

FRAGILE STATE AND THE CHALLENGE OF INSURGENCY IN NIGERIA

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Abstract

Nigeria have continued to navigate into fragility as indexes like; weak state capacity, weak state legitimacy and citizens vulnerability to a range of shocks, indicative of a fragile state, is now a reality as every news item today in Nigeria is on insecurity. Notwithstanding the global comprehensive discourse on fragile states and the danger they pose to the contemporary world order, the efforts of various security agencies to tame the ugly trend, Nigeria have continued to face a multifaceted kidnapping threat. Fragile and conflict prone settings take an immense toll on human capital, consequently producing rancorous series of crisis that have the capability of decreasing lifetime productivity of people's wages and diminish their socioeconomic mobility. The work employs the library research data collecting approach, and data were acquired via secondary sources with fast appraisal assessment. The study, which was based on State Fragility Theory, examined the Nigerian state's vulnerability in the face of rising insurgency threats, with an emphasis on kidnappings in Nigeria from 2015 to 2024. And concludes that, Nigeria is indeed in a state of fragility which have resulted in the existence of ungoverned spaces in Nigeria and non-state actors (kidnappers) are taking advantage of it to entrench themselves deeper in society, as government presence in the space they occupy seems to be non in existence, this is a major contributing factor to the thriving business of kidnappings in Nigeria. The paper therefore, recommends amongst others the substantial investments in small and medium enterprises that are necessary and have the capacity to create jobs in other to upscale economic growth.

Keyword: Fragile State; Kidnapping; Insurgency; Extreme Poverty, State Fragility; Government

Introduction

Despite the comprehensive discourse on fragile states and the danger they pose to the contemporary world order, Nigeria have continued to navigate into fragility as indexes like; weak state capacity, weak state legitimacy

and citizens vulnerability to a range of shocks, indicative of a fragile state, is now a reality as every news item today is on insecurity. Over the years, kidnapping in Nigeria has grown into a protracted, pervasive security threat and fast-paced and multifaceted

criminal enterprise. It is being committed by varied armed groups and criminal gangs operating across the country, on land and at sea, pursuing different agendas and driven by varied motivations such as; political, ideological, financial, social and cultural.

A cursory look at the topic fragile state and insurgency may suggest a less than serious relationship between the two concepts. However, a critical analysis of the same topic (state fragility and insurgency) reveals a serious correlation amongst the two concept such that actions from one trigger reactions or serious consequences from the other. These actions and reactions are the focus of this study. There is no universally accepted definition of a fragile state, but there are obvious characteristics that can be used as a bench mark to conclude that a state is fragile. These include but not limited to; institutions of state are frail or lack stability, there is obvious extreme poverty, frequent violence, and unpredictability politically. According to World Bank Report, cited in Oseghale, (2024):

“A fragile state is a low-income country characterized by weak state capacity and/or weak state legitimacy leaving citizens vulnerable to a range of shocks. The World Bank, for example, deems a country to be ‘fragile’ if it (a) is eligible for assistance (i.e., a grant) from the International Development Association (IDA) (b) has had a UN peacekeeping mission in the last three years, and (c) has received a ‘governance’ score of less than 3.2 (as per the Country Performance and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) index of The World Bank).”

The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) sees fragile state as the mixture of exposure to risk and inadequate coping ability of the states, and communities to manage, absorb or mitigate those threats. Fragility can lead to negative outcomes including violence, the breakdown of institutions, displacement, humanitarian crises or other emergencies, (OECD 2018:1). The common denominator in all of these definitions is that, a fragile state is that state that has practically failed to perform basic fundamental functions of a sovereign state, like; provision of security and welfare to the citizenry, social services and rule of law.

Fragile nations pose a threat. Their chaotic settings breed instability across borders, create safe havens for terrorists, jeopardise access to natural resources, and condemn millions to poverty. However, Western attempts to transform these troubled areas have seldom resulted in improved outcomes. Kaplan (2008) contends that in order to avoid repeating the carnage and disasters seen in Iraq, Bosnia, and the Congo, the West must reconsider its approach to fragile states and begin assisting their peoples in establishing governments and states that are appropriate for the local landscape. Fixing Fragile States exposes the fatal flaws in current policies and explains why the only way to give these countries a chance for peace and prosperity is to reconsider how development works. Defective governance systems, not corrupt

bureaucrats or armed militias, they are the tumors that consume weak governments.

The solution, therefore, is not to send more assistance or peacekeepers, but to rebuild political, economic, and legal frameworks in order to utilise local traditions, overcome political fragmentation, enhance governance capacities, and catalysis business investment. The international community's efforts to help fragile governments such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sudan, Bolivia, Somalia, and Iraq have failed to address the underlying issues of political illegitimacy and bad governance. Factors such as colonialism have cut states apart from their environments, governments, and populations, limiting their capacity to harness their history, customs, social capital, and conventional governing capacities. These techniques have the potential to damage the state-society relationship (Kaplan 2008; Seyoum, 2024).

Insurgency on the other hand is a condition of revolt by individuals or groups against a government, which is the rising up against what is believed to be a constituted or legitimate authority. The term "insurgency" is not an organised revolution and is not recognised as war. It is used to describe an unlawful movement or action capable of posing a threat to a state or seen as such by another authority, particularly once viewed from the framework of its not being authorised, and therefore seen as an illegitimate

cause or actions.

According to Onwuah, et al., (2017) citing Powell and Abraham (2006) sees insurgency as a violent move by a person or group of persons to resist or oppose the implementation of law or running of government or revolt against constituted authority of the state or of taking part in insurrection. The perpetrators of insurgency are often gangs of bandits taking advantage of inadequate policing and the easy availability of firearms, which are evidence of state fragility. The banditry violence, obviously unconnected to the Boko Haram insurgency in the northeast, began as a farmer-herder conflict in 2011 and intensified between 2017–2018 to include cattle rustling, kidnapping for ransom, sexual violence and killings (Muvunyi, 2021).

The above understanding of both concept shows an obvious nexus between them (fragile state and insurgency), which is that a fragile state is a low-income country regarded as having a weak state capacity and or weak state legitimacy thereby leaving citizens vulnerable to a range of shocks. These shocks epitomize by insurgency in Nigeria have become an endemic social ill taking its toll on all categories of members of the Nigerian state as terror has been unleashed on Nigerians, as daily news have indicated, with a corresponding prevalence on the various classes of people in the society; rich and poor; young and old; male and female; Indigenes and foreigners. This

condition of insurgency, which is as a result of the fragility of the Nigeria state, poses a serious security challenge to national integration and it is enthroned through the perpetuation of cattle rustling, arm robbing, kidnappings, terrorism and other deviance behaviour. This paper therefore, seek to interrogate the fragility of the Nigeria state vis a vis the raising challenges of insurgency, focusing on kidnappings from 2015 to 2024, in Nigeria.

Literature Review

A fragile state is significantly vulnerable to crisis in one or more of its sub-systems. It is a state that is principally susceptible to internal and external shocks and domestic and international conflicts. In a fragile state, there is life-threatening factionalism or expressively disjointed security organisations. In fragile states, constitutional institutional arrangements are exposed to challenges by rival institutional systems, be they derived from traditional authorities, devised by communities under conditions of stress that see little of the state (in terms of security, development or welfare), or be they derived from warlords, or other non-state power brokers.

The opposite of a "fragile state" is a "stable state" one where dominant or statutory institutional arrangements appear able to withstand internal and external shocks and contestation remains countries such as Mozambique and Burundi have so far demonstrated a remarkable turn-

around within the boundaries of reigning institutional arrangements, (CPIA, 2014). With the right conditions like prudent management of available resources some of the challenges of these countries falling behind can be manage to growth, international spotlight must be kept on countries where the Millennium Development Goals are hardest to achieve, using common principles for action; making the international aid architecture more rational; improving the organisational response of the wide range of actors involved, including the "3Ds" diplomacy, defence and development; and measuring results. (CPIA, 2014).

Features of A Fragile State and Insurgency

Fragility refers to feeble or deteriorating structures and to situations where the social bond is fragmented as a result of the State's inability or unwillingness to deal with its basic functions of state, meet its responsibilities regarding service delivery, management of resources, rule of law, impartial access to power, security and safety of the populace and protection and promotion of citizens' rights and freedoms, (CPIA Report, 2017).

Still on CPIA, many countries are making headway in the direction of achieving the Millennium Development Goals; "a group of 35 to 50 countries (depending on the measure used) are falling behind. It is estimated that out of the world's seven billion people, 26% live in fragile

states, and this is where one-third of all people surviving on less than US\$1.25 per day live, half of the world's children who die before the age of five, and one-third of maternal deaths occur” (CPIA Report, 2017). In addition to falling behind, the gap with other developing countries is widening since the 1970s. In 2006, per capita GDP grew only at 2% in fragile states, whereas it reached 6% in other low-income countries, World Bank, (2008).

Predictions show that, fragile states will constitute an even larger share of low-income countries in the future given that many better performing low-income countries graduate to middle-income status. This is a major challenge for development efforts and it has been argued by the Overseas Development Institute that fragile states require essentially different methods from the development models exercised in more resilient countries, because of the different perspective of threat that confront them. The impact and effect of climate change is on land, air and water and these are basically the sum total of our environment, which is defined as the aggregate of land, water and air, their relationship among themselves and also with human beings and other living organism and properties (CPIA, 2017; Oseghale, 2024).

Insurgency according to the United States Department of Defense is seen as an organised movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict (DOD, 2007). The

threats of insurgency have intensified in Nigeria and have attracted global attention in recent times. On the other hand, not all rebellions are insurgencies. A rebellion may not be viewed as an insurgency if a state of war exists between one or more sovereign states and rebel forces, even if the revolt takes the form of armed rebellion. Internal security has been significantly weakened by violent activities of civilian-in-arms against the Nigerian State.

Muvunyi, (2021, p. 1) assert “Abductions have become more indiscriminate across northern Nigeria as local criminal gangs view victims as a source of income, and the villagers, who have been ignored by the government, as disposable.” The problem of ungoverned spaces in Nigeria as a result of its fragility has become more pronounced in urban centres, and non-state actors are taking advantage of these gaps to entrench themselves deeper in society, this is a major contributing factor to the thriving business of kidnappings in Nigeria. There are many signs that government efforts to fight criminality, kidnapping and rebel activity are not producing results as result of weak state capacity, which the World Bank observes as an indicator of state fragility.

Nexus Between Fragile State And Insurgency

Political, social and economic costs of Insecurity are huge, as depriving people of a life free of fear and want and diminishing their trust towards

state institutions are the hallmark. According to the World Bank, by 2030, 62% of the global poor will live in fragile and conflict-affected states. People in these states are twice as likely to be undernourished as those living in other developing countries, while their children are twice more likely to die before the age of five. The world is experiencing a tipping point in its fight against poverty, now exacerbated by the shock of the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic that endangers the modest progress fragile environments had made towards achieving the ambitions of Agenda 2030 where poverty will be history.

By 2022, more than half of the world's people living in extreme poverty will be living in fragile states, according to projections by World Data Lab. There are currently 39 fragile states that the World Bank classifies as "countries with high levels of institutional and social fragility" and "affected by violent conflict." They are home to almost 1 billion people, 335 millions of which lived in extreme poverty in 2020. Projections by the World Data Lab's World Poverty Clock suggest that by 2030, there will be 359 million people living in extreme poverty in today's fragile states; representing 63 percent of the world's poor. This means that while most stable countries can anticipate the end of extreme poverty, more than a third of the population in fragile states will live in extreme poverty.

According to Jasmin, et al., (2021)

Nigeria is part of a broader region that is being subjected to significant levels of conflict, fragility, and poverty. Seven out of 10 Sahel countries are currently classified as fragile (Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Chad, Sudan, Nigeria, Eritrea), and these seven countries alone are expected to account for 26 percent (147 million) of the total extreme poor in 2030, while the non-fragile Sahel countries add an infinitesimal figure of 2.6 million to that balance. Following Nigeria is Sudan with 8 million, Chad 7.7 million, and Mali 6.9 million as the Sahel countries projected to be with highest extreme poverty in 2030. Jasmin, et al., (2021) further emphasized that, by 2030, non-fragile states will move slowly and closer to a reality where extreme poverty will be history, however fragile states will have more people in extreme poverty than ever before.

This vulnerability in fragile states has long-term consequences. Fragile states, therefore, need to be a priority not just in the humanitarian context, but also for longer-term development. The concentration of poverty in just a few pockets may otherwise lead to a spiraling effect and something one may call a self-reinforcing tendency that keeps the country away from any hope of stability. Moreover, high poverty rate increases the risk of conflict, putting fragile states at increased risk of conflict deterioration. As lack of access to basic services, representation, weak and unaccountable institutions, socioeconomic exclusion, create fertile

ground for violent conflict, organised crime and increased irregular migration flows. To break the vicious circle of conflict and low development, Nigeria government need to adopt a different development approach, by putting security at the top of its agenda.

Statistics of Fragile States

The 2017 yearly Fragile States Index report shows that Finland has continue to sustain its position as the world most fragile Free State while South Sudan return to the number one position on fragile States index, a look at the 2016 report as against that of 2017 the case of Mexico, Turkey and Ethiopia have grown from bad to worse, even that of developed countries like United Kingdom and United States has also show sign of worsening this could be attributed to the 2016 acrimonious election campaigns, a red alert has been raised for Senegal and South Africa, (FSI, 2017). Fragile States Index (FSI) relying on economic, social, and political indicators use in computing pressures experience by countries has assessed 178 countries in the past thirteen years based on a system that is called “CAST conflict assessment framework” a System developed by policymakers centuries ago, the data collected through this process which is from over 50 million data points are quantitatively and qualitatively analyzed (Oseghale, 2024).

Nigeria is among the furthestmost fragile states in the world, the report of fund for peace which painstakingly looks at many African countries as less

stable due to their “social, political, economic and demographic vulnerability.” The global attention to ending poverty needs to focus on fragile states, as speaking geographically; poverty is progressively more intense in Africa. Therefore, ending poverty the world over successfully, will to a great extends depend on African fragile states. The World Data Lab projects that by 2024, over 500 million people in fragile nations would be living in extreme poverty. This demonstrates the persistence of poverty and the difficulty that these countries confront in fulfilling their sustainable development goals. The estimates take into account ongoing wars, the effects of climate change, and economic recovery patterns following COVID-19, all of which have disproportionately impacted fragile nations.

Finally, the World Data Lab predicts that nearly 500 million people in unstable nations will be living in extreme poverty by 2024. Nigeria is indeed projected to be part of the alarming statistics regarding extreme poverty in fragile states. According to reports, millions of Nigerians are living in terrible poverty, with some putting the figure at more than 80 million. Given current tendencies in economic growth and social stability, or lack thereof, Nigeria's problems are expected to persist or deteriorate. Because of its fragile state status, Nigeria is expected to continue to have significant levels of poverty in 2024. Inadequate infrastructure, restricted

access to education and healthcare, and population expansion create economic inequality (Onah, et al., 2024).

And by the projection of 2030, five fragile states in the top 10 and the top 2 will both be states that are currently experiencing fragility and conflict: Nigeria and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). These two countries will represent one-third of total extreme poverty by 2030 as the number of the extreme poor persons in both countries is projected to grow from the current 152 million to 178 million. This is more than the total increase among all other fragile states combined. That fragile poor states tend to have higher fertility rates than stable countries are not an overemphasis, as they also have a higher share of children living in poverty.

The data model used by the World Poverty Clock makes it possible to disaggregate poverty by age, and it shows that, for example, half of Nigeria's 90 million people are living in extreme poverty, and most are children under 15 years of age. Equivalently, almost half of Nigeria's 105 million children live in extreme poverty. These are ratios apparent in most fragile states (Hoogeveen, & Pape, 2020). State fragility is one of the main obstacles to effective, justifiable determinations to combat poverty. Merely few of the over 40 fragile states in the world are expected to achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) by the target date of 2030, according to MDG Report, around 1.5 billion people live

in fragile countries and regions, they are among the world poorest and often they suffer doubly: from poverty and from the impact of violent conflicts.

Statistics of Insurgency (Kidnappings) In Nigeria

The roots of kidnapping, which is now a re-occurring phenomenon in Nigeria, can be traced to abductions by Niger Delta militants in the early 2000s. Where militants kidnaping foreign oil workers and use them as bargaining chips to draw international attention to environmental degradation and underdevelopment in oil-producing communities as well as for their economic benefit. However, over time, the practices have due to the fragility of the Nigeria state have become increasingly monetised. Oil companies desperate to secure the release of their staff, were quick to pay substantial ransoms. The lucrative trend kidnapping had become, warranted militants to migrate from kidnapping oil workers to kidnapping local politicians, their relatives or other influential individuals. The ransoms kidnappers collect is believed to have been used in the purchase of arms and ammunition. In terms of geographic prevalence, kidnapping for ransom and extortion, which have become pervasive across all parts of Nigeria by criminal groups, including on roads, has been the most widespread manifestation of the crime (Assanvo, & Okereke, 2019).

The brain behind of the abduction of more than 300 students in Katsina state in December, Auwalu Daudaw was

recently pardoned by the governor of Zamfara state after he "repented" and handed over his weapons to the government. Auwalu Daudawa and his gang were promised accommodation in the town by Governor Matawalle, along with assistance to improve their livelihoods. In July last year, Mr Matawalle promised bandits two cows for every AK-47 gun they surrendered. The payment of ransom to kidnappers rather than solving the problem of kidnapping have compounded it, as depicted by the action of the same Auwalu Daudawa, who later went back to continue his stock in trade (kidnapping) after collecting the ransom. Prompting, Mr. President Muhammadu Buhari to insinuate that state governors was fuelling the crisis of kidnapping.

As according to him, in his verified twitter handle Muhammadu Buhari (@MBuhari) February 26, 2021 said: "State Governments must review their policy of rewarding bandits with money and vehicles. Such a policy has the potential to backfire with disastrous consequences. States and Local Governments must also play their part by being proactive in improving security in and around schools." The ungoverned territory Auwalu Daudawa has pre-superintended over has however heave-a-sign of relief as he was killed in the act on April 2021 (Nduka, 2021).

As indices indicative of a fragile state becomes much more evident in Nigeria, insurgency (kidnappings) is also glowing at an alarming rate, as

unmistakable kidnappings in many parts of the Nigeria, appears to have become a business, especially for otherwise unemployed youth. SB Morgen, relying on its own countrywide network of researchers, expresses concern that kidnapping will increase as result of the effects of coronavirus and the fall in oil prices, thereby putting more people out of work. The report of SB Morgen, 2020 shows that, over time, the pool of possible victims of kidnappings in Nigeria have greatly expanded, as victims are now often poor villagers, whom sometimes are kidnapped indiscriminately, a clear departure from the targeted kidnapping of wealthy people. These poor people struggle to pay ransoms quickly because of their relative poverty, as they are more likely to be killed. The report also presents a valuable attempt to quantify the costs of kidnapping and to map its spread. Between 2011 and 2020, it concludes that over \$18 million had been paid in ransom.

The amount of ransom accelerated in the latter portion of that period: between 2016 and 2020, of this period around \$11 million was paid out. It shows that kidnapping has spread from the oil area to the entire country and that the reality on ground now is the Nigeria army is now stationed is almost every part of the states, essentially to keep order, with the exceptions of Kebbi state and the Federal Capital Territory of Abuja (SB Morgen, 2020). In 2015, according to the Nigeria Police Force reported in 886 kidnappings, about 630 people

were reportedly abducted between May 2016 and May 2017. A recent Bulwark Intelligence threat analysis indicated that kidnapping figures remained relatively stable in 2017 and 2018. While the abduction of foreigners attracts much attention, the great majority of kidnapping victims are Nigerian nationals.

Since December, more than 600 students have been abducted from schools in north-west Nigeria, highlighting a worrying development in the country's kidnap-for-ransom crisis, according to the Global Terrorism Index released on 27 November 2020. Since December 2020, gangs of bandits seeking lucrative ransom have kidnapped a total of 769 students from their boarding schools and other educational facilities across northern Nigeria in at least five separate incidents. At least 1,606 people were killed in 125 fatal incidents, an average of 13 per incident, suggesting that Nigeria is the third-most terrorised countries in the world,

Nigeria has seen a surge in insurgency and kidnappings since 2014, with over 1,680 students abducted since 2014. This has resulted in a decrease in school attendance, with one in every three Nigerian youngsters not attending school. Travellers, merchants, clerics, and anyone believed to be wealthy have all been targeted as a result of the crisis. Kidnapping has developed a sub-economy, with abductors collecting millions of naira in ransom payments.

Social media is flooded with public demands for donations to buy the release of kidnapped family and acquaintances. According to SBM Intelligence, there have been 735 mass abductions in Nigeria since 2019, with 3,620 persons seized in 582 incidents between July 2022 and June 2023 (Ewang, 2024; Pelumi 2024).

According to the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project, bandit gang operations surged by 731% between 2018 and 2022, with about 13,485 banditry-related deaths between January 2010 and May 2023. In January 2024, Ajayi (2024) said that gunmen on the Lagos-Ibadan corridor kidnapped politicians. The same month, gunmen assassinated two traditional rulers in Ekiti state. Bandits kidnapped seven people and murdered another on the Sagamu-Ijebu-Ode motorway in May 2024. It's just the third month of the year and Nigeria has had more mass abduction victims than it did in 2019 and 2020 combined. This was disclosed in an intelligence report published by SB Morgen Intelligence, an international security intelligence-gathering firm, on Wednesday. According to the report, there have been 68 mass abductions in 2024, with 1,867 victims.

However, of the 78 mass abduction incidents in the 24 months of 2019 and 2020, there were only 1,301 victims. Furthermore, the victim count in just three months has surpassed half of the figure recorded in the 12 months of 2021. According to the report, Nigeria has seen a significant increase in mass

abductions since 2019, with at least 735 incidents and over 15,398 victims. Kaduna was reported to lead with 132 incidents and 3,969 victims, followed by Zamfara and Katsina (Akinmoyeje, 2024).

Hostage-taking in Nigeria dates back to the 1990s in the Niger Delta, where the majority of the country's oil is produced, perpetrators are now targeting socially vulnerable groups like as children and women in order to provoke public outrage and press their demands for ransom payments or the release of their incarcerated gang members. When a ransom is requested, it is assumed that the victims' family or the government would pay it, and delays or nonpayment can be lethal. The Nigerian government has said it does not negotiate with terrorists in dealing with the security crisis, but experts say this may not be true. State governments have heard and seen some state governments negotiating with these groups and bandits, which has only emboldened the criminals (Ewang, 2024; Pelumi 2024)

Theoretical Framework of Analysis

Fragile states are defined by poor governance, a lack of political stability, and insufficient provision of essential services. In Nigeria, insurgency presents significant obstacles owing to socioeconomic concerns, ethnic diversity, and historical grievances. The State Fragility Theory was explored for this study because it provides a complete framework for analyzing the issues that Nigeria faces as a fragile state

dealing with insurgency. The foundation of State Fragility Theory is that states can display variable degrees of fragility, defined as inadequacies in three basic functions: state authority, state capacity, and state legitimacy.

This theory proposed that, a fragile state struggles to retain control over violence inside its borders (authority), fails to deliver critical public services to its inhabitants (capacity), and lacks the permission or support of its citizens for governance (legitimacy). The idea emphasizes that these dimensions are interrelated, with shortcomings in one area exacerbating inadequacies in others, resulting in a cycle of instability and dysfunction. The notion of state fragility theory evolved in the 1990s, notably after the Cold War ended, when many nations experienced substantial instability and dysfunction. Researchers such as Jörn Grävingholt, Sebastian Ziaja, and Merle Kreibaum developed and conceptualised fragile states theory (Grävingholt, et al., 2015; Asylbek kyzy, et al., 2023).

Nigeria's weak governance, which includes corruption, incompetent law enforcement, and insufficient public administration, jeopardises the country's capacity to respond effectively to insurgency threats. The country's roughly over 250 ethnic and varied religions groups frequently cause tensions and disputes, which insurgent organisations use to gather support to execute their acts. Poverty and unemployment provide ideal ground for recruitment into insurgent

organisations, while past injustices such as colonialism, military domination, and marginalisation have instilled animosity in many areas.

The difficulty of insurgency in Nigeria may be viewed through a variety of lenses, including Boko Haram's ideology, militia organisations such as the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB), the government's harsh military reaction, and international implications. Nigeria's open borders with neighbouring nations encourage arms trafficking and insurgency mobility between areas, complicating containment operations. Understanding conflict patterns in Nigeria is critical for resolving insurgency-related concerns. While state fragility theory provides valuable insights into understanding the challenges faced by certain countries, State fragility theory like every known theory has been subject to various criticisms, primarily focusing on its conceptualization, measurement, and implications for policy.

Methodology

The methodology which is mainly qualitative uses the library research data collection method as data were collected using secondary sources with rapid appraisal assessment, focuses on books, articles from libraries and online source which helps in the explanation of concept such as state fragility and insurgency. These works were analysed to extract points made by different authors that argue for or against state fragility and insurgency.

Discussion

Report shows that for the past 20 years financial support to fragile states has doubled. Donor countries have recognised that fragility contribute greatly to poverty and insecurity in the country concerned. Switzerland is also increasingly engaged in fragile countries and regions and has made her involvement part of its international cooperation strategy for 2013–2016. (Millennium Development, Goals, Report, 2020). The new Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) report takes this direction, to form a universal understanding of fragility which goes beyond fragile and conflict-affected states.

The timing of the report is deliberate. It will add a voice to the finalization of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), 2030 the new proposed date of SDG, the 16th specifically aims to reduce violence of all forms. All countries, not only those traditionally considered “fragile”, will be expected to meet targets for this goal. According to World Bank (2011) “World Development Report” fragile states are twice as likely to be affected by malnutrition and infant mortality as other developing countries. Moreover, it is three times more likely that children in these countries will be unable to attend school and twice as likely that the population will have no access to clean drinking water.

Fragility, poverty and violence thus form a vicious circle, when state structures are weak and it is no longer

likely to guarantee basic social, economic and legal services or security, conflicts often intensify. Nevertheless, this vicious circle can be broken through the development of legitimate institutions and an active civil society. The responsibilities of state among others are to effectively cater for the socio-economic needs of the people including the provision security and welfare or, when it fails in its responsibility to the people, the state therefore is automatically calling for alternative to itself. The abysmal failure of successive administrations in Nigeria to address the challenges of poverty, unemployment and inequitable distribution of wealth among ethnic nationalities, which are fallout of state fragility, Boko Haram violence has exposed the fragility of the Nigerian state, this have ultimately resulted into anger, agitation and violent crimes against the Nigerian state by some individuals and group, hence the recent upsurge of insurgency in Nigeria (Usman, & Bashir, 2018).

Fragile and conflict situations impose an enormous encumbrance on human capital, by creating a vicious cycle that lower people's lifetime productivity and earnings thereby reducing socioeconomic mobility of the people. As one in every five people in these fragile and conflict prone countries are at the same time deprived of money, education and basic infrastructure. And in the past 10 years the number of people living in close proximity to conflict has nearly doubled. Therefore, according to the World Bank Group Urgent action is needed in

these countries impacted by fragility, conflict and violence (FCV) so as to put an end to extreme poverty globally. As crisis situations become increasingly prolonged with terrible impacts on people and their economies, prompting the World Bank Group to release an FCV strategy, which for the first time methodically brings a full suite of financing and expertise to address these challenges in both low-and-middle income countries.

The President of the World Bank Group David Malpass, emphasized that there is need to break the cycle of fragility, conflict, and violence to end extreme poverty in those affected countries. And therefore, stress the need to ensure access to basic services, transparent and accountable government institutions, and economic and social inclusion of the most marginalized communities. As according to him these kinds of investments go hand in hand with humanitarian aid. The strategy also highlights a long-term support to help countries transit out of fragility, including private sector solutions, such as scaling-up investments in small and medium enterprises that are vital and capable creating jobs so as to spur or scale up economic growth. The strategy further addresses the cross-border impacts of fragility, conflict and violence FCV, by focusing on the development needs of both refugees and host communities (The World Bank, 2020).

Faced with this challenge of tackling

the root causes of conflict as well as their security and development consequences which is critical for the whole region's stability, the European Union (EU) is working with the Nigerian government, the United Nations and the World Bank Group on a recovery and peacebuilding assessment that have the capacity to tackle poverty, weak institutions, income inequality and a lack of human security by focusing on peacebuilding, strengthening infrastructure and social services, as well as investing in economic recovery. Additionally, a new peacebuilding project financed by the EU Emergency Trust Fund aims to prevent further violence by enhancing community-level conflict management, community reconciliation; women's inclusion and reintegration of former fighters were put in place (Rudischhauser, 2016).

Conclusion

The challenge of insurgency in Nigeria is deeply rooted in the fragility of the state itself. The combination of socio-economic deprivation, political corruption, ethnic divisions, weak institutions, and regional instability creates an environment conducive to insurgency. Addressing these issues requires a comprehensive approach that goes beyond military solutions. The efforts of various security agencies to tame the ugly trend of insurgency notwithstanding, Nigeria have continued to face a multidimensional kidnapping threat. Nigeria indeed is in a state fragility which have resulted in the existence of ungoverned spaces in Nigeria and non-

state actors (kidnappers) are taking advantage of to entrench themselves deeper in society as government presence in the space they occupy seems to be non in existence, this is a major contributing factor to the striving business of kidnappings in Nigeria. Tackling the root causes of conflict as well as their security and development consequences is critical for the stability of Nigeria, to end extreme poverty and break the cycle of fragility, conflict, and violence, countries need to ensure access to basic services, transparent and accountable government institutions, and economic and social inclusion of the most marginalized communities.

Recommendations

The complex relationship between fragile states and insurgency in Nigeria is a time bomb, affecting both states. To address this, policies should be implemented to reduce poverty and unemployment in vulnerable regions, ensure equitable resource distribution, and build community trust. There is a need for peer-review among federating states to learn from progressing economies and enhance training programs for security forces. Cooperation among stakeholders is fundamental for building resilience to state instability. The Nigerian government and aid agencies must put an end to severe poverty, secure access to basic services, and promote economic and social inclusion for marginalised populations. The government's measures to combat crime should be comprehensive, involving accountability, efficiency,

and transparency. Neighbourhood watch organisations and technology can assist monitor neighbourhoods and change plans in response to local input. A diversified strategy is required to handle both urgent security issues and long-term socioeconomic development objectives.

The importance of strengthening and improving governance through anti-corruption measures, as well as increasing public service delivery, cannot be overstated, since these efforts assist re-establish trust in governmental institutions. Engaging local communities in peacebuilding initiatives can increase resistance to extremist ideology by addressing

grievances at the root. Strengthened engagement with neighbouring nations on security issues can assist to reduce cross-border insurgent activity. Investing in education can assist counteract radicalisation and provide opportunities for legitimate jobs to the young people so as not resort to crime and criminality. The government has to boost economic activity by supporting farming and ensuring that Nigerians cultivate and produce what they eat, reducing reliance on imported food. There is a need to give soft loans to small businesses in order to boost the economy and productivity of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.

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