because of the mere reason that they lacked the French language skills. They also complained that most of the official documents are written and typed in French thereby undermining English language as the second official language of the country and promoting the sense of secessionism in the people who feel deeply marginalized.

However, the contemporary causes of Biafran agitations remains controversial. There is the problem of poor quality of democratic governance in Nigeria as the state tends to undermine its own electoral and other laws in order to protect the elite. The nature of the Nigerian state and its culture of democratic governance promotes elite conspiracy to further marginalise the poor and enrich the accounts of selected few from national commonwealth, which has intensified group grievances, while re-enforcing the secessionist ideology.

Unfortunately, the Nigerian and Cameroonian government's had often adopted a militarised approach to run-down any group that initiate secessionist agitation. Ani (2017) revealed that the post Nigerian Civil War marginalisation of the Igbo led to the compulsory retirement of some Igbo civil servants from the Nigerian public service like Jim Nwobodo and

Cyprian Ekwensi, which made many Ndi Igbo in the employment of the Nigerian government to lose faith in the post-Civil War reconstruction. There was also the economic impoverishment of Ndi Igbo, especially the millions of people that kept their hard earned money in the banks. After the war, the Igbo customers lost their millions and billions of cash deposits in different banks, as each customer were given only 20 pounds irrespective of the glaring documents that showed their huge cash deposits in the banks (Ani, 2017). It forced a number of wealthy men and women, in the People's Club of Nigeria to sell their assets, especially land and buildings, which they re-distributed to their members for them to start their business enterprises, thereby cushioning the frustration and harvest of deaths that followed such loses. The situation was worsened by the declaration of the properties and assets of Igbo people, as abandoned properties in Rivers State. There was also the delay integration and promotion of Igbo soldiers in the Nigerian army after the Nigerian Civil War (Ani, 2017).

Ani (2017) maintain that the massive killing of Igbo people during the Nigerian Civil War and the recurrent mass destruction of Igbo properties since the 1980 ethno-religious conflicts in Northern Nigeria, which was re-enforced by the massive attacks on the lives and properties of Igbo people in Lagos State during the 2023 General Elections has continued to re-enforce the think-home philosophy, championed earlier by Nnewi, Onitsha and Aba businessmen, which is gradually spreading the need for Igbo businessmen to return to their region and build their businesses considering the challenges that Igbo businessmen in

many parts of Nigeria faces in their locations outside their region. This dangerous trend in the Nigerian nation building process is inculcating and promoting the idea of 'Igbo suffering and marginalization' into the psyche of other class of Igbo people. In 1999, Ralph Uwazurike, the Indian trained lawyer formed the Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB), while the years that followed witnessed Nnamdi Kanu's formation and transformation of the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) in 2014. Kanu used the Radio Biafra, which he started in London in 2009 to galvanise massive criticism against the Nigerian government and popularise his Biafran agitations. Immediately, President Buhammadu Buhari took over the mantle of leadership, Kanu was arrested in October, 2015 and detained without trial for one year and six months (Bybee, 2017). The years that followed witnessed the mass incarceration of thousands of IPOB members. It was these factors that lent much support to the resurgence of agitations by MASSOB and later IPOB for secession and the independence of the Biafran State.

The study therefore investigates the multiple dynamics of bad governance in particular reference to the sense of group marginalization and the multiple dynamics of negative and positive implications that secessionist agitations drive in the Cameroonian and Nigerian states. The role of the political elite in the secessionist development and its violent as well as international implications on the states affected were advanced in this study. The Ambazonian and Biafran secessionist associations were badly stereotyped within Cameroon and Nigeria by the

political elite who would remain threatened politically and economically by any idea of break-up of the parent state. When their agitations and criticism against good governance and marginalisation of the poor in Nigeria and Cameroon reached a crisis level due to the opposition from state; lives and properties were lost, while national image and development were undermined.

Theoretical Framework and Methodology

This study adopts the remedial right theory. Buchanan (1997) in the theory maintains that secession can be attained through two ways. The first is the moral reasoning about the conditions for an entity to have the right to secede, irrespective of whatever institutional or legal requirements inherent in the state. Buchanan (2004) argued that when citizen's rights are permanently violated, and territory illegally annexed by foreign or domestic forces and group autonomy within a country is violated, then secession becomes morally permissible. The above, except illegal territorial annexation has been the lot of the people living in Biafra and Ambazonia. The situation is worsened when the governments of Cameroon and Nigeria are known to notoriously ignore the essential interest of the majority (Birch, 1984). They neglect the need for social amenities by the poor masses and increasingly send their children and relatives abroad for educational and other healthcare management. The second way according to Buchanan (1997) is the existence of legitimate criteria for secession within the framework of international institutions. That legitimate criteria for secession must be

a "morally defensible system of international law" (Buchanan, 1997:32). Buchanan (2003) went on to argue that considering that states prevent secessionist agitations, the second path to independence is of greater significance.

The United Nations Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1994) have it that all peoples have the right to self-determination (United Nations, 1997). Ironically, the above rights to self-determination was actually granted traditionally to the colonial territories. That was the idea of some scholars, who argue that in international literature, self-determination is only limited to colonies or decolonisation process (Kemoklidze, 2009:123-124; Muharremi, 2008:416). For them, the United Nations General Assembly (1970) use of people is interpreted as colonised people, thus contemporary international law denies minority groups of the right to unilateral secession (Muharremi, 2008: 416-417). However, that position of limiting the argument to colonized people is not correct. The United Nations General Assembly (1970:123-124) had it that "every state has the duty to promote through joint and separate action, realisation of the principles of equal rights and self-determination of peoples". However, the truth remains that the denial of rights to secession is also noticeable in the constitution of many countries including Nigeria and Cameroon, which places secessionist groups on the path of violent demonstrations, protests and call for referendum while branding secessionists as terrorists like the Nigerian government has done.

This study is developed using secondary materials from academic literature. Writings on secessionism, self-determination and the changing nature of Ambazonian and Biafran agitations were sourced, analyzed as well as interpreted and the findings presented thematically.

Violent Political Posture and Secessionist Agitations

Self-determination struggle is at the heart of conflict manifestations in many parts of the world (Rabbit, 2006:185). Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research (2011) used their conflict barometer to reveal that conflict has escalated in 73 percent of secessionist agitations in the globe. The escalation of conflict and the increasing demands for secessionism in Africa, in many cases, are rooted on the negative character of the state in the affected countries. When the state begins to neglect the needs of the masses and threatens those that raises alarm over their bad policies and governance culture, resistance and secessionist orientations begins to evolve.

The Nigerian political elite over the years have engaged in politics of impoverishing the masses. In Cameroon, it is more of democratization of dis-empowerment and sit tight leadership. Thus, it is the political behaviour and anti-good governance disposition of the political elite in both states that have institutionalised and sustained the factors that engineered Ambazonian and Biafran secessionist agitations. The degree of political insensitivity of the Cameroonian and Nigerian ruling elite, especially to the growing insecurity of lives and properties made them to increasingly loose legitimacy, while

promoting the increasing support for the Ambazonian boys and Nnamdi Kanu's IPOB, because the open criticisms against the government from the agitated groups, will easily receive public opinion support from many of the masses, who are already suffering from different forms of negligence.

Bybee (2017) reveals that while Kanu was imprisoned, Amnesty International reported on the deadly repression of pro-Biafra activists by Nigerian security forces, who killed 150 activists between August 2015 and August 2016. It is part of the Nigerian historical and nation building records that in early September, 2017, the Nigerian military invaded the roads, communities and cities across Igboland in what is popularly known as Operation Python Dance (Egwu Eke). That operation led to mass intimidation, mass killings, and societal militarization that is comparable to declaration of war and unlimited human rights abuses as revealed from the videos that were released across different Igbo communities at that time. Consequently, on 14th September, 2017, the military successfully invaded the family home of Nnamdi Kanu, where they kidnapped and shot many human beings. It is also in the same manner that the Cameroonian security agencies captured and incarcerated the leaders of Ambazonia agitations. It would be stated that the abduction of Nnamdi Kanu in Kenya and the incarceration, a fate suffered by the leader of Ambazonia, moved the agitations from the hands of gentle and civilized peace loving individuals to the hands of mafia networks who then took arms in Nigeria as Eastern Security Network and Unknown Gunmen. This group declares every Monday sit at home.

They also declares every day that Nnamdi Kanu will appear in court as sit at home. The danger of the declaration is that hundreds of people have been sentenced to the great beyond for daring to step out on the days of sit at home. They have also destroyed properties worth billions of naira. The same situation is obtainable in Cameroon where the Ambazonian militia has taken over many parts of Anglophone Cameroon and have practically made life uninhabitable there due to the armed conflict between them and the Biya forces in the bid to control the affairs of the territory.

It should be noted that the alleged formation of Biafra Secret Service and Biafra National Guard, which were not registered as vigilante groups under the watch of the Police in their areas of influence is illegal and a threat to national security. Ironically, the action of the military by declaring IPOB as a terrorist organisation can only be defined as an excessive attack on the Igbo civilian population because the military by that action was subverting democratic laws and processes. The weapons that the military accused IPOB member to be carrying and using for their terror operations like stones, Molotov cocktails, machetes and broken bottles among others makes a mockery of the grounds of their accusation (Ani, 2017). The military declaration of IPOB as a terrorist organisation goes against Terrorism (Prevention) Act 2011 (as amended), which stipulated the procedures for the declaration of an organisation a terrorist group.

Thus it is very clear that the Defence Headquarters has no role to play in the declaration of what constitutes a terror

group or not in Nigeria. It is the Attorney General, or National Security Adviser and or the Inspector General of Police in approval of the President who should approach the judge in chambers with an application to proscribe an organisation as a terrorist group. The judge would properly investigate, approve, declare and it will be gazetted. For the avoidance of doubt, President Goodluck Jonathan followed the process to declare Boko Haram and Ansaru terrorist organisations (Ani, 2017). However, in the case of IPOB, the military have to declare the group as terrorist organization before getting the approval of the presidency.

The Nigerian government and their Cameroonian counterparts have continued to deny many of the attacks on the innocent people living in the territories where the secessionist agitations were dominant. This denial of fundamental human rights has manifested in the form of mass imprisonment. Thus, when the Camroonian government and their Federal Government of Nigeria counterparts increasingly uses force to maim, dehumanise and sentence members of the Ambazonian and Biafran agitators to the great beyond, they simply re-enforce negative psychology that sustains arms violence as has been witnessed in parts of Anglophone Cameroon and in Imo State, Nigeria. Nwachukwu (2017) maintains that the continuous detention of Chidiebere Onwudiwe, Benjamin Madubugwu, David Nwawuisi, Bright Chimezie, George Onyeibe and other IPOB members in prison remains a threat to their fundamental human rights.

Similar Trends in Secessionist Agitations

There are a number of trends that has remained consistent in the secessionist agitations of the Ambazonian people and that of Biafra. First the state quickly responded to the secessionist demands with full force. They released their military and police might to arrest and detain the members of the secessionist groups up to their leaders. Those arrested include persons wearing group cloths as well as those who engage in any form of advocacy for them using the electronic media within the Nigerian and Cameroonian sovereign space. Some of those arrested are denied access to basic diets that are necessary to keep them alive. Others that are having health challenges like Nnamdi Kanu are not allowed to access sound medical attention nor their physicians allowed to see them in the prison.

The Cameroonian and Nigerian States have simultaneously unleashed the machinery of the state to repress the voices and behavior of people living in the secessionist areas. This is made manifest in the Python dance by the Nigerian military and the full invasion of communities by the Cameroonian military. The politics of impoverishment in Africa where the political elite in Nigeria and Cameroon respectively, practically enrich themselves to the detriment of the larger population of the masses is a major reason that moves public opinion and behaviors against the government in support of the secessionist. Sometimes, the government willingly dis-empowers the individuals that openly criticizes their policies and activities. The government uses the

strong influence of the state to close down the businesses of opposition politicians and individuals.

The activities of the secessionist groups in a bid to attain their independence has also led to mass killings and destruction of properties by some of the criminals elements amongst the agitators. This criminal elements have resorted to the kidnapping of police, army and other security personnel in retaliation for their members that were arrested by the security agencies. Unfortunately, many of the security personnel that were kidnapped by the militia arms of the secessionists cannot be accounted for in Nigeria and Cameroon. Similarly, they also unleash the same degree of mayhem to the political class and other vocal individuals that have tried to defend the position of the Cameroonian and Nigerian government. There is also the problem of kidnapping for ransom by the criminal elements amongst the activists. They have adopted that additional strategy possibly as a way of increasing their financial sustainability and economic status. Recall that the some member of the groups do not have formal financiers and funder, hence engaging in further criminality as a way of surviving is fundamentally necessary for them to keep their agitations going.

The leadership of Nigeria and Cameroon has exhibited dictatorial behaviors in their governance approach, especially in relations to the secessionist groups. Both are diehard individuals that finds it difficult to change their position on things and issues related to IPOB and Ambazonia. It should also be noted that both secessionist groups use the online media for propaganda and advancement of their position and secessionist dream.

The IPOB people uses the Biafra Radio while the Ambazonians uses *BaretaNews* media. The secessionist groups as well as their activities caused massive migrations from different parts of Nigeria and the whole Anglophone Cameroon.

Differences

Government complicity in the 'disappearance' of Nnamdi Kanu, while Cameroonian Ayuk Tabe remains in Cameroonian prison after been arrested by Nigerian DSS'. Today both Ayuk Tabe and Nnamdi Kanu have been arrested by the Governments of Cameroon and Nigeria. Two of them are undergoing trials by the different provisions of Nigerian and Cameroonian laws.

Secondly, the Ambazonian militias have developed their secessionist agitations into a full-fledged arms struggle unlike the Biafran independence advocacy which is still operating at protest level and not currently fully armed. In Anglophone Cameroon, there is a near-civil war situation between the secessionist and the Ambazonians unlike the situation in Biafra land. The government forces have burnt down villages in different parts of Cameroon where they believe were strongholds of the armed militias while the Nigerian army has not burnt down any village in Biafra land.

The Biafran supporters have protested in many Euro-American states and that was not experienced in that form for Ambazonia. Rather, there is a collective protest by Frenchmen oversees that President Paul Biya should resign and hand over power to another democratically elected person. The argument is that his government has

become autocratic, suffering from dictatorial tendencies and engaging in a sit -tight behavior.

There is the Ambazonian refugee centre in Cross River State, Nigeria for Cameroonians and currently no refugee camp for Biafran displaced persons. However, there was an internally displaced people camp in Ukwu, Nigeria. In the Cameroonian state, many of their regional political elite supported the Ambazonian struggle at the onset unlike that of Igbo political elite who have consistently remained anti Nnamdi Kanu.

It was on September 14, 2017 that the Nigerian government machinery finalised the declaration of IPOB as a terrorist group. Lai Mohammed, the Minister of Information and Culture continually called on the international community to proscribe IPOB, which did not get the needed foreign support. It would be recalled that on March 1, 2017 Justice Binta Nyako of the Federal High Court Abuja threw away all the evidence accusing IPOB as an unlawful organisation on the ground that they are not sufficient. The courageous judgement of Binta Nyako on April 25, 2017, which banned Nnamdi Kanu from speaking to the press or staying with more than ten persons was a threat to Kanu's fundamental right to free association and expression (Nwankwo, 2017).

Sequel to the demonstrations and celebration of the Biafra Day after the release of Nnamdi Kalu from incarceration, the Federal Government of Nigeria used her military force to unleash excessive force on many communities in South Eastern Nigeria. The military confrontation of unarmed demonstrators in different parts of the

South-east, led to the death of over 40 people as well as the arrest of over 50 others (Ojibara, 2016:59).

The massacre of IPOB activists in Ukwa, Abia State as part of the Operation Python Dance (*Egwu Eke*) has been widely criticized by Igbo people of all classes. It will also be recalled that on 14th September, 2017, the Nigerian government unleashed the instrument of their military apparatus on the country-home of the IPOB leader, kidnapping, kidnapping Nnamdi Kanu and dozens of others. Weeks later, the decomposing bodies of alleged IPOB activists were found in the forest of Ukwa West, Abia State. The criticism against the military Operation Python Dance I and II and the mass killings in parts of Igbo land made the military hierarchy to initiate medical service across Biafra, which led to closure of schools, panic and resistance across most Igbo communities. The medical initiative was termed a strategic biological terrorism by millions of educated and non-lettered Igbo men and women, who stated that it was an initiative aimed at total genocide in Igboland. These problems cannot be solved with strong arm or violence but through individual discipline and understanding as well as respect for the law of self-determination as contained in the Article 4 and 5 of the Africa's Charter on Human and Peoples Rights (ACHPR) (Banjul Charter 1987). The Banjul Charter 1987 holds in Article 20 of the charter states that

All peoples shall have the right to existence. They shall have the unquestionable and inalienable right to self-determination. They shall freely determine their political status and shall

pursue their economic and social development according to the policy they have freely chosen. Colonized or oppressed peoples shall have the right to free themselves from the bonds of domination by resorting to any means recognized by the international community.

Conclusion and Recommendations

This study focuses on secessionism in Nigeria and Cameroon. It presents the activities of the Ambazonian and Biafran secessionist groups and how it has undermined nation building processes in both countries. This study posits that the series of secessionist threats in Nigeria and Cameroon has led to insecurity in the affected areas as well as restriction in movement of people and the safety of lives and properties. The study found that the problem in Nigeria and Cameroon is that of the inability of citizens to promote unity in diversity and this has led to the deepening cleavage which has bred and is breeding insurrections and disaffection among the citizens.

Finally, the study recommends that there is need for mediation as against the continuous incarceration of the leaders of the secessionist agitations, which continues to fuel new dimensions of insecurity within Nigeria and Cameroon. The politics of development and peacebuilding should be central political manifesto amongst political parties in the country as developmental transformations within the geospatial environment where the secessionist agitations are taking place will undermine the secessionism. The mediation with the secessionist leaders would bring the secessionists to a discussion table while the peacebuilding and politics of

development will change the marginalization rhetoric in Ambazonia and Biafra. It should be stated that the Nigerian and Cameroonian states should engage in a shift from their

realist posture on the secessionists as well as their advocates and engage them in sustainable dialogue for sustainable peace, unity and national development of their states.

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